

Papers of Workshops

June 21-25, 1993

LONERGAN WORKSHOP

Volume 10

Dear Bob -

You missed a good one this year!
I hope you enjoy this.

all the best,

Fred & Sue L.

LONERGAN WORKSHOP
Volume 10

edited by
Fred Lawrence

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EDITORIAL NOTE

For the celebration of the twentieth anniversary of the *Loneragan Workshop* our theme is The Legacy of Lonergan.

Lonergan's understanding of mathematics and the sciences generally has only started to be explored and expanded. A leader in doing so is Patrick H. Byrne. His past articles for this journal have featured the link between Lonergan and an appreciation of the methods and contents of modern mathematics and sciences. His development of Boston College's Perspectives IV course, "New Scientific Visions," uses Lonergan to study the evolution of science in terms of the dialectical distinction between 'normative achievement' and propagandistic 'cover story.' Byrne's paper for the present volume addresses the shibboleths about science after Galileo and Newton abandoning Aristotle's 'final causality' by helping us to understand the relationships among Aristotle on final cause, Lonergan on finality, and aspects of modern, especially biological, science.

Through the years, the dean of Lonergan studies, Frederick E. Crowe, SJ, founder of the Lonergan Institute at Regis College in Toronto, has pioneered the exploration of almost every dimension of Lonergan's achievement. At past Lonergan Workshops he has spoken most helpfully on the development of Lonergan's notion of value, and laid out the implications of Lonergan's late thematization of learning's 'way up' and 'way downwards,' especially on the philosophy of education in his Supplementary issue of the *Loneragan Workshop Journal, Old Things and New*. Departing from a striking statement by Lonergan on what he was trying to do in his life's work, Crowe traces in some detail the evolution of Lonergan's efforts to integrate history as both lived and written into theological studies.

For almost a quarter of a century the Chair of Boston College's philosophy department and now Director of BC's Lonergan Institute, Joseph Flanagan, SJ, has been responsible along with my wife Sue and me for the founding and the longevity of the Lonergan Workshop. He also was the instigator of BC's signature programs, Perspectives and PULSE. His past papers have been oriented in an astonishing variety of ways towards 'setting the imaginative conditions' for intellectual conversion, and for making *Insight* one's own. In his paper for this volume, Flanagan compares and contrasts the achievement of the

Lonerger of *Insight* with that of the Lonergan of *Method in Theology* by means of a comparison of both these Lonergans and the Heidegger of *Being and Time*.

Mary Ann Glendon, a specialist in family and comparative law now at the Harvard Law School, was part of the small interdisciplinary team that met weekly for over four years in order to design BC's Perspectives III, a course on the foundations of law, political science, economics, and sociology, 'Horizons in the New Social Sciences,' which was rebaptized 'Foundations of Western Law' at Boston College's Law School. She went on to study Lonergan in a more concentrated way and at length with Fr. Flanagan. Her paper is a ripe fruit of these long years of collaboration; it exposes what might be called the dialectic of contemporary self-understanding in the law.

Glenn Hughes teaches at St. Mary's University in San Antonio. The revised version of his Boston College dissertation, published by the University of Missouri as *Mystery and Myth in the Philosophy of Eric Voegelin*, is a profound and incisive treatment of Voegelin's thought on transcendence that avoids the sometimes obfuscatory jargonizing of much Voegelin and Lonergan scholarship. The same absence of jargonizing marks this lucid essay on transcendence in Lonergan.

Since completing his doctoral work on Newman, Joseph A. Komonchak of Catholic University has been applying Lonergan's thought to the development of a theology of the church, and his past contributions to this journal have been in this vein. More recently he has for some years been working in the functional specialties of interpretation and history in an attempt to find out just what happened to the Roman church at Vatican II. This has taken him into the study of the lives and thought of the thinkers who were the major players at the Council. Thus it is fitting that for this volume on Lonergan's legacy Komonchak uses his learning to locate Lonergan's youthful yet ambitious writings on the philosophy of history within the preconciliar fermentation that exploded in the 1960s and after.

Perhaps best known for the work that issued from his doctoral studies under political theologian Johann Baptist Metz, Matthew L. Lamb has turned from his earlier focus on getting beyond the superficial similarities between the transcendental projects of Lonergan and of Metz's mentor, Karl Rahner, to show how Lonergan's 'meta-(read:post- or anti-Cartesian) method' can be relevant to political theology today. Now concerned with the crisis of Catholic scholarship generally, Lamb uses the opportunity of this volume to suggest how

Lonergan's achievement subverts the conditions in which, as Lamb often puts it, "conservatives don't preserve the tradition and liberals don't advance it," since neither party knows how to mediate in an integral fashion between past and future.

My own paper presents a portion of a constructive effort in political theology. It sets forth a hypothesis linking Lonergan's appropriation of the conversational structure of consciousness implicit in Thomist trinitarian theology with the post-modern foundations of communication as constitutive, pragmatic, and recreational.

For most of its years the Lonergan Workshop has been graced by the presence of Sebastian Moore. People can find in his papers for this journal a kind of itinerary of his thinking during his years in the States at Marquette and at Boston College. The present paper is the fruit of his first year after returning home to Downside Abbey in Britain. It dwells upon the importance of the dramatic pattern of living for spirituality and especially for our appropriation of Christ's saving action.

Philip Rule, SJ, of the College of the Holy Cross, was first exposed to Lonergan's thought as a Jesuit seminarian at West Baden by the likes of Joseph Wulftange, SJ (see Lonergan's acknowledgments in the "Preface" of *Insight*); and he later went on for a degree and a career as a scholar in English, with a special interest in Newman and the English Romantics. This paper, which uses Lonergan's thought to illumine that of both Newman and Coleridge, grew out of Rule's year as a Scholar-in-Residence of Boston College's Jesuit Institute, for which he delivered an earlier version of this paper.

The Chicago Divinity School's David W. Tracy first became well known on account of his book, *The Achievement of Bernard Lonergan*. That book cleared the way for Lonergan's thought in the public sphere and was the centerpiece of the 'first reception' of Lonergan. Now Tracy returns to the theme in light of the post-modern concern for philosophy and theology as, in P. Hadot's phrase, 'spiritual exercises.' Thus Tracy keynotes what surely must be the basis in and relevance for practice of the 'second reception' of Lonergan.

This volume is prefaced by a letter from Wilbur Charles Woodhams, the rector of the American Episcopal church in Rome, St. Paul's Within-the-Walls, on the occasion of the Second Vatican Council. It is reproduced here as a splendid evocation of the mood of the Christian churches at that time, perhaps a harbinger of the spirit that made Lonergan's 'first reception' possible.

This volume is dedicated to a former undergraduate student at Boston College, a Peruvian named Miguel Ferreyros, who was the first among several students to bring a parent, his father, to a summer Workshop. The letters at the beginning of this volume, one from Miguel and a later one from his father, Señor Ferreyros, informing us of Miguel's death, bespeak the Christian spirit served by Lonergan's achievement.

The volume closes with an interview of Lonergan by French Canadian theologian Pierre Robert—a simple and powerful evocation of the spirit that may enliven the 'second reception' of Lonergan to which this volume is dedicated.

Thanks to Anne O'Donnell for help in getting this book out.

FRED LAWRENCE
Boston College

For all the saints ...

Bernard Lonergan, SJ

Luke Dougherty

Miguel Ferreyros

John McKeon

Ronald Nelson

Michael O'Callaghan

Eric O'Connor, SJ

Juan Bazdresch Parada, SJ

Vincent Potter, SJ

Jim Rayburn

Edward 'Ned' Stanton, SJ

William Warthling

Joseph Whelan, SJ

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The Rev. Wilbur Charles Woodhamis

March 26, 1966

St. Paul's Within-the-Walls, Rome.

The general outline of the visit of the Archbishop of Canterbury Dr. Michael Ramsey, to His Holiness Pope Paul VI, on March 23 and 24, you know from press dispatches. As one privileged to be present at their public meetings and the events surrounding them and as witness to the events of the last five years in Rome, I send along some personal observations.

Dr. Ramsey flew into the Rome airport to be greeted by a great throng of Roman dignitaries, headed by Bishop Willebrands, Cardinal Bea's "right hand man" in the Secretariat for Unity, members of the Secretariat and representatives of the Vatican Secretariat of State. The entrance was well planned and the Archbishop burst from the plane door like gorgeous violet ink exploding from a bottle. (He has a *new* purple Canterbury cap in velvet which should be a style-setter!) He was quickly taken to the airport room reserved for greeting special dignitaries and I had the pleasure of handing him a letter of welcome from Bishop Bayne, who is Bishop-in-charge of the American Congregations in Europe. Dr. Ramsey said a few words to the press and television, then off to Rome and the English College (Roman) where he was to be guest of the Vatican. Before the Reformation, the College belonged to the Church of England and has a long and illustrious history — and a group of seminarians any school would be proud to own.

After settling in, Dr. Ramsey received Cardinal Bea, head of the Secretariat for Unity, noted Biblical scholar and the great Roman Catholic figure in the Ecumenical movement. Originally the Pope had wanted to leave the Vatican and call on Dr. Ramsey, but this was vetoed by his advisors who quite rightly felt that a precedent would be established requiring him to call on every head of state who came to see him. This would be impossible, and so it was felt best not to break this ancient precedent. After a warm visit and a cup of tea, Dr. Ramsey came to the new Anglican Center in the beautiful Palazzo Doria, quite near the Piazza Venezia, where in a simple and impressive ceremony witnessed by members of the local committee and their families, mem-

bers of the Secretariat for Unity, and Canon John Findlow, director of the Center and the Archbishop's representative in Rome, he blessed the Center and spoke movingly of its purpose and hopes. The Center will include a library of Anglican theology for the benefit of the many Roman scholars who are constantly seeking knowledge of the Anglican Communion, and will be the home of the Archbishop's representative and the place where some of the projected dialogues will take place. The Archbishop spoke in the small oratory with its beautiful altar of travertine marble which was later given from the alms offered when Dr. Ramsey celebrated the Eucharist at St. Paul's Within-the Walls, the American Episcopal Church in Rome.

Then off to the British Embassy, where a great reception gave all the members of All Saints Church of England and St. Paul's Within-the-Walls churches a chance to greet Dr. Ramsey. Included were guests from Protestant churches in Rome and Roman Catholics who have been particularly interested in the Ecumenical movement — well over 1,000. Dr. Ramsey, the formalities of the "receiving line" over, sat in a comfortable chair in Sir John Ward's (the British Ambassador) library and chatted with the guests who crowded around him. Then he went off to dinner with Her Majesty's Ambassador to the Holy See — and we all went to rest!

Wednesday morning, the Archbishop celebrated at All Saints church — and the contretemps mentioned in the press caused so little commotion that he was not aware of it — then off to the first meeting with a Pope of an Archbishop of Canterbury acting as President of the Communion of Bishops of the Anglican churches all over the world.

The meeting took place, significantly, in the Sistine Chapel. This was to give it a dignity and importance that has not been accorded a visit in centuries. Heads of state are received in the Pope's private library where our then Presiding Bishop Lichtenberger was received in 1961, and Archbishop Fisher had been received in 1960. ... Two golden chairs were placed before the altar which was resplendent in a gold frontal. For the first time, the chairs were at the same level. Always before the Pope has received sitting on a chair slightly raised above the others — a throne. The television lights gave a view of the Sistine frescoes that we had never seen before. I was seated a few feet from the chairs, and ranked on either side of them were the immediate entourages of Rome and Canterbury. Cardinals Tisserant, Bea, Cicognani — the Bishop of Cariboo (and Anglican Executive Officer, Mr. Dean), the Bishop of Ripon. Dr. Moorman, Canons Sutherwaite, Findlow and

Andrews, Dr. Kelley — and in the second Anglican rank, the Bishop of Gibraltar, Archdeacon Douglas Wanstall, Rector of All Saints, and The Rev. Wilbur Charles Woodhams, Rector of St. Paul's Within-the-Walls.

The Pope and the Archbishop had chosen to meet first in an ante-room as they both thought this confrontation should be free of press and television — then together they walked with solemn joy down the red carpeted Sistine Chapel and took their places side by side. By ancient protocol, the visitor speaks first, and so Dr. Ramsey did from his chair at the Pope's left. He spoke in English of their mutual hopes and vision of the Body of Christ — then His Holiness responded in Latin. We all clapped (one does get used to clapping in church), then the entourages and principals formed a procession and went into the tapestry room of the Borgia apartments for the exchange of gifts customary to such an occasion. On one table were the Papal gifts; on another those of the Archbishop. Pope Paul happily showed his to Dr. Ramsey — a beautiful fresco "Head of Christ" from a twelfth-century church, the complete history of the Vatican Councils — about one hundred volumes bound in leather. Then Dr. Ramsey presented his — beautifully bound copies of his own theological writings, a gold pectoral cross and chain especially made by craftsmen at the Canterbury crafts school, a volume on "British Stained Glass." Dr. Dean presented a cross of Canadian jade from Cariboo, Dr. Kelley a volume of his works — we all exchanged greetings with the Pope and off he went. Then the Archbishop was taken in tow by Cardinal Tisserant and that distinguished scholar showed him the treasures of the Vatican Museum, especially those relating to English history. In each section of that fabulous museum we were greeted by the curator and the ancient treasures were displayed. There was the "Codex B" Bible — we turned the pages — Thomas Aquinas' manuscript of the "Summa" in his own hand, the petition of the English nobles to the Pope asking that a divorce be given Henry VIII, Anne Boleyn's letter from the tower, the Gutenberg Bible, the incredibly beautiful illuminated Bibles of earlier centuries — it was a rare feast. But when we got to the library, the eyes of Dr. Ramsey, scholar, showed brightest. After describing the enormous size of the Vatican archives, Cardinal Tisserant went over to a small door at the side of the carefully guarded library stacks and said, "I don't suppose they've opened it." Then he fished an old key case from under his scarlet robes, opened the door and led us into a small oak and book-lined library. "This is my room," he said. "I work here three days a week." Having seen the glory of Vatican treasures, for the first

time there was a note of envy in Dr. Ramsey's voice. "Oh, lucky, lucky man!" he said, and clasped his hands at the wonder of this private, scholar's world. Together, the two scholars looked over several volumes. Then the Cardinal gave us each a Vatican printing of a history of "The Books of the Gospels at the Oecumenical Councils" — and off we all went to the English College for lunch. With a pleasant memory of previous ecumenical gatherings and discussions with students, we joined them for a grand break in Lenten disciplines which one wag described as a "luncheon of seven courses and four Cardinals."

Dr. Ramsey had a few moments to collect himself (we Romans retired for an essential nap) and off he went for a private hour with the Pope who had promised that 'anything' could be discussed. Only Bishop Willebrands and Canon Findlow were present — and they aren't talking. But we do know the general result from their dramatic joint statement issued later and the Archbishop said that he made it clear that the Pope's earlier statement on mixed marriages was far from satisfactory. Rome, since long before Our Lord's time, has awed its visitors — the Emperor's palace rose seven very high stories above the Palatine Hill to amaze those approaching from the Appian Way. One sensed throughout the visit that Dr. Ramsey appreciated this grandeur — and it was really turned on for him — that he was not led by it into "giving the show away," but that he was being led by the Spirit to bring to Rome those great treasures of His which have been entrusted to our Communion. Then the apparently tireless Archbishop was received by Cardinal Bea in the historic Borgia apartments of the Vatican — and again two great Christian scholars had a meeting of the minds. Dr. Ramsey brought greetings in English — really a superb sermon on the nature and hope of the Church — and Cardinal Bea replied in French. The rest of us gawked at the rooms we can't usually see and talked with men of many communions. Included were twenty laymen from St. Paul's Within-the Walls and twenty from All Saints Church — no women. Someone asked a monsignor why the Archbishop was not staying at the Vatican — his reply was: "Why would he want to stay here? I have to sign four books to get out at night and four more to come in!" (He was not at the Vatican — the English College is across the Tiber in old Rome — because he had to be where he could be called upon.)

The reception over, Dr. Ramsey returned to the English College to dine on cold cuts in his room, and rest! Some of us fought our way through Roman eight o'clock traffic to return here to the Rectory for a

meeting of the local committee for the new Anglican Center. (A gift of caviar made it three times in one day for that delicacy and all of us were beginning to feel we had had a surfeit of richness of all kinds!) Discussing finances made it apparent that we still have some unity to discuss within our own Communion. But we sent Bishop Dean off to Jerusalem and the Metropolitan's meeting with some positive suggestions and great hopes for our continuing work here.

Seven-thirty Thursday morning and St. Paul's Within-the-Walls received an Archbishop of Canterbury for the first time! The church was filled, and in its chancel were a Roman bishop and assorted priests as well as our own. Many Roman Catholic priests and seminarians were in the congregation. Wearing the simple white linen Eucharistic vestments, the Archbishop celebrated, singing the Merbecke setting and the hymns "Praise to the Holiest" (343) and 'Pange Lingua' (199). He spoke movingly of the challenge to the church to be one, thanked St. Paul's for the contributions the parish has made to the Anglican mission in Rome over the last five years, and mentioned his hopes for the Anglican Center. We then had a quick breakfast in the Rectory, and a hair-raising escorted ride through Rome's crowded streets, past the Forum and Coliseum, out the Porta Ostiniense to St. Paul's Outside-the Walls, the great basilica built over the site of St. Paul's martyrdom and the church where John XXIII announced the Second Vatican Council and where the Pope had held a service of prayer for the non-Roman Catholic observers at the close of the Council in 1965.

At St. Paul's we were escorted to the red satin-lined reception room and given chairs in a semicircle facing the two golden chairs. There was a wait of twenty minutes before the Pope arrived and we had a chance to see the monastery's prized ninth century codes — beautifully illuminated — and the Archbishop was given a copy of the paintings very well photographed and bound in leather. "Homemade," the Rector told me proudly. It was magnificent. Then came a gift that moved the Archbishop to tears — he was given the white leather breviary used by John XXIII in his last months and which had been on his bedside table when he died. His signature was on the fly-leaf.

Then came the Pope amidst clapping monks who had done the same for Dr. Ramsey — and the two sat side by side and exchanged pleasantries until a table was placed before them and they signed the many copies of their historic statement — English, Latin — copies of each for each. The Pope seemed more open and relaxed than he had in the Sistine Chapel.

Archbishop and Pope leading the way — the Pope very slightly ahead illustrating “first among equals” — they led us out into St. Paul’s basilica, surely one of Christendom’s grandest edifices, open and uncluttered, to face a crowd estimated at ten thousand — anyway, it was a sea of faces and about one thousand of them were “ours” — at least we Anglicans had eight hundred tickets to distribute. (One good Irish lady was heard to remark later, “Wasn’t it awful? All those Protestant faces!”)

There on a platform placed before the high altar the Pope, Bishop of Rome, and the Archbishop of Canterbury took their seats side by side — and on the same level. We were ranked on either side and I was pleased to be next to the Rector of the English College so I could join lustily in singing the Latin *Veni Creator* — a little late. In the front row on the floor of the nave were twenty-six of the leading Cardinals, liberal and conservative. Tisserant, Ottaviani, Cicognani, Bea. Opposite was Dr. Reinhardt, our American Ambassador who with his family had been at the earlier Eucharist. He came as Honorary Senior Warden of St. Paul’s Within-the-Walls — invitations being issued only to “the faithful” and not to diplomats as such.

The service was most moving, beautifully arranged by the members of the Secretariat and Canon Findlow. The Pope opened with prayer in Latin. Then there were prayers in English, lessons in English, then the Archbishop read the prayer for Unity of God’s People from the Book of Common Prayer. The Service was printed in Latin and English. The Pope ended by bidding the Lord’s Prayer, which we said each in his own tongue. The statements were read — first in Latin by Bishop Willebrands, then in English by Bishop Dean. Then Pope and Archbishop exchanged the signed copies which had been put in tubes of white Florentine leather, beautifully embossed, and then “the Kiss of Peace” — which the Italian papers noted as “un abbraccio lungo.” And so it was — and with a warmth and closeness that had not been felt in the Sistine meeting. This to the cheers and clapping of the ten thousand — their presence made it absolutely clear that the Church is its people, not the hierarchy in lone splendor — they walked down the long alley which had been cordoned with strong wooden barriers. People were standing on benches the length of the nave — more than one hundred yards — and wildly joyful. We followed closely to find the forecourt of St. Paul’s also jammed with people. His Holiness turned to show the mosaics to His Grace, then they moved to the gate where they embraced again. One could sense in those two

great men the longing of all Christians to be one in Christ coming to focus with tremendous power. It was not Montini and Ramsey facing one another, but two Communion of the broken Body of Christ — and His healing Presence was there. As I watched from six feet away, I saw the Pope's face working with emotion — he removed his ring and, I suspect, forgetting his English in his excitement — gestured to Dr. Ramsey that he wished to give it to him. With some fumbling he placed it on the Archbishop's fourth finger, next to his ring of Canterbury. Dr. Ramsey was dumbfounded. How fitting it was that the hopes of understanding should be so sealed, as the Pope was wearing the cross given him the day before by Dr. Ramsey. We all moved to the gate through a crowd of people and each of us took the Pope's hand and said good-bye. The guard forced a passage for him to his open limousine and he drove off amid tremendous cheering — as did the Archbishop and his entourage immediately after.

Off went Dr. Ramsey to visit the Secretariat for Unity, a farewell at the English College, and then the three o'clock plane for Geneva and the World Council of Churches. At the airport, he let me photograph the ring, which had been given Cardinal Montini by his people in Milan when he left them to be made Pope — it is a beautiful ring of gold, inset with jade and diamonds. A great crowd of church and diplomatic dignitaries went to the plane to say good-bye to Dr. Ramsey including this "lesser church dignitary" — as the local press put it. We all knew that these three days had brought the Holy Church Catholic into a new era, that we would never be the same complaisant people, that already the Spirit had taken us beyond the promised dialogue and that we could now begin to face the world as the Church, even while our true unity was being realized in mutual concern and common action.

Miguel Ferreyros

May 26, 1986

Lima, Peru

Dear Fred, dear Sue,

There has been a lot going on in my life during the last couple of years: before settling down in Lima, I traveled around several provinces of Peru and then visited friends in Santiago and Buenos Aires.

After this, I had somewhat more knowledge of my country. I had some real Third World experiences during these trips, e.g., in a removed and very impoverished peasant community. I spent a few days appreciating the almost impossibility of education by a government-sent teacher. Peasants prevent their daughters from going to school for more than a couple of years and even boys are not sent to school before they're 8 or 10 years old in the belief that their brains would "water down" ... But I've found that these so different and sometimes "primitive" qualities of the Andean people cannot be understood as just backwardness. They *are* a different, autonomous people with its own culture, semi-integrated and dependent on the coast's western culture. Ignoring this has led historically to arrogant, racist and oppressive behavior by the "civilized white-culture-oriented coast, i.e. Lima," Peruvian, — in the good old Spanish tradition. A series of economic factors, like low agricultural produce prices, erosion and decreasing productivity of the Andean soil, have triggered a centuries old tradition of *ressentiment* and subversion to break out now in the form of organized violence, e.g., as *Sendero Luminoso*.

When I had begun to grasp the nature of the polarized relationship of the two worlds in Peru through direct experience, I started working in sales at a Lima wholesale distributor ...

Before and after I had begun this training program in business, I tried hard to develop contacts and work for people in the "other," the poor Third World sector of the dual economy.

Fred, you helped me contact Henry Nouwen in Boston; he and a Maryknoll friend of mine in Boston, Don Allen, had given me some names of people that worked in the Church and some development institutions in Peru. I started participating in some parish activities and — this was until last year — I made a research project on Peru's

Paper industry for a political economics journal, whose staff needed this study to better advise the national paper industry union ...

It felt rewarding to achieve this work, and yet I know I need to improve my skills in these research fields. I need to turn this sort of work into more of a routine, commit myself more to it and I hope one day to be able to creatively integrate development oriented work into my business career — or the other way around.

However, on and off, a cynical inside voice perforates one, reminding me that this my life project is a naïve dream, innocent of the struggle between the two worlds, of private interests against the common good.

At occasional meetings in parishes, with grassroots groups, or political folks I can almost hear this voice; laughter, reinforcing my sense of not belonging, of being an artificial, already defeated intruder, or maybe just a patronizing helper.

Then again I sometimes drive to work with a feeling that I shouldn't, that I'm betraying the other world. And during the day, an air-conditioned and elegantly decorated office, smiling secretaries and busy (some of them I think just appearing busy, to hide their directionlessness) executives protect me from realizing my isolation from the real world.

And yet, it is starting from this world that I've decided to develop my life's purposefulness and project.

Sometimes I wonder how this project will succeed to prove more than just a fancy rationalization for my choosing a comfortable lifestyle.

Deep inside though, close to the sense of being myself torn between the two worlds, of both of which I am a part, I feel a real drive to help reconcile these contradictory and violent worlds through my work.

Well, in the last couple of years I've also come to realize somewhat more that there's a limit to how much one is and can be responsible for history. I find myself searching and working towards an integrated balance between this sense of external responsibility on the one hand and the development of my talents.

... I guess I've had a strong need to share some of these thoughts with you. In fact more or less around Christmas 1-1/2 years ago I started a letter to you, but it didn't get very far. Now that I reread this letter I realize that I couldn't have written much then (coherently, at least). You can still see probably quite some confusion in this letter,

and maybe more so than I've ever had, but there's a difference and I think it has to do with feeling there's a concrete direction in my life at least for some of the ideas I used to breed both under your independent study guidance ...and after (don't worry, you're not getting any credit for the trouble I get into).

But at the same time, and this is partly causing the confusion, in Peru everything seems overshadowed by the impossibility of the realization of most ideals; be this mine or other people's ideals, expectations, etc.

A sense of frustration and hopelessness seems to permeate people of the different ideologies. Neo-liberals in power until 1985 failed to even get close to implementing successfully their policies. The present social democratic APRA government has managed under Alan García to mobilize public opinion in its favor with some short-lived successes (as inflation plummeted at first).

But the basic limitations continue; just to mention two: First the external economic constraint on the government limiting its ability to invest in development. Second the illegitimacy (as Weber would say) and inefficiency of bureaucracy both public and private. Human rights abuses by police and corruption of government officials thrive as ever.

Inefficiency in both choosing what to invest in and how to carry it out is something that I see at work too. A week ago I started a new job in a pharmaceutical industrial plant. Fortunately I already found space for interesting work there, i.e. an import substitution project, which I'm making a financial evaluation on ...

If I don't close this letter now I'll move onto international politics and then it'll never get mailed — with all that's been going on lately. Maybe in the next letter or else even in person.

I'm planning to move to the New York - Boston - Amherst area towards the end of this year, to decide on a graduate program, take the exams, etc. To start in fall 1987. If I don't find an interdisciplinary program I'm thinking of doing an MBA first and later a development economics program maybe in Latin America.

I look forward to hearing how you're doing.

All the best,

Your Miguel

p.s. Before sending this off I was reading through some of "The Human Good and Christian Conversation." I found some quite meaningful ideas, e.g. in the section on the Waves of Modernity. Overall it made

me feel challenged to study philosophy and to become more methodological in my work, essays (and letters).

Oh, by the way, the Bishop of Lewes, Peter, wrote me he might come to Peru for a visit later this year. From his letters I can tell he might need a vacation. He's so full-heartedly involved in his work, e.g. "caring and sharing" which still encounters a lot of obstacles from English materialistic, consumerist society.

Alfredo Ferreyros

May 8, 1992

Lima, Peru.

On an announcement of the June Lonergan Workshop, I had read your kind lines inquiring about our well-being here in Peru ...

About Miguel, I afraid I have to convey to you very sad news. Our dear son had a tragic accident in Mexico City on September 30th of last year and passed away on the 9th of January in Houston, where we had taken him, hoping we could perhaps save him. ... From there we brought him to Lima to be buried on the 16th of January. ... I am enclosing the announcement of his death which we had printed in English for our friends abroad.

Yes, it has been a long time since we visited Boston. In fact Rosita and I never went back after Miguel's graduation. Miguel himself came back to Lima and, after working for three years in the family business, he went to Yale to take his Master's degree which he did very successfully in May 1990. During his holidays, while he was in Yale, he took on jobs in many activities that attracted him like, with CARE in Santo Domingo, World Bank in Washington, and others that did not take him to the Boston area. ...

After Miguel left Yale, he went to work in Mexico City with a Consultant firm called Booz Allen & Hamilton for a year and then worked in a local firm when the accident overcame him. At Yale he obtained two Masters Degrees — in Business Administration and in International Relations. He was specially interested in working in Developing Countries, and he had received a job offer from the United Nations Development Program. He was due to go to New York in October, to look at this offer and I think he was looking forward to an activity where he could have been in a position to help others. Miguel

was not married so he was very mobile to take on that sort of job, which would most likely have covered many countries.

During Miguel's stay in Mexico, he made many friends and, as we met them when they came to visit at the hospital, we found they were from all walks of life. He maintained his interest in outdoor life and belonged to one or two trekking clubs. He enjoyed going out to the countryside at week-ends. ... His friends were mostly local Mexicans. He was always liked and respected very much wherever he went and considered a serious young man. I think the extract from the New Testament mentioned on the enclosed card fits in with his character.

Thank you for having written to us. It has brought back many memories from days gone by and given us a possibility to be in touch with you and tell you about our dear Miguel, who we would appreciate if you and your wife remember in your prayers.

From the commemorative card:

MIGUEL ANTONIO
FERREYROS GILDEMEISTER

*Lima, Peru January 28, 1961

† Houston, USA January 9, 1992

caused by a traffic accident
in Mexico, Sept. 30, 1991

Be compassionate as your Father is
compassionate. Do not judge and you will
not be judged; do not condemn and you
will not be condemned; grant pardon
and you will be pardoned.
Give and gifts will be yours.
Good measure, pressed down and shaken
up will be poured into you lap;
the measure you award to others
is the measure that will be awarded
to you.

Luke 6:14
36,37,38

Teleology, Modern Science and Verification

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[Finality] neither denies nor minimizes such facts as entropy, cataclysm, the death that follows every birth, the extinction that threatens every survival. It offers no opinion on the ultimate fate of the universe. But it insists that the negative picture is not the whole picture.

Bernard Lonergan

(A) INTRODUCTION

IT SEEMS THAT classical teleology and modern science have been on a collision course from the very outset of the latter. At the very inception of modern science, Galileo abandoned final causes in his account of natural motion. He thereby set the stage for a profound suspicion about the need for the notion of final causality in a natural science of the natural world. After more than two centuries, the critique of teleology by modern science gained new momentum in 1859 with Darwin's development of a natural account of the origin of species. For all its inherent scientific merits, there were for Darwin and many of his supporters profound philosophical and theological motivations at work as well: Darwin was highly motivated by his antipathy toward Paley's natural theology based upon the idea that organs and organisms were designed with a purpose, and that therefore there had to be a divine designer.¹

Positions taken with regard to teleological questions have important consequences for theological questions in such areas as the transcendence of God, creation, redemption, and the manner in which grace can be said to perfect nature. They also have profound relevance in the field of ethics. For example, since the publication of *After Virtue*,

¹ On this see Ospovot, 1981: 33-36, 63-65.

Alasdair MacIntyre has made the indispensability of teleology in ethics a focal issue in contemporary discussions of ethics. He has sought to ground a meaningful, rational, and coherent account of teleology in ethics in a theory of narrative and tradition. Yet, for all the significant contributions of his work in this area, he has not been without critics, many of whom are nonetheless sympathetic to his aims. Chief among these criticisms, to my mind, is the vulnerability of his approach to charges of relativism and historicism. If the teleological normativity of ethics is rooted in a narrative or tradition, on what basis might one criticize the narrative or tradition itself? If from the viewpoint of some other tradition, then are traditions themselves merely arbitrary options?

Although MacIntyre's work toward the resolution of this problem has been impressive thus far, I am not convinced that the lingering questions have as yet been satisfactorily answered. The simplest traditional notion that there is a 'natural telos' to human living might provide an answer to some of these questions. Recourse to the idea of a 'natural' teleology would neatly get beyond the relativism of traditions, and would provide a transcultural standard for judging traditions themselves. Yet MacIntyre has rejected this alternative because, as he puts it, "Aristotle's ethics, expounded as he expounds it, presupposes his metaphysical biology." (1981: 139). In some ways this peremptory rejection of the classical answer has proven beneficial, for it has led MacIntyre and his readers to take more seriously the historicity, concreteness and complexity of how real human beings actually struggle with and arrive at ethical decisions, in ways that perhaps the classicism of the tradition overlooked. But it has also troubled the foundations of his account.

Thus MacIntyre's work poses in yet another way the larger question as to whether it might be possible to conceive of a notion of 'natural teleology' which does not fly in the face of modern scientific achievements. In this paper I would like to indicate how I believe the work of Bernard Lonergan can make a contribution toward this goal. The issues involved are complex, and the history of views on these issues is more complex still. It would take a substantial book devoted to the dialectical history of the idea of teleology to do justice to the subject. Even so, at the risk of oversimplification, I believe that many of the dilemmas which have led to modern agnosticism and hostility concerning teleology can be traced to one or both of two root issues: the problem of differentiating descriptive and explanatory teleological

concepts, and the problems related to the verifiability of teleological assertions. The latter are, in turn, connected to the considerable problems of verification raised by modern science itself.

In this article I hope to show Bernard Lonergan's contributions to these latter two problems, in hope that this might one day provide assistance to the larger problem of moving beyond current impasses. Toward this end, I will begin with a brief account of Aristotle's ideas concerning final causality, distinguishing them from what might be called the 'descriptive notion of final causality.' A series of explanatory issues will be taken up following this point of departure.

(B) ARISTOTLE'S CONCEPT OF FINAL CAUSE

Without question the ongoing discussion of the notion of final causality in Western thought has been profoundly influenced by the work of Aristotle. Hence I begin with a brief summary of his views on the topic. Many of the difficulties modern thinkers have had with the notion of final causality can be traced either to misreadings of Aristotle's writings on final cause, or to an undifferentiatedness in his own treatment of some of these issues, or to both. Let us briefly consider what he actually held.

Aristotle's *Physics* contains one of the classic accounts of the notion of final cause. As such, what he meant by final cause needs to be interpreted within the contexts developed in that work.² The most immediate context is that of *Physics* Book B.3 in which Aristotle sets forth his theory of the 'four causes.' Thus, final cause first needs to be understood in its relationships to the other three causes.

Aristotle refers to the first of the four causes as "that from which as a constituent" (194b24). It is underlying nature or matter in the sense of that which is presupposed to be 'the same' in a change. (Change, in turn, is given a preliminary analysis in Book A, where it is conceived of as the reception or loss of form by 'that which underlies'

²Of course Aristotle's other writings — especially his biological writings and *Metaphysics* Book A — also address final causality and related issues. A complete interpretation of Aristotle on final causality would of course require that what I set forth here be complemented by the nuances and differences contained in these other texts. I shall, however, limit myself to the account in *Physics* for present purposes.

(*hupokeimenon*) or 'matter'.³ That is to say, according to Aristotle's view saying "M changed" means "M did not have form, F, earlier, but it changed so that now it does." In turn, 'M' and 'it' refer to "that which underlies" or matter, or as it later came to be called, material cause. The second cause Aristotle identifies as "form (*eidos*) or pattern (*paradeigma*), this being the formula of the what-it-is-to-be (*ho logos ho tou ti en einai*)" (194b27).⁴ Form, later referred to as the formal cause, is what one knows about something insofar as one has formulated its explanatory definition (*ho logos ho tou ti en einai*). Third, there is "that from which change or rest first begins" (194b30), subsequently referred to as efficient cause. Strictly speaking, this cause is a substance (*ousia*), but it is a cause of change primarily with respect to the form possessed by the mover-substance and received by the moved-matter. In other words, that which is moved receives its form from the *ousia* which already 'has' that form. Aristotle's example is of the parent as cause of the child. The form of humanity of the parent is indispensable for the transformation of mere matter into something which has the form of a human being. The fourth or final cause is the end (*telos*) (194b33), the "that for the sake of which" (often referred to as 'purpose') of some sequence of motions. It is the form which finally results at the completion of the motion.⁵

Aristotle's causes turn out to be four distinct yet legitimate ways of answering the question, "Why is this changing the way it is?" Biological examples are particularly illuminating. To "why is this plant sprouting leaves along its branches rather than only at its tips?" one could answer, "The growth pattern characteristic of this species is thus and so," and then one has answered via the form (formal cause) of the growth itself. Again one could answer, "because it has absorbed sufficient and appropriate nutrients with which to do so" and the

³ The term 'matter' (*hylē*) is not introduced to denote 'that which underlies' until the last page (192a23) of Book A.

⁴ Aristotle's terminology is not rigorous on this issue. At 194b27 he uses 'form (*eidos*) or pattern (*paradeigma*)', while at 190b he speaks of 'shape (*morphē*) or form (*eidos*)', but at 193b9-12 the contrast is between 'shape' (*morphē*) and 'shape' (*schēma*). If one adds to this the fact that *eidos* itself originally derives from a term having to do with seeing, the terminological inconsistency causes considerable difficulty in pinning down his precise meaning. But in general one can discern a contrast between a precise meaning of 'form' having to do with "what is known in a formula (*logos*) or definition (*horos*)" — in Lonergan's terms, what is known insofar as an insight receives explanatory formulation — and something more like a descriptive notion of 'shape' in which relation to sense appearance is more prominent.

⁵ For fuller details, see Byrne, 1990, 6-21.

answer would be in terms of matter (material cause). Or one could answer, "because it has developed from a seed produced by the plant of such and such a species" which designates the form, definition, of the principal mover of the moved plant (efficient cause). And yet one could also answer quite intelligibly, "its growth in this manner is has a pattern intrinsically related to the production of the mature, adult plant of this species" (final cause). Thus there is a sense in which one can speak of a final cause as the 'nature' of a pattern of changes. That is to say, insofar as 'nature' means "principle and cause of being moved or of rest in the thing to which it belongs primarily" (192b22), eventual form is one such cause. For final, completed form is the 'natural outcome' of a pattern of changes, even in cases where some interruption should inhibit the completion of the process. The process itself is made intelligible by its relation to the mature form which is, "for the most part," (196b11) its outcome. In each of the latter three cases, form constitutes the heart of the answer to the question of why it is changing in this way; but the way in which form which is given in answer varies according to the way the question has been construed —form being received by the moved, form of the mover, or resulting form when the moving has reached its completion. *Thus final cause is the completed form of something, as it is related to the process (set of changes) which brings that thing to completion. In no way did Aristotle conceive of final cause as somehow operating from the future on the present to guide the process of change.* To do so would be to confuse final cause with efficient cause.⁶

Aristotle's account of final cause is also set within the larger context which includes his remarks concerning luck and chance. Although some of his predecessors regarded chance and fortune as causes themselves, Aristotle did not agree. According to him, a chance event, E, is an instance of a final cause, but one which *de facto* comes to be in an unexpected way. More technically, terminal forms ordinarily come to be as the terms of regular, recurrent patterns of events—for example, the emergence of a mature biological individual as the term of a natural growth pattern. Such terminal forms are in some sense explanatory of the growth pattern. But occasionally a terminal event occurs in a way which is not "for the most part." Such outcomes fall, according to Aristotle's way of thinking, under the category of chance. Chance occurrences happen to the extent that a single, concrete thing (*ousia*)

⁶See Randall, 228-229.

may possess two or more capacities which have no intrinsic intelligible relationship to one another. (To use Aristotle's terms, a thing (*ousia*) might possess two capacities, C_1 and C_2 . If C_2 is in no way contained in or implied by the formula of the 'what-it-is-to-be' C_1 (*ho logos ho tou ti en einai*), they have no intrinsic intelligible relationship.) Rather, they are only "accidentally related" (197b18-20). Now suppose the thing (*ousia*) undergoes a sequence of events (e.g., E_{11} , E_{12} , E_{13} , E_{14} , E_{15}) which proceeds in accord with C_1 , taking C_2 'along for the ride,' so to speak. Suppose further that, before the natural end of this sequence is reached, an external mover intervenes to initiate a second sequence in accord with C_2 (e.g., E_{26} , E_{27} , E_{28}) thereby bringing to completion the natural *telos*, T_2 , of C_2 . In such a circumstance, T_2 is not only the actual terminal form of the sequence (E_{26} , E_{27} , E_{28}) that began with the intervention; it is also the end of the *entire* sequence (E_{11} , E_{12} , E_{13} , E_{14} , E_{15} , E_{26} , E_{27} , E_{28}), since the initial part (E_{11} , E_{12} , E_{13} , E_{14} , E_{15}) was indispensable to the *actual outcome*. And, strictly speaking, actual outcome is the proper meaning of final cause.

Thus T_2 is the end of the 'chance sequence' (E_{11} , E_{12} , E_{13} , E_{14} , E_{15} , E_{26} , E_{27} , E_{28}). It is a chance sequence because the two segments came about, not according to any intrinsic intelligible connection based on a single form, but by the unrelated external intervention and the unrelated coincidence of C_1 , and C_2 , being in one and the same thing.

Aristotle illustrates his point with the example of a man who happens to go to the marketplace in order to accomplish one end, T_1 (196b33-197a5). The operations he employs in going to the market (conscious as well as bodily) are the sequence (E_{11} , E_{12} , E_{13} , E_{14} , E_{15}). When he arrives there, although he went with a different end (T_1) in mind, he sees someone who owes him money, which sets off an unrelated sequence of actions (E_{26} , E_{27} , E_{28}), the natural term of which (T_2) is getting paid. In a second example (197b14-16) Aristotle speaks of a horse coming to the river to drink (E_{11} , E_{12} , E_{13} , E_{14} , $E_{15} \rightarrow T_1$) where you are drowning, and thereby accidentally becomes the instrument of your being saved (E_{26} , E_{27} , E_{28} , $\rightarrow T_2$). The horse does this only accidentally because there is no intrinsic intelligible relation between its capacity to satisfy its thirst, and its capacity to pull a human being.

Thus in Aristotle's view, most final causes are realized neither always nor necessarily, but only "for the most part" (196b10-11) within the limits set by the accidental combinations of conditioning events. In most terrestrial cases at least, final causes are radically conditioned by the accidental intersection of paths of finalistic orientation. These

conditioning events, in turn, are realized through processes that are themselves finalistic in some limited sense. Hence the successful realization of most final causes depends upon the chance realizations of unrelated paths of finalistic movements.

The question of the character of this general context of accidental sequences within which final causes come to be realized is undifferentiated and underdeveloped in Aristotle's own writings. If one wishes to ask about the teleological character of not just this or that process, but of the entire cosmos, one must turn to Aristotle's account of the relation of the cosmos to its final cause, the Unmoved Mover (*Physics*, Books H and Θ). One essential role — all too frequently overlooked, I believe — played by the account of the Unmoved Mover is to express (1) Aristotle's affirmation of the teleological character of the whole cosmos by its finalistic relationship to the Unmoved Mover, and (2) the goodness of the cosmos as a whole which follows as a consequence of that relationship (1075a12-1076a5). Hence, one principal role of final cause in Aristotle's thought is to signify the denial that occurrences are ends in themselves, and to affirm that present occurrences are 'for the most part' intelligibly connected with quite definite subsequent outcomes in a whole that is in some sense good.

The theorem that there must be an Unmoved Mover, and that its relation to the moved is not that of efficient but of final cause, is in many ways dependent upon Aristotle's contention that motion is, and must be, eternal. Hence, whatever limitations there are to Aristotle's way of conceiving the teleology of the cosmos as a whole might derive from that contention.

Now there is little doubt that final cause plays a role of profound importance in Aristotle's natural sciences and metaphysics. However, there has been considerable disagreement concerning the precise interpretation of his doctrine of final cause. This is not the place to enter into that complex discussion, but much of it arises from attempts to determine how Aristotle (or anyone) might coherently answer one or both of the following questions: (1) How does final form T (which lies in the future and, therefore, is not yet) *cause* change E to occur? and (2) How can one *know* that T is the final form to which observed change E is leading? I believe that these two questions underlie not only much debate concerning the proper interpretation of Aristotle, but also much of the post-Aristotelian debate regarding teleology. I suspect Aristotle would reply to the first question by pointing out that the questioner had confused final cause with efficient cause, and would answer the

second question by saying something like "one knows the end to which present functioning is oriented by some combination of induction (*epagoge*) and common sense (*empeiria*)."⁷ Both replies would undoubtedly be adequate for Aristotle's context, but they need to be enlarged and supplemented for the context established by the development of modern science. Here I believe Lonergan's work can be especially helpful.

(C) THE PROBLEM OF THE DESCRIPTIVE NOTION OF FINAL CAUSALITY

If there is a final cause of change C, how does that final cause cause C to occur? This is probably for many the most troubling question regarding teleology. In Aristotle's strict sense, final cause or end (*telos*) is conceived of as a completed form. The relationship between current action and the end is implicit in the illustration Aristotle provides for his definition of change (motion), where he refers to the type of changing we call 'building' (201a17-19). The activity of building reaches its end (in the sense of both cessation and completion) when the architect's intellectual formulation of the edifice is fully realized in steel and concrete, glass, stone and wood.

Now in light of this illustration, we might put the previous question about final causality as follows: How does the edifice which does not yet exist affect the activity of building? The answer, in the strictest sense, is that it does not "affect" it at all. What affects the building activity is the *already* realized intellectual conception of the building, first worked out in the mind of the architect, then communicated and understood by engineers, supervisors and laborers. The contents of insights, such as those informing the organized activities of a construction company, constitute what people usually mean by "having a purpose for what one is doing." However, an *already* realized intellectual conception of the edifice functions, not as a final cause, but as a moving (efficient) cause (or perhaps more technically, as an instrumental efficient cause) of the movement.

⁷ Usually *empeiria* is translated as 'experience.' However, the multiple common meanings of the English term, 'experience,' obscure Lonergan's technical distinction between experiencing as the pre-intellectual level of cognitional operations, and commonsense intelligence (as when one says "The person of common sense knows by experience.")

While the not-yet-completed edifice in no way *affects* the building activity, that does not mean there is not some sense of *cause* which is applicable to the relation between the sequence of changes and the end. As was pointed out in the previous section, the most general meaning of 'cause' is: whatever is an intelligent answer to the question, 'Why is it changing in that way?' Yet the notion of one thing 'affecting' another does not exhaust the range of possible answers. Let me distinguish, therefore between 'final cause' and 'final causality.' Final cause in its strict sense always means completed, terminal form. I shall use 'final causality,' on the other hand, to denote an intelligible relationship between a series of events and a final outcome. Furthermore, I shall adapt Lonergan's terminology to distinguish between a *descriptive* notion of final causality and *explanatory* notion of final causality.

Modern⁸ difficulties about final causality are, at root, difficulties about *how* current changes can be related to subsequent realizations. By way of contrast most people of common sense have little difficulty in affirming that what human beings think about in the present does affect future outcomes in some way. This commonplace lies at the heart of what I shall call the descriptive notion of final causality. As with other instances of what Lonergan referred to as descriptions, the descriptive notion of final causality derives from understandings of "things as related to us" (1992, 316). The descriptive notion of a "hiss" is a sound which is understood as possessing a similarity to the sound of air escaping from a tire. In this vein, let me define what I mean by "the descriptive notion of final cause" in the following way:

A sequence of sensible changes can be said to exhibit *descriptive final causality* insofar as the sequence is understood to be similar to other sensible sequences of changes which occur when a human being acts to bring about an intelligibility he or she has in mind.

In such sequences, human intelligence discerns a kind of directed, ordered complexity which resembles that following from human agency. When we discern some such order, we tend to say that we, as well as others, "act with purpose."

⁸ Cooper has argued (250-253) that these questions were pondered by the ancients as well, and that Aristotle himself was concerned to point out the difficulties with the positions taken by the materialist, anti-teleological thinkers of his own time.

The great difficulties arise when one attempts to extrapolate this descriptive notion of final causality to non-human sequences of sensible change. When there is no good reason to affirm a human intelligence as operative in these changes, what sense can final causality have? Does some "vital force direct the activities of the organism"? Does "Nature produce such well-adapted organs"? Or is "the gene is trying to preserve itself"? Does every photon, electron, and organism 'feel' its 'subjective aim,' as Whitehead contends (1978: 224)? Here, I believe, it is necessary to cross from description to explanation. Failure to do so inevitably results either in outright denial of final causality, or in attempts to give quasi-descriptive accounts of the mechanism of final causality (e.g., the metaphors mentioned above) which are doomed to elimination from the context of modern science.

(D) EXPLANATION AND FINALITY

Loneragan, of course, does not use the terms "teleology" or "final cause" or even "final causality" in the sections of *Insight* devoted to knowledge of the universe;⁹ I suspect he chose to adopt instead the term "finality" in order to avoid both the descriptive connotations historically associated with the former terms, as well as the convoluted disputes which followed from them.¹⁰ I would like to suggest that this shift in terminology also signals the fact that Lonergan's way of thinking about these matters involves a shift from a descriptive to an explanatory approach.

As a first approximation to understanding this shift, notice that in the previous section I spoke of human intelligence discerning a kind of directed, ordered complexity characteristic of human agency. At this descriptive level there is already a certain kind of anticipation of what is essential to explanatory final causality. It is a shift from thinking about the relation between the present change and future end, to thinking about a certain pattern of intelligibility immanent in the

⁹His technical term for the universe insofar as it encompasses both natural and human realities is 'proportionate being' (Lonergan, 1992, 416ff). As such, this term prescind from references to either absolutely supernatural realities or to absolutely transcendent being.

¹⁰See, for example, his remarks in the opening paragraph of §6 of Chapter XV of *Insight*.

sequence of changes themselves.¹¹ Descriptively and undifferentiatedly, the term "directed" here means *both* that there is an application of later operations to the results of earlier ones, *and* as well that the sequence of operations is determined by the influence of a mind-like entity. This means that the pattern among occurrences, rather than the not-yet realized result, has subtly become the focus of attention. This attention to the order of the sequence of operations themselves underlies descriptive final causality, in spite of the fact such descriptions themselves are conceived in ways that obscure this fact. That is to say, since descriptive final causality relies upon language of similarity to human behaviors in which the role of thoughts have great prominence, the "mind-like" aspects of the description can distract one's attention from the order in the sequence of operations.

In order that this preliminary, descriptive attention to the order of the sequence of operations might become completely explanatory, the full range of "things" and "relations" involved in the ordered patterns of changes needs to be understood and formulated independently of "how they are related to me." For this to happen, several sorts of phenomena which were all lumped together descriptively as "finalistic" or "purposive" or "teleological" need to be differentiated and explained separately. These include the "purpose" of an organ in an organism, the purpose of the organism itself, the purposiveness of organic (especially embryological) development, and the purpose of Nature. I shall indicate briefly how each of these is transformed in Lonergan's approach.

(E) FORM, FUNCTION AND PURPOSE

Historian of biology William Coleman has traced the development of nineteenth century biology. He analyzes "what was going forward" as a sorting out of the relationships between the various conceptions of "form" and "function" which arose during that period. The concept most closely related to teleological issues, that of "purpose," became, according to Coleman, closely linked if not completely identified with the concept of "function." At the beginning of the nineteenth century the understanding of the relationships among these three terms — form,

¹¹ See Lonergan's remarks at the end of §5 of Chapter XV of *Insight*.

function and purpose — was implicit in the ways biological science was practiced. According to Coleman,

The ultimate point of reference regarding the existence of “purpose” in nature might be the Aristotelian metaphysics and the idea of the organism or, the common bond of most eighteenth-century anatomists, the Christian conception of a beneficent and all-wise creator God whose power and wisdom were readily betrayed in His works. But in either case or, as was probably true, with the support of the latter by the former, anatomists viewed form and function — the body part or organ and its necessary activities — as indissolubly joined by the idea that all existing beings were the product of intelligent and providential concern. Means, the organs and thus the object of anatomy, were fitted to ends, the determination of which was the daily task and grand objective of physiology, that term being read widely to include all inquiry into organic function.¹²

As one can see from this account, physiology was considered the ‘queen’ science, guided by its interest in ‘purpose’ or function; anatomy was, like philosophy in the medieval period, relegated to the role of an auxiliary that supplied knowledge of the forms or structures which served as the ‘sites’ (Coleman: 17) for biological functions.

Coleman notes the important role played by the founder of comparative anatomy, Georges Cuvier, in establishing the paradigm that “without a knowledge of function or the purpose for which a given organ was designed there could be no satisfactory understanding of the structure itself” (Coleman: 18).¹³ In other words, questions about

¹² Coleman, 18-19. In addition to the possible influence of Aristotelian and Christian ideas, Coleman discusses the substantial influence of German *Naturphilosophie* in theories regarding purpose and function and, in addition, embryological development (24-26, 48-53).

¹³ This notion that a given organ performs a specific function has survived to the present, at least in textbooks. For example, “An organ may be defined simply as a unit or structure of the body which performs a specific function” (Gardner and Osburn: 1973: 18). As the brief outline of liver functioning below will indicate, virtually all descriptively distinguishable organs are involved in a number of explanatory functions. This is not to say, however, that there is not an important point behind the descriptive tendency to identify single functions such as digestion, reproduction, respiration, etc. with single organs or organ systems. In fact they represent seminal ‘higher viewpoint’ insights into what will eventually become the autonomous set of terms and relations underpinning the explanation of what Lonergan would refer to as the genus of properly biological higher integrators of chemical reaction-events.

'purposes' tended to be put with regard to structures such as organs and answered in terms of functions.

The carnivore, Cuvier argued, was perfectly constructed for his place in the economy of nature. Keen senses, great speed, and fearsome claws and teeth were nicely suited to the pursuit, capture, and consumption of the animal prey (Coleman: 18).

Coleman goes on to explain how the further questions and discoveries of the nineteenth century altered this paradigm, shifting focus first from functions of organs to those of tissues, then from tissues to cells, and eventually to the origins and transformations of cells.

In Coleman's account two things are made clear regarding the alternating importance of form and function in the development of biological science during this period. First, form or structure tends to derive its primary meaning from description of 'topographic' visual appearance (Coleman: 19); and this reliance on description of visual appearances persists even through the shifts in ideas regarding the unit of organic functioning from organ to tissue to cell. Second, though less evidently so, the principle meaning of function was also descriptive. Functions mentioned by Coleman include: fleeing, pursuit, capture, consumption, respiration, excretion, nutrition (Coleman: 14, 18). Now while these functions could be conceived in terms of their relations to other functions, nevertheless they all tend to resemble functions humans perform. To the extent that what one has in mind when one thinks of such functions is experiences of one's own performances, to that extent one is thinking of such functions descriptively.

Consider for a moment the question, What is the purpose of the eye or the wing of a bird? One might respond, "the purpose of the eye is that the bird may see; of the wing, that the bird may fly." As such the answers are expressed in a form that Lonergan calls descriptive. These are organs which human beings tend to think about descriptively by relating them to their own experiences (i.e., of seeing and, if not quite of flying, at least of self-moving). If one were to go on and ask What is seeing? or What is flying? these would be questions which might well confound a descriptively-oriented pattern of thought.

Non-scientists of today, and probably biological scientists of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, tend to think primarily about organs for descriptive reasons — the differences in their structural and functional appearances to us ground descriptions useful in our ordinary commonsense dealings. Such descriptions may also have

a scientific utility: they provide the points of departure for explanatory investigations. The task of comprehending the vast complexity of even a single organ of a single species is formidable, and confining one's research to a single organ-as-described not only provides the "tweezers by which we hold things while explanations are being discovered" (Lonergan, 1992: 316), but also pares down the range of further pertinent scientific questions, at least temporarily.

It was descriptive answers to questions about the purpose of an organ or organism that formed the background of Paley's natural theology and argument from design for the existence of God.¹⁴ Descriptive answers to questions about purpose and function are not completely useless, but many biologists of the nineteenth century, including Darwin, found them maddeningly problematic — just as Galileo found problematic the scholastic accounts of natural fall which appealed to final causes. Whatever virtues such descriptive answers might have, they tended to cut off other lines of inquiry, especially those which head in an explanatory direction.

Suppose we ask about the purpose of the liver, instead of about organs more familiar to ordinary description. What is the purpose of our liver? What does it do? How does it function? Precisely because we tend not to think descriptively about our livers at all, these questions have an intellectual freshness to them.

A contemporary physiologist might begin her reply noting that the liver is a complex primarily responsible for the interconversion and storage of carbohydrates, proteins and fatty acids. But these remarks would have to be amplified, for the liver is also responsible for a wide range of additional functions: production of liver bile, recovery of iron-bearing pigments from broken-down red corpuscles, synthesis of blood proteins, conversion of toxic by-products (such as ammonia) into non-toxic forms suitable for excretion, and the synthesis of vitamins, among others. A contemporary anatomist, on the other hand, might begin by noting that what is descriptively identified as the liver 'contains'¹⁵ several different kinds of cells and substances: liver cells, connective cells, endothelial cells and intercellular fibers (comprising ducts and sinusoids), blood cells and fluids, and circulatory vessels

¹⁴ See Coleman, 58; Ospovot, 33-36, 63-65.

¹⁵ The single quotations here and in following paragraphs are meant to draw attention to the fact this is a descriptive and indeed 'body'-way of speaking, which though useful for communicative purposes here, is also misleading for explanatory purposes indicated below.

composed of muscle cells, endothelial cells, connective cells and intercellular fibers.

If the physiologist were to continue her account of the first function — the interconversion and storage of carbohydrates, proteins and fatty acids — she would draw attention to the metabolic pathways of the liver cells themselves. In doing so, she might emphasize the fact that liver cells operate in at least two distinguishable phases: the absorptive phase (“during which ingested nutrients are entering the blood from the gastrointestinal tract”) and the postabsorptive or ‘fasting’ phase (“during which the gastrointestinal tract is empty and energy must be supplied by the body’s endogenous stores”) (Vander, Sherman and Luciano: 405). The patterns of biochemical reactions in liver cells differ between these two phases. The absorptive phase tends to be characterized by transformations of carbohydrates and proteins into glycogen, triglycerides (types of fatty acids), urea, water, carbon dioxide and energy in the form of ATP. On the other hand, transformation of glycogen, proteins and triglycerides into glucose, ketones, urea, water, carbon dioxide and ATP typifies the postabsorptive phase.¹⁶ The physiologist would go on to explain in greater detail what specific sequences of chemical reactions are responsible for these transformations, particularly how enzymes are produced through the agencies of specific RNA molecules and ATP molecules; their relationships to the chemical schemes of ribosomes and mitochondria; how the concentrations of RNA and enzymes are themselves regulated by other chemical sequences; how rising or falling concentrations of specific chemical compounds set the conditions for the absorptive or the postabsorptive phase; and how these compounds themselves are produced in the digestive tract and transported to the liver cells.

This way of speaking about this function of the liver presupposes a massive intellectual movement in the direction of explanatory relations of things to one another. First, the varying sets of chemical compounds ‘within’ the liver cell are related to one another by means of chemical theories which explain sequences and recurrent schemes of sequences of chemical reactions. Second, chemical theories also provide the basis for comprehending the relations between recurrent schemes ‘within’ liver cells and schemes characteristic of other cells. For example, chemical processes where fatty acids are transported out of liver cells, across various cellular and intercellular structures and into ducts

¹⁶ For detailed diagrams see Vander, Sherman and Luciano: 407, 408.

and circulatory vessels, constitute some of the relations among what are descriptively called 'tissues' within the organ. Or again, when changes of chemical schemes 'in' the digestive tract give rise, according to chemical laws, to chemical processes which, in turn, are responsible for the shifts between the absorptive and the postabsorptive phases of liver cell schemes, one is moving toward an explanatory understanding of relations among what are described as 'organs' or even 'systems of organs.'

But it must be emphasized that such accounts have not yet reached relations among things; they are, rather, formulations of relations among *conjugates 'within' things*. As Lonergan puts it,

Within such schemes [of recurrence] the plant or the animal is only a component. The whole schematic circle of events does not occur within the living thing, but goes beyond it into the environment from which sustenance is won and into which offspring are born. No doubt, the higher the type, the greater the complexity and the greater the proportion of significant events that occur within the animal. But this greater complexity only means that the larger circle connects a series of lesser and incomplete circles. The vascular system occurs within the animal, but it depends upon the animal's digestive system, which depends upon the animal's capacity to deal with its environment and, in turn, that capacity depends upon the growth and nourishment secured by the vascular system (1992: 156).

This is to say that a plant or an animal (not the organ, tissue or cellular substructure) is the 'thing' of concern in biology, and biology's explanatory task is to understand the plant or animal in relation to other things. The 'other things' include, of course, other plants and animals, but also other non-biological things: atmospheric gases, aqueous solutions, and minerals, for example.¹⁷ Investigation of these ranges of relations has led to current understanding of organisms as 'containing' ever more complex 'metabolic pathways' — that is, recurrent schemes of chemical events nested in larger and more intricate chemical schemes which, in turn, are nested within still more comprehensive and complex schemes connected to one another in relationships of conditioning and being conditioned. Finally, what is true of the liver is no less true of the eye or the wing: neither is a thing

¹⁷ In order to keep the illustration as simple as possible, I am prescinding here from the very important range of phenomena associated with the fact that animals are also related to other things by their sensations and neural responses to them.

in itself; insofar as either is known, not descriptively but explanatorily, the eye or wing is but one of those "lesser and incomplete circles" of chemical schemes. Hence the 'function' of any organ, indeed any organism, is only known in a completely explanatory fashion in terms of its role within the ecology, the 'larger circle' of interrelationships within which it concretely exists and functions. Thus a concrete ecology, or what Lonergan calls the "flexible circle of ranges of schemes" of recurrence, (1992: 485) provides the proper explanatory context for understanding biological function.

For questions regarding teleology, the implications of employing this notion of a "flexible circle of ranges of schemes of recurrence" are significant. In the first place, what nineteenth century biologists meant by 'forms' or 'structures' themselves come to be understood, not as things (much less as 'bodies'), but as conditioning schemes of recurrence. If Lonergan is correct, in any biological instance the organism alone is the 'thing'; neither the organ, the tissue, the cell, the molecule nor the atomic element is a 'thing within' the organism. Biological things have chemical *conjugates*, but they do not contain chemical things. Hence, even the chemical structures — for example, protein chains comprising cell membranes and connective fibers — which do not regularly take part in metabolic pathways are nevertheless schemes of recurrent relations among electrons and nuclei. It is the regularity of this sub-chemical recurrence which is responsible for what is referred to descriptively as 'stable structure.'

Second, the 'flexible circle' does not recognize the authority of the organism's outer covering (whether membrane, shell or skin), for "the plant or the animal is only a component" in the larger circle. Hence, the early biological interest in spatially and descriptively distinguishable organs or organisms has been largely displaced by something approximating Lonergan's explanatory notion of "flexible circle of ranges of schemes of recurrence." Biological research has increasingly become, like research in physics, a search for "the unspecified correlation to be specified, the undetermined function to be determined" (Lonergan, 1992: 62). But descriptive ideas of functions to be determined will no longer do. The indeterminate function to be determined by biological science is a "flexible circle of ranges of schemes of recurrence." Just as the physicist seeks the function which relates the positions and times of Mercury's orbit, so also the biologist seeks a complex 'flexible circle' which explains all the data on an organism in its environmental relations with other things.

Of course, one may think in terms of 'subfunctions.' A human's metabolism is itself a 'circle of ranges of schemes of recurrence,' although less comprehensive and less complete than the organic functioning of the whole of an individual human, or than the functioning of the ecology in which a human life is lived. Likewise, absorptive and postabsorptive phases are also 'circles of ranges of schemes of recurrence' still less comprehensive and complete. Biological study must focus on subfunctions because of their intricacy. For adequate explanatory answers to questions about purposes and teleology, however, the larger, concretely operative identity must be emphasized. The decomposition of glycogen into glucose could be called a 'function'; but if it occurs in the postabsorptive phase, postabsorption is what is functioning. More concretely still, the human organism in its ecology is what is functioning in and through every one of the operations and schemes of recurrence of its sub-functions.

Thus, if one asks about the 'purpose' of an organism, or organ, or cell, the response requires something of an inverse insight. The organ does not have a 'purpose' of its own; nor does it even have a 'function' of its own in the strict sense, even though the transposition of the question about purpose into a question about function was a movement in the explanatory direction. Strictly speaking *the* function is the 'flexible circle of ranges of schemes of recurrence,' and questions about purposes of cells, tissues, organs and organisms need to be answered in terms of the roles they play in that function. Thus the arduous and lengthy work of biological investigation which fills in the details of the heuristic notion, 'flexible circle of ranges of schemes of recurrence,' serves to provide the proper explanatory answers to Cuvier's search for biological purpose.

I must note here, finally, that this notion has nothing to do with any final cause, Aristotelian or otherwise, which has not yet occurred. This heuristic notion pertains, rather, to an actually operative recurrent pattern which is truly constitutive of what a cell, organ or organism really is in its actually functioning reality.

(F) DEVELOPMENT

Thus it may be fairly said that neither what Aristotle called final cause, nor what Lonergan called finality, has any direct role in the properly explanatory answer to Cuvier's question about the purposes of

organs. Yet this statement holds true only insofar as one prescind from an important — some would argue the most important — feature of biological phenomena, namely development.¹⁸ The previous section adopted the tacit assumption that only mature organisms function in the explanatory circle of relationships which constitute an ecology. While it is the case that what was initially intended in early nineteenth century biological questions regarding the purpose of organs can be completely subsumed under the heading of the roles they play in flexible circles of ranges of schemes of recurrence, it is not altogether evident that this could also be the case with organic development.

Once one broadens the field of consideration to include biological development, teleological issues reappear which cannot be adequately dealt with in the same way as can questions regarding functions of organs or organisms. At the heart of this difference is a basic conundrum regarding organic development which might be stated in the following terms: how is it that organic functioning at an earlier period in time causes a seemingly unrelated result at a later time?

Coleman traces the centrality of this problem in the history of embryological science in the nineteenth century. He notes that the investigations of the nineteenth century dramatically dethroned the 'preformation' theories of the previous century, and set in their place theories based upon the paradigm of 'epigenesis.' The preformationist doctrine held that "the existence and structural and functional integrity" of the adult organism were already present from the very beginning. According to preformationists, embryological process was simply a matter of "growth ... of the already exactly delineated embryonic creature" (41).¹⁹ Epigenesis, on the other hand, is "change building on previous changes" (42) which originate, not from a miniature, preformed organism, but from "unformed primordium" (43). While numerous careful empirical researches accumulated to demonstrate the superiority of the epigenesis paradigm, nonetheless the concept of epigenesis itself posed considerable philosophical difficulties. As Coleman notes:

¹⁸ For the moment let me say that by biological development I mean to indicate the range of phenomena including growth, cellular division, reproduction, and especially embryological epigenesis.

¹⁹ Coleman goes on to suggest that preformationist ideas were thought to be more compatible with Christian ideas of Creation, at least those circulating in the wake of Newtonian thought (41-42).

The task of the epigeneticist was more formidable.... Epigenesis is change building on previous changes and in the normal course of events in the organic realm it leads always to a demonstrable and necessary end, that is, to the production of an adult organism belonging to a particular species. But the fertilized egg, these epigeneticists well knew, was truly unstructured and carries out quite independently a sequence of remarkable transformations. If, therefore, organic form is not original but is produced, what possibly can account for the regularity and directedness of such an extraordinary complex developmental process?

To pose this question was, for most determined epigeneticists, to anticipate its answer: *they postulated the existence of a special developmental force. This force acted without respite on the embryo, dictating its every transformation and ensuring that the embryo always progressed toward its goal*, however indirect the actual developmental pathway might appear to be.... Loosely speaking, most early epigeneticists were vitalists (42, emphasis added).

Coleman goes on to trace the ways in which debates between vitalists and mechanists (who insisted that there must be chemical bases underlying embryological transformations) affected the history of biology in this period. Thus the epigenetic study of embryological development led to the conflict between researchers who insisted upon a vitalistic 'force' or 'essence' necessary to explain the facts of embryological development, and researchers who insisted upon a 'mechanistic' causal account of this sequence of transformations (43-47, 53-56).

I believe that behind the notion of a vitalistic 'force' or 'essence' or 'entelechy' there lies a quandary as to how the immature organism "has a plan about its goal" (i.e., what it should be like as a mature adult), and how it uses that plan to guide its growth and development. Since few²⁰ would go so far as to claim that the fertilized egg or early-stage embryo could have consciousness of this plan (or of anything else), the vitalistic force takes on the role of a surrogate.

This line of thinking is, I believe, underpinned by descriptive and even counter-positional assumptions. In its encounter with an ordered complexity (i.e., "the regularity and directedness of such an extraordinary complex developmental" sequence of transformations; Coleman, 42) which resembles the effects of human agency, a counter-positional

²⁰ Whitehead and certain process thinkers influenced by him are something of an exception.

mentality tends to turn to the descriptive notion of final cause — “a sequence of changes like that which occurs when I act with a purpose in mind.” In this descriptive notion of final cause there is found the suggestion of a cause of that sequence: some mind-like goal-directed force. Against the backdrop of these sorts of ideas, Lonergan remarks:

Because the notion of development is peculiarly subject to the distorting influences of counter-positions, our account of insight as activity made no attempt to discuss the nature of genetic method. This omission will now be remedied (1992: 476).

That is to say, Lonergan found it necessary to omit discussion of a large component of natural science methodology — genetic method — from Chapters 2-4 of *Insight*, and to defer them until he had worked out the rigorous elements of his method of metaphysics in Chapter 15. The complexity of his discussion of development there is the result, I believe, of his attempt to recast these issues in explanatory terms. At the heart of this attempt is his definition of development itself:

[A] development may be defined as a flexible, linked sequence of dynamic and increasingly differentiated higher integrations that meet the tension of successively transformed underlying manifolds through successive applications of the principles of correspondence and emergence (1992: 479).

The definition, unrelentingly technical though it is, is the statement of a definite kind of intelligibility immanent in certain sets of empirical data. It is neither the kind of intelligibility characteristic of classical laws alone, nor of classical laws combined into simple schemes of recurrence nor even of nested flexible circles of ranges of schemes of recurrence. Rather, while the immanent intelligibility of development exhibits a remarkable order and regularity, it is a regularity which “effects the transition from one set of [classical] forms, laws, schemes to another set” (Lonergan, 1992: 490).

In elucidating his technical definition of development, Lonergan first provides a series of illustrations, and then introduces the terms, ‘higher system as integrator’ and ‘higher system as operator.’ ‘Higher system as integrator’ corresponds pretty closely to what I termed in §E a “lesser flexible circle of ranges of schemes of recurrence” — namely that circle which characterizes the organism as a whole, as distinguished from the ‘larger circle’ which characterizes a whole ecology. In the ‘higher system as integrator’ of an organism, there is a vast series

of sequences of chemical reactions, organized into mutually conditioning and conditioned patterns of recurrence. While these recurrences do not follow a simple, fixed pattern as, say, the planetary orbits do, there is nevertheless an overall immanent pattern characteristic of, and immanently operative in, each reaction. Considered from that point of view, the 'higher system as integrator' in a mature organism is relatively stable and unvarying.

However, the higher system in an immature, developing organism simultaneously does something in addition to maintaining a complex, flexible pattern of chemical schemes. It also synthesizes and increases the concentrations of new chemicals. These new chemicals, in turn, begin to inaugurate new chemical schemes of recurrence, and these new chemicals and schemes pose problems for integration. This is what Lonergan means in speaking of 'higher system as operator.' As operator, the higher system changes the conditions under which other already occurring chemical schemes operate. Some can no longer survive under the changed conditions, and so cease to function. More importantly, however, the new chemical schemes set new conditions; in virtue of the fulfillment of these new conditions, still higher schemes become possible (1992: 143); and if in addition the operator itself supplies a first event, E, of this still higher scheme, the higher scheme will begin to function regularly. The net effect of this mode of operation is that a new higher system is stimulated into emergence, thus replacing the old higher system. But the operator which brought about this effect *was* the old higher system. Thus the operator brings about its own replacement, first by transforming its "underlying chemical manifold," and then by providing the events which initiate the emergence of new higher schemes.

In addition, an operator need not be a one-shot affair. The higher system which replaces the old one can itself also function as an operator; moreover, the new operator can also bring about a new higher system which is yet a third instance of an operator, and so on. In other words, there can be not only operators, but *linked sequences* of operators. The events making up the resulting series of stages are thus "understood in relation to one another" in terms of this linked sequence of operators — the sequence explains why events in the series follow upon one another in the precise pattern that they do. Finally, when not only are the operators immanently linked into an explanatory sequence, but also the sequence is characterized by "increasingly

differentiated higher integrations," then one has the explanatory intelligibility immanent in what Lonergan calls "development."

Notice that no vitalistic 'force' or 'essence' functioning as a surrogate consciousness is required, in Lonergan's way of thinking, in order to provide a full explanatory account of developmental process. His notion of "a linked sequences of operators characterized by increasingly differentiated higher integrations" satisfies the insistence of the mechanists for a 'causal' account of the observed sequence of morphological changes (see Coleman: 43), but it does so without succumbing to the counterpositional assumptions of mechanism. The morphological changes are brought about through chemical syntheses, but the chemical syntheses themselves are determined by a linked sequence of 'higher systems' whose manner of setting the conditions for the series of chemical syntheses cannot be wholly accounted for by the laws of chemistry alone.

Yet Lonergan's notion of "a linked sequences of operators characterized by increasingly differentiated higher integrations" also retrieves the grain of truth at the heart of the vitalist's position. As we saw in §C, ordinary human intelligence in its descriptive mode discerns a 'directedness' in certain patterns of intelligibility immanent in sequences of organic changes, although it tends to envision some sort of mind-like 'body' to 'push' things in that direction. Mechanism tends to go too far, denying the validity of saying that the pattern can *in any sense* be called 'directed.' It regards this descriptive analogy as merely epiphenomenal, as something which can be completely explained away by laws of chemistry alone. The postulation of a separate, non-mechanical vitalistic force tends to function not only as a counterpositional attempt at explanation, but also as an emphatic assertion of the reality of the 'directedness' discerned by descriptive thought. Lonergan preserves this basic contention — that development has an irreducible, intelligible directedness of its own — but does so without postulation of an *ad hoc* force on the analogy of a pervasive mind-directed 'body' which has no other empirical consequences whatsoever.

Lonergan's notion of development preserves this 'directedness' in an explanatory manner without the need for an immanent consciousness²¹ responsible for the directing. The sense of 'directedness' which

²¹ To deny that there is any consciousness *immanent* within either the chemicals or the organism or even 'in' nature which directs to vital push does *not* mean that there is no *transcendent* consciousness which is in some fashion the cause of universal

characterizes Lonergan's notion is to be found in the relationships among the operators in the sequence. The operators are linked, for the later operators depend upon the earlier ones in the sequence for their emergence. More to the point, however, if one asks, What is it doing? or Why is it doing that? of any higher system located in an early stage of the sequence, one is asking for a full explanatory account of its immanent intelligibility. That is to say, one is asking how something is related to other things.

Hence, one *cannot* give a complete explanatory answer if one restricts oneself only to present phenomena. If one asks what the planet Mars is doing at present, one cannot adequately answer the question without including, "It is moving in an orbit characterized by the function $F(r, \theta, t) = 0$," and that function intelligibly relates its current position and motion to other positions and motions at other times. Again, if one asks what the liver is doing at present, one cannot answer it in its postabsorptive phase without understanding, among other things, that phase in its intelligible relations to its absorptive phase. Likewise, to give a fully explanatory answer to what the present higher system as operator is doing, one must say that it is an operator which is intrinsically and intelligibly related to successive operators and thereby, to a whole intelligibly linked sequence of operators. By dint of being so linked, there is already 'directedness.' And if the later operators in that series can also be explanatorily characterized as "increasingly differentiated higher integrations," then one has the explanatory reformulation of the core of descriptive discernment.

Thus Lonergan's treatment of development as "a linked sequence of operators characterized by increasingly differentiated higher integrations" reveals the possibility of a kind of teleology that is compatible with modern science. The idea of such a sequence is not the idea of a not-yet actualized 'final cause' in Aristotle's strict sense. It is, rather, an intelligible *process* characterizing a temporal series of observable events, much as the orbital functions which follow from the work of Kepler or Newton or Einstein are intelligible patterns characterizing a series of observable planetary positions over time.

order. It does mean, however, that the 'in some fashion' would have to be transcendently different from a 'push' or a *finite human finality* or even "a linked sequence of operators characterized by increasingly differentiated higher integrations."

(G) EVOLUTION AND EMERGENT PROBABILITY

While Lonergan has shown that it is possible to conceive of a kind of teleological process — development — which is compatible with modern science, there has arisen, of course, a more fundamental objection to the affirmation of a teleological dimension of nature — namely, that arising from the fact of randomness. Even if one must admit that there is an intelligible directedness operative in organic developments such as that found in the embryo, the larger context of biological phenomena, it may be argued, is not strictly comparable. Indeed, it might be argued, natural evolution proceeds, not in the directed fashion of the developing embryo, but according to merely chance variations. Hence, the outcomes of evolution can in no sense be said to exhibit any sort of directedness. They are merely the outcomes of blind chance. If the variations are chance, then the outcomes are likewise merely matters of chance. And chance, far from being teleological, is its very antithesis.

Let us see how Lonergan's work provides a different interpretation of the fact of randomness in nature. Far from denying objective randomness in nature, Lonergan both admits its possibility and indeed its extreme likelihood (1992: 76, 120, 287). Again, far from positing an additional vitalistic force in nature as a whole to provide the drive of underlying evolution and thereby to overcome the factor of chance, Lonergan explicitly denies the objectivity of such a force, regarding its postulation as 'counterpositional.' (1992:504-507) His own way of understanding the role of randomness in evolutionary process involves a radical return to the very roots of modern science, and the retrieval of a more fundamental interpretation of both its 'mechanical' origins, and as well a nuanced understanding of the meaning of 'statistical residues.' Let us see how he does this.

First, Lonergan goes behind the mechanistic and deterministic accounts ('cover stories' as to what modern scientists are doing when they are doing modern science) to the originating cognitional activities of the modern scientists themselves. In so doing, he pinpoints the types of insights which grasp correlations of data, and the types of formulations of those insights which are 'explanatory correlations.' One of his great contributions in this line of intentionality analysis is the discovery that purely explanatory correlations, or 'classical laws,' are inherently abstract (1992: 112-113). No concrete or even idealized processes can be derived from pure classical laws alone. *Arrangements*

of masses or charges or energies or temperatures or fields or molecules or cells, must be *assumed* in addition to the classical laws themselves. These arrangements are needed to determine how, when, and where the abstract classical laws govern the interactions of things with one another. Only by introducing additional ideas about arrangements is it possible to obtain the particular combination of classical laws which characterize processes such as orbital motion, simple harmonic motion, wave diffusion, heat flow, chemical reactions, or the formation of a bacterial colony. Such arrangements constitute the *conditions* for such processes, conditions which are in no way determined or guaranteed by the classical laws alone.

Hence, there is a second, separate component in scientific research which consists in the exploration of the various arrangements of conditions under which classical processes operate. As it happens, the arrangements scientific investigators tend to think up most often tend to have a symmetrical pattern or order which makes it easy to solve and characterize the temporal unfolding of the process. Furthermore, when processes unfold under the control of these symmetrical sorts of conditions, they constitute what Lonergan called 'systematic processes.' On the other hand, symmetrical arrangements are not necessarily the only ones possible; it is also possible to conceive of patterns of conditions which would provide the bases for 'non-systematic processes.' While it is possible to conceive of such processes, direct intellectual comprehension of the intelligibility of the details of their unfolding is formidable. What one can do instead in the cases of non-systematic processes is to develop explanatory categories of the different types of events included in them, and to determine the actual relative frequencies and ideal relative frequencies ('probabilities') of occurrence of those events. The 'non-systematic divergence' of actual frequencies of events from ideal probabilities is the basic meaning of 'randomness.'²²

While non-systematic processes have conditions under which they operate, so also the events which occur in non-systematic processes can in turn become the conditions for subsequent processes. While these subsequent processes may themselves also be non-systematic, they are not necessarily so, and here lies Lonergan's great genius in thinking about the evolutionary process of the universe. The consideration of a the particular type of systematic process which Lonergan calls a

²² For a detailed discussion, see Lonergan 1992: 70-82, 109-121.

'scheme of recurrence' (1992: 141-143) leads him to a theory about the emergence of genuine novelty. What distinguishes a scheme of recurrence within the general field of systematic processes is that its events are linked by classical laws into repetitive patterns (141). Like all other systematic processes, a scheme of recurrence will actually function only under specific conditions, and the specific conditions are those required by the scheme's particular combination of classical laws. Again, as with all other systematic processes, particular combinations of classical laws characterizing schemes of recurrence in no way determine or account for the actual occurrence of its requisite conditions. What can provide the fulfillment of those conditions is an actual combination of events which conforms to ideal probabilities arising from non-systematic processes.

Hence, non-systematic processes can occasionally give rise to sets of events which provide the fulfilling conditions for this or that particular scheme of recurrence. More significantly, because random events occur according to probabilities, such sets of events occur eventually and with greater or lesser frequencies. Hence, the randomness of events is, in a sense circumscribed in a non-systematic way by objective probabilities. Thus non-systematic sets of events can provide the fertile conditions for the emergence of schemes of recurrence, and when they do, systematic processes emerge from non-systematic ones.

Moreover, certain schemes can themselves function as fulfilling conditions for other schemes. In this way there is formed a "series of schemes of recurrence" (1992: 142). When this happens, the stages in the series itself are "increasingly systematic" (1992: 149). Now such a series exhibits a 'directedness' which is in many ways very similar to that of the "linked sequence of operators characterized by increasingly differentiated higher integrations" of development. Yet there is a major difference between the directedness of what Lonergan calls 'development,' and the directedness of what he calls 'emergent probability.' The major difference is in how the conditions for the emergence of new schemes are fulfilled. In development, those conditions are fulfilled by the very functioning of the previous stage of the higher system itself — which means, there is a systematic functioning which brings about the conditions for emergence. But in the general case of emergent probability, the conditions are only fulfilled non-systematically, although in conformity with probabilities.

All this is to say that one can indeed speak of the directedness or teleology of particular evolutionary sequences in a way that is both

meaningful, and compatible with modern science. Explanatory teleology is compatible with modern science, for it takes its stand on answering comprehensively the questions about how things are actually related to one another. Explanatory teleology thus is discriminating, for it realizes that intelligible answers to questions are not all of one kind. There are intelligible relations formulated in abstract classical laws, but there are also intelligible relations between abstract classical laws and the conditions under which their relations are actualized. The intelligibilities of those conditions are of several types. The conditions can be governed by the ordering of a "linked sequence of operations," or they can be governed by probabilities. In the former case, explanatory directedness becomes evident only when one recognizes that probabilities themselves can change (increase) when the total set of conditions for later schemes include earlier schemes.

Yet one may still have the lingering question about the finality of the universe as a whole. It may be true that organic developments and even certain sequences of evolutionary process can be conceived of as teleological. But what of Evolution as a whole? Can it, too, be said to have a directedness to it, or are developments and evolutionary sequences mere isolated pockets of directedness in a vast sea of flux? This is not just a question for explanatory reformulation, but also a question for judgment, and we take it up in our next sections on verification.

(H) EMPIRICAL VERIFICATIONS

One might say it is all very interesting to have devised a framework for talking about teleological issues which is compatible with modern science and which, in addition, manages to prescind from counterpositional and descriptive approaches to teleology. But, it might be objected, this is all ultimately nothing but metaphysical speculation, since none of it can be empirically verified. As C. F. Wolff said concerning the preformationist idea of the complete, mature structuring of the zygote, "what [one] does not see, is not there" (Coleman, 41), and no one has ever seen 'directedness.' In this final section we take up this issue of the possibility of verifying teleological assertions. The present section will proceed through the following stages: (1) verification as following the type of insight to be verified; (2) empirical

verification of “flexible circles of ranges of schemes of recurrence,” of “a linked sequence of operators characterized by increasingly differentiated higher integrations,” and of specific instances of emergently probable evolutionary sequences; (3) verification of human finality. Subsequent sections will take up verification of the finality of the universe as a whole, and the question of whether there is reason to hope for the fulfillment of the finality of the universe.

(1) Verification in General

First, verification is a matter of affirmative judgment. As Lonergan has argued, judgments are what they are by virtue of their positions in the dynamic structure of human consciousness. As such, judgments come as responses to Is it so? questions. In turn, the ‘it’ in Is it so? refers to a propositional expression of an insight or set of insights. In addition, a judgment is rational — authentically answers the Is it so? question — insofar as it issues from a reflective insight grasping the conditioned proposition as ‘virtually unconditioned.’

Implicit in this structure is a principle: namely, that judgment is with regard to the ‘direct borrowed content’ (1992: 300-301) of formulations. Hence, verification processes inevitably vary according to, and are adapted in conformity with, the insights and formulations which postulate the ‘conditioned.’ Reflective intelligence receives its ‘conditioned’ from the addition of the ‘Is it so?’ question to formulations of direct insights. The work of reflection proper begins as reflective intelligence endeavors to figure out the ‘link’ — or more often, several alternative possible ‘links’ — between the ‘conditioned’ and the ‘conditions’ according to which affirmative judgment would be reasonable. This link to conditions is what reflective intelligence demands before it will grant unconditional, rational assent. Reflection continues beyond the search for links when it endeavors to establish whether or not such conditions are indeed fulfilled. The conditions can be empirically given data, or the absence of further pertinent questions, or satisfaction of syntactical rules, or, most often, intricate combinations of all three.

Hence, there is not one and the same verification procedure for each and every judgment. The paths to reflective understanding are subtle, complex and commonly tortuous. This is evident from the very structure of Lonergan’s chapter in *Insight* on “Reflective Understand-

ing." Its eight substantive sections, arranged in a cumulative order, take up the different reflective processes pertaining to a strategic set of nine types of judgments. To sum up, specific verification procedures are differentiated from one another according to the differences among the formulated insights to be verified.

(2) Empirical Verification of Flexible Circles of Ranges of Schemes of Recurrence

For the most part I have been considering teleological issues regarding empirical phenomena, and I wish to argue that most of these are not matters of metaphysical speculation but of empirical verification. For that reason it is convenient to begin with the question of the 'purpose' of the mature organ or organism, for in its explanatory reformulation the answer to that question prescind from any assertion of immanent directedness. The absence of the issue of directedness helps isolate for consideration other factors which tend to obfuscate the issue of whether or not explanatory directedness is itself verifiable in properly teleological contexts.

We saw in §E that the explanatory reformulation of the question of the purpose of the organ or organism became the question of the role played by the organ or organism in the 'flexible circle of ranges of schemes of recurrence.' Hence the question of verification of the explanatory function of the organ becomes a question of verifying one's proposed account of that circle.

This task in itself is not simple, for a 'flexible circle of ranges of schemes of recurrence' can no more be 'seen there' than can a preformed miniature organism. But, as Lonergan has pointed out, to insist that one's insights must have sensible consequences does not mean that one must be literally able to 'see' the contents of those insights. Indeed, this is strictly impossible. Only acts of intelligence, not acts of sense, have the capacity for consciousness of intelligibilities. Neither does the insistence on sensible consequences mean that these consequences must be simple. Under the topic of what he calls "The Canon of Selection," Lonergan notes,

However the neatness and simplicity of the canon of selection can prove a trap for the unwary. If the canon demands sensible consequences, still it is satisfied when those consequences are so slight that only an expert equipped with elaborate apparatus

can detect them. If the sensible consequences must be involved by the correlation or law or expectation, still grasping that implication may suppose a profound mastery of a field, a capacity to follow recondite and intricate mathematical operations, and the audacity necessary to form new, primitive concepts and to follow long chains of abstract reasoning (1992: 95).

Certainly the history of biology in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries exemplifies the picture Lonergan paints. It was not until the 1850s that microscopes with resolving power sufficient for careful study of tissue and cellular structures were developed (Coleman: 22-23). Advances in optical theory were needed, first to guide microscopic technology and then to justify the interpretation of what was seen at the eyepiece. Again, a line of research into the biochemical bases of organic functioning that has stretched from the study of oxygen respiration by Priestly and Lavoisier in the 1770s through the monumental work of Claude Bernard (in the period of 1840s to 70s) to the present has been marked by a series of intertwined innovations in theories, techniques, and apparatuses that have made the connections between idea and sensible consequences wondrously intricate.

Hence, the process of verifying an account of organic function is complex. The intricacies of the insights underlying 'flexible circles of ranges of schemes of recurrence' have given rise to a parallel intricacy in verification procedures. Along the way it has led and will continue to lead to revisions and then further revisions of the initial proposed 'models' of the flexible circles. These verification processes stretch across several laboratories and indeed many generations of scientists as 'further relevant questions' are posed, insights are sought and attained to answer them, and ever wider ranges of data are brought to light for reflection.

But there is another issue affecting the verification of anything as complex as a 'flexible circle of ranges of schemes of recurrence.' Anything so complex will involve the intelligible relationship of components presently functioning to components not presently functioning. Suppose the organism dies before the transition from one of its phases to another takes place. Would there then be empirical data to confirm one's account of the 'flexible circle of ranges of schemes of recurrence'? This question draws attention to the fact that any scheme, however complex, can actually function only insofar as "other things [remain] equal," (Lonergan, 1992: 74). The conditions or 'other things'

can remain equal in virtue of the functioning of some still wider flexible circle; but ultimately the widest such circle is itself dependent upon 'other things' which are fulfilled only non-systematically in accord with probabilities. Hence, sooner or later a significant set of conditions fails to be fulfilled and schemes, simple and complex, break down.

How, then, is it possible to verify a 'flexible circle' if there are not always data on all of its subfunctions and if, in addition, it breaks down before some of them ever function? The question requires a distinction for its answer: on the one hand, insofar as one is giving an account of the functioning of this particular deceased entity and its particular 'flexible circle,' then one can only say there is no empirical evidence that it actually exhibited its unrealized phases. But on the other hand, insofar as one is considering this entity as one that *is similar in all pertinent respects to others* which did not die, and insofar as there is empirical evidence for the intelligible relations between the phases which function in their 'flexible circles,' there is a basis for affirming the operation of entire 'flexible circle' in the case of the deceased entity as well. The entity failed to exhibit sensible consequences, not because the 'flexible circle' was not 'there to be seen,' but because 'other things' did not remain equal. These observations provide the basis for saying that the entity's stages which did appear were modes of or components in a larger, operative flexible circle, and that it was this larger flexible circle which was actually functioning throughout.

(3) Empirical Verification of Development

What has just been said regarding the problems of verifying the flexible circle hold true for the "linked sequence of operators characterized by increasingly differentiated higher integrations." Lonergan stated the fundamental precept of genetic method to be "Specify the [linked sequences of] operator[s]" (1992: 491). To that precept there follows its corollary: "Work out the sensible consequences of such linked sequences, and determine if they are fulfilled under the relevant conditions."²³ Linked sequences of operators are not directly sensible, but they do have directly and indirectly sensible consequences which form the basis for verifying them. As with the flexible circles, linked sequences of operators also possess a complexity in which certain of

²³ For Lonergan's own brief account of elements in this process, see 1992: 491.

their stages are not currently operative, but are intelligibly linked with stages that do have presently sensible consequences. Again, as with any scheme of recurrences, a higher-system-as-operator functions only insofar as other things remain equal. When the 'other things' change, a flexible circle may shift from one of its phases to another, or it may cease altogether. Similarly, when 'other things' alter, a sequence of operators may exhibit its 'minor flexibility' (1992: 478-479), or may also perish. Hence, under varying conditions, any individual instance of an intelligible sequence of operators may follow a somewhat different series of stages than another individual of the same species, or it may fail to reach maturity altogether. Nevertheless, as in the case of the flexible circles, we may say that the operations the organism did perform were indeed operations of a larger, complex intelligible pattern. We may also add that *because* in this case that larger, complex pattern was a pattern of linked operators, its functioning possessed an immanent explanatory directedness even though that directedness never reached its mature term.

The verification of instances of organic directedness or teleology should by no means be expected to be simple. What I have tried to show here, however, is how Lonergan's work has removed the objections that 'in principle' teleological assertions of this type are not compatible with scientific insistence on empirical verification.

(4) Empirical Verification of Instances of Emergently Probable (Evolutionary) Sequences

Organic development possesses a methodological advantage not shared by evolutionary process in general — namely, species are made up of *individuals* which differ from one another only by their empirically residual differences.²⁴ Hence, methodologically a scientist can draw upon data from many individuals to work out and verify the complexities of the linked sequence of operators.

Natural evolution, on the other hand, takes this advantage away from the investigator. Emergence of new schemes of recurrence and

²⁴ This of course is a methodological idealization. Seldom if ever do even members of the same variety of the same species differ only by their merely empirically residual individuality. It seems, however, that biologists are tacitly aware of this and tend to employ techniques which enable them to prescind from slight intelligible differences among individuals that have few if any consequences for the insights they are attempting to verify.

their associated species and things seems to regard quite unique processes (at least at higher levels of complexity). Again, repetitions of gestational processes can be repeated as often as the fertility cycle of the species allows, but millions of years might be needed to allow for repetitions of evolutionary processes, and in the meantime altogether too many of the 'other things' would have also evolved, leaving very little 'equal' in the field of conditions.

These are some of the inherent difficulties of verification in the field of evolutionary biology. Lonergan's explanatory nuancing of Darwinism (1992: 154-157, 290-291) does not eliminate these difficulties. Even so, evolutionary biologists have been slowly and steadily working out ever more ingenious and subtle ways of successfully testing hypothetical accounts of evolutionary origins. Lonergan's reformulations of emergent probability in more strictly explanatory terms can only be expected to purify such procedures. Thus, while verifying hypothetical accounts of evolutionary directedness is an exceedingly difficult task, it is not an impossible one.

(5) Verification and Human Finality

Questions regarding human finality (teleology) really deserve a separate and far more detailed treatment than can be attempted here. Indeed, the major thrust of the present paper has been to answer the objections to the very notion of teleology in general which underpin the more specific rejections of the notion of a 'natural' teleological dimension to being human. Nevertheless, I believe a few brief remarks are called for here.

First, human finality can be affirmed, and indeed Lonergan has shown that such an affirmation is an immediate corollary to self-affirmation. For self-affirmation is the affirmation of a 'unity, identity, whole' characterized by a structured intentionality. In that structure, certain cognitional acts are related to one another by different types of acts of questioning. Questions are instances of 'operators' as conscious; by their very occurrence they promote a transformation of the *de facto* constitution of the human subject. Because questions occur, not in isolation but in a structured, explanatory pattern of relations with other acts and questions, they form a 'linked sequence' of operators. Building on this affirmation of human intentional finality, Lonergan shows that, unlike finite sequences of organic operators, human self-

transcendence is intrinsically unrestricted. Each human has an unrestricted desire to know and love which underpins his or her human living, whether or not that desire is ever fulfilled, whether or not it is distorted and betrayed.

My second point is that with such assertions Lonergan left the field of empirical method restricted to *sensible* consequences. There is a remote possibility that someone could discover and verify the explanatory terms and relations of Lonergan's cognitional structure on the basis of the sensible data of human behavior alone; but this is highly unlikely. The fact of the matter, of course, is that Lonergan himself did not do so, nor did he invite his readers to do so. The basis of the verification of his account of human finality is the broader field of, not just sensible data, but experiential data which also includes the data of consciousness. The ultimate standard for the veracity of Lonergan's account of the structure of human conscious functioning and its dynamic dimension, is the givenness of the acts *to the conscious subject him- or herself* engaged in the conscious activity of attempting to verify that account. Likewise, the affirmation of the unrestrictedness of that dynamism rests upon the givenness-to-self of genuine questions about whether anything lies beyond the horizon of the desire to know and love — because that desire is itself manifest in questions (Lonergan, 1992: 372). Thus, with human finality, the question of verification requires a broadening of the field to that of 'generalized empirical method' (1992: 96).

A third set of remarks concerns some of the implications of such an affirmation. Because of the unrestrictedness of the desire to know and love, human finality possesses an awesome flexibility, well beyond anything imaginable in the realm of organic development. Hence, the generalized empirical study of human teleology demands a far greater intricacy. In the first place, human intentionality is not disembodied. Hence, the sequence of intentional operators needs to be understood in its relationships to sequences of human organic and psychic operators (1992: 492-504). Again, since the individual human being, no less than the biological organism, "is only a component in the whole schematic circle of events" (1992: 156), so also the finality of the communal and historical dimension of human existence would have to be part of the explanatory study of human finality. That is to say, such considerations lead to the recognition that human teleology is inevitably realized in community and in tradition, the very issues that MacIntyre has been working at for over a decade. Lastly, there is the set of issues

raised by Lonergan's discovery of *feelings* (intentional responses to value) as self-transcending (1972:31-38) — what sort of 'operators' such feelings are, how they are related to organic, psychic and cognitional operators. These are indeed an intricate set of further issues, from which this paper must prescind. Complicated though these questions are, their answers are neither unverifiable nor incompatible with modern science — provided one is willing to admit the fact that, insofar as modern science restricts itself to formulations which must have sensible consequences, it cannot deny the possibility of other modes of verification.

(I) MACINTYRE RECONSIDERED

At this point it might be worthwhile to return briefly to MacIntyre's remarks that Aristotle's account of the virtues needs to be redeveloped because it is grounded in his 'metaphysical biology.' I presume what he has in mind is something like the following: Aristotle assumed that each entity had a specific, in-born potential for an end. But evolutionary biology has revealed that species can be transmuted so that things do not, after all, have specific ends which stand as perfections of their in-born potentialities. Hence, it is no longer possible to speak of the virtues as perfections of human natural potentials.

If I am correct in my hunch about what MacIntyre meant, I think two kinds of responses can be developed on the basis of Lonergan's work. First, suppose an offspring of two parents of species *S* possesses a genetic mutation which alters its sequence of operators in such a way that its term is not a flexible circle characteristic of species *S*, but instead one characteristic of a new species, *S'*. (Lonergan refers to this as the 'major flexibility' of development, 1992: 479.) Such a set of circumstances, however, does not really negate the idea that this offspring does have a definite finality. It only indicates that the offspring has a finality different from that of its parents. No doubt this would run counter to an Aristotelian expectation that offspring ought to have exactly the same nature as that of their parents, but that does not really go to the heart of what MacIntyre seems to interpret as the basic problem with Aristotle's foundation of the virtues.

But a somewhat more sophisticated objection might be raised: it may well be that the offspring has the finality of species *S'*, but this would not be known until it reached this transmuted end. Until that

happened — and possibly even after it happened — one would *expect* it to have the natural end of its parental species, S. Thus the idea that each thing has its own nature has little or no predictive value, and cannot therefore be used to guide expectations about natural perfections of entities. To this I think the proper reply involves drawing a distinction between non-human and human finality.

Non-human development is not immanently guided by intelligence. It simply follows the patterns determined by the linked sequence of operators in their flexible unfolding under a range of 'external' conditions. Hence, it is no doubt quite difficult if not practically impossible to possess infallible expectations (grounded in empirical determinations) as to whether or not a given individual actually possesses the same finality as its parents. Nevertheless, that practical impossibility does not affect the fact that this particular entity does have a finality and, 'other things being equal,' would arrive at corresponding natural end-state flexible circles of functioning.

In human development, however, the operators themselves are intelligent. Human development is effected through a sequence of questions and answers. Included in this sequence are questions about properly human finality, and answers to such questions form expectations which can and do indeed guide the sequence itself. Moreover, because the fundamental operator of the sequence is the pure *unrestricted* desire to know and love, answers to questions about human finality are met with further questions until there are "no further pertinent questions" on that topic. In other words, the pure, unrestricted desire to know and love takes on the role given the human natural potential in Aristotle's thought. Far from being a feature of a metaphysics rooted either in an outdated biology or in specifically Hellenic cultural assumptions, *this* notion of human finality is compatible with modern science (and, arguably, with any successor science). Moreover, it transcends the limitations of any particular culture's vision of the good life, for it is the source from which such ideas arise, and as well the source from which criticism and revision of such visions emerge. Lonergan's account of human finality has these features because it rests, not on an direct account of the *end* to be realized, but upon a heuristic account of how that end is to be realized.

(J) AFFIRMATION OF THE FINALITY OF THE UNIVERSE

One thing that is truly remarkable about Lonergan's metaphysics is his affirmation of the finality, not just of organic development or human existence or even limited instances of evolutionary process, but of the universe as a whole. Indeed his statement of that affirmation is striking:

[F]inality, then, is the dynamic aspect of the real. To affirm finality is to disagree with the Eleatic negation of change. It is to deny that this universe is inert, finished, static, complete.... It is an affirmation that may turn out to have implications for the future, but such implications are a further question, for finality is an affirmation of fact and fact pertains not to the future but to the present and to the past.... Finality means not merely dynamism but *directed dynamism*. It neither denies nor minimizes such facts as entropy, cataclysm, the death that follows every birth, the extinction that threatens every survival. It offers no opinion on the ultimate fate of the universe. But it insists that the negative picture is not the whole picture (1992: 472).

What could possibly be the basis for so sweeping, universal and unabashed an affirmation? Surely it cannot be sensible data (at least not only such data), for the range is completely universal, and who could experience every sensible aspect of this universe? Moreover, it is an affirmation which is apparently unaffected by yet-to-be-sensed empirical data in the future. Might not periods of evolutionary emergence alternate randomly with periods of massive extinction so that no overarching intelligible pattern of directedness could be affirmed at all? If there is such an overarching directedness, would not its affirmation require knowledge of probabilities and actual frequencies whose empirical determination must wait upon the arrival of sensible data from the future? Finally, neither can the relevant conditions for the affirmation of the finality of the universe as a whole be the direct data of consciousness alone, for those data in themselves only provide the grounds for affirmations of one's own conscious activities and the fact of oneself as performing them.

Yet there is another route to such an affirmation in Lonergan's view, for the affirmation of the finality of the universe is the affirmation of "a *theorem* of the same generality as the notion of being," a theorem which "affirms a parallelism between the dynamism of the mind and the dynamism of proportionate being" (1992: 470). Now to

speak of a 'parallelism' — or to use Lonergan's more technical term 'isomorphism' (1992: 424, 475) — that obtains between the structure of knowing and the structure of the known, suggests that the affirmation is analogical. Hence, Lonergan's affirmation of the finality of the whole universe is based upon the affirmation of an analogy, or isomorphism, between the dynamic structure of human knowing and what is so known.

An analogy (or proportion) is a statement of limited identity that involves four sets of terms and their relations. In the analogy, $A:B::C:D$, A has a relation to B (symbolized by the colon between them), and C has a relation to D. The double set of colons between B and C symbolizes that the two relations are identical; the relations are identical even though the terms need not be.

The mathematical concept of isomorphism extends this analogous mode of thought into more complicated fields. Consider a field of numbers; it has a potentially infinite multitude of terms, implying at least as multitudinous a set of relations among those numbers. Suppose one wished to compare that set of terms and relations to the set of terms and relations comprising the segments of a line. Are the relations among the line segments the same as the relations among the numbers? To answer Yes is to affirm an isomorphism between these two quite different fields (numbers and line segments).

Still, how could one go about arriving at such an affirmation? The potential infinity of relations in each of the two sets seems to pose an enormous, insoluble task of comparison. Mathematicians solve this task, where it is soluble, not by comparing the members of two infinite series one-by-one, but by discovering some limited set of operations on the basis of which all other relations among the terms can be constructed. For example, a mathematician might take addition and subtraction as basic for numbers, and take splicing and slicing as basic for line segments. The mathematician then attempts to show that if all corresponding combinations of basic operations in the two fields yield exactly corresponding results, then an isomorphism exists.

Lonergan does something similar in establishing his 'theorem.' The two fields in his case are the human acts of cognition on the one hand, and the realities of the universe (proportionate being) on the other. The basic terms in the cognitional field are experiencing, understanding, and affirmation; the basic operations are direct inquiry and Is it so? inquiry. The basic terms in the field of the universe are potency, form and act. The question for affirmation, then, is whether

there is a mode of operation in the universe which exactly corresponds to the mode of operations of human inquiry. Is it so? That is to say, is it true that to every result of the sequence, experiencing-inquiry-understanding-affirmation, there corresponds a unified reality, potency-form-act? And if so, what corresponds to the direct and reflective inquiries in the universe itself?

To pose the questions in this fashion can facilitate the grasp of a virtually unconditioned basis for an affirmative answer to the first of them. There is indeed a one-to-one correspondence between each sequence, experiencing-inquiry-understanding-Is it so?-affirmation, and each proportionate reality of the universe, potency-form-act. Why? Notice, to begin with, I do not say there is a correspondence between any sequence of human cognitional activities whatever, and proportionate realities. It is *only* the sequences of cognitional activities that terminate in acts of *affirmation* that can be truly said to correspond to proportionate realities. This is because knowledge of what *is* is attained *only in affirmations*. These acts alone satisfy the demands made by the self-transcending question, *Is it so?*

Nor should one think of such sequences as simple. Although only three terms — experiencing, understanding, affirming — are used in specifying the structure of knowing, this is after all only a schematic shorthand. The actual unfolding of sequences of knowing almost always involves multiplicities of further questions about rough, initial insights, numerous further insights which correct and smooth out the problems detected by further questions, attention to elements of experience hitherto overlooked, and so on, as human thought winds its way toward a grasp of a virtually unconditioned. If the schema — experiencing, understanding, affirming — is to be taken literally, it can only mean what is affirmed is the rounded and corrected understanding that comes at the end of this process, and that understanding really does pertain to what is experienced in the range of experiencing that is ultimately found to be relevant during the process. Then the affirmation affirms that this nuanced and corrected understanding *truly is the intelligibility of what is given* in that range of experiencing. Affirmation confers a highly privileged status to whatever it affirms, the status of really existent intelligible organization of potency. Hence, there is always a one-to-one correspondence between the structure of an actual instance of human knowing and what *is* and is so known in that instance. Finally, precisely because the overarching structure of human knowing is an *unrestricted* desire to know, there is no propor-

tionate reality beyond its reach. Hence, not only those proportionate realities which have actually and truly been humanly affirmed are isomorphic to human knowing, but all proportionate realities possess that isomorphic correspondence. Lonergan sums up this issue in the following terms:

The correct locus of the parallel is to be found in the dynamic structure of our knowing. Inquiry and understanding presuppose and complement experience; reflection and judgment presuppose and complement understanding. But what holds for the activities also holds for the contents. What is known inasmuch as one is understanding presupposes and complements what is known by experiencing; and what is known inasmuch as one is affirming presupposes and complements what is known by understanding. Finally, the contents of cognitional acts either refer to the known or are identical with the known, and so the dynamic structure of knowing is also the structure of proportionate being (1992: 511).

Let us now turn to the second question. If it is true that there is an isomorphism between experiencing-understanding-judging and potency-form-act, then what in the universe itself corresponds to the operations — direct and reflective inquiries — which constitute the relations between the cognitional acts? The answer is *finality*, and finality is known, not directly, but analogously. That is to say, to affirm a parallel structure is not simply to affirm a one-to-one correspondence between the acts and their contents. That much is self-evident. Rather, it is to say that, just as the acts are intrinsically constituted by their relations to one another, so also the contents are ontologically constituted by their relations to one another. They are what they are by their relations; their relations are isomorphic to the relations among the cognitional activities. But those cognitional relations are intrinsically dynamic. Therefore, the ontological relations are intrinsically dynamic. This point is most emphatic in the case of the metaphysical element, potency. Notice that, according to Lonergan's definition, potency is not merely the content of an act of experiencing. As a mere content of experiencing, it would lack metaphysical significance — it would have no *known* relation to what *is*. The content of an act of experiencing becomes metaphysically significant only when its relation to *what is* is somehow specified. In the case of potency this is done by the emergence of questions. Questions *reveal*, although they do not settle, the *relation* of contents of experiencing to what is. That is to

say, potency is defined by experiencing under the sway of the intellectual drive to understand and know.

The objective ground of this open dynamism [of the universe] is potency. For potency is what is to be known by the *intellectually patterned experience of the empirical residue*. But intellectually patterned experience is dynamic; it is experience under some heuristic structure that is derived from the detached and disinterested desire to know; it is experience dominated by that desire. And the dynamic orientation of such experience no less than the experience itself has its counterpart in proportionate being (1992: 471. Emphasis added.).

In particular instances, the dynamic aspect can be known directly — as when specific developmental sequences of operators, or specific sequences of evolutionary emergence are empirically verified. But the general case is affirmed analogously (isomorphically) on the basis of the self-affirmed structure of human knowing. But does the general case include just the dynamic relation of this or that potency to its form and act in proportionate being, but not the universe as a whole? The answer to this last query comes from focusing on the fact that potency is not defined just as “intellectually patterned experience,” but as “intellectually patterned experience *of the empirical residue*.” This last nuance reveals the universality of the dynamic character of the universe. The ‘empirical residue’ consists of merely empirically given spatial and temporal differences, merely empirically given spatial and temporal continuities, mere spatial and temporal coincidences that constitute merely random divergences. The ‘empirical residue’ is the ‘whatever-it-takes’ to make it possible for something intelligible to be *given* to the experiencing of a finite consciousness. One may have a perfectly fine idea about something; that idea might or might not be in some realm other than proportionate being. But if that idea is going to be not only intelligible and actual, but also a component within *proportionate being*, it must also have empirical ‘givenness’ to it, and givenness as such is merely coincidental. It possess no immanent intelligibility of its own. Precisely as such, the empirical residue *is potentially open to any intelligible organization whatsoever*. That is to say, if one could speak of the ‘essence’ of potency, one would say that its ‘essence’ is to be dynamically directed toward intelligible organization. Since in every aspect and every detail, the experienceable, proportionate universe must, by definition, include

some element of potency, the universe as a whole is never without the dynamic aspect provided by potency as such.

Moreover, if this directedness is known through the analog of the *unrestricted* desire to know, then potency in its very being has a directedness toward unrestricted intelligible formation. This means that no finite intelligible systematization will exhaust this dynamic directedness of potency. Whatever aspects of potency are brought under some finite order, other aspects will remain, analogically speaking, to pose an ontological problem for further real emergence. As Lonergan put it:

[The universe's] potential unity is grounded in conjugate prime potency, in the merely empirical conjunctions and successions that constitute the inexhaustible manifold of the merely coincidental that successive levels of forms and schemes bring under the intelligible control of system. Thus the merely coincidental becomes space-time through the interrelations of gravitation and electromagnetic theory. This displaces the coincidental to the level of physical events, where it is overcome by the higher unities... (1992: 533-4 See also 476).

Even cases of breakdowns, cataclysms and extinctions have a potentiality for higher integrations. The earliest stars formed in our universe, which emerged out of the coincidental manifolds of hydrogen and helium nuclei, appear to have exploded in supernovae. Yet in doing so they released a manifold of nuclei of higher elements that did not exist before they functioned, and that would not have provided the potency for higher chemical schemes had the schemes of the earliest stars continued to entrap them. The earliest organisms on the earth's surface appear to have been anaerobic unicellular organisms, which released oxygen as a by-product. This in turn transformed the atmosphere into a manifold which was eventually toxic to their functioning and led to their virtual extinction. The new coincidental aggregate of oxygen molecules, however, was potency to other and indeed more differentiated forms of biological functioning. These are among the instances of what is implied in speaking of the finality of the universe as 'displacing the coincidental' to a higher level.

Two cautions must be added. First, the parallelism of the dynamic structure of the proportionate universe with that of the human mind does not mean that the ontological path of emergences terminating at some particular proportionate being must, therefore, be exactly parallel in all its details to the cognitional activities employed by some investigator who arrives at his or her affirmation of that reality.

Indeed, the dead-ends in a line of investigation are dead ends precisely because they do not contain instances of the virtually unconditioned. And this means that they do not correspond to realities at all (except the realities of this human being's cognitional functioning). A second caution is that one must avoid the mistake of saying any *particular*, *finite* emergent proportionate being is *the* purpose for that line of emergence. (This is especially important in human affairs, where religious people often seem all too ready to declare that some particular outcome was God's purpose.) The *telos* of the universe remains unknown. Lonergan affirms that the universe is possessed of an 'upward directedness,' but is quick to add that its directedness is '*indeterminate*,' and is realized only non-systematically, in accord with probabilities (1992: 472-3, 475). That there is a finality to the universe, this can be affirmed. But just *what* the *end*, the *final cause* of that directedness is, this remains for the present shrouded in mystery.

(K) CAN THE FULFILLMENT OF THE FINALITY OF THE UNIVERSE BE AFFIRMED?

If neither modern science nor metaphysics grounded in self-appropriation can affirm anything about the end of the universe, nor perhaps even that it is realizable in time, is this the end of the discussion? Here, I believe, one may turn to the category of what Lonergan calls 'knowledge born of religious love' (1972: 115). The problem of the unknowability of the end of the universe is posed by the fact that potency has an inherently unrestricted directedness to it, but natural human acts of knowing are restricted, i.e., only *virtually* unconditioned. Religious love, however, is 'being in love in an *unrestricted* fashion' (1972: 105). At the very least religious love would seem to supply something additional, possibly capable of overcoming this limitation. Of course 'knowledge born of being in love in an unrestricted fashion' is largely a matter of believing the statements of beings that such love discerns to be in communion with its beloved. Hence there would have to be statements containing affirmations of an Unrestricted Intelligence about the end of the universe made available for acts of belief motivated by religious love.

Among the questions regarding the fulfillment of the finality of the universe is a very large one pertaining to sin. Sin is not natural. It

has been argued²⁵ that natural disasters prove no obstacle to the natural finality of the universe. But can the same be said of the disasters resulting from sin? Have they so distorted the very fabric of the universe that its natural teleology is hopelessly thwarted? If so, is there a supernatural agency operative which is capable of overcoming this source of disturbance? If so, is that agency not only overcoming the disturbance but also, beyond that, so transforming the finality of the universe that an even higher end is to be affirmed?

Clearly, these are questions for theological, not for metaphysical method. My objective here has been limited to the latter — to merely indicate how Lonergan may have cleared a place where the discussion of these issues might proceed without contradicting the normative achievements of modern science.

²⁵ See for example Lonergan, 1992: 689-692.

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“All my work has been introducing history into
Catholic theology”
(Lonergan, March 28, 1980)

Frederick E. Crowe

BACK IN 1977, Lonergan remarked that “The whole problem in modern theology, Protestant and Catholic, is the introduction of historical scholarship.”¹ Three years later he summarized his own lifework under that heading, declaring that “All my work has been introducing history into Catholic theology.”² At the same time he set that work within the wider context of the Second Vatican Council: “The meaning of Vatican II was the acknowledgement of history.”³

All three remarks were made in conversation, and survive on tape-recordings. They have a value like that of headlines in respectable newspapers: on the subjective side they focus our attention, perhaps even startle those less familiar with Lonergan; and on the objective side they bring a mass of confused data to a point, distill the very essence of the matter, something that can easily escape us in an hour-long lecture. My quotations may not startle anyone attending this workshop, but they are still useful to bring into focus what certainly has to be a major element in the Lonergan legacy, and to sharpen our overall view on what he was doing with his life.⁴

Well, that is one side of the story. I once read a headline that said, We are becoming a nation of headline readers. If that is not to be the case in Lonergan studies, we have the task of discovering what the headline means. When it means the events of a lifetime, and we have an hour in which to detail them, we must set limits to our task. My limits are those of a historical sketch; I will chart the course of this lifelong work, note transition points in the development of Lonergan's

¹ *The Question as Commitment*, ed. Elaine Cahn and Cathleen Going, Thomas More Institute: Montreal, 1977, 103.

² *Curiosity at the Center of One's Life: Statements and Questions of R. Eric O'Connor*, Ed. J. Martin O'Hara (Montreal: Thomas More Institute, 1984) 427.

³ *Curiosity*, 426.

⁴ Of course these brief 'headline' remarks omit the illuminating details, but that loss turns to the advantage of the secondary writer, who can fill them in and thus have something to contribute to a workshop such as this.

thought as the problem emerged ever more clearly, mark off the main steps in the history of his work on history.

A sketch has to be selective, so I reduce this long history to six steps. The first three deal with the period in which he had not fully adverted to the need, and takes us up to about 1959; the fourth step is full advertence, the turning point when he discovered the real problem and began to take tentative steps toward a solution; the fifth and sixth deal with the two main features of his final position, when he had managed to get it all together, insofar as it was given to him to do so in one lifetime.

To expand that table of contents a little, I locate the first step in the period 1933 to 1938, when Lonergan's interest was in the history that happens. The next is that of his doctoral dissertation, 1938-40, in which he begins his work on the history that is written, but confines the question to the history of speculative development. The third step turns from speculative to dogmatic development; the effort is to structure theology according to the two ways of analysis and synthesis, with the history of dogmatic development guided by the analytic process; and this reached its full development in his Trinitarian theology around 1957.⁵

Then there is a great leap forward in the late 1950s and the early 1960s, when Lonergan came to realize how important was the challenge of the German Historical School. This involved a radical change in his approach, so radical that I would make the realization itself a distinct step, quite apart from his efforts in this period to find a solution, though these also deserve our attention.

⁵The boundaries of Lonergan's focus on the analytic-synthetic structure are 1946, when he was teaching theology in Montreal and wrote the notes *De ente supernaturali* (unpublished, Lonergan Archives, Toronto) in the synthetic order, and 1964, when he was teaching in Rome and published the two volumes of *De Deo trino* (Rome: Gregorian University Press), one a work of analysis and the other a work of synthesis. But 1964 really falls in the next period; he had been moving out of the analytic-synthetic orbit since 1959 with his course *De intellectu et methodo*, and indeed had recorded his doubts on its adequacy in his 1954 article, 'Theology and Understanding' (*Collection* [Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, 4; Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988] 114-32; see the section on 'Contemporary Methodological Issues,' pp. 127-132). An interesting point: the first edition of vol. 1 of *De Deo trino* (Rome: Gregorian University Press, 1961) was subtitled *Pars analytica*; the second edition (1964) was subtitled *Pars dogmatica*. To be noted also: Lonergan, in finding the analytic-synthetic pair inadequate, did not repudiate it (see his 'Christology Today: Methodological Reflections,' *A Third Collection* [New York: Paulist Press, 1985] 74-99, at 96 n. 10).

The fifth step is the discovery of differentiations of consciousness as the subjective key to development in theology and so to history in that field, and this is the work of the late 1960s.⁶ The final step is the objective counterpart of differentiations of consciousness: stages of meaning in human development, subjective in each of us, but objective in the history that happens. (So we return to the theme of step one, but with a greatly enriched view of what happens in human development.) Lonergan's final word on this culminating step, I would say, is given in the unpublished paper of 1977-78, "Philosophy and the Religious Phenomenon."⁷

As you can see by now, Lonergan's introduction of history into Catholic thought starts with its introduction into his own thinking; his work was to make history intelligible in the context of a theology that was strong on tradition, and first of all intelligible to himself. This meant learning, and learning is a slow advance in tentative steps. So we do not expect to find Lonergan saying in 1928, "All my work will be to introduce history into Catholic theology." His idea of the task in hand evolved through forty years and more, and the outcome can hardly be understood except in terms of the massive maneuvering of his forces during all those years.⁸

⁶ Differentiations of consciousness is a term with a long and complex history in Lonergan, and it is difficult to decide where to stop the flow to examine progress. As we shall see, 1962 introduces the term in the present context, but the step is hardly completed before *Method in Theology* was written in 1971 (London: Darton, Longman & Todd; New York: Herder and Herder, 1972). A useful marker: 'Natural Knowledge of God' in 1969, defining undifferentiated consciousness and listing some differentiations in the new technical sense (*A Second Collection* [London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1974; Philadelphia: Westminster, 1975] 117-133, at 131-32). But there are anticipations long before; see Appendix C below.

⁷ This paper will be published in the Fall 1994 issue of *METHOD: Journal of Lonergan Studies* 12:2, along with studies of its content and its role in Lonergan's work.

⁸ I take occasion here to justify the procedure of this paper, which is to study the history of Lonergan's thinking on history rather than to start from his final position, build on it, relate it to current theology, and so on. There is a partial justification in the theme of the workshop: Lonergan's legacy. Immigrants to a new land work hard to give their children a better life, only to find sometimes that the third generation has little appreciation of the sacrifices made on their behalf; the same could happen in Lonergan studies. A better justification is the light which the genesis of a position throws on the position itself: the light that *Insight* brings to *Method in Theology*, that *Verbum* brings to *Insight*, that the unpublished writings of File 713 of the Lonergan papers bring to Lonergan's apprenticeship to Thomas Aquinas (I borrow the term from William Mathews). There is a third reason, perhaps the real one, that we all do what we can, and I am more at home in Lonergan's history than in bringing his thought to bear on current problems.

It should be understood, however, and is worth an explicit declaration, that we are dealing with a steady flow rather than with discrete building blocks. There is no sharp boundary between phase and phase of Lonergan's evolution. We do not cross Rubicons, rather we explore unmapped territory, reaching plateaus that enable us to see what we have traversed, sometimes following inadequate directions and retracing our steps, and so on. Thus stages of meaning, which assume new importance in 1977-78, were elaborated in *Method*, anticipated in the levels and sequences of expression of *Insight's* chapter 17, and have their roots in the writings of the 1930s (File 713 of the Lonergan Papers, Archives). Again, differentiations of consciousness are broached already in the three categories of *Insight*: common sense, theory, and interiority. And so also in other questions. But we have to stop the flow of history at certain points if we are going to give a manageable account of it.

A final introductory point: our interest is not in historical details but in the general structure of history. The question will not be of the type, which letters of Ignatius of Antioch are genuine? or who drafted *Pascendi* for Pius X? The purpose will rather be to take an X-ray of history.⁹ Our interest will be in the upper blade of empirical method rather than in the lower blade of particular data.¹⁰ All through the phases of his development, then, Lonergan was concerned, and we will be concerned in following his progress, with a theoretical component that combines with concrete data to mediate insight: the scissors action of empirical method.

⁹ A phrase Lonergan used to describe his work in *The Way to Nicea: The Dialectical Development of Trinitarian Theology*, trans. Conn O'Donovan (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1976) viii: "But the reader must be warned that we do not propose to add to erudition by research, or to clarify interpretation by study, or to enrich history with fresh information. Such functional specialities we presuppose. Our purpose is to move on to a fourth, to a dialectic that, like an X-ray, sets certain key issues in high relief to concentrate on their oppositions and their interplay."

¹⁰ One could speak, as Lonergan did at first, of the *a priori*, which has a legitimate use in any field of investigation (the *a priori* of possibilities), but the *a priori* seems sometimes to be rejected on principle (though how that is done without using an *a priori* premise I do not know), so it is better to use Lonergan's term of the upper blade. (His usage can be found through the index of such books as *Insight*, or *Understanding and Being*, or *Topics in Education* — all from the University of Toronto Press [Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan 3, 5, and 10 respectively, 1992, 1990, and 1993].) The alternative to the upper blade he called the principle of the empty head (*Method in Theology* 157).

1. THE HISTORY THAT HAPPENS, 1935-38

A first and basic distinction must be made between the history that happens and the history that is written about what happened. Both of these were part of Lonergan's thinking from the 1930s, and remained part of his thinking forty years later. But in 1938 the history that happens was the focus, and in 1978 it was the history that was written. Furthermore, when he spoke in 1968 of "the task of doing genuine history," a task that "confronts contemporary Catholic theologians with the most basic and far-reaching of problems,"¹¹ he did not mean the history that happens; we do not, except in a minimal sense, 'do' the history that happens. He meant the history that is written.

Nevertheless, the history that happens was a major question in Lonergan's own early thinking, probably because of the influence Hegel and Marx had on him in this largely undocumented period.¹² It remained a topic of major importance throughout his life; references in *Insight* to the same pair of thinkers indicate this, and his 1973 statement that chapter 20 of *Insight* presents the whole idea of the structure of history affirms it clearly enough.¹³ The most rewarding context in which to study this is the human good: "at the present time it would seem that the immediate carrier of human aspiration is the more concrete apprehension of the human good effected through such theories of history as the liberal doctrine of progress, the Marxist doctrine of dialectical materialism and, most recently, Teilhard de

¹¹ *A Second Collection* 96, in "Belief: Today's Issue," pp. 87-99. See also the quotation in my first paragraph, where the question is of introducing *historical scholarship*, again the history that is written.

¹² A letter Lonergan wrote to his Provincial Superior, Henry Keane, January 22, 1935, speaks (p. 5) of this influence; we hope to publish this letter in the biography being written by William Mathews. In another letter to Fr. Keane, written August 10, 1938, Lonergan reveals his hope of studying the 'essential branch of philosophy' that philosophy of history is, though it is 'not yet recognised' as such.

¹³ *A Second Collection* 272, in "Insight Revisited," 263-278. The structure is the familiar triad of progress, decline, and redemption, which are to be understood as operating not consecutively but simultaneously: we are always progressing, always declining, always being redeemed. See *Topics in Education* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993) 69, on 'intellectual development ... sin ... redemption': "in the concrete all three function together. They are intertwined. They do not exist in isolation, but they have to be described separately before they can be considered together."

Chardin's identification of cosmogenesis, anthropogenesis, and christogenesis."¹⁴

2. THE *GRATIA OPERANS* DISSERTATION

As time went on, the history that is written engaged Lonergan's interest more and more, and it is this history that he came eventually to regard as the real problem; the very term 'historical scholarship' that appears in my first paragraph is evidence of that, and all the rest of my paper will confirm it.

The first step in the long journey was taken in Lonergan's doctoral dissertation. I would not say that he knew he was taking such a step. He knew he was dealing with history; he knew that historians must exercise their understanding — the enemy at this stage is historical positivism; but he was still twenty years from experiencing and measuring the impact of the German Historical School. What he was specifically concerned with, as the subtitle shows, is the speculative development of thought on operative grace from Augustine to Thomas Aquinas.¹⁵ The study had to be historical, but without surrender to positivist principles, as if historical inquiry were conducted 'without a use of human intelligence.' Lonergan would find a middle course. "That middle course consists in constructing an *a priori* scheme that is capable of synthezizing any possible set of historical data irrespective of

¹⁴A *Second Collection* 7, in "The Transition from a Classicist World-View to Historical-Mindedness," 1-9, a paper of 1966. See also the 1976 paper, "Questionnaire on Philosophy," on liberal progress, Marxist dialectical materialism, and religious conversion (*METHOD: Journal of Lonergan Studies* 2/2 [October 1984] 1-35, at 14-19). The historical causality of Christ in history would have been a key factor in Lonergan's new Christology, had he lived to write it. Around 1963-64 with this in mind he began to draft a new theology of the redemption, but only recently have we brought together the various relevant files in his papers. Michael Shields is now at work on their ordering and translation.

¹⁵"*Gratia Operans: A Study of the Speculative Development in the Writings of St. Thomas Aquinas*. Being a thesis undertaken under the direction of the Rev. Charles Boyer, SJ, towards partial satisfaction of the conditions for the Doctorate in Sacred Theology, Rome, Gregorian University, 1940" (Lonergan Archives, Toronto). The thesis, considerably revised, was published in four articles in *Theological Studies* 1941-42, and the articles in turn were published in book form as *Grace and Freedom: Operative Grace in the Thought of St. Thomas Aquinas* (London: Darton, Longman & Todd; New York: Herder and Herder, 1971). The introductory pages to the dissertation, all-important for Lonergan's methodology, were not published till 1985 — see the next note.

their place and time, just as the science of mathematics constructs a generic scheme capable of synthetizing any possible set of quantitative phenomena."¹⁶

The *a priori* of 1940 is the upper blade of empirical method of 1953, and the search for this kind of understanding marks all Lonergan's work. The scheme in question here is "the general form of the speculative movement on the nature of grace from St. Augustine to St. Thomas."¹⁷ This will follow the general form of any speculative development, which oscillates between general and particular in the following way. We have an insight on a specific point; we generalize it and make it the whole explanation; we learn it is insufficient for a complete explanation, so we go behind it to a more general factor; we make this in its turn the whole explanation, only to discover that it too is insufficient by itself; we go back to our first insight, the specific one, but now we make a synthesis of the general and specific, and have a better approximation to a complete explanation.¹⁸

There are parallels in more familiar territory. For example, in a religious order silence is seen to be a good thing for a life of prayer, so a rule is laid down: Let there be silence. Then there's a fire in the house, and considerable damage is done because people kept silence too rigidly. So a specific rule is added: Let there be silence except when the house is on fire. And so on. For another example, in the church we might start with the people of God, the *laos*. But with this alone we get the disorders Paul talks of in 1 Corinthians 14. So it seems good to have leaders, those who oversee the operation, those who preside, elders who make decisions, and so on. This side may develop over two millennia, but eventually it too is found to be insufficient. And so on, once again.

Parallels from daily life are not as clear-cut as the form of speculative development, but they make the point in a rudimentary way, and enable us to avoid the heavy weather of Lonergan's doctoral dissertation. He could not take our easy way out, for he was dealing with actual history, a concrete case of speculative development; but using this constant form of the dialectic of particular and general discoveries, he was able to find an intelligible order in the work of theologians like Augustine, Abelard and Bernard Clairvaux, Peter

¹⁶ 'The *Gratia Operans* Dissertation: Preface and Introduction,' *METHOD: Journal of Lonergan Studies* 3:2 (October 1985) 9-49, at 11.

¹⁷ *Ibid.* 13.

¹⁸ Lonergan's own words are quoted in Appendix A below.

Lombard, Philip the Chancellor, Alexander of Hales and Albert the Great, and Thomas Aquinas (the latter in two distinct phases of his development).¹⁹

3. THE FORM OF DOGMATIC DEVELOPMENT

When Lonergan chose to work on Thomas Aquinas for his doctorate, it was more or less predetermined that the relevant field of history would be that of speculative development. But when he was assigned to teach theology, the context changed, and it was almost predetermined now that the relevant field of history would be that of dogmatic development. At any rate in the next step, as I read his history, we have the form of dogmatic rather than of speculative development.

The conceptual tool he uses now is easily traced to Aristotle and Aquinas. In the more dialectical form of speculative development (the previous step) one suspects the influence of Hegel and Marx to be operative still, but for the pair of analysis and synthesis, with their inverse orders, with their interlocking and their mutual conditioning, it is Aristotle and Thomas who are the teachers.

Lonergan liked to illustrate this pair of concepts in the field of chemistry. Analysis begins with what is immediate: chairs, lights, paper, whatever. So, if one "followed the history of the development of the science"

one would begin from common material objects, learn the arts of qualitative and quantitative analysis, and very gradually advance to the discovery of the periodic table and the sub-atomic structures. But one might begin at the other end with pure mathematics, then posit hypotheses regarding electrons and protons and neutrons, work out possible atomic and then

¹⁹Ibid. 35-39. Note that what went forward between Augustine and Aquinas in the theology of grace is part of the history that happens. But Lonergan's reflections on how to understand that history and his use of an upper blade to make it intelligible come under the heading of the history that is written. This twofold consideration applies over and over in the history I am sketching: Lonergan is often dealing with the history that happens, but I am more concerned, at least after the first section of my paper, with the history that is written.

molecular structures, develop a method of analysis, and finally turn for the first time to real material things.²⁰

But there is an example of analytic process in Aristotle himself that illustrates the process simply and effectively. Someone comes to you. Why did he come? To get some money. Why did he want money? To pay a debt. Why did he wish to pay the debt? To be just. Why be just? And so on, till we reach the ultimate notion of the good.²¹ If, however, we were teaching ethics, we would invert Aristotle's order, start with the ultimate notion of the good, work out the human and social good, find justice as a division, and the payment of debts as a subdivision.

Lonergan used this pair from 1946 to 1964 as providing the ideal structure for theology — ideal, for he did not get round to using it everywhere himself. He did, however, structure his whole Trinitarian theology according to this idea, proceeding by analysis from the three consubstantial persons to the divine relations, from the relations to origins, from origins to processions, from processions to the psychological analogy. Turning to the synthetic order, and starting from the fundamental idea of the psychological analogy, he systematically derived the notions of processions, relations, and consubstantial persons — the inverse of the analytic order.²²

The focus of Lonergan's interest at first was clearly the synthetic side; see, for example, his *De ente supernaturali* of 1946, a synthetic work on grace, and his *De Deo trino*, where the second, synthetic volume was written first (*Divinarum personarum conceptio analogica* in the first edition of 1957). But gradually, as time went on, his interest turned to the analytic. That is of some importance for the present study, for the analytic way was the temporal way, the way of actual historical development in the church, while the synthetic way was outside time, the way of logical simultaneity.²³ It follows that analytic

²⁰ *VERBUM: Word and Idea in Aquinas* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1967; London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1968) 62.

²¹ *Posterior Analytics* 1, 24 85b 30-35; Thomas Aquinas, *In Aristotelis libros ... Posteriorum analyticorum*, 1, lectio 38, no. 334 (Turin: Marietti, 1955) 288.

²² This rather cryptic outline is found in the 1954 article we saw earlier ("Theology and Understanding" 122); it summarizes some six hundred pages of the later 2-volume work, *De Deo trino* (1964).

²³ The analytic member is also called the way of discovery, the way of reduction to causes, the way of certitude, and the temporal way. The first four are found in *Divinarum personarum conceptio analogica* (Rome: Gregorian University Press, 1957) 20; the fifth, *via temporalis*, is added in *De Deo trino*, vol. 2 (1964) 33. The contrasting synthetic way is also called the way of composition, or the way of

process is slow. Thus, the laboratory experiments in chemistry that Lonergan speaks of recapitulate in a short time what took thousands of years in actual development. The swift steps Aristotle took in the laboratory of his mind to reach the notion of good took several thousand or maybe several million years of cultural development in the actual history of the human race. And similarly, the Trinitarian theology that Thomas Aquinas arranges with such apparent ease in synthetic order, took twelve centuries to reach the point where his synthesis was possible.

All this is rather dull stuff compared to the exhilaration we feel in dealing with liberation theology, religious experience, inter-religious dialogue, hermeneutics of suspicion, and so on. Maybe so, and maybe Lonergan was a dull theologian for the first half of his life. But some of us who were teaching theology in the 1950s can testify to the extraordinary power this analytic-synthetic pair had to reduce to some order the extremely chaotic mass of material a teacher of dogmatic theology had somehow to handle.

As for Lonergan's personal history, unless we understand that first half of his career, we are likely to find the most flagrant contradictions between what he said earlier and what he said later, and so to dismiss him as incoherent. For example, right up to 1964, he has theology begin, not with data as in the empirical sciences, but with the truths of faith: 'non a datis sed a veris incipit.'²⁴ Within three years he seems to have abandoned this and to be holding the exact opposite. Thus in his 1967 paper, "Theology in Its New Context," he says, "theology was a deductive, and it has become largely an empirical science. It was a deductive science in the sense that its theses were conclusions to be proven from the premises provided by Scripture and Tradition. It has become an empirical science in the sense that Scripture and Tradition now supply not premises, but data."²⁵

But before we assert a flat contradiction, getting Lonergan's friends up tight and giving his enemies cause to chortle, it would be good to examine in what sense he is using the word 'theology' in each case. In fact, as he said at the Florida conference of 1970, in reply to a question on this very point, 'behind the shift there is a greatly enlarged

teaching (thus, in *Divinarum personarum* 21), to which are added in the 1964 work, the way of probability and the way of logical simultaneity (*De Deo trino*, vol. 2, 33-34).

²⁴ *De Deo trino*, vol. 2, 20.

²⁵ *A Second Collection* 55-67, at 58.

notion of theology.’²⁶ The ‘theology’ of 1964 was restricted to and practically coincident with systematics, with doctrines as basis, and theology in that sense still begins from truths, in 1993 as in 1963; the ‘theology’ of 1972 begins with research, true enough, therefore from data, not truths, but research, which was not considered part of theology in 1964, has become in the ‘greatly enlarged notion of theology’ an intrinsic part.

Lonergan himself did not see a break with his former position, but rather a development in continuity with it. The synthetic side represented by Thomas Aquinas still has its place in the functional specialties, namely, in systematics. The analytic side is taken out from under dogmatic theology, and set free to develop according to its own nature, but it also has its place in the functional specialties, namely, in the first four or five.²⁷ The synthetic way, which claimed the lion’s share of attention in 1946, is now just one functional specialty in eight.

4. THE REAL PROBLEM EMERGES

When Lonergan was called to Rome in 1953 to teach at the Gregorian University, there was unhappiness in many quarters. Regis College didn’t want to lose him from Toronto, and Lonergan himself, deep in what was meant to be a book on method in theology, was pessimistic about finding leisure in Rome to finish it. I myself wrote to the General of the Jesuits, to the effect that a theologian of Lonergan’s caliber should be allowed to stay where he could work in peace. The General replied that if Lonergan were really of the caliber I claimed, it would do him good to come to Rome.

I don’t want to make that long-suffering General into another Caiphas, but in fact he prophesied for the people. It *did* do Lonergan good to go to Rome and encounter challenges there that we at Regis College were not likely to present to him. The challenge, to simplify

²⁶ *Foundations of Theology: Papers from the International Lonergan Congress 1970*, ed. Philip McShane (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1971; Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1972) 224.

²⁷ “Aquinas composed his *Summa Theologiae* in the *via doctrinae*; see the *Prologus*. It corresponds to the functional specialty, *Systematics*, of my *Method in Theology*. The *via inventionis* would cover the first four or perhaps five previous specialties,” (‘Christology Today,’ at 96 n. 10).

the matter, came from the German Historical School,²⁸ and it came via the six hundred students he had to face daily in the classroom. That is his own account,²⁹ given in headlines again and needing qualification, for he was already moving on his own, maybe more slowly, to meet the challenge.³⁰

In any case there was, during those twelve years Lonergan spent teaching in Rome, a stubborn wrestling with new ideas and something of a quantum leap in his own thinking.³¹ I venture to be even more specific, to narrow down the critical period that I am calling the fourth step, and locate it in the four years 1959 to 1962; so much is happening

²⁸ Simplified, because the full list is longer; for example 'Time and Meaning' has this: "the contribution to thought worked out in the nineteenth century by German philosophers, German historians, German students of languages, German students of literatures ... the *Geisteswissenschaften*" (Bernard Lonergan: 3 Lectures [Montreal: Thomas More Institute, 1975] 30). But Lonergan regularly focused on the German Historical School.

²⁹ In 1970 he was asked about his growing interest in *meaning* after *Insight*, and replied: "Well, it was being sent to Rome and having to deal with students from northern Italy and France and Germany and Belgium who were totally immersed in continental philosophy — I had to talk meaningfully to them, and it involved getting a hold of the whole movement of the *Geisteswissenschaften*" (A Second Collection 220, in 'An Interview with Fr. Bernard Lonergan, SJ,' 209-230). A little more formally three years later: "The new challenge came from the *Geisteswissenschaften*, from the problems of hermeneutics and critical history, from the need of integrating nineteenth-century achievement in this field with the teachings of Catholic religion and Catholic theology. It was a long struggle that can be documented from my Latin and English writing during this period and from the doctoral courses I conducted *De intellectu et methodo*, *De systemate et historia*, and eventually *De methodo theologiae*. The eventual outcome has been the book, *Method in Theology*" (ibid. 277, in 'Insight Revisited'). See also *Caring about Meaning: patterns in the life of Bernard Lonergan*, ed. Pierrot Lambert, Charlotte Tansey, Cathleen Going (Montreal: Thomas More Institute, 1982) 105: "I was learning all the time myself; I was moving into the European atmosphere in which phenomenology was dominant." In some defense of the students Lonergan had in Montreal and Toronto, I should say that we did pepper him with questions, but our questions were more likely to concern *scientia media* or *actuatio finita per actum infinitum*; we were not excessively concerned with phenomenology or with the German Historical School.

³⁰ Chapter 17 of *Insight* is revealing here, along with such remarks as: 'Prior to all writing of history, prior to all interpretation of other minds, there is the self-scrutiny of the historian, the self-knowledge of the interpreter' (ibid. 23).

³¹ Charles Hefling has dealt largely with the problem I am attacking, in his article, 'On Reading *The Way to Nicea*,' ed. Timothy P. Fallon and Philip Boo Riley, *Religion and Culture: Essays in Honor of Bernard Lonergan, SJ* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987) 149-166. I do not know at this date how much my pondering of the question owes to my earlier reading of Hefling — and I could make a parallel remark about my debt to many others who have written on Lonergan.

then that to deal with this short period alone will require the longest part of my paper.

I choose 1959 for the start, partly because the course Lonergan taught that year, *De intellectu et methodo*, puts the problem of history more clearly than any previous work of his that I know, partly because in his education lectures of that summer he declared, "It is at the present time that the full impact of the development of the historical sciences during the past century is hitting theology, and theology has not thought its way through the problems yet,"³² a remark that I take as implicitly autobiographical: only now is Lonergan feeling the impact, and he has not yet thought his way through the problem.

1962 is less clear-cut as marking the emergence of a new approach and the outcome of the period of wrestling, since so much went on in 1963 and 1964 before what we call the great breakthrough to functional specialties in 1965; but 1962 saw the crucial differentiations of consciousness beginning to emerge as an explanatory factor in development, and so many new avenues had opened by that year that it is not wholly arbitrary to make it a turning point and give it special significance in Lonergan's evolution.³³

So, first the problem of history as it presented itself to Lonergan in 1959, and then the situation in 1962 when the elements and shape of a solution were beginning to emerge from the chaos.

The work to study for 1959 is the course, *De intellectu et methodo*, given at the Gregorian University in the spring term of that year.³⁴ The focal concern in at least the first half of that course was the difference between the sources of theology and theology itself, and the way we move from one to the other. How do we make the transition from the conceptuality, say, of Palestine, to that, say, of medieval scholasticism? How maintain continuity in making the transition? How bridge the ever widening gap as theological systems take us further and further from our sources?³⁵ It's the problem of what we call the

³² *Topics in Education* 247.

³³ For easier reference to what occurred during these formative four years, I list in Appendix B below the main pieces in the picture.

³⁴ We have a very good set of notes on this course, 72 pages, legal-size, single-spaced, with a monitum, '... notae ... collectae et ordinatae ... ab aliquibus auditoribus ex his tantum quae in scholis colligi potuerunt'; we owe the notes to Francesco Rossi de Gasperis and P. Joseph Cahill. The course of the following year, *De systemate et historia*, is also important, but we have better documentation for *De intellectu et methodo*.

³⁵ Student notes 11-25.

historicity of the human race, the problem of the mark of time on our social arrangements and cultural achievements, the mark of time on all human thinking and activity, the mark of time therefore on scripture, creed, and dogma, all of which, however divine they be, are also human products.

Naturally, Lonergan sees no solution in simply clinging to the terms of scripture and tradition (we may think here of fundamentalism), no solution either in mere manipulation of concepts and judgments (we may think here of conceptualism). He goes behind words and concepts in his habitual appeal to intelligence itself and its threefold formation through understanding, science, and wisdom. His twofold way of analysis and synthesis is invoked.³⁶ A key factor is wisdom,³⁷ but wisdom is something we gradually acquire, so it does not offer an easy way out, any more than an appeal to book or authority; the solution has to lie in growing up to meet the problem.

This is vintage Lonergan, and a good foundation as far as it goes. But it is equally a foundation for tracing any development, be it in chemistry, ethics, philosophy, whatever; more is needed to meet the specific problem of the historicity of scripture, creed, and dogma. Lonergan tackles this specific question in a detailed analysis of two quite different ways in which we experience, conceive, think, judge, and know: the symbolic mode, illustrated most simply in the case of two persons who smile at one another, and the theoretic mode, illustrated best historically in the achievements of the Greek *logos*.³⁸

The problem is now clear to Lonergan; he has posed it openly and faced it squarely enough with the resources at hand, namely, the two modes of thinking and knowing and acting which he contrasts here. Quite clearly these derive from the common sense and theory of *Insight*. It is more important, I think, that Lonergan has recognized the locus of the solution and is on the way to the differentiations of consciousness that are not yet a theme in *Insight*,³⁹ that become a theme in 1962, and then in *Method in Theology* are seen as the key to development.

³⁶ Ibid. 6-8, 12-13, 27-28.

³⁷ Ibid. 18-22.

³⁸ Ibid. 31-36.

³⁹ That statement is provocative, in view of what chapter 17 of *Insight* has to say, but I believe it can be defended; see Appendix C below on early approaches to differentiations of consciousness.

What effected the change to the later meaning and use of differentiations of consciousness? A chief mediating factor is the concept of worlds. It surfaced along with that of horizon in the 1957 lectures on existentialism,⁴⁰ it makes an appearance in *De intellectu et methodo* in 1959,⁴¹ and becomes a central theme in the 1962 course at the Gregorian University, *De methodo theologiae*. The worlds are set out in a series of antitheses: the sacred world over against the secular (*profanus*), the interior world against the external, the visible world against the intelligible.⁴²

The antitheses are of special importance in *De methodo theologiae*, one might even say that this notion structures the whole course.⁴³ They are important too as we look forward, for they parallel the differences, not to say oppositions, we shall find to obtain between differentiations of consciousness. Indeed, change a word here and there, and you could say the theme of the course is differentiations of consciousness rather than the antithetic worlds. In any case, there is the closest relationship: the differentiation of the worlds, Lonergan says, is according to the dynamism of consciousness, the structure of consciousness, the technical evolution of consciousness.⁴⁴

Lonergan, I believe, is moving toward a more thematic treatment of differentiations of consciousness. The movement is well advanced in a lecture he gave later that same summer of 1962 at Regis College, Toronto, and Thomas More Institute, Montreal: "Time and Meaning." I will therefore close off our fourth step with some account of that lecture, which happens also to provide a rather good statement of the problem of history.

⁴⁰ A week of lectures at Boston College, July 1957. Extant are Lonergan's notes for the course, a tape-recording of the lectures, and a transcription of the recording (Lonergan Archives).

⁴¹ 34-35.

⁴² 8-11 of the student notes of the course, *De methodo theologiae*: 60 pages, legal-size, single-spaced, with the monitum again, 'Notae desumptae ab alumnis'; also available are the tape-recording and transcription of the parallel lectures of the institute on 'The Method of Theology,' Regis College, Toronto, August 1962.

⁴³ Thus, following 8-11 describing the antitheses, 11-14 reflect on the antitheses, 15-18 set out the problematic founded on the antitheses, and the rest of the notes labor over the problematic. The summer institute adds lectures on hermeneutics and history that were not part of the Latin course. Note that both the course and the institute lectures have operations of the subject for a starting point, and go on from there to discuss the worlds of the subject.

⁴⁴ 11 of the notes. Also 9 on the opposition of the sacred and secular worlds: 'Cuius oppositionis radix est in ipso *dynamismo* conscientiae humanae.'

The approach now is through Piaget and his notion of differentiation, grouping, and grouping of groups. But the grouping of groups runs into the same problems we considered in the antithetical worlds. For example, the two worlds of common sense and theory “do not admit this grouping of two lower groups into one single higher group. One has to shift from one to the other. There are fundamental oppositions between these two worlds and by illustrating that, we’ll have a first fundamental division of field of distinct types of development.”⁴⁵ So it is not directly the differentiations of consciousness that give us types of development; it is the worlds. But there is still the closest relationship between the two: “the four spheres [namely, those of common sense, theory, interiority, and religion] ... may be differentiated in consciousness.”⁴⁶ In fact, Lonergan oscillates between the objective and subjective throughout this lecture; the turn to the subject, so often employed to characterize his later work, is not yet fully achieved.

I remarked earlier on the very clear statement of the question that “Time and Meaning” gives us. Let me conclude our fourth step with that. “I want ... to offer a sketch of the way in which meaning develops. ... And when I speak of a sketch of the way in which meaning develops, I mean some sort of thread or highway that will perhaps be of some use in relating what appear ... to be totally unrelated ways of understanding human life and its significance.”⁴⁷ Lonergan clarifies this positive goal by contrast with two mentalities to be excluded: the romanticist and the classicist. The latter is more familiar: “The bearing of the talk may ... be taken ... as opposed to an abstraction, to a cult of the universal, the ideal, the norm, the exemplar, with the result that one never really apprehends things in their particularity.” But on the other side, “The bearing of the talk may also be taken as opposed to a romanticism which knows the concrete, the singular, the individual, the personal, the historical — but does so at the expense of any overall view, and results in a sort of fragmentation compensated by enthusiasm that is lost in detail.”⁴⁸

⁴⁵ ‘Time and Meaning’ 44.

⁴⁶ Ibid. 48. Further, Lonergan speaks now of the ‘undifferentiated consciousness’ of the primitive (p. 51); once there were differentiations of common sense (*Insight* 203), but then the word had not acquired its technical sense; when that occurs, Lonergan will use ‘brands’ for the varieties of common sense (*Method in Theology* 276). See also the 1962 seminar notes, *De argumento* ... (note 49 below).

⁴⁷ ‘Time and Meaning’ 29.

⁴⁸ Ibid. 30.

This has been a long and rather confused section, and even then I had to omit several topics and pass over a good deal of the data.⁴⁹ But a sketch is a sketch, and I have to leave these four years, 1959 to 1962, with the monition that they merit the closest scrutiny as a unit in Lonergan's development.

5. THE UPPER BLADE FOR HISTORY: ORDERED MULTIPLICITY IN DIFFERENTIATIONS OF CONSCIOUSNESS

There is a long way to go in our fifth step: the introduction of research, interpretation, and history into the intrinsic structure of theology; the creation of dialectic and foundations to replace the old appeal to proof-texts; the rethinking of doctrines and systematics so that what was once theology *tout court* is now restricted to two specialties out of eight; the addition of communications, to give the handing on of the message equal importance with receiving it; and, most directly relevant to the present purpose, the thematizing of differentiations of consciousness and of their role in the development of theology.

Much of this was achieved, at least on the broad scale, with what we call the breakthrough of February 1965, but it seems the next

⁴⁹ Topics omitted: meaning and interpretation, horizons and conversions, mediation (which becomes a prominent theme in 1963), foundations (which appears in *De methodo et intellectu*, 1959, and will be a topic in 1964), the question of method itself, and so on.

Another datum of the time is Lonergan's outline for a presentation at a faculty seminar of the Gregorian University and the Biblical Institute, 'De argumento theologico ex sacra scriptura' (Spring 1962), which talks of transition from one context to another, asks what makes it possible, and responds that it seems to be the transcendence of truth ('Videtur transcendentia veri,' p. 3), which allows it to be transposed from context to context. He illustrates this with the transposition a doctor makes of a patient's report, or the transposition a judge makes of witnesses' testimony (the same examples of doctor and judge are used, with expanded treatment, in *De methodo theologiae* 49).

Of special interest here is Lonergan's list of the ways in which scripture can be viewed and become thematic (as language, encounter, event, word of God — seven ways in all), and of four contexts in which a theologian may work (dogmatic-theological, human life ...).

The transcendence of truth and the possibility of its transmission will remain a rock in Lonergan's theology, but I would say it is a precondition and presupposition of transposition from context to context; it is even a positive factor; but it is not the immediate and specific factor in the transition. That will be found in the ordered multiplicity of differentiations of consciousness, with their ordering in stages of meaning.

six years were needed to work it all out to the satisfaction of Lonergan's rigorous mind.⁵⁰ He once remarked that with the reading of Dawson's *The Age of the Gods* in the early 1930s there began "the correction of my hitherto normative or classicist notion" of culture;⁵¹ no doubt the correction began then, but it was still a long road to his 1966 paper "The Transition from a Classicist World-View to Historical-Mindedness."⁵² I see a similar pattern and struggle in the move from analysis-synthesis to the eight functional specialties.

Is the point at issue growing obscure? Let me recall our headline: "All my work," Lonergan said, "has been introducing history into Catholic theology." Introducing history into *theology*, so we are in the world of meaning; introducing *history* so we are in the world of developing meaning; history in *Catholic* theology, so we have a starting point in a Palestinian culture and a terminal point in any people whatever who await the preaching of the gospel: Palestine, the Greco-Roman world, the Middle Ages, modern times with its innumerable peoples around the globe and its innumerable subcultures within our great cities.

Historically, the problem arose in its general form with the German Historical School, and received its specific theological application in works like Newman's on the development of doctrine; it became acute with the definition of the Immaculate Conception in 1854 and of papal infallibility in 1871. There had been a change in doctrine; how do you account for it? what made it happen? how do you justify it? Attempts to go beyond Newman took various forms: at one end of the spectrum an excessively logical attitude that would turn the whole *Summa theologiae* of Thomas Aquinas into dogma, at the other an excessively mystical view of development that dispensed with rational justification.

Lonergan began with full reliance on Newman — that is my memory of the years 1946-50 when he taught me. Insofar as something more than Newman was needed he found it in the analytic member of the twofold way. This is not to be reduced to the bare logic of conclu-

⁵⁰ I think here of Dorothy Sayers' trinity of the artist (first outlined at the end of her play, *The Zeal of Thy House*, 1937, then expanded into a whole book, *The Mind of the Maker* [New York: Meridian Books, 1956]): the creative idea, the laborious task of working it out in words or symphony or stone, the reception the work of art inspires in the observer. Lonergan had his creative idea in 1965, and had carved it in words by 1971; the third step, I suppose, is ours to take.

⁵¹ "Insight Revisited" 264.

⁵² *A Second Collection* 1-9.

sions theology; the difference is in understanding. We have "The Assumption and Theology" of 1948 to illustrate that in the concrete, we have "Theology and Understanding" of 1954 to give it a wider theological application, and we have the "Questionnaire on Philosophy" of 1974 for a general statement.⁵³ In the last-named work, when urging that young philosophers become generalists in the world of thought, Lonergan said:

it cannot be stressed too strongly that the mediation of the generalists is intelligent rather than logical: by logical mediation I understand the process from universal concepts to particular instances as just instances; by intelligent mediation I understand the process from understanding the universal to understanding the particular.⁵⁴

The same paper speaks of the harm that results when theologians, in deriving the dogmas of the church from scripture, give an ultimate role to logic. Logic works within a given universe of discourse, but other universes of discourse are always possible, and to pass from one to another is beyond the competence of logic. He continues:

We reach the notion of method when we ask how does one effect the transition from one universe of discourse to another or, more profoundly, how is there effected the transition from one level or stage in human culture to another later level or stage or, vice versa, from a later to an earlier level or stage. Obviously the operations involved in such transitions are not ruled by the logic of clear terms, coherent propositions, rigorous inferences. Quite different, though quite common, types of operation have to be considered and considered just as explicitly as the logical operations that from Aristotle to Hegel were thought to control legitimate mental processes.⁵⁵

That restates in other terms the problem we already saw in *De intellectu et methodo* and in "Time and Meaning." It adds a helpful clarification by its contrast with logic. Moving from one universe of discourse to another, we need more than logic. What do we need? What is it that makes developments possible in doctrines and theology? Chapter 12 of *Method in Theology* undertakes to tell us.

⁵³ "The Assumption and Theology," *Collection* 66-80; "Theology and Understanding," see note 5 above; "Questionnaire on Philosophy," see note 14 above.

⁵⁴ "Questionnaire" 32-33.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.* 24.

We need, of course, 'exact historical investigation' to "determine the starting-point, the process, the end-result of any particular development"; and to "determine the legitimacy of any development" we need to "ask whether or not the process was under the guidance of ... conversion." But these are not the fundamental questions. There is a deeper issue, and that "deeper issue is the more general question that asks how is it that developments are possible? How is it that mortal man can develop what he would not know unless God revealed it?" Lonergan continues: "The basis for an answer to this question lies in what I have already referred to as the differentiation of consciousness."⁵⁶

This is a new concept of development, miles apart from both the narrowness of logic and the surrender of reason to authority. It needs a through study with chapter 12 of *Method* at the center,⁵⁷ but I think I can take a shorter route by examining a lecture given two years after the completion of *Method in Theology*, where he takes up the question again and, in my view, breaks new ground.

The lecture in question is "Variations in Fundamental Theology."⁵⁸ Its point of departure is volume 46 of *Concilium*, which has *Fundamental Theology* as its theme. It runs through the difficulties fundamental theology encounters today, quoting the various contribu-

⁵⁶ *Method in Theology* 302. And, a few years later: "So there emerges the question of doctrinal pluralism. Its real basis, I believe, is the multiple differentiation of consciousness possible at the present time and often needed to master issues in theology," *A Third Collection* 197-198 (in "Theology and Praxis," pp. 184-201). And, after a few more years: "Differentiations of consciousness justify or lead to the discovery of previously unnoticed implications in the sources of revelation," *ibid.* 250 n.8 (in "Unity and Plurality: The Coherence of Christian Truth," pp. 239-250).

⁵⁷ What I just quoted from chapter 12 is a kind of thesis. In good scholastic style Lonergan explains the terms of the thesis with a list of the differentiations of consciousness (*Method in Theology* 303-305). Because these same differentiations 'also characterize successive stages in cultural development' (305) he outlines those stages; first in the move from the scriptures (symbolic apprehension) to theological and church doctrines (305-312); then (314-318) in the three developments by which he regularly characterizes the modern thinker: 'his science and his conception of science, his history and his conception of history, his philosophy and his conception of philosophy' (317). Turning to the development of doctrines (319-320) he feels obliged to state his Catholic position on the permanence (320-324) and the historicity (324-326) of dogmas, before taking up pluralism and the unity of faith (326-330), and concluding with what is more of an appendix, some pages on the autonomy of theology (330-333).

⁵⁸ The second in a series of the four Larkin-Stuart lectures given at Trinity College, Toronto, unpublished. First delivered in November 1973, it was presented a second time with slight changes at New Haven in 1974; the key phrase "ordered multiplicity" was lost in the second version.

tors to the volume. Coming to theological pluralism, Lonergan refers to Rahner on the contrast between an earlier time when "their medieval heritage had given Roman Catholic theologians a common and to some extent unambiguous language" and the present time when we have no common language.⁵⁹

It is in this context that we find what we are looking for. Lonergan remarks, casually enough, that the "scattering of views I have illustrated may, perhaps, be given some unity by referring to my *Method in Theology*."⁶⁰ But on Rahner's point in particular he has this to say.

For Rahner's puzzlement over the swarm of disparate theologies that resist precise classification and so escape theological judgment, we may offer a set of larger containers, namely, the ordered multiplicity of differentiations of consciousness and their diversification by the presence or absence of religious, moral, or intellectual conversion. Such broad genetic differences can serve to mark off frontiers that contain conceptually disparate views.⁶¹

This is a fundamental statement for the purpose of my paper, and the phrase 'ordered multiplicity of differentiations of consciousness' is a key to the most radical concept of development of doctrine since Newman's book on that subject. We are talking about theological differences, we locate them as genetic differences, we ascribe the diversity to differentiations of consciousness,⁶² we group the diverse theologies under 'larger containers,' we unite them in an ordered multiplicity. There is a third option, then, that escapes the two

⁵⁹ 14-15 of 1973 MS.

⁶⁰ Ibid. 18.

⁶¹ Ibid. 19.

⁶² I doubt that Lonergan ever tried to draw up a complete list of differentiations of consciousness. *Method in Theology* names ten: the child's move into a world mediated by meaning, the world of common sense, orientation to the transcendent, the development of symbols, arts, literature, the emergence of systematic meaning, post-systematic literature, the emergence of method, the development of scholarship, the development of post-scientific and post-scholarly literature, the exploration of interiority (303-5). A simpler list is found in *Philosophy of God, and Theology: The Relationship between Philosophy of God and the Functional Specialty, Systematics* (London: Darton, Longman & Todd; Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1973): religious, linguistic, literary, systematic, scientific, scholarly, self-appropriation (57). Elsewhere, after distinguishing four differentiations (scientific, religious, scholarly, modern philosophic), he adds a note to say, "Our listing ... is not intended to go beyond the needs of this paper" ("Unity and Plurality" 250 n. 12), a remark that may caution us in interpreting other lists.

extremes I mentioned: a logical development that would make dogmas of all the conclusions of Thomas Aquinas, and a mystical approach that surrendered reason to the unsearchable.

6. STAGES OF MEANING AS THE ORDERING PRINCIPLE

We now have “the ordered multiplicity of differentiations of consciousness” as the key factor not only for development of doctrine but also for unity in the pluralism of communication. But if a series is ordered, there is an ordering principle; that is good Thomist doctrine. So what is the ordering principle here? Can we take the question one step further in that direction?

Late in life Lonergan seems to have thought so, and I will come to his final position presently, but there is earlier background in what he has to say on the origin of differentiations. How do they arise? Some information on that should be helpful in the effort to reduce them again to an ‘ordered multiplicity,’ and I believe we have a rich source on this in the ‘Patterns of Experience’ of chapter 6 in *Insight*. The wealth of that chapter is not forgotten when Lonergan comes to the sources of pluralism in chapter 12 of *Method*, but it is compressed into a couple of lines while other factors are added.⁶³

I believe, then, that there is potential for the ordering of the multiplicity of differentiations in a study of the origins. Statements like the following are instructive: “the intelligibility proper to developing doctrines is the intelligibility immanent in historical process. One knows it, not by *a priori* theorizing, but by *a posteriori* research, interpretation, history, dialectic, and the decision of foundations.”⁶⁴ It is in historical process that differentiations arise and it is there that we may grasp their intelligibility. Again, when Lonergan introduced the

⁶³ *Method in Theology* 326: “There are three sources of pluralism. First, linguistic, social, and cultural differences give rise to different brands of common sense” (on this see Appendix D below, where there are some data from chapter 6 of *Insight*). Secondly, there is undifferentiated consciousness and there are its differentiations. Thirdly, there is conversion and its presence or absence.

The word ‘pluralism’ perhaps points more clearly to the fact that we are not dealing just with developments of the past, but are also concerned with applications in the pluralist world of the present and on into an indefinite future; in fact, much of this section 11 deals with preaching the gospel to all nations with their enormous differences.

⁶⁴ *Method in Theology* 319.

phrase, ordered multiplicity, he referred us to *Method in Theology*, and by speaking of 'broad genetic differences' gave us a clue what to look for there. How are 'broad genetic differences' rendered intelligible in *Method*? It seems to be done through an analysis of the stages of meaning, which are certainly related genetically: "just as the second stage comes out of developments occurring in the first, so the third stage comes out of developments occurring in the second."⁶⁵

Further, I believe that, in linking the ordered multiplicity of differentiations of consciousness with stages of meaning, we are on the track of something very important for what Lonergan calls his lifework of bringing history into theology. To start with, the idea has roots deep in his earliest work on history, where already he had developed a theory of stages correlated with what we would now call differentiations of consciousness.⁶⁶ Then *Method in Theology* provides the materials for a new integration of history and meaning. To cap the series we have what I consider to be Lonergan's definitive position in the unpublished paper, "Philosophy and the Religious Phenomenon," found in File 725 among his papers, and to be dated, from evidence in the text, in early 1978 or late 1977.

There is no need to present the paper in detail,⁶⁷ but it had two parts, the second part had two concerns, and the second concern "was with the ordering of the differences due to developments"⁶⁸ — exactly our question. Further, Lonergan in his own view is taking a step forward; after referring to his earlier work, he now feels that he can present his case "in a less abstruse approach."⁶⁹ Let me quote. "The issue in hand is the need of some account and ordering of the various contexts in which, first, religious living occurs and, secondly, investigations of religious living are undertaken." The account will be a dialectic in which two sets of terms are involved: "the terms whose meaning shifts in the course of time and ... the terms that denote the factors bringing about such shifts in meaning."

⁶⁵ Ibid. 94.

⁶⁶ The stages were naturally different all those forty years ago. See in Appendix E below an excerpt from the unpublished paper (ca 1937-38), *The Philosophy of History*.

⁶⁷ The paper will be published, with studies by a number of Lonergan scholars, in the Fall 1994 issue of *METHOD: Journal of Lonergan Studies*.

⁶⁸ Page 27 of the MS. Discussion of the question had covered pp. 20-27.

⁶⁹ Ibid. 20.

The first factor is clearly identified and subdivided at once: "The terms whose meaning shifts are social contexts and cultural contexts," the former illustrated by "family and mores, community and education, state and law, economics and technology," the latter by "art, religion, science, philosophy, history."⁷⁰ The second factor ("terms that denote the factors bringing about such shifts") is found in four stages of meaning: "the linguistic, the literate, the logical, and the methodical."⁷¹ This appears from a summation a few pages later, where he speaks of "headings of social arrangements" and "areas of cultural interest," and then of "four stages diversifying the scope of social and cultural initiatives."⁷² Stages diversifying the social and cultural are surely to be identified with the factors bringing about shifts in the meaning of social and cultural terms. And, obviously, as underlying cause of the shifts, these stages are the more fundamental of the two factors.

This analysis is now applied to religion.

... within these varying social and cultural contexts ... religion discovers itself, works out its identity, differentiates itself from other areas, and interacts with them. But in its linguistic stage religion will manifest itself as myth and ritual. In its literate stage it becomes religion of the book, of the Torah, the Gospel, the Koran. In the logical stage it may reduplicate itself with the reflection on itself that would end dissension by dogmatic pronouncements and would seek overall reconciliation by systematic theologies. In the methodical stage it confronts its own history, distinguishes the stages in its own development, evaluates the authenticity or unauthenticity of its initiatives, and preaches its message in the many forms and styles appropriate to the many social and cultural strata of the communities in which it operates.⁷³

The analysis that applies to religion in general is now illustrated by the history of Christianity, which "began and spread through the words and deeds of Christ and his apostles. But by the end of the second century there had emerged an élite that studied the scriptures and read Irenaeus ... Hippolytus ... Tertullian ... Clement and Origen."⁷⁴ So we have the transition from the linguistic to the literate stage. This

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Ibid. 21. The MS has simply 'stages'; I supplied 'of meaning' from *Method in Theology*, remembering always how comprehensive the term is.

⁷² Ibid. 23.

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ Ibid. 24.

literate stage leads into the logical stage and a focus on truth. Of course, this did not await the third stage: one can find "brief formulas of faith embedded in the New Testament," that is, in the first stage itself, but the 'apologetics and controversy' of the second stage, as it were, forced the issue. So we have the several various councils with their condemnation of the several various heresies.⁷⁵

The next transition is from uttering the truth to reaching some understanding of it. The trend began early but "became the occupation of a large and ongoing intellectual community in medieval scholasticism. The inspiration of scholasticism was Anselm's faith seeking, though hardly attaining, understanding. Its schoolmaster was Abaelard's *Sic et non*. Its achievement was the collected works of Aquinas." The promise, however, of its "spontaneous method, stemming from the practice of *lectio et quaestio*," was not fulfilled: it "was led astray by the ineptitude of Aristotle's *Posterior Analytics*." In this situation, Lonergan locates the Reformation and Council of Trent.⁷⁶

True, the Reformation "remained faithful to the Greek councils and so was committed to a logical stance and, in time, to a Scholasticism of its own." Nevertheless

Protestant insistence on scripture kept open a door. Through that door in due course there entered into scriptural studies the application of new, nineteenth-century methods to historical investigation and textual interpretation. So there came to light the differences between the mind of the scriptures and the mind of the councils, and there followed doubts that conciliar dogmas could be attributed to divine revelation.

Lonergan finds three surrenders to this problem of the differences between scripture and the councils: "nineteenth-century Liberal Protestantism ... early twentieth-century Modernism" and the movement "in the wake of the Second Vatican Council when even Catholic theologians find the definition of Chalcedon questionable and wish to change both our traditional understanding of Christ and our profession of faith in Christ."⁷⁷

Perhaps it is time for a resume. The task was to incorporate the infinite riches of history without surrendering to relativism, to acknowledge history but to retain doctrines and systematics. A good

⁷⁵ Ibid. 24-25.

⁷⁶ Ibid. 25-26.

⁷⁷ Ibid. 26-27.

summary of the problem was quoted from "Time and Meaning": we want a thread to guide us through history, to enable us to avoid both the rigidity of classicism and the chaos of romanticism. There is the multiplicity of history to welcome, but there is the ordered multiplicity that comes from an upper blade of empirical method. The upper blade, the ordering principle is provided by a theory of the stages of history.

The problem, then, is the one that so many theologians have tried to deal with in the last hundred years: to combine changing history and permanent dogma, to have a view of things that is broad enough and deep enough and strong enough to allow one to acknowledge history and retain traditional faith. If Lonergan managed to get it all finally together, and succeeded in integrating history with doctrine and system, it is certainly due to his twofold analysis: his analysis of the human mind and heart when it is thinking, understanding, judging, deciding, and his analysis of the human mind and heart when it is changing, developing, growing, responding to challenge.

APPENDIX A: EXCERPT FROM LONERGAN'S DOCTORAL DISSERTATION

(See note 10 above)

First, the specific theorem is adverted to and analyzed: it is seen to explain something.

Second, the specific theorem is generalized: all parallel differences are considered and coordinated.

Third, its implications are worked out and there will be a tendency to give it the systematic significance of alone constituting the solution to the whole problem.

Fourth, the insufficiency of the specific theorem to account for the whole problem leads to the discovery of the generic theorem.

Fifth, the generic theorem is analyzed, generalized, has its implications worked out.

Sixth, there is a tendency to make the generic theorem serve as the full solution of the problem. ...

Seventh, the insufficiency of the generic theorem is adverted to and there follows the rediscovery of the specific theorem in a new setting. This gives the synthesis of generic and specific theorem. — "The *Gratia Operans* Dissertation: Preface and Introduction," *METHOD: Journal of Lonergan Studies* 3:2 (October 1985) 32-33.

APPENDIX B: SOURCES FOR STEP FOUR, 1959-62

(See note 33 above)

(Unpublished works: see Lonergan Archives, Toronto)

De intellectu et methodo, graduate course, Gregorian University, 1958-59, documented in typed notes of Francesco Rossi de Gasperis and P. Joseph Cahill, and in some of Lonergan's own notes.

"Method in Catholic Theology," *METHOD: Journal of Lonergan Studies* 10:1 (Spring 1992) 1-26, a paper before the Society for Theological Studies, Nottingham University, April 1959.

Topics in Education (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993; Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 10), lectures at Xavier University, Cincinnati, August 1959, on the philosophy of education.

De systemate et historia, graduate course, Gregorian University, 1959-60, documented in the handwritten notes of Francesco Rossi de Gasperis and in some of Lonergan's own notes.

"The Philosophy of History," lecture at Thomas More Institute, Montreal, September 23, 1960.

De Deo trino: Pars analytica, 1st ed. (Rome: Gregorian University Press, 1961).

"The Origins of Christian Realism," lecture at Regis College, Toronto (repeated elsewhere), September 8, 1961.

De argumento theologico ex sacra scriptura, notes for a faculty seminar, Gregorian University and Biblical Institute, Rome, May 1962.

De methodo theologiae, graduate course, Gregorian University, 1961-62.

"The Method of Theology," 2-week institute covering the same ground as the previous entry, Regis College, Toronto, July 1962; tape-recording and transcription available.

"Time and Meaning," *Bernard Lonergan: 3 Lectures*, Montreal: Thomas More Institute Papers, 1975, pp. 29-54; lecture, Regis College, Toronto, September 16, 1962, and Thomas More Institute, Montreal, September 25, 1962.

"History" and "Philosophy of History," papers in the Lonergan Archives, Batch IX, File 7, sheaves *a*, *e*, *f*; to be dated, it seems, in the early 1960s.

APPENDIX C: EARLY APPROACHES TO DIFFERENTIATIONS

(See note 39 above)

Chapter 17 of *Insight* speaks of levels and sequences of expression (#3.3), and declares that 'Development in general is a process from the undifferentiated to the differentiated' (594). But the focus is more on the levels of consciousness than on its differentiations, and when we come to the natural place for the latter to appear, the question is more of differentiations in writing than in consciousness: advertising, literary writing, scientific writing, philosophic writing (592-93). Further the term most favored is not differentiation but classification: "It is a distinction that grounds not an actual but a potential classification" of levels and types of expression (594). Again, "Because the classification is potential rather than actual ..." (ibid.). And again, "... the problem of working out types of expression ... is to be met, not by assigning some static classification that claims validity for all time, but by determining the operators that relate the classifications relevant to one level of development to the classifications relevant to the next" (595).

Chapter 6 of *Insight* speaks of 'the differentiation of common sense' (203), but in the sense of the later 'brands' of common sense; the very fact that he uses the word here for varieties of common sense shows it has not yet acquired its technical meaning, for then common sense will be characterized as undifferentiated.

Topics in Education (lectures of 1959) provides more data on Lonergan's usage. But his usage has not yet jelled, and we have to keep our eye always on the context. In *Topics* the immediate context is the human good, first as object, then as the developing subject. The human good as object divides into two chapters, first the invariant structure (ch. 2), then differentials and integration (ch. 3). Integration is achieved on four levels (pp. 73-78): undifferentiated common sense, differentiated common sense, classicism which is the pure development of intelligence, the Greek achievement, and fourthly, historical consciousness (a term, incidentally, receiving here what may be its first thematic treatment). Now the third level, classicism, 'involves the differentiation of consciousness' (75). Again, education is a differentiation of consciousness (116), and in Nicea there is a transition from the compact symbolic consciousness of the New Testament 'to a more enucleated theological consciousness expressed in the Greek Councils' (57-58).

How evaluate all this? I would say that 'differentiation' (like 'experience') is a term with a general sense that has a very wide application, that in this general sense it was at first applied both to the varieties of common sense and to common sense itself as a mode of knowing, that in both *Insight* and *Topics* it has this general and rather fluid sense, but that later it became quite technical and was reserved for differentiations that went beyond common sense, which is now designated as undifferentiated. — But the question needs more thorough research than I have given it here.

APPENDIX D: POSITIVE THEOLOGY AND DOCTRINES

(See note 49 above)

The transcendence of truth and the possibility of its transmission were central questions in Lonergan's long struggle to relate positive or historical theology to the traditional speculative or systematic theology of the type created by Thomas Aquinas. High points in the struggle are recorded in "Theology and Understanding" (see note 5 above) 128-130; *De constitutione Christi ontologica et psychologica* (Rome: Gregorian University Press, 1956) 42-43; "Method in Catholic Theology" (see Appendix B above) 16-21; *De intellectu et methodo* (see notes 5 and 34 above) 13, 48, and 58-65 passim, especially 64; *De methodo theologiae* (see note 42 above) 48-60; *De Deo trino*, vol. 1 (1964; see note 5 above) 5 note 1.

The last-named work begins to differentiate the functions of theology in a way that will be fully worked out in *Method in Theology* (see note 6 above), but the more difficult question was the relation of history to doctrines. Lonergan's earlier work stressed their interlocking characters (see especially "Method in Catholic Theology") but he had not found a view that would release historical theology from its domination by dogma and allow it to grow according to its own nature. Nor could he effect this release till he had created the functional specialties of Dialectic and Foundations to join phase one, theology in indirect discourse (what Matthew said, what Athanasius said, etc.) to phase two, theology in direct discourse (what the theologian affirms). Without Dialectic and Foundations, historical theology "becomes lost in the wilderness of universal history" ("Method in Catholic Theology" 21) and falls prey to out-and-out historicism.

All the pieces of the puzzle fell into place at once on that February day of 1965 when *Method in Theology* took sudden shape in Lonergan's mind; it must have been a 'eureka' experience of the first order.

APPENDIX E: ORIGIN OF DIFFERENTIATIONS OF CONSCIOUSNESS

(See note 63 above)

Chapter 6 of *Insight*, under the heading of patterns of experience, gives a good deal of background for the later and more precise notion of differentiations of consciousness.

Contrasting the infinite potentiality of human offspring with the fixed patterns of the animal, Lonergan remarks that the 'initial plasticity and indeterminacy' of the human child grounds 'the later variety' (213). And he adds quite a list of the factors that produce the variety: 'the locality, the period, the social milieu' (211); or again, the variation will depend 'upon native aptitude, upon training, upon age and development, upon external circumstances, upon ... chance' (209); or, still again, in the drama of life, each person will find and develop 'the possible roles he might play' (212); and yet again, 'the stream of sensitive experience is a chameleon' (209), while 'aesthetic liberation, artistic creativity, and the constant shifting of the dramatic setting open up vast potentialities' (214).

Some of these factors suppose certain differentiations to be already achieved, but it is easy to reduce them to originally given factors like locality, natural aptitude, and potentiality.

APPENDIX F: EXCERPT FROM PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY

(See note 66 above)

Now the possibility of philosophy leads us to distinguish between two phases in human progress: the automatic stage in which there is a constant succession of brilliant flowerings and ultimate failures; the philosophic stage in which the historical expansion of humanity has its ultimate goal in a sound philosophy that not only is sound but also is able to guide the expansion effectively.

Next, the actual course of human events divides this division once more into two sections. Hence we have:

- A. The world prior to the discovery of philosophy, that is, up to Socrates, Plato and Aristotle.
- B. The failure of philosophy to fulfil its social mission, that is, from Plato to the Dark Age.
- C. The automatic cultural expansion following upon the Dark Age and continuing up to the present. It has had sound philosophy but no social consciousness of the social necessity of philosophy.
- D. The future — Philosophy of History (unpublished manuscript of the 1930s) 101-2.

WHERE THE LATE LONERGAN MEETS THE EARLY HEIDEGGER

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INTRODUCTION

THE PURPOSE OF this paper is to lay the groundwork for a conversation between the followers of Lonergan and Heidegger. A major difficulty in such a conversation is the set of assumptions or encompassing horizons that form the basic context of meanings within which the participants operate. Followers of Heidegger tend to assume that Lonergan, like Husserl, is still operating within the problematic set by Descartes and Kant. Quite ironically, those who know Lonergan tend to assume that Heidegger is still trapped within the problematic set by Kant. As in most cases like this, there is some truth on both sides, and it touches on one of the most fundamental assumptions affecting the Lonergan/Heidegger conversation. To sort out the issues at stake, I propose first to deal with Kant and his problematic, as it emerged from the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century. Second, I will explain how the early Lonergan of *Insight*¹ dealt with this problem. Third, I will sketch the main lines in Heidegger's *Being and Time*. Fourth, I will tentatively compare Heidegger and Lonergan. Fifth, I will sketch major developments in the thought of the late, post-*Insight* Lonergan. I will then focus on Heidegger's central discovery in *Being and Time*² of the historicity of the human person. Finally, I will close by suggesting how followers of Heidegger and Lonergan might begin a dialogue on the notion of historicity or what we might refer to as 'living in language.'

¹Bernard Lonergan, *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding*; Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 3 (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1992; 1st ed. 1957).

²Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, J. Macquarrie & E. Robinson, trans. (London: SCM Press, 1962).

SECTION I: KANT AND HUME

A basic perspective on continental European thought is the way it understands and evaluates the Enlightenment called forth by the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century. European thinkers' interpretations of the Enlightenment depended on how they interpreted the scientific revolution which precipitated it.

The first question to be considered then is: How have the more recent continental philosophers interpreted the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century? The surprising answer is that they did not interpret it through the writings of the Renaissance scientists who brought about the revolution. Rather, for the most part they read the interpretations of these scientific developments by modern philosophers, namely, Bacon, Descartes and most especially, Hume and Kant, who remain the pivotal figures in dealing with the scientific background of the Enlightenment today.

So our question can be rephrased: How did Kant and Hume interpret the scientific revolution? Or, more precisely, How did they interpret the major achievement of that revolution, namely, Newton's new science of mechanics? Kant interpreted Newtonian science in light of Hume's criticism of scientific laws, and especially his critique of the traditional notions of substance and causality. Kant wondered how it was possible to defend Newton's system against Hume's critique.

Hume's arguments against the principle of causality depended to a large extent on his epistemology, the basic thesis of which was that our ideas are derived from sense impressions, as copies or images of our sense impressions. From that basic stance, Hume destroyed the traditional idea of causality and its assumption of a necessary connection or conjunction between two events as cause and effect. Arguing that people having become accustomed to connecting such events as smoke and fire mistakenly assume that fire 'causes' smoke, he replaced causality with a principle of association. For Hume, causality is simply a convention, a way of associating events with one another, a subjective relation which cannot be validated in actual, objective experience. Furthermore, if present experiences are always contingent, there is no way to predict future temporal sequences since there can be no present, factual evidence that is necessarily linked to future events. Thus, Hume's critique ruled out the possibility of verifying scientific laws as necessary, universal, causal relations among changing objects.

On the basis of his own epistemological theory, Kant proceeded to refute Hume's arguments.³ Quite briefly, Kant maintained that scientists operate with categories that are neither derived from experience, nor copies of experienced impressions, but rather are constructed by the mind itself. Such categories are without empirical content unless it is supplied by sense intuition or perception; moreover, they cannot be applied to empirical experiences except through imaginative schemas (conjoined with *a priori* forms of sensibility, space and time). According to Kant, then, scientific knowledge comes about by combining rational categories with the empirical contents from sensible intuitions or perceptions. The categorial propositions of thinking provide the transcendental conditions for objective experience but they would be empty without the *a priori* conditions of sensing. The basic mistake of traditional philosophers was to develop a science of metaphysics from the pure categories of the mind alone, under the erroneous supposition that they could arrive at a knowledge of things in themselves simply through the categories proper to pure thought. Precritical metaphysicians failed to realize that human knowing was limited by sensible, *a priori* forms.

Kant's purpose, therefore, was twofold: to take seriously the importance of the sense intuition in Hume by demonstrating that traditional metaphysics had misapplied the *a priori* categories of the mind in such purely speculative sciences as cosmology, psychology, and natural theology; and yet to go beyond Hume's epistemology to redeem the validity of scientific knowledge of the universe articulated in Newtonian mechanics.

However, Kant's putative rescue of science from Hume's skepticism was a somewhat hollow victory since scientific knowledge for Kant is not knowledge of things in themselves, but merely knowledge of things as they appear to our senses. Scientific knowledge, therefore, is not knowledge of things in their actual, intrinsic reality and of the ways they are related to one another, but rather knowledge of the extrinsic and phenomenal order of things.

Lonergan, on the contrary, would argue that scientific knowing is knowledge of the actual, intrinsic reality of things. The significant difference between Lonergan and Kant is that Lonergan critically appropriated the scientific revolution in a fundamentally different way.

³Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, N. K. Smith, trans (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965).

SECTION II. THE SHIFT FROM DESCRIPTIVE TO EXPLANATORY KNOWING

Lonergan agrees with Kant that your epistemological position determines the way you interpret and formulate your metaphysical theory. But, unlike Kant, he also argues that your epistemology depends on your own prior, implicit or explicit, cognitional theory. Therefore, if you wish to do philosophy in a methodical way that will provide you with critical control of not only your metaphysics but also your epistemology, then you must begin not with questions about the validity or objectivity of knowing, but with the prior question concerning the activities of knowing themselves. Instead of first asking, Why is knowing what it is?, begin with the question, What is knowing?, or What are you *doing* when you are doing knowing?

Thus, in *Insight* Lonergan spends the first eleven chapters answering the question, What am I doing when I am knowing? Only in chapter twelve does he turn to the question, Why is doing that knowing? In their philosophical reflections, modern philosophers like Descartes, Leibniz, Kant, and the British empiricists had responded to and been influenced by the scientific revolution. By means of the same scientific discoveries Lonergan was able to clarify the difference between the questions of epistemology and cognitional theory.

Taking cognizance of dramatic recent advances in nineteenth-century mathematics and physics, Lonergan distinguished clearly between the contents of our knowing, and the activities through which these contents become known. Instead of focusing on the categories through which scientists know, Lonergan shifted attention to the preconceptual or prepropositional operations that generate categories and/or propositions. Even more important, he drew attention to the questions that precede and condition the cognitional operations themselves.

Prior to what scientists know, then, there are the activities through which they know; and prior to these activities, there is the basic, orienting wonder that initiates, sustains, and permeates all scientific inquiries. But the same desire to know can also initiate, direct, and drive other — practical, symbolic and artistic — patterns of knowing. By moving behind cognitional contents and cognitional activities to the basic, orienting desire to know, Lonergan was able to identify and appropriate the 'objective' that grounds and directs each and every pattern of knowing, namely, being.

Every pattern of knowing pursues the same 'objective,' but each does so in its own specialized way. By focusing on the different normative structures through which human knowers pursue the same ultimate objective through various, specialized methods, philosophy can be carried on in a new methodical way.

Following this methodical approach to philosophy, Lonergan came to very different conclusions about the Enlightenment through his much more nuanced interpretation of the scientific revolution that engendered it. Lonergan realized that the laws discovered by scientists like Galileo, Kepler, and Newton were not universal, certain, and necessary, as Kant thought. Neither certain, nor necessary, nor universal, the laws discovered by modern empirical scientists like Galileo and Newton were a new type which Lonergan called 'classical' laws in order to distinguish them from the 'statistical' laws discovered by scientists in the nineteenth century. Even scientists themselves mistakenly regarded classical laws like Galileo's law of falling bodies and Newton's law of gravitation to be universal, certain, and necessary, because that was the accepted notion of science ironically inherited by Renaissance thinkers from Aristotle, whom they were trying to refute. If classical laws are not universal, certain, and necessary, what are they?

Such a question is not a scientific question but a philosophical question. Physicists do not ask themselves what they are doing when they are knowing scientifically. They are concerned with the contents known, not with the cognitional activities through which they become known. This is why Einstein advised us not to pay attention to what physicists say they are doing, but to watch what they do.

Lonergan paid close attention to what scientists do, and he characterized their activities as a remarkably abstractive, enriching process which involves shifting from a descriptive framework of knowing into an explanatory perspective. Instead of identifying things in their relations to us through descriptive correlations, scientists of the Renaissance abstracted from things as they present themselves to our senses, and shifted to understanding things in their relations to one another. Thus, in explaining why things fall, Galileo abstracted from the weight of things perceived by the way they 'feel' to an observer; he focused instead on the measurable relations of distance, time, velocity, and acceleration. Newton grounded these measured distances and durations in a putatively certain, universal, and necessary framework he named absolute space and absolute time. But

later scientists abstracted from sensibly observed distances and durations, and conceived a strictly intelligible, coordinate system for centering and measuring observable distances and durations.⁴

Since scientists had committed themselves to explaining why things are what they are, they eventually found themselves wondering, why space is the way it is, and why time is the way it is. Arguing that gravitational and electromagnetic correlations form or structure spaces and times to behave the way that they do, Einstein eliminated Newton's absolute space and time. There is no time apart from space, no space apart from time, no space and time apart from velocities, and no velocities apart from mass. [In other words, space, time, mass, and velocity are changing quantities, mutually dependent in such a way as intrinsically to limit one another: e.g. change the velocity and you change the mass. This implies that the physical universe is a limited universe.]

It follows that there is no infinite space and time, no 'divine sensorium' within which God created the universe. The vast nothingness it is so tempting to try to imagine, and which has been said by so many philosophers and scientists to actually exist, was eliminated by the scientists *doing* science.

In brief, Lonergan stressed that scientists do not trust scientific theories, but they trust their own minds working methodically, discovering and formulating theories, and/or correcting or adapting prior scientific theories in order gradually to get closer to their final goal of a complete explanation of the physical universe.

Since the shift from descriptive to explanatory frameworks, or from things as related to us to things related to one another, is so foundational to the scientific enterprise, let me briefly point out one more example taken from chemistry to illustrate this shift in perspective.

Chemists may begin by describing the properties of ice, water, and steam in terms of their appearances to observers: their size, shape, color, location, and ways of behaving. Such descriptions would lead you to think that ice, water, and steam were three different realities, not three variable states of one and the same compound that chemists eventually named H₂O. The observable facts are that the shapes, sizes, colors, locations, and ways of behaving of ice, water, and steam change quite dramatically as one and the same subsisting compound named

⁴See Lonergan, *Insight* chapter 5.

H₂O undergoes various transformations from solid to liquid to gaseous states. However, not content just to describe the properties of things, chemists intend to explain 'why' chemical things are 'what' they are, and why they act and interact the way they do. And so eventually they discover that the weight of H₂O does not change as it goes from a solid to liquid to vaporous state. Moreover, having discovered the 'weights' of different chemical compounds and elements enabled scientists to correlate chemical realities to one another in terms of their weights. This led to the periodic table, and eventually to the theory of valences which enabled chemists to 'explain' why chemical compounds and elements *interact* the way they do. As the science advanced, chemists were able to explain why chemical compounds have their shape, size, color, and locations.

In other words, scientists begin with descriptive observations, move through measurements to explanatory correlations, and gradually return to the descriptive correlations as they find ways to explain why we can see, feel, smell, the compounds the way we do. The purpose of science is not to discredit the so-called 'subjective appearances' of things. Just the opposite, scientists intend to explain them. It is a mistake to name descriptive properties 'secondary qualities,' to name scientific, explanatory correlates 'primary qualities,' and then to discredit these 'secondary qualities' as merely subjective. This is what Galileo did.

Galileo, instead of granting that such ordinary descriptive knowing as we have of the rising and setting of the sun is a limited way of knowing what scientists were trying to explain, insisted that knowing things in their sensible appearances was simply 'subjective knowing,' not true, 'objective knowing.' This foundational mistake shared by Bacon and Descartes is a misunderstanding of what scientists are doing when they do science. It is the context for the basic misinterpretation of the Enlightenment by Continental philosophical thinkers.

In demonstrating phenomenologically that scientists are in fact moving toward a complete explanation of our physical universe and how it operates, Lonergan got behind this four-hundred year old set of erroneous assumptions about the scientific revolution and its consequences.

There is also a human universe and quite different sciences are required to explain how it operates. I will return to this human universe later in the paper, but first I wish to note briefly what

Lonergan was able to learn from the dramatic developments in mathematics during this same period.

SECTION III: HISTORY OF MATHEMATICS

The history of development in Western mathematics is divided into three periods.⁵ In the first Greek period, thinkers focused on such mathematical objects as geometrical figures, numbers, and ratios. In the second Renaissance stage, attention shifted to the way these mathematical objects are generated or constructed. In the third modern stage, the even more comprehensive context of group theory has been established in the last two centuries.

At this third stage, the focus is on the properties of the operations that generate the relations and differences among mathematical objects rather than on the objects themselves, or on the way these objects are generated and correlated. In the second stage, Descartes grasped that the unknown object could be either a geometrical or numerical object. He discovered that you could multiply and divide lines in the same way you multiply and divide numbers, so that the resulting 'numerical' quotient or product could also be interpreted as a 'geometrical' quotient or product. The crucial second-stage breakthrough was to realize that the unknown object becomes knowable through the operation that generates it. But if you proceed even further and start wondering about the nature of these operations that generate mathematical objects, then you have moved from Renaissance mathematics to the third, contemporary stage.

In this third stage mathematicians realize that the properties of mathematical terms and relations derive from the property of the operations by which you generate them. For instance, you can transform 4 into 3 by subtracting ($4-1=3$), or you can transform 4 into 5 by adding ($4+1=5$). You may ask, What is adding? For someone in the first stage, the answer is a surprise: adding is an operation that reverses subtraction, and so, whatever you construct by adding, you can deconstruct by subtracting since adding and subtracting are reversible operations. What you do with adding, can be undone by subtracting. Of course, the same is true of multiplying and dividing.

⁵Pierre Boutroux, *L'Ideal scientifique des mathematiens dans l'antiquité et dans les temps modernes* (1920).

Together these four operations form the system we call arithmetic. Learning to do arithmetic is learning to generate sums, remainders, products, and quotients, and learning how to reverse them one into another.

Descartes discovered that the objects you generate through your system of reversible operations may be geometrical or numerical operations. This underscores a second key property of the objects over and above the reversibility of a system of operations which enables us to deconstruct whatever we construct. The second significant property of a system of operations is the range or horizon within which the system can operate. For example, there is a notable difference in the range of adding, subtracting, multiplying, and dividing according as they operate in arithmetic, or algebra, or analytic geometry. Arithmetic, algebra, and analytic geometry form a series of horizons or higher viewpoints in which the latter encompass the former. At the level of algebra, you can do everything that you did at the level of arithmetic, but you have extended your powers of constructing (adding and multiplying) and deconstructing (subtracting and dividing). The same is true as you advance from simple algebra to analytic geometry.

In stating $(a+b)=(b+a)$ you have invented a new way of dealing with numbers since a or b may refer not just to a single number as in arithmetic, but to any of a series of numbers. Again, in analytic geometry the letters can be interpreted either numerically or geometrically. Moreover, in calculus your operations move to an even higher level, taking into consideration all the ways different types of series are limited. Then, number theory brings you to an even higher level of operation as you classify the different types of series in terms of real numbers, complex numbers, transfinite numbers, etc. Finally, you can begin to study the successive levels of mathematics through which you have advanced as a conditioned series of higher systems of operations that are self-regulating or reversible within a certain operational domain or horizon.

In light of these developments, if you ask, What is a number? the answer is: numbers are what you make through operations; and operations are defined as a system or group that is self-regulating within a certain domain or horizon. Notice about this definition that you are defining mathematical objects (numerical or geometrical) in and through the operating subject who is doing the constructing and deconstructing in whatever range he or she is capable of performing. The subjective and objective poles are mutually determining. The

objective horizon within which the subject performs depends on the operating levels that he or she has achieved. What is so remarkable about this way of defining an operating subject, is that *it combines explanatory and descriptive viewpoints within one and the same definition.*

You will recall that the explanatory perspective correlates things to one another while the descriptive viewpoint correlates things in relation to the sensing of the knowing subject. However, we have explained above how mathematical objects can be correlated to one another in and through the subject's system of operations. Furthermore, we have suggested how knowing subjects can move through a series of more advanced and more encompassing horizons steadily increasing their powers to construct and deconstruct mathematical objects within an objective field implicitly defined by the subjects' own operating powers. On the basis of these thematizations, we can distinguish between the present, actual operating range of any mathematical knower, and the potential range that knower may achieve by further developing his or her operating powers thereby generating and attaining yet more universal and comprehensive horizons of knowing.

Notice the parallel, then, between the way mathematicians keep expanding their operating horizon, and the way scientists keep expanding their operating horizon. Without going into detail we may state that scientists intend a complete explanation of the physical universe while mathematicians intend a full exploration of data that resemble the data of the physical universe. Over and above scientific and mathematical expansions, then, there is room for philosophy or wisdom, which has come to be called metaphysics. In philosophical inquiry knowers are invited to establish an actual operating horizon (or a metaphysics) that will integrate and encompass both mathematical and physical horizons as well as other domains. Most important, such a metaphysics can be formulated as a system of implicit or heuristic definitions similar to the one we have just sketched in the field of mathematics.

SECTION IV: LONERGAN'S METHOD OF PHILOSOPHIZING

In this context we can see the flexibility and power of Lonergan's method. Recall that Lonergan argued that philosophers' metaphysical

position will depend on their prior epistemological position, while their epistemology will depend on their prior appropriation of their own activities of knowing. Just as the central problem in any science is to move from a descriptive to an explanatory perspective, so the same problem exists in metaphysics. Briefly stated, the shift is from 'What is metaphysics?', to 'Why is any given metaphysics what it is?' The answer is that any metaphysics is the way it is because of its (implicitly or explicitly) assumed epistemology; and in turn, the 'why' of its epistemology is its (implicitly or explicitly) assumed cognitional theory. An *explicit* explanatory metaphysics requires that we specify all three theories — metaphysics, epistemology, and cognitional theory. Another way of stating the requirements of an explicit explanatory metaphysics is to say you need to specify what you mean by reality, by objectivity, and by knowing. These are three interrelated terms which are defined in such a way that they also are supposed to express or mediate or generalize 'you' as the subject who is operating with these three basic meanings.

This explicit specification can be done through the technique of implicit definition. We have seen that in mathematics you can explicitate and so define the objective horizon of a mathematical knower through the subject's own cognitional operations. This is because, as Lonergan has shown, the objectivity of mathematical knowers depends on their authentic subjectivity.

In like manner, Lonergan develops his metaphysics by first inviting you to specify your subjectivity in and through your own cognitional operations. Then Lonergan goes on to specify being through these same cognitive operations, namely, being the object which will be known when you have made all the correct judgments that can be made.

Finally, Lonergan specifies the meaning of objectivity in and through three correct judgments of the following type: 1) I am a knower. 2) This is a desk. And 3) I am not this desk. He helps us realize that three such correct judgments are made within the field of being or reality — which is the basic objective of all knowers' knowing. Therefore, the three judgments posit a real knowing subject, a real known object, and a real known distinction between you, the knowing subject, and any correctly known object, in this case, the desk.

In terms of Lonergan's approach to reality or being, objectivity, and knowing, it becomes clear that an authentic metaphysical knower is any knower operating in a horizon set by his or her own unrestricted

desire to know, which is to say that the basic horizon for all knowers is being. There are four basic properties of this statement to be noted.

In the first place the statement is completely comprehensive and concretely singular since it is applicable to every single knower who ever lived, is living, and will live. It is completely comprehensive because it implies a spontaneous and immediately given, conscious orientation operating through questioning toward an unrestricted objective. In the second place, the single statement that the basic horizon for all knowers is being does not depend on the subject-object relation as it is usually imagined. Instead, we remark that there are three judgments involved in relating a subject to an object, and in distinguishing that subject from the object; but any one of those three judgments, if it is correctly affirmed, is absolute in and by itself because it is affirmed within being, within the horizon that encompasses everything that truly is. Hence, the so-called 'subject-object split' is within being just like any other object that is judged correctly.

In the third place it is extremely difficult to grasp why these first two properties just stated can be affirmed: namely, because the immediate, spontaneous wondering of all knowers is characterized as unrestricted or infinite. The history of both physics and mathematics has shown that these disciplines have been plagued by a recurring tendency to make space and time infinite and unrestricted, and then to place reality or being inside that non-existent, infinite space and time. This has to do with the inbuilt spontaneities of the imagination. Since these spontaneities lead us to think of space and time as existing outside being, while positioning being inside space, knowers, then, must 'turn themselves inside out' in order to operate within the objective horizon of being or reality, and to affirm the understanding of space and/or time as existing within being. Therefore, this 'turning oneself inside out' takes a long time, and is difficult to achieve. [Einstein's accomplishments certainly set the conditions for doing what Lonergan noted it took even Saint Augustine years to achieve.]

A fourth property of the statement about what constitutes an authentic metaphysical knower is the basic distinction between what any knower presently knows, and his or her actual capacity to know. To be an authentic knower, the knower must have appropriated the difference between the limited horizon within which he or she is actually operating, and the unlimited horizon which is always present

as an infinite, known-unknown being which becomes known in a limited way whenever one knows correctly.

Notice that there is no way of escaping the fact that you are a knower oriented to knowing being, because spontaneously, naturally, and immediately every human knower is oriented by his or her desire to know or wonder toward an infinite, unlimited objective. You may affirm that you are not such a human knower, but that affirmation does not change the fact that you are a knower. For example, Descartes invited knowers to doubt everything they knew in order to discover an indubitably clear and certain truth. In accepting that invitation and doubting your own spontaneous desire to know everything about everything, you set up a performative contradiction between what you think you are in achieving radical doubt, and what you are doing in fact when you are doubting. Similarly, most knowers think they exist within space and time alone because they think that all reality is within space and time. But that is not 'where' reality is. Rather, space and time, if they are real, are so only because they exist in being.

In short, to become an authentic knower or genuine metaphysical knower, then, is for a knower to accept the invitation to discover the actual, concrete contradiction between what they are saying or thinking they are doing when they are knowing, and what they are doing in fact.

SECTION V: LONERGAN AND HEIDEGGER: PRELIMINARY COMPARISON

Heidegger has characterized the unfolding of Western philosophy from the time of Plato down to the twentieth-century as "the forgetfulness of being." Related to this characterization, as we have just noted, Lonergan specified human knowers as authentic or inauthentic according as their account of human knowing is or is not in agreement with their own actual, spontaneous orientation to being, which for the most part is not yet known by true judgments. Again, Heidegger's 'forgetfulness of being' is also related to the fact that it is remarkably difficult to appropriate the fact that you do not actually know the infinite. This is shown by the fact that most people, and almost all scientists before Einstein, 'imagined' they did somehow know the infinite. However, mathematicians 'doing' mathematics, and scientists 'doing' science gradually corrected this 'imaginative mistake.' In doing so they also

provided philosophers with an array of tools for clarifying basic philosophical issues.

I have focused on generalizing the art of 'implicit definition' so that a field of objects is specified in terms of the subject's own operating activities, thus, resolving the subject/object dichotomy. Further, the same mode of specifying subjects and objects allowed Lonergan to specify the dialectic of authentic and inauthentic ontological knowers in terms of the horizon of their own concretely operating cognitive activities. Finally, this way of correlating concrete subjects with their world of objects allowed Lonergan to make the crucial distinction between the proximate norm of truth for a correct judgment, made within a limited context of meaning, and the remote norm of truth which depends on the way any limited context of knowing is correlated to, oriented by, and open to an unrestricted desire for infinite truth.

There are important parallels between Lonergan's specification of the concrete knowing subject, operating in a horizon or world of objects, and Heidegger's specification of the person as 'Dasein' whose essence is to be in the world in such a way as to question the meaning of being. For both Lonergan and Heidegger, in addition to subjects operating in a world or horizon, there is also the mode in which they operate within that horizon. For both, human subjects may be in their respective worlds authentically or inauthentically. However, if you examine just what these two authors mean by subjects' authentic and inauthentic ways of being in their respective worlds we find very important differences.

Followers of Heidegger tend to place Lonergan within the post-scientific revolutionary problematic formulated by Kant. But this is a mistake, as demonstrated by Lonergan's critique of Kant's categorical system, which has much in common with Heidegger's critique of Kant. Followers of Lonergan, on the other hand, tend to put Heidegger within the problematic that resulted from Kant's phenomenon/noumenon distinction, a mistake that goes back to Galileo's distinction between primary objective qualities of things known through geometrical proportions, and the merely subjective qualities known through our senses. As we saw, Kant reduced both qualities to the cognitive status of phenomena and postulated a noumenal realm which could not be known within the limits of human reason since, as human, reason must operate in and through sensible *a priori* forms. However, Heidegger followed Husserl's phenomenological method into the realm of intentional consciousness and began appropriating what

Lonergan has called the world of 'interiority.' How did Heidegger move beyond Husserl to rediscover the being question which, according to Heidegger, had been displaced and forgotten since the time of the early Greek philosophers?

A most remarkable achievement of Heidegger was to shift philosophy into the language world of ordinary appearances and to locate the question of being hidden within the ordinary appearances of things in the world about us. For someone trained in Lonergan's philosophy this achievement is not so easy to appreciate, because of the critical role played in his philosophy by the move from describing things as they appear to us to explaining things by the ways that they function with one another. This difficulty is compounded by the scientific revolution's discovery of symbolic algebra and geometry with its accompanying break with the language world of ordinary appearances of things. This break precipitated philosophy's shift away from the Greek and medieval metaphysical perspective to the epistemological perspective of British empiricism and German Idealism.

In order to approach the issues of comparison more helpfully, we need to consider briefly the nineteenth-century background of Heidegger's thought.

SECTION VI: NINETEENTH-CENTURY CONTEXT OF HEIDEGGER'S THOUGHT

For Lonergan scholars to appreciate what Heidegger has done they must first turn to appreciate how Kierkegaard shifted the definition of the person from the traditional formula of the rational animal to that of the choosing animal.⁶ Thus, the 'to be' of a human person lies in the choices that he or she makes. We exist in and through our choices.

Besides moving the focus on persons from their knowing to their choosing, Kierkegaard also identified the basic orienting motives that explain why choosers decide to do what they do. For Kierkegaard every chooser is ultimately moved by a basic religious desire. This desire becomes distorted and contracted because of the person's fear of death. For Kierkegaard, Kant's autonomous, self-legislating subjects who do

⁶My insights into the connection between early Heidegger and Kierkegaard are confirmed in the elaboration of that nexus by Ralph Harper in *On Presence, Variations and Reflections* (Philadelphia: Trinity Press International, 1991).

their duty under their own rational commands are a delusion. In fact these practical subjects are morally deceived about their own ability and responsibility to choose wisely. They do not wish to face up to the conscious, steady undertow of fear (or dread) that reveals their own mortality, as well as the moral impotence of their supposedly self-commanding self.

The influence of Kierkegaard's thought, however, was delayed until the early twentieth century. The debate over the method of the human sciences and history as opposed to the method of the natural sciences occupied most thinkers of the period. The turning-point came with Dilthey's attempt to do for history and the human sciences what Kant had done for the natural sciences. Dilthey realized that the new emerging science of history, especially as practiced by the German historical school, offered philosophers the same opportunities for philosophical analysis as Newton's mechanics had given Kant.

Just as Kant had asked, "What sort of a mind would you have to be given in order to know the way that Newton knew?" so Dilthey could ask, "What sort of mind would you have to have to know historically the way that Ranke and Niebuhr knew?" As Kant had attempted an epistemology of the natural sciences, so Dilthey would attempt an epistemology of history and the human sciences.⁷ In this endeavor he was very much indebted to Hegel's metaphysics of history, and especially to his notion of 'objective spirit,' which manifests itself in the philosophy, art, and religion of a people. However, for Dilthey this 'objective spirit' was not the manifestation of Hegel's 'world spirit' acting in history but the expression of a people's interpretations of their own living, the expression of attitudes and needs which they embodied in their families, society and state.

Notice that Dilthey has shifted from the human being as a reasoning animal to the much more concrete designation of the individual living at particular times and places in an historically conditioned community. This means that historians examining the history of a people begin assuming that a people's mode and manner of living was an expression of the way they had interpreted and expressed themselves in their various social patterns of behavior. This implies that the data which historians examine is dramatically different from the data of the natural sciences. Chemists do not ask what water means by turning itself into ice. But, once a historian has established that

⁷Wilhelm Dilthey, *The Essence of Philosophy*, S.A. Emery and W.T. Emery, trans. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1954).

Caesar crossed the Rubicon, then that historian wonders what Caesar intended to do, and why he intended to do it. In addition to Caesar's actual, physical crossing of the river, there were his conscious intentions expressed in and through his physical performances. Caesar made a decision based on his evaluation of possible courses of action; and, having so deliberated, he then chose to execute his plan of action.

Dilthey's discovery that the physical actions of human beings, singularly and collectively, are expressions of personal or common meanings was a dramatic advance in nineteenth-century thinking because this meant that the work of historians is primarily hermeneutical; they have to interpret in the manners and mores of a people their lived meanings or intendings. This provided a basic and far-reaching distinction between the history that people were living, and the written historical accounts which attempted to interpret those lived meanings. Finally, and most important, it meant the explicit realization that people are essentially 'historical beings' since the meanings they are living are, for the most part, inherited meanings.

Notice the progression in nineteenth-century thinking from the human being as a reasoner into a chooser who executes his or her choices, and thereby lives out the meanings that motivated these choices. Such meanings are expressed in and through the courses of action and interaction undertaken by a people. Just what Dilthey means by 'meaning' is not my intention to specify. My purpose is only to point to Dilthey as a key turning-point taken up and recontextualized by Husserl and Heidegger. First, a brief note on Husserl.

Husserl is part of the philosophical movement that began with Descartes' 'turn to the subject' in order to analyze his or her conscious activities. Like Descartes, Husserl turns to the conscious subject by suspending or bracketing the subject's 'natural attitude'⁸ which assumes the objective reality of things. His intent was to discover a consciousness purified of such interests. The result was the discovery that the basic character of consciousness lies in its 'intentionality.' Consciousness is directed to objects by its very nature. Husserl refers to this method of philosophizing as 'phenomenological' because he intends to describe the way objects appear to a conscious subject who has bracketed the 'natural attitude.' The purpose is to get behind the categorical structures of knowing and establish a fundamental grounding for all of our conscious living. But he also intends to

⁸Edmund Husserl, *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to Phenomenological Philosophy*, F. Kersten, trans (The Hague: Nijhoff 1982).

describe carefully the objects of our intentions in order to discover their essential natures. In other words, because consciousness is a 'consciousness of,' the conscious subject's intending will be spontaneously involved with conscious objects. Instead of attempting to specify just what Husserl meant by these basic terms I will shift to Heidegger's critique of both Dilthey and Husserl.

SECTION VII: HEIDEGGER'S *BEING AND TIME*⁹

While Heidegger thought of himself as using Husserl's phenomenological method, he also realized that he radically altered that method. Heidegger's problematic, unlike Husserl's, was not an attempt to work out the epistemological grounding of the sciences, to overcome the subject-object dichotomy, and to establish philosophy as a rigorous science. Instead, his problematic regarded the meaning of being. According to Heidegger, this problematic was first posed by presocratic philosophers, but had been covered over in the course of the history of philosophy. And so Heidegger transformed phenomenology into the method for uncovering and revealing why philosophers had forgotten the question of the meaning of being.

In his major work *Sein und Zeit* Heidegger argued that the question of being was forgotten not because of 'what' a person is, nor because of 'why' a person is, but rather because of 'how' that person is. The mode and manner of being a human being is what leads one to the forgetfulness of the being question. A leading question for Heidegger, therefore, is not what a human being is, but *how* a human being is. The 'how' question, as we shall see, is more comprehensive and concrete than the 'what' or 'why' question.

Heidegger claimed that the human person's way of being is to ask about being. To indicate that a person's mode of being-in-the-world is to inquire about being, Heidegger coins the term 'Dasein.'

To a follower of Lonergan this might sound like Heidegger is referring to the human person as spontaneously oriented through wonder toward being. In the first twelve chapters of *Insight* Lonergan established that all human knowers, no matter what pattern of knowing they may be operating in, are always seeking to know being. Because being sets the conditions for the possibility of any and all knowers to know, then any and all knowers operate within the horizon or field of being. All human beings are born into and live within the horizon of being. Whenever and whatever any knowers know, they know it within being. As Lonergan puts it, the notion of being "underlies, permeates, and constitutes" every known content as known.

But this construal of Heidegger's sense of 'Dasein' is somewhat misleading. We can see the reason why if we compare the structures in

⁹In this analysis of Heidegger's thought I am very indebted to Joseph J. Kockelman's Heidegger's "Being and Time" (Washington, D.C.: Center for Advanced Research in Phenomenology and University Press of America, 1989).

which and through which any knower exists and operates according to Lonergan, with the structures or 'existentials' in which and through which human being or 'Dasein' exists and operates according to Heidegger.

For Lonergan in *Insight* the structures through which knowers operate are the cognitional activities of experiencing, understanding, and judging. But, as you will recall, these activities are initiated and sustained by the underlying desire to know that permeates and directs the continuous, recurrent flow of these activities.

Heidegger never identified his thematization of Dasein's 'existential structures' with the cognitional structures of a conscious, knowing subject. From Heidegger's viewpoint, the subject operating in the purely cognitional mode of being is 'only looking at' things. This of course is not true for the Lonergan of *Insight*. Yet for us to appreciate Heidegger's 'existentials,' we need to shift to the Lonergan of *Method In Theology*, keeping in mind at the same time Heidegger's historical context in which the most significant event was Kierkegaard's shift from the human being as a knower to that being as a chooser.

This in turn is intimately connected with questions concerning the differences between the human and the natural sciences — or what Lonergan referred to as the shift from 'nature' to 'history.' Lonergan criticized Aristotle's categories as being only descriptive rather than explanatory, for they deal only with things as related to ourselves. In contrast, Heidegger criticized them as being *a priori* categories adequately applicable to sub-human nature alone; whereas his own 'existentials' might be compared to *a priori* categories applicable to the being of the human person. The point is that the being of the person must be analyzed differently because of its fundamental difference from the mode of beings of all other material, vegetable, and animal things. Accordingly, for Heidegger man's mode of being is to stand-forth (to ex-sist) in-the-world in such a way as to reveal his or her selfhood, and his or her way of being with other beings. In other words, human beings are in the world to uncover and make manifest the Being of their being, and the way they are with other beings. Just how, then, does Dasein do this?

Dasein makes beings known in accord with the way that Dasein is attuned to them, or in accord with the way Dasein evaluates and cares for them. The most primordial mode of being of the human person is a 'caring' or intending toward things close by in order to discover their usefulness for human living. Beneath the scientific explanation of

things, underneath the metaphysical or substantial reality of things, there is their 'near-at-hand' reality by which they are integrated into Dasein's everyday world of living. Things reveal their primordial reality in so far as they belong to the work-a-day world of people who care about them as part of their world.

In addition to being-with things in a world, Dasein is also with other people who share in his or her way of being-with things. Here Heidegger wished to stress that, in their very being, human beings *are* a being-with-others. So much so, that to recognize self, as a singular self, one must turn away from others and come-back on one's own self.

The stumbling-block is that the way of being with others, caring for them, and having concern for them, is covered over and disoriented by our average, everyday way of being-in-the-world with things. My own way of being as a being-with-others is disoriented and covered over and, as a result, in place of my authentic self, I develop an everyday-self that is like every other's everyday self, or what Heidegger calls a 'they-self.' Instead of discovering the possibilities of my own being, I realize myself in comparison with those about me. I want to be like this 'one' or that 'one,' so that I can become a 'one' and, thereby, find security and solace in being like them. Hence, instead of being myself I become like them, a 'they-self.'

Moreover, in understanding myself as in tune with other inauthentic selves, I articulate these understandings in the public, everyday speech into which I am born, and in which I grow up. My 'mother-tongue' encourages my becoming like others, giving me a set of significances that fore-structure my world to be like them in their world, so that we can chat about our average, everyday self and world in a way that will lead us all to hide from our authentic way of being in the world and of caring about things and one another.

In addition, in order to have things to chat about and to distract ourselves, we are 'greedy for new things,' curious to discover the 'new' simply because it provides us with continuous distractions. We speak about them, but we do not get beyond the public, everyday way of speaking about them, and so we do not get to know these things in themselves, and in the real possibilities of being-with them that they might disclose to us. We are endlessly open to novel experiences, but this openness is mere curiosity that provides us with endless opportunities of escaping from ourselves. Thus, we 'fall away' from ourselves, throwing ourselves into the world of things, and busying ourselves with average, everyday concerns and possibilities which assure us that

we have found a 'normal' way to live and to realize our true selves. Whereas, our genuine and unique 'ability-to-be' remains hidden and covered-over. We have fallen-away from ourselves and made ourselves a stranger to our own authentic way of being in the world with things and with others.

Why have we disowned our authentic way of being, and chosen instead to live in an inauthentic manner? Heidegger borrowed his answer from Kierkegaard, but he recontextualized Kierkegaard's insights in terms of his own existentials — mood, understanding, speech. Put simply, Dasein disowns his or her authentic mode of being and chooses instead to 'fall away' from an authentic way of being and to 'throw self' into an inauthentic way of being-in-the-world, because Dasein 'dreads' the fact that his or her being is a being-unto-death.

If I exist as a caring being who cares about the way I 'world' myself, then, concern about death becomes the concern about 'my-own-utmost possibility.' To really care about my death would transform my caring being into a dreadful way of being that would make all my other cares 'shrink up into insignificance.' In fact, dread of death makes everything seem insignificant. Death has the power not only of disclosing to Dasein the basic ground and ultimate horizon of Dasein's 'own-most possibility,' but also of causing the whole world to 'sink away' into insignificance and become 'nothing.'

What Dasein dreads in death does not arise from anything or anywhere but from 'nowhere' and 'nothing.' Dread, however, is not simply a denial of things but also has the power to disclose to Dasein why he or she has chosen to fall away from his or her 'own-most self,' and flee into becoming a 'they-self.' Dread of death has the power to disclose that Dasein has 'thrown itself forward' into the familiar everyday way of being a 'they-self' precisely because its way of being is to-be-unto-death. To care about death, then, can help Dasein to find and to retrieve its lost, thrown-away self, and to turn back to an authentic way of being its own self.

Finally, and most fundamentally, this analysis of care in terms of the dread of death reveals the temporality of Dasein's way of being in the world. Dread of death permits Dasein to discover that her 'past' way of being has been inauthentic precisely because of the way that she has 'futured' her being-in-the-world. Among future possibilities of Dasein's way of being is to hide from such a dreadful possibility, and so, (in the past) Dasein has thrown itself into the world, becoming like other inauthentic subjects, thereby refusing to discover Dasein's own

authentic mode of being. In other words, Dasein may exist in an authentic or inauthentic way according to the way that Dasein *temporalizes* itself, which means according to the way Dasein organizes its future, past and present times (of meaning).

Death, while 'not-yet,' can be made present, and in being made present, is able to disclose my being as a being 'thrown into existence.' This means that I am not the author of my being. I am right now a being who has been thrown into existence. To choose to be in this authentic mode Dasein must 'resolve' to listen to and answer the 'call of its own conscience' in the face of the dread that arises from understanding one's own being, as thrown-in-the-world in such a way as to-be-toward-death. My possibly authentic self 'calls me' to turn aside from my inauthentic 'they-self,' and 'resolutely choose' to live in the truth of my own being as 'having-been' thrown forward unto death 'here-and-now.' My present, therefore, embraces a past 'has been,' a present 'here and now,' and a future 'will be,' each of which I can organize authentically as my own personal fate, or disown by distracting myself in being concerned with the 'present-to-hand,' public world that has been handed-down to me. Instead of handing-down my own past throwtness to myself through a resolute choice of my own present and future, I may choose to be a 'they-self' and flee from the dreadful anxiety of my own-most possibility of death. This means not only that I choose to live inauthentically now, but I also choose to live in an inauthentic past and future.

This completes my brief sketch of Heidegger's analysis of Dasein as set forth in *Sein und Zeit*. I will now turn to my attempt to opening a conversation between the later Lonergan and the Heidegger of *Being and Time*.

SECTION VIII: THE LATER LONERGAN AND EARLY HEIDEGGER

To compare the late Lonergan with the early Heidegger it will be necessary to state briefly the major developments in Lonergan's post-*Insight* writings. These developments can be summarized under the rubric of 'intentionality analysis.' In *Insight* Lonergan had moved beyond both the traditional priority of metaphysics, and the Kantian priority of epistemology, to the priority of cognitional theory. Lonergan did not refer to his methodological approach as 'intentionality analysis'

until after *Insight* when he had articulated his theory of the concrete subject as operating on four different conscious levels, with the levels differentiated by the type of questions being asked and answered more adequately. "On this showing," Lonergan stated, "speculative intellect loses its primacy. The key position now pertains to the deliberating subject, and his deliberations are existential for they determine what he is to be; they are interpersonal, for they determine his relations to others, they are practical, for they make this earth a better or worse place in which we are to live."¹⁰

This quotation involves a remarkable advance over *Insight* since it reverses the traditional way of thinking about the relation between metaphysics and ethics. Just as *Insight* placed the metaphysical subject within the horizon of the cognitional subject, so after *Insight* Lonergan located the cognitional subject within the horizon of the deliberating subject. Similarly, Lonergan recontextualized the transcendental notion of truth within the more comprehensive and concrete transcendental notion of value.

Lonergan's post-*Insight* shift into 'intentionality analysis' opens up the very concrete notion of the subject as religious, as receiving and responding to religious experiences. In this shift, all of Lonergan's earlier research in *Grace and Freedom* gets recontextualized. Love becomes the central issue and the very core of our personal identity. Love encompasses every level of our being and leads us to revalorize our own being and the being of the world in which we live. Lonergan sums up this new dimension by the famous phrase of Pascal, "The heart has reasons that reason does not know." As Lonergan says, "Where before knowledge preceded, founded, and justified loving, now falling-in-love and being-in-love culminate and complete the process of self-transcendence."¹¹ This means that just as a moral subject deliberating within a social horizon takes up and enhances the knowing subject operating in the world of cognitive objects, so the religious subject transforms, transcends, and encompasses both cognitive and moral horizons. The traditional separation between metaphysics, ethics, and theology is completely recontextualized since an analysis of

¹⁰Bernard Lonergan, "Aquinas Today: Tradition and Innovation," *A Third Collection. Papers by Bernard J.F. Lonergan, SJ*, F.E. Crowe, ed. (New York: Paulist 1984) 35-54 at 46.

¹¹Bernard Lonergan, *Method in Theology* (New York: Herder & Herder 1972) 115, 116.

the intending subject and his or her intended world embraces all three modes of the subject's way of being — as knower, chooser, and lover.

However, while intentionality analysis as practiced by Lonergan relates cognitional, moral, and religious concerns, he also differentiates them. This is because, unlike the phenomenologists, Lonergan did not confine consciousness to its 'intentional' aspect, but explicated it as "an awareness immanent in cognitional acts." It follows that there are different types of consciousness because there are different kinds of conscious acts. For Lonergan cognitional consciousness is comprised by sensible, intellectual, and rational consciousness. Moral consciousness includes all these three prior kinds of consciousness, but adds the kind of awareness that is concomitant with the acts of deliberating, evaluating, and choosing which render us moral or immoral subjects. Finally, there is the religious consciousness originating in acts of worshipping, praying, sacrificing, and similar sacred activities.

For Lonergan this way of specifying consciousness or awareness helps us to keep distinct but not separate our conscious self, and our acts of attending to our conscious selves. If we were not in a prior conscious state, or if we were not already conscious beings, we could not become explicitly aware of ourselves, question ourselves, think about ourselves, make judgments about ourselves, deliberate about ourselves, and love ourselves.

This distinction between being conscious, and being focally and thematically conscious is synonymous with the distinction between what we are *immediately* aware of and what we are *mediately* aware of. Immediately we experience or are aware of objects intended by our questions; but once these objects are intended in our questioning, they are transformed into known-unknown objects mediated through our various cognitional and moral acts.

Accordingly, immediately and quite spontaneously we ask cognitional and moral questions. Immediately and quite spontaneously, we are knowers and choosers. But what we know and choose depends on the way we mediate our experiences in and through our acts of knowing and choosing. While we have no choice about being thinkers and choosers, we do have varying degrees of freedom concerning the thoughts we think and the choices we make. This was Kierkegaard's remarkable discovery.

In the context of that discovery, Kierkegaard could assert that people can choose to exist in direct opposition to their own spontaneously 'given' selves. Kierkegaard's Don Juan chooses not to choose, but

assumes, quite falsely, that he can drift about without committing himself, without making a deliberate choice. In fact such drifting is already a choice.

This distinction between what people actually, immediately, and spontaneously are, and what they assert they are, is what Heidegger took over and adapted in his distinction between the authentic and inauthentic person.

Heidegger also took up and adapted Kierkegaard's discovery of the problem of 'converting' from an inauthentic to an authentic way of living or mode of being. Kierkegaard realized that changing your basic way of living is not a matter of accepting proofs and demonstrations, but involves a fundamental break from a prior orientation to a 'radically' different direction. As a prospective course of action such a turnabout evokes 'fear and trembling' since it means that the subject's former way of being and behaving are to be rejected as basically untrue. For Heidegger, such conversion demands a change from a 'they-self' to a self who has understood and resolutely chosen his or her own 'fate' as a being-unto-death.

In his own rather more differentiated context of meanings Lonergan took up and adapted Kierkegaard's and Heidegger's distinction between an authentic and inauthentic subject, and the consequent foundational problem of 'converting' from one way of being to a radically different way. However, having differentiated and correlated the human subject as knower, chooser, and lover, Lonergan also differentiated and correlated three different types of authentic and inauthentic subjects, and three corresponding types of conversion — intellectual, moral, and religious.

Moving into another area of concern he shares with Heidegger, Lonergan, besides distinguishing different acts and levels of the operating subject, also made a crucial distinction between the *proximate* and *remote* norms of intellectual, moral, and religious authenticity. However, it must be said, that Lonergan is much more precise about the proximate and remote norms of truth, than he is about the proximate and remote norms of morality and religion. In fact, one can say without exaggeration that the problem of *Insight* in the form of a question is: What are the conditions required to make a correct judgment of fact? Consequently, *Insight* is dominated by the problem of working out the proximate norm of truth

To answer that question we have to analyze the question about when evidence is sufficient for making a correct assertion or denial of

any matter of fact. Lonergan's answer to this question in *Insight's* chapter ten clarified the proximate norm of truth. Then in chapter twelve the remote standard of truth, namely, the spontaneous, natural, and immediate orientation of every human knower to being, is worked out.

The key to this orienting desire to know is that it is potentially infinite or unrestricted. The rich irony of disclosing that your own desire to know is potentially infinite, is that you must discover that you do not ultimately know what reality is fully and actually, even though habitually you tend to assume you do know. So pervasive and powerful is this assumption that it took more than two millennia of Western mathematics and science finally to bring this false assumption out into the open.

The development of number theory in mathematics and of special relativity in physics provided philosophers with the opportunity of locating the theoretical knowing subject within a horizon specified by the operating range of the mathematical or scientific knower. As a result, philosophers were able for the first time to distinguish clearly between the actual range or horizon of knowers' operations and their potential but undeveloped desire to transcend that horizon, since all knowers operate in actually limited horizons, but they also have an unlimited potency to transcend those horizons. These developments in science provided Lonergan with the opportunity to specify the remote standard of truth as the "proper unfolding of the unrestricted desire to know;" and to uncover the four biases that interfere with this 'proper unfolding.' For Lonergan, then, there are two norms of truth: the proximate norm that operates within a context or horizon; and the remote norm for questioning any given context or horizon in relation to our own immediate, spontaneous orientation to being.

Lonergan did not analyze in detail a similar distinction between proximate and remote norms for moral and religious meanings and values. However, he did provide materials for working out these distinctions. This distinction is critical for a Lonergan/Heidegger conversation since, in Lonergan's first analysis of Heidegger's writings, just after *Insight*, he suggested that Heidegger was "bogged down in a search for the remote criterion of truth," meaning that he had neglected the problem of the proximate norm of truth.¹² At that time, however, Lonergan had not yet fully worked out his own notions of

¹²Bernard Lonergan, *Existentialism. Notes for lectures*, Boston College; typescript made at the Thomas More Institute, Montreal; 1957.

moral and religious conversions; even more importantly, he had not articulated a transcendental notion of value. Lonergan's transcendental notion of value in chapter two of *Method In Theology* articulated the significant distinction between judgments of fact and judgments of value more clearly than had been done in *Insight*, precisely because he finally did differentiate the transcendental notion of value from the transcendental notions of intelligibility and truth that had dominated the earlier work. In addition he also elaborated a normative scale of values. In making these further developments, Lonergan achieved a 'reversal' of the traditional priority of metaphysics over ethics and at the same time restored the primacy of the ancient, philosophical question regarding the best way to live.

The conversation between the early Heidegger and the late Lonergan should begin in the context of *Method in Theology's* chapter on 'the human good' and the following two chapters on 'meaning' and 'religion.' Among the striking similarities between the late Lonergan and the early Heidegger, I wish to focus on the single issue in Heidegger's achievement that seems central for both of these thinkers, namely, the notion of 'temporality,' which grounds the notion of 'historicity.' Both notions bring clearly into focus the way that Heidegger integrated, but also transcended the achievements of Kierkegaard, Dilthey, and Husserl.

This aspect of Heidegger's achievement can be summed up by the familiar claim that he transformed phenomenology from an eidetic into an hermeneutic phenomenology. This transformation is epitomized in a pair of the later Heidegger's statements: "We live in language;" and "Language is the house of being."

To start getting some clarity about the meaning of these affirmations, we have to note the way they affect the 'life-world' or 'lived experience' — terms which are ambiguous, since they refer to both animal and human living. Animals operate in ecological systems which may be named their 'life-world' or environment. This environment is sensibly present to animals, providing them with sources for satisfying their immediately felt needs for food, mating, and preservation of the species. Human beings are also present to their environment through immediate, sensible awareness, but once a person has acquired a language, the immediate sensible world is transformed into a linguistically mediated world. More importantly, the immediately felt, inner experiences are also mediated linguistically. For example, when someone asks you, 'How do you feel?' your inner feelings are mediated

through such familiar responses as, 'I feel fine,' or, 'I feel a cold coming on,' etc. Once you have acquired a language, no longer do you perceive the world around or the world within you 'immediately.' You perceive them through language. You 'language' your inner feelings and outer sensing, but you do it so spontaneously that you are unaware of the way your language forms and focuses your experience. You look through language like a window without even noticing it. This has remarkable implications.

What people generally refer to as 'immediately obvious' is usually not 'immediately' but only 'linguistically' obvious. The world about us, we suppose, is only immediately perceived; in fact it is really linguistically perceived. This fact makes trying to clarify just what 'immediate,' as opposed to 'mediated,' experiences are into a major problem, because it means having to break free from your taken-for-granted linguistic meanings in and through which you routinely mediate your inner and outer experiences.

Heidegger was able to do this in two stages, first by subjecting the average, everyday-way-of-being-with things to analysis and appropriating them; and then by showing that this mode of being-with and speaking about things, is a way of fleeing from the fear of death. This analysis was a crucial part of Heidegger's fundamental distinction between authentic and inauthentic ways of existing with and speaking about things. Not only does *Dasein* 'language' the world in which he or she lives, but does so through an authentic or inauthentic language. Language, then, not only lets us talk about the world but it also 'carries' the very mode of being of *Dasein* within that 'language world.'

Heidegger, then, demonstrated that language plays much more than a merely instrumental role, whereby we signify inner and outer experiences. It has an ontological, structural role revealed in the resolute choice of *Dasein* to confront death, and to take over its 'thrownness,' as well as its heritage. Such a decision embraces future possibilities and past actualities within an authentic, concrete present. Such a decision reaches forward and backward in time, uniting all three temporal dimensions of our being, past, present and future. Through this decision *Dasein* grounds his or her way of being with things and with others. And yet it is not the past, present, and future tenses of the languages we speak, which make us beings that exist in different times at one and the same chronological time. Rather, our languages derive their temporal structure from the structure of

Dasein's own temporality. Similarly, historians who examine, evaluate, and narrate past human living are able to do so because historians themselves are already historical beings.

Dasein always exists ahead of itself while at the same time returning to its past self in every concrete, actual present. *Dasein* can exist authentically or inauthentically because he or she may choose to live presently within the horizon of its future death, and simultaneously, to hand over its 'has-been' aspect of itself to itself within this same horizon. However, for the most part, *Dasein* instead lives lost with things in an inauthentic 'they-self.' In other words, *Dasein's* past does not pass away but continues to accompany *Dasein* as he or she struggles with present, projected courses of actions, either in the context of a denial, or of an explicit acceptance of his or her own death.

Dasein's 'life-world' therefore is a 'language-world'; or *Dasein* is always living a story, that is, living in the past, present and future at the same time. To live a story is to live historically, and that 'lived story' may be authentic or inauthentic.

Putting Heidegger's insights into temporality and language together, we see that the human being is a 'meaning-being.' According to the way a person interprets his or her own past, present, and future meanings, whether that person chooses to live with himself or herself in an historically authentic or inauthentic way will be determined. Heidegger uses this distinction to distinguish truth from untruth in offering a basic critique of Western philosophy as the 'forgetfulness of being.'

The original meaning of the Greek word for truth, *aletheia*, is to let the hidden be seen by unveiling or revealing it. According to Heidegger this original meaning of truth was covered over by the later traditional philosophic definition of truth as a correspondence between a proposition and the things signified by that proposition. In this way of defining truth, if the proposed correspondence was correctly judged, then, the judger of that proposition could be credited with a true statement. Such a true proposition could then be communicated and handed around, thereby becoming one of the 'handy' truths revealing the reality of things. However, such 'handy' truths actually covered over and hid the being of things which could only be discovered by a 'disclosure' that let those things show themselves in and through the 'existential-structure' of *Dasein's* authentic way of being-in-the-world. This more primordial reference structure in which things reveal themselves in their being was hidden and covered over in the 'untruth' of

the conventional, or public 'handed-around-truths.' These were also handed down from one generation to the next, making it more difficult for *Dasein* to retrieve his or her primordial way of being with things and letting things show themselves in their being.

This 'original truth' or 'being' of things was lost, first in propositional truth, and then in the supposed scientific truth of things. This led to the Cartesian notion of truth in terms of 'rational certitude' and, finally, to the romantic notion of truth in the nineteenth century which located truth in the creativity of the individual knower.

The recovery of the original meaning of truth as the 'disclosure of being' begins with Husserl's initiation of the new phenomenological method. But Husserl's own efforts were hindered since he was unable to free himself from the Cartesian and Kantian problematic.

It was left to Heidegger to lay bare the 'existential-structure' of *Dasein*, uncovering the hidden, authentic mode of the human being's way of existing as a concrete, factual being who can choose to exist in accord with his or her own personal fate, as a being thrown-forward unto death. The authentic *Dasein* 'comes-back' to his or her own unique being in order to situate him-/herself in a world-history with past, present, and future persons.

Lonergan agrees with Heidegger that human beings are historical beings or that 'historicity' is a basic mode of human existence. The differences between Heidegger's and Lonergan's understandings of the 'historicity' of the human subject can be focused in terms of a fundamental question, repeated in several different ways, from Lonergan's framework.

Granted that we live or exist in different 'meaning times' at one and the same chronological time, just how is this 'existential' or 'ontological simultaneity' to be understood? Granted the human subject can live in many different times at one and the same chronological time, is our capacity to do so a limited or unlimited potency? I have argued above that our ability to unite a stretch or span of different 'nows' into a single series will vary according to the actual operating range of the subject; and that while the *actual* operating range of the subject is limited, Lonergan insists that it is *potentially* infinite.

As I noted, Lonergan distinguished between a proximate, limited standard of truth, and a remote, unlimited standard. A similar distinction can be made between a limited and unlimited standard of value. Accordingly, the authentic, cognitional, moral and religious being of any subject is to be and to live within the tension of an actual,

limited knowing, doing and loving horizon, and a potentially unlimited horizon. It follows that the cognitional, moral and religious meaning-world of any subject is actually limited, but potentially unlimited. However, for Lonergan, these actual limits can become opportunities for further transcendence.

To put the problem in terms of time, living simultaneously in different times is living in those times in a non-temporal way. No doubt this 'non-temporal' range is presently limited, but the key question is, do we have the potential to live forever, to live in an eternal way? Eternity is an actual, unlimited simultaneity. And so, when I ask whether the human person has an unlimited capacity to live in a non-temporal way, I am asking whether the human being can live forever. In other words, is human mortality simply a limit that provides an opportunity for unlimited knowing, choosing and living? Or, is the human, historical subject a potentially unlimited, historical subject? This is, of course, another way of asking what the meaning of death is. Is death a limit to be transcended? Or is it an event that terminates the very being of the human subject? Is 'death' natural? Or are our beings 'naturally' everlasting? The traditional way of putting this question was in terms of the immortality of the soul. We are raising the traditional question of the immortality of the soul in the new context of the 'historicity' of the human person.

We are obviously conditioned by the different times in which we live, but just what is the nature of this 'conditioning'? On Heidegger's proposal, we can make a basic decision that reaches forward to our own death, and backward into our heritage, thus uniting these different meaningful times in a present 'time' that stretches forward and backward spanning a limited series of times. We make such decisions in particular places and in particular times which, though they condition, do not determine or cause our decisions.

There is an interesting illustration of the way people 'live in language' in Tocqueville's account of how, although both American settlers and native Americans lived in the very same places in the 1830s, they interpreted the meaning of their simultaneously 'situated living' in dramatically different ways. From Heidegger's perspective one might say, they lived in different 'language-worlds.' The settlers and native Americans had the same immediate, sensible experiences, but they mediated these immediate experiences through quite different language-worlds. They were living different histories, but doing so in the same places and at the same time. These physical places and

times, may have conditioned their language-worlds in some ways; but their languages interpreted and constituted in an overwhelming way the meanings and values that the settlers and natives gave to their similarly 'situated living.'

People, then, are primarily, and fundamentally 'linguistic beings.' This means that the physical places and times of our birth are not nearly as significant as the languages into which we are born and raised, because to a large extent the language world into which they were born is what makes people live the way they do. For Heidegger, however, this language is inauthentic, and unless we choose our 'ownmost-ability' to die, then, we will live an inauthentic history in an inauthentic linguistic world.

In the light of Heidegger's distinction between an authentic and inauthentic 'language-world,' the question about eternity becomes, what is the meaning of my death? Is my death a limit to be transcended? Is my 'ownmost-ability' not the possibility of dying, but the possibility of transcending death? If death does not determine my way of being who I am, then it is merely a temporal limit that can be understood and evaluated as a concrete, possible opening to everlasting life.

This question can be posed again in terms of Heidegger's basic decision about the precise 'motive' for answering the call of my own conscience and resolutely choosing my ownmost possibility as a thrown being. No doubt the dread of death allows me to cut through the self-deceptions I have already successfully fabricated. Further, the dread of my own death exposes and lays bare my being as a being who did not have to exist, and who was 'thrown' into existence. Therefore, my being is not 'totally unconditioned.' Rather I have received my being. I cannot get behind my already-having-been and originate my own being. Dread of death is therefore a powerful 'felt-unknown,' but that still does not explain why I should 'resolutely' choose to be 'loyal' to myself, uniting and ordering to one another my past, present and future existence in an authentic way. Such a decision also means that I must reject my prior inauthentic ordering of my historical self. Just what is the motive for making such a decision?

In examining Heidegger's analysis of *Dasein's* dread of death one is struck by the religious nature of the language he uses in analyzing the dread of death: anxiety, guilt, death, conscience, call, fallenness, fate, resolve, loyalty, and reverence. Furthermore, he speaks of dread of death as having the power to make you feel 'uncanny' — a 'not-

being-at-home.' As a result of this 'not-being-at-home,' *Dasein* flees into the public, familiar world where it no longer feels 'uncanny.'

This sort of analysis is quite familiar to anyone born into Judaeo-Christian story of the fall of the divinely created Adam and his banishment with Eve from their primordial home in paradise where they were 'at-home' with God. Heidegger, raised a Catholic and having given a course entitled *Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion* a number of years before publishing *Being and Time*, was quite familiar with this. Nor would Heidegger deny the religious background of his language. On the contrary, he insists that the earliest writings of Christianity (Paul's Letters to the Thessalonians) reveal the primordial temporality of the human person. But he also argues that the theological tradition connected with Augustine's Neo-platonism 'covered over' this authentic awareness of being-in-the-world. Moreover, he insists that his analysis of *Dasein* is not theological, but deals with the more primordial, ontological structures. From Heidegger's viewpoint, these structures needed to be retrieved from the inauthentic Western philosophical and theological tradition. Thus, the motive that grounds and provides the basic orientation for *Dasein*'s confrontation with death is not religious or moral but ontological. But this only pushes the question back a further step.

Is the 'ontological' being of the human person actually finite but potentially infinite? For Lonergan, as we have seen, authentic, metaphysical knowers live continually in the tension between their present, actual, or finite horizon, and their present, actually possible, infinite horizon. For Lonergan in *Insight*, then, the person is a concretely possible, immortal knower. But for the later Lonergan my knowing being is sublated by my choosing and loving being. Thus, we may distinguish our beings as immortal, incarnate knowers and choosers. In this context, the question arises, whether the meaning of death can be so effectively communicated as to provide an 'incarnate chooser' with the motivation for choosing death as a possible course of action (which is to become an authentic, human knower, chooser, and lover). In other words, can death be given a meaning that motivates us to accept dying as an authentic human choice, consistent with the human desire for everlasting life?

In the Christian tradition the death of Christ has been accepted by Christian believers as a supreme, everlasting act of love with infinite, redemptive meaning and value. The meaning and value of this act have been communicated effectively to successive generations of

Christian communities who have been constituted by those meanings as a continuing historical community for centuries. Lonergan speaks of this way of communicating as "incarnate meaning" since it combines and unites all the other carriers of meaning — intersubjective, symbolic, artistic, and linguistic.¹³

The single event of Christ's death continues to radiate and to speak effectively in art, in symbols, in language, and in intersubjective contexts. For believing Christians, then, this event provides the motivating meaning for interpreting death as a limit that can and has been transcended, provided that persons choose to live in this meaning-giving event. For the believing Christian community this decision by Christ simultaneously orders all future and past times to one another, by opening to every person living in every place and time. as actually limited, but ever developing toward unlimited participation in eternal life.

This single, incarnate decision and deed, handed down in passion narrative and Eucharistic celebration has become the lived story that orders and provides the basic orienting unity for the foundational memories and expectancies of all the historical communities. They believe that while Christ certainly died, even more certainly he continues to live, and can be personally encountered outwardly in word, ritual, and community; and inwardly in the experience of mystery and awe. These outer and inner experiences can recur over years, evoking in loving believers acts of denial and sacrifice. These acts can constitute an ever deepening union with Christ, making more real the certainty of everlasting life. Such union and communion embrace not only actual, living people, but also extend to a more mysterious communion with deceased human communities.

I have responded to the questions concerning both the meaning of death and the motive for choosing death in the religious meanings and values of the Western Christian tradition. One could go on and give religious meanings and values to the words that Heidegger himself uses in his analysis of the dread of death. This is possible from Lonergan's standpoint because he has differentiated intellectual, moral, and religious authenticity.

However someone operating out of Heidegger's perspective could respond in the following manner. This religious language is an inauthentic language that has covered over and kept hidden the meanings

¹³Lonergan, *Method in Theology* 73; on the other carriers of meaning, 50-73.

and values you are attempting to communicate. Moreover, they have been successfully hidden because the fear of death is not, in fact, encountered in the Christian way of being-in-the-world. A similar objection could point out how Leo Strauss, also a student of Heidegger, has shown how Western liberal democracy was actually founded on the 'fear of death,' which has also characterized the 'lived story' of liberal democracies and the way of being-in-the-world of people who live in them, as so beautifully documented by Tocqueville.

A student of Lonergan could agree about the accuracy of such an interpretation of Western culture since it forms what Lonergan has called the "longer cycle of decline."¹⁴ However, that is only half of the story. There is also a "long cycle of progress" that has taken place in the differentiations of conscious intentionality, practical, theoretical, interiority, and transcendence.

To return at this point to our discussion of the Enlightenment and the importance of the interpretation of the scientific revolution, a conversation between followers of both Heidegger and Lonergan which is centered on the meaning of the phrase 'living in language' is a promising place to begin. The key questions from Lonergan's perspective are: do we 'live in language' in a way that is personally limited but also presently potentially unlimited? Can our 'meaning-beings' and lived meanings last forever? Are our lived meanings constructed and communicated so as to be temporally conditioned yet intrinsically independent of the physical times and places of our lives?

(Conversation to be continued.)

¹⁴Lonergan, *Insight* 251-267.

KNOWLEDGE MAKES A NOISY ENTRANCE

The Struggle for Self-Appropriation in Law

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"[E]ven with talent, knowledge makes a slow, if not a bloody entrance. To learn thoroughly is a vast undertaking that calls for relentless perseverance. To strike out on a new line and become more than a weekend celebrity calls for years in which one's living is more or less constantly absorbed in the effort to understand, in which one's understanding gradually works round and up a spiral of viewpoints...."¹

SOME YEARS AGO when Joseph Flanagan brought together a group of professors from each of the human sciences with a view toward founding what became the Perspectives program at Boston College, he began with a simple request. It would help our interdisciplinary efforts, he said, if each of us would familiarize the others with the story of the development of our own discipline. Easy, we thought. It was only after a year of weekly meetings that we admitted to ourselves and to each other that none of us really knew how to make sense of our own field, or even our own specialties, much less how to communicate what little we knew to others outside the field. But we had an interesting year in which we learned, among other things, that foundational works in the human sciences are rarely read anymore. One can receive a law degree without reading Blackstone or Austin; a doctorate in theology without *The City of God*; in economics without Adam Smith; and so on. Some of us sheepishly confessed that we had not read the 'great books' in our own fields — until we were obliged to do so for the Perspectives program. We were living proof that "knowledge makes a slow, if not a bloody entrance." Ever wise as the serpent and gentle as the dove, Joseph Flanagan had started us off on the spiraling path of self-appropriation.

This essay is in partial fulfillment of that long ago request to tell the story of law. I must call it a partial effort because I'm still far from being able to present Father Flanagan with the fullness of experience

¹ Bernard Lonergan, *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding* (New York: Harper & Row, 1978), 186.

and understanding that he was seeking. But the partial story that I offer today goes something like this: Legal reasoning, belonging as it does to the realm of human affairs, provides an especially interesting operating model of recurrent operations of experiencing, understanding, deliberating, and deciding. Because lawyers share a common training and many common experiences, the practice and study of law also furnish numerous examples of the way in which coming to know is a group enterprise. But lawyers have seldom been attentive to their own ways of knowing. In fact, they have often told misleading stories about 'finding' and 'applying' law in situations where the law was silent or ambiguous. Now and then, participants in the common law tradition have attempted to make explicit the latent dynamism of their heritage. But in recent years, their progress along the spiral way has been impeded by a widespread and uncritical acceptance of avant-gardist attacks on reason and tradition. The story opens in the home of those attacks, the legal academy.

The False Opposition Between Tradition and Insight

It is a commonly held opinion among legal scholars that tradition impedes creative mental activity. And indeed it might, if tradition were a static frozen lump of pastness, and if the essence of creativity were novelty, or originality.² In this respect, legal theorists seem to have accepted what Tocqueville called "the philosophical method of the Americans."³ Americans, he wrote, had an intense dislike for tradition, formalities and ready-made systems. Reluctant to accept any man's word as proof of anything, they preferred to rely on their own individual efforts and judgment in intellectual matters. Of all the countries in the world, he commented with some amusement, America was the one where the precepts of René Descartes were "least studied

²Lawyers are not alone in these beliefs about tradition and creativity. T.S. Eliot remarked in a 1919 essay that the word 'tradition' rarely appears in literary criticism except as a term of disapproval. In praising an artist or writer, he wrote, critics tend to insist on "those aspects of his work in which he least resembles anyone else. In these aspects or parts of his work we pretend to find what is individual... We dwell with satisfaction upon the poet's difference from his predecessors, especially his immediate predecessors." "Tradition and the Individual Talent" in *Selected Essays* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1950), 3-4.

³Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America* J. P. Mayer ed. (Garden City: Doubleday, Anchor, 1969), p. 429.

and best followed.”⁴ Such habits of mind, he went on, would tend to foster applications and useful inventions but were unlikely to engender love of knowledge for its own sake or the kind of science whose application is either unknown or remote.⁵

Reading those lines today, an American might well bridle. After all, we smash atoms; engineer genes; walk on the moon. Yet Thomas Kuhn sounds curiously like Tocqueville in his appraisal of modern American science. The United States, he says, has produced many inventive persons like Thomas Edison, but its contributions to the ranks of basic scientists “have as yet been notoriously sparse.”⁶ In an essay on tradition and innovation in scientific research that is as important for students of human cognition as his better-known study of scientific revolutions, Kuhn has speculated about why Americans have been more inventive than creative. He points out that significant advances in the sciences have generally been made by people who combined the traits of the traditionalist and the iconoclast: researchers who were fully immersed in the ‘normal science’ of their times, yet daring enough to break with it. Kuhn stresses, as Lonergan did before him, the importance of the community of specialized knowers. More often than not, it is the professional group, rather than the individual, that displays the traits of traditionalism and innovativeness simultaneously.⁷ Within any scientific community, some individuals will be more tradition-bound, while others will be more inclined to challenge the tradition. Kuhn believes that the net effect of a tradition in good order will be to pull all members of the group, to a greater or lesser extent, in both directions, thus creating a fruitful tension that is productive of discoveries and advances.

Kuhn’s explanation of the seeming paradox that tradition-bound work promotes the kind of insight that eventually transforms the tradition is that “no other sort of work is nearly so well suited to isolate for continuing and concentrated attention those loci of trouble or causes of crisis upon whose recognition the most fundamental advances in basic science depend.”⁸ The typical prelude to discovery in

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid. 459-65.

⁶ “The Essential Tension: Tradition and Innovation in Scientific Research,” in *The Essential Tension: Selected Studies in Scientific Tradition and Change* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977), 225, 239.

⁷ Kuhn 227-28.

⁸ Kuhn 234.

the natural sciences is "not ignorance, but the recognition that something has gone wrong with existing knowledge and beliefs" (as when Copernicus realized that it was taking too many epicycles to explain the motions of the planets within the Ptolemaic system).⁹ The lesson for educators, according to Kuhn, is that the natural sciences cannot move forward without rigorous training in the system of thought that represents the reigning paradigm, the 'normal science,' of the time. He concluded, just as Tocqueville had, that a culture that is biased against tradition is unlikely to produce many creative, as distinct from merely inventive, persons.

Strikingly similar observations have been made by the most profound observers of the development of the arts and the human sciences. T. S. Eliot, for example, strenuously resisted the tendency of many of his contemporaries to measure artistic creativity by the degree to which an individual's work diverges from that of his or her predecessors. No artist or poet, Eliot maintained, "has his complete meaning alone."¹⁰ There is a way in which the whole of European literature has a simultaneous existence, and what makes a European writer 'traditional,' is a sense of how the past is operating in the present.¹¹ This is why, paradoxically, we "often find that not only the best, but the most individual parts of [a poet's] work may be those in which the dead poets, his ancestors, assert their immortality most vigorously."¹² Eliot then puts forward the intriguing idea (about which I will have more to say presently) that significant new work in a tradition transforms what has gone before. When a major new work of art is created, he suggests, something happens to the whole tradition from which it emerges — "the relations, proportions, values of each work of art are readjusted" — so that, in this sense, the past is altered by the present as much as the present is affected by the past.¹³ Thus, we do not read Virgil in quite the same way after Dante; or Dante the same way after Eliot; the Hebrew Scriptures, after the Apostolic Writings; the Magna Carta, after the American Constitution.

⁹ Kuhn 235.

¹⁰ Eliot 4.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Ibid. 5.

Tradition as the Crucible of Creativity

For Tocqueville, Kuhn and Eliot, then, there is a good deal more to 'tradition' than the inert weight of the past. All three are operating, as well, with an understanding of 'creativity' that encompasses much more than novelty or originality. In each case, the idea of a tradition seems to be similar to Alasdair MacIntyre's notion of a dynamic "historically extended, and socially embodied" process which sets the conditions for its own continuous growth and development.¹⁴ To be a traditionalist in that sense is neither to be backward-looking, nor bound to a status quo, but rather to be a participant in a community of intense discourse about whatever it is that gives the tradition in question its point and purpose.¹⁵ Creativity, though, is a more elusive concept. The word itself (as applied to human agency) is relatively modern, and the literature on the subject (much of it dealing with the psychology of particular individuals) does little to illuminate the phenomenon itself. But a suggestive common thread in numerous first-hand accounts of path-breaking discoveries in science and mathematics is a professed inability to explain the breakthrough in question, accompanied by an insistence that it was not achieved by logical, systematic, processes of induction or deduction.¹⁶ The modern stories, in fact, all resemble the one that Lonergan recounts with such zest in the opening pages of *Insight* — the tale of how Archimedes became discouraged while trying to devise a method for measuring the proportion of gold in a crown made for the King, and betook himself to the public baths. There, as legend has it, he was idly noting the displacement of water by his body, when he had a flash of understanding so powerful that he ran naked into the street proclaiming his discovery, with a 'Eureka' that has echoed through the centuries.

A typical modern account is Karl Friedrich Gauss' letter to a friend describing how he had discovered the solution to a mathematical

¹⁴ This is the helpful phrase of Alasdair MacIntyre in *After Virtue* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981), p. 207. See also, MacIntyre, *Whose Justice? Which Rationality?* (Notre Dame: Notre Dame Press, 1988) 7-11.

¹⁵ MacIntyre, *After Virtue* 206.

¹⁶ Several of these accounts, which make fascinating reading, are collected by Arthur Koestler in *The Act of Creation: A Study of the Conscious and Unconscious Processes of Humor, Scientific Discovery, and Art* (New York: Macmillan, 1964). See, especially 146, 165.

problem that had resisted four years of struggle: "At last ... I succeeded, not by dint of painful effort, but so to speak by the grace of God. As a sudden flash of light, the enigma was solved ... For my part I am unable to name the nature of the thread which connected what I previously knew with that which made my success possible."¹⁷ In these 'creation' stories, another common element is that though the breakthrough cannot be forced, it is characteristically preceded by intense and laborious effort.¹⁸ As Louis Pasteur put it, "Fortune favors the prepared mind."¹⁹ Others have spoken of the way that collaborative normal science brings a problem to 'ripeness.'²⁰ Where, we may wonder, would Kepler have been without the years of observational data provided by Tycho de Brahe? Creativity (except in the Book of Genesis) does not bring something out of nothing. Rather, it seems to be a matter of uncovering, selecting, re-shuffling, combining, and synthesizing available data, ideas, and skills.²¹ And, usually, the efforts of many persons have been involved along the way.²² As Newton said, "If I have been able to see farther than others, it was because I stood on the shoulders of giants."²³ Lonergan, of course, situates creativity within the dynamic structure of human cognition: the recurring and cumulative processes of experiencing, understanding, deliberating, and deciding. That process of knowing is the same whether the knower is a scientist, an artist, a theologian, a political theorist, a lawyer, or a child learning how to walk and speak. That process regularly generates insights, not only on rare occasions in the minds of great geniuses, but in the minds of all men and women every day in the course of our ongoing mental operations. As we go about our daily business, we attend to the data of sense and

¹⁷ Koestler 117.

¹⁸ Cf., "[E]ven with talent, knowledge makes a slow, if not a bloody, entrance. To learn thoroughly is a vast undertaking that calls for relentless perseverance. To strike out on a new line and become more than a weekend celebrity calls for years in which one's living is more or less constantly absorbed in the effort to understand, in which one's understanding gradually works round and up a spiral of viewpoints. ..." B. Lonergan, *Insight* 186.

¹⁹ Koestler 113, 145.

²⁰ "The statistical probability for a relevant discovery to be made is the greater the more firmly established and well exercised each of the still separate skills, or thought-matrices, are." Ibid. 108-109.

²¹ Ibid. 120.

²² Cf., Lonergan, "Belief: Today's Issue," in *A Second Collection* (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1974) 87 ("Man's coming to know is a group enterprise.")

²³ Koestler 124.

experience. Our intelligence leads us to wonder, and to formulate questions. (At least that is the way it's supposed to work. Lonergan once remarked to some lethargic students in a Boston College class on *Method in Theology* that I audited: "If you don't wonder, you won't try to understand; you'll just gawk!") Once we begin to wonder, though, we're off to the races, for insights, far from being rare occurrences, are as natural to human beings as breathing.

The quality of any given insight, Lonergan taught, depends on the quality of mind and material involved in this process. Insights, as he famously said, are a dime a dozen.²⁴ Some are duds. So we reflect on our insights. We sort them out. We marshal the evidence; we talk them over; we test the new ideas against what we know; we investigate their presuppositions and implications; we give further questions a chance to arise; and eventually we decide whether to accept or doubt them. Insights accumulate into viewpoints, patterned contexts for experiencing, understanding, and judging.²⁵ Over time, the recurrent, cumulative, and potentially self-correcting processes of experiencing, wondering, understanding, critically evaluating, judging, and choosing may enable us to overcome some of our own errors and biases, the errors and biases of our culture, and the errors and biases embedded in the data we received from those who have gone before us.²⁶ As our insights accumulate and form patterns permitting higher integrations, our horizon shifts. When we move to a higher viewpoint, we become aware of a certain rearrangement of all that we have ever known, a certain transformation of our very selves. Parts of the past assume a new relation to one another; feelings change; doors open in the mind and heart. Sometimes the change is so great that when we try to express what has occurred, we use words like conversion, and redemption.

To sum up to here, then, tradition is a dynamic process of collaboration, and moments of creativity or insight are inherent in the process of human knowing. Along with the experiences and the logical operations that lay the groundwork for such moments and enable us to review and consolidate them, they are what permits the process to advance. The fact that what constitutes an 'advance' will always be

²⁴ Lonergan, *A Second Collection* (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1974) 36.

²⁵ Lonergan, *Insight* 445, 447, 451.

²⁶ "The seed of intellectual curiosity has to grow into a rugged tree to hold its own against the desires and fears, conations and appetites, drives and interests, that inhabit the heart of man." Lonergan, *Insight* 285.

more contestable in the arts and human sciences than in the natural sciences should not be permitted to obscure the fact that the process of knowing in each case entails the same recurrent sequence of experiencing, understanding and deciding. Insight cannot be produced on demand, but the available evidence suggests that it can be rendered more or less probable — within an individual or within a group — through intense participation in a vital ongoing tradition.

Tradition and Creativity in American Law

Now let us turn to tradition and creativity in the law. In the Founders' America, as well as in the post-colonial society that Tocqueville visited a generation later, there was at least one important group of individuals who (at that time) conspicuously did *not* follow the "American philosophical method." This group's habits and practices in fact essentially involved carrying forward a "historically extended, socially embodied" tradition. The group was the legal profession and the tradition was the Anglo-American common law. As late as 1894, the English legal historian F. W. Maitland could still write of the common law in terms similar to those Eliot would use to describe European literature. "When we speak of a body of law," Maitland said, "we use a metaphor so apt that it is hardly a metaphor. We picture to ourselves a being that lives and grows, that preserves its identity while every atom of which it is composed is subject to a ceaseless process of change, decay, and renewal."²⁷ There is a way, Maitland explained, in which all the activities of monarchs and legislators and magistrates over the centuries — abolishing, revising, and innovating — merely become an organic part of a system inherited from their distant predecessors.

At about the same time, on our side of the Atlantic, another legal giant, Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., likened the law to a "magic mirror" in which a suitably trained observer could see reflected the birth and growth of society.²⁸ When I think of the law this way, wrote Holmes, I see a mighty princess eternally weaving into her tapestry "dim figures of the ever-lengthening past" — figures too faint to be noticed by the

²⁷ F. W. Maitland, "Origins of Legal Institutions," in *The Life of the Law*, John Honnold, ed., (Glencoe: Free Press, 1964) 6.

²⁸ O. W. Holmes, Jr., "The Law" (speech to the Suffolk Bar Association on Feb. 5, 1885), in *Collected Legal Papers* (New York: Harcourt, 1921) 25.

casual spectator and too symbolic to be interpreted except by her disciples. But to the discerning eye, the tapestry of the law discloses "every painful step and every world-shaking contest by which mankind has worked and fought its way from savage isolation to organic social life."

To most jurists who thought about the law that way, 'tradition' was the indispensable midwife of the modest sort of creativity that is involved in the lawyer's craft. Tradition was understood to include, in large part, the finely honed techniques of preventive law handed down through generations of practitioners — the skills that produce well-wrought agreements, by-laws, contracts, deeds, leases, wills, and trusts designed to permit human beings to arrange their relations with one another with a minimum of friction, to enable people to plan for the future, and to avoid occasions for dispute by anticipating and providing for contingencies. No lawyer manufactures such instruments from whole cloth; indeed it would be irresponsible to do so. One turns first to the formbooks (and now data banks) which are the repositories of the accumulated experience of bench and bar constantly revised in the light of changing social needs and circumstances. One adapts and supplements the received knowledge to meet the requirements of the particular life-situation at hand. A good lawyer over time contributes his share in this way to the tested experience that finds its way into the forms. Tradition also includes the institutional settlements that compose the background against which planning, counseling, and dispute resolution take place — the court decisions, constitutions, and enacted laws of various sorts that help to head off disputes, or to settle them with a minimum of expense and delay when preventive law fails and informal mechanisms for resolving trouble break down. Tradition encompasses, as well, the interpretive techniques that have been developed for working with these institutional settlements. Last but not least, the American legal tradition is an important part of the ongoing cultural story of what kind of people we are and what kind of society we wish to bring into being.

What, then, is "creativity" within the legal context? Historically, and even now, many would say it consists in the art of adapting and supplementing the accumulated techniques and institutional settlements of the past so as to deal with the new problems that are constantly generated by changing social, economic, and political circumstances — from the garden variety legal problems of everyday life to the larger questions of how to order our lives together in the

polity.²⁹ The most attentive legal theorists have described legal creativity in terms that are strikingly similar to those used by Kuhn, Koestler, and Eliot. The creative jurist, as Roscoe Pound saw it, displays the qualities of both innovator and traditionalist: "The creative process consists in going outside of the authoritative legal materials of the time and place, or even outside of the law, and selecting something which is then combined with or added to the existing materials, or the existing methods of developing and applying those materials, and is then gradually given form as a legal precept or legal doctrine or legal institution."³⁰

Many legal theorists have noticed that something beyond mere technical skill is involved in bringing a body of existing settlements to bear on a new problem. They sometimes refer to this element as 'hunch' or 'intuition.' Pound, for example, wrote, "The trained intuition of the judge continually leads him to right results for which he is puzzled to give unimpeachable legal reasons."³¹ Karl Llewellyn described legal creativity this way:

If one observes a new fact situation and is sensitive to its real-life meaning, then there is a sudden and (so to speak) *ex post facto* change in the meaning of one's prior life experience in that area, and thus a change of content in the words used to describe and regulate the area. I cannot explain this process; I only record its existence: the new illuminates and at the same time changes the old.³²

The reader will already have noticed how closely this passage resembles T. S. Eliot's account of what happens in literature when a creative moment alters the value and relations of prior contributions.³³

²⁹ Here is what Roscoe Pound said on the subject: "[C]reation is the reshaping of traditional legal materials, the bringing in of other materials from without and the adaptation of these materials as a whole to the securing of human claims and satisfaction of human wants under new conditions of life in civilized society." Pound, *The Theory of Judicial Decision*, 36 *Harvard Law Review* 940, 951 (1923).

³⁰ *Ibid.*

³¹ *Ibid.*

³² Karl Llewellyn, *The Case Law System in America* M. Ansaldi trans. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), p. 79 (first published, 1933).

³³ Cf. Edward H. Levi, *Introduction to Legal Reasoning* (1948), pp. 3-4 ("Therefore it appears that the kind of reasoning involved in the legal process is one in which the classification changes as the classification is made. The rules change as the rules are applied.")

The quality of a lawyer's intuitions, Llewellyn prudently added, would depend greatly on that lawyer's experience, intelligence, and character. Furthermore, since legal insights, like other insights, are a dime a dozen, a conscientious attorney does not usually act on a hunch, but critically evaluates his or her bright idea in the light of existing institutional settlements and the concrete facts of the problem at hand. As a respected Illinois judge once put it: "If I have reached a decision by means of a hunch, it has been a hunch with a long-delayed fuse, for often I have started confidently toward one conclusion, only to be checked and turned about by further study."³⁴

Though the traditional methodology of the common law was seldom articulated systematically, Lord Edward Coke in the seventeenth century captured its essence when he said: "Reason is the life of the law; nay, the common law itselfe is nothing else but reason."³⁵ By 'reason,' Coke went on to say, he did not mean the natural reason of an individual, but a kind of group or 'corporate' reason: the "artificial perfection of reason, gotten by long study, observation and experience, ... fined and refined over centuries by generations of grave and learned men. ..." ³⁶ Coke's cryptic but highly suggestive description of the common law as a collaborative reasoning process was an early and important step toward lawyers' understanding of their own ways of knowing and doing. But it stands out as an exception to the more common disposition to avoid reflection on method until quite recent times. Coke's reflections were followed, moreover, by some backward steps, notably Blackstone's account. The law of England, according to Blackstone, was the custom of the realm from time immemorial, and adjudication was a process of oracular law-finding.³⁷ One might say that Blackstone substituted a certain kind of tradition for reason as the life of the law.

The discrepancy between Blackstone's account of 'finding' law and the robust, creative, dynamic style of American courts in the early nineteenth century did not seem to trouble American lawyers who used

³⁴ Walter Schaefer, Precedent and Policy, 34 *University of Chicago Law Review* 3, 23 (1966).

³⁵ E. Coke, *The First Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England* *97b.

³⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁷ Blackstone portrayed judges as "living oracles" who declared and expounded, but did not *make*, the law, which was to be *found*, for the most part, in the "customs of the realm from time immemorial." Judicial decisions, he said, were not themselves the law, but were "evidence" of the law. W. Blackstone, *Commentaries on the Laws of England* *69.

Blackstone mainly as a guide to doctrine. Karl Llewellyn described the 'Grand Style' of American courts in the formative years of the republic as follows:

The tone and mark consist in an as-of-courseness in the constant questing for better and best law to guide the future, but the better and best law is to be built on and out of what the past can offer; the quest consists in a constant re-examination and reworking of a heritage, that the heritage may yield not only solidity but comfort for the new day and for the morrow.

It is a way of on-going renovation of doctrine, but touch with the past is too close, the mood is too craft-conscious, the need for the clean line is too great, for the renovation to smell of revolution or, indeed, of campaigning reform.³⁸

As the nineteenth century drew to a close, the pace of social change accelerated and lawyers and judges experienced great difficulty in adapting to the changes. Perhaps in part to conceal their confusion, American courts and treatise writers adopted a rigid, formalistic style that for a time created the appearance of mechanical law-finding and disguised the presence of the kind of recursive questioning and modest judicial creativity that constitutes the essence of the common law tradition. So long as the formal style held sway in the courts and the academy (from the 1880s to the 1920s), the accounts given by judges and scholars of what they were doing clashed with the way law was experienced by practitioners. As it happened, it was just in this same period that legal education shifted from apprenticeship in lawyers' offices to university law schools. We drifted from a system in which theory and common sense cooperated *sub silentio* to a disjunction between theory and common sense that to this day separates the legal academy from the bar. Most practitioners, it seems safe to say, regard legal reasoning as a specialized form of commonsense or practical reason, not realizing that it is actually a system in which practical and theoretical reason co-operate. The academy, for its part, has never been more distant from or disdainful of the practice than in the current period of fancy theory (law and economics, critical studies, feminist legal theory, etc.) Both the practice and the academy have suffered from the separation. Neither the practitioners' pragmatism nor the scholars' abstract theory does full justice to the unappropriated, but

³⁸ Karl N. Llewellyn, *The Common Law Tradition* 36 (1960).

time-honored, recursive, potentially self-correcting method of the common law.

As that method has unfolded over time, it could have served as one of Lonergan's illustrations of a group's movement along the spiral path of experiencing, understanding, reflecting, deliberating, and deciding. The wheel of common-law method, as he might have said, not only turns, but rolls along. And, as it rolls, the rubber hits the road — for lawyers, unlike, say, philosophers, must regularly come to closure on disputed questions, must give answers, and must take responsibility for the answers they give. The practitioner consulted by a client, the judge pondering a dispute to be resolved, and the legislator faced with a drafting problem all begin with attending to the data, that is, the concrete facts of particular problems, the social context, and the experience embodied in the relevant institutional settlements. They formulate questions; they weigh the merits of various approaches; they consider the practical consequences likely to flow from a decision one way or another. After a thorough appraisal of the problem in as many of its facets and from as many angles as possible, the lawyer, judge or legislator chooses a course of action. Only the legal scholar has the luxury of lingering indefinitely between deliberation and decision.

Now what is the method that lawyers employ when they say they are researching the law and interpreting it in relation to the facts of a particular case? We may begin by noting that it is a method in which practical and theoretical reason co-operate. Thus common-law reasoning is superior to a pure system of common sense (which lacks the apparatus to critically evaluate its own contents).³⁹ And it is also superior to systems of pure theory which are ill-suited for the realm of human affairs where, as Aristotle taught, we have to work with premises that are only "for the most part true" to arrive at conclusions "that are no better."⁴⁰ In the world of the lawyer, at least where problems of any difficulty are concerned, it is usually impossible to say that one or the other version of the facts or law is wholly accurate or inaccurate. The arguments employed in support of one or the other position are usually better described as strong or weak, rather than as right or wrong; and the conclusions one reaches more usefully

³⁹ Lonergan, *Insight* 178-79; 216; 226; 416-21.

⁴⁰ *Nicomachean Ethics* Book I, ch. 3.

understood in terms of probability, rather than certainty⁴¹ — as better or worse, rather than as correct or incorrect.

So, the common law method was never a system of deductive and inductive logic; nor was it mere praxis unchastened by theory; nor was it just a system of reasoning by analogy with the principles of choice more or less up for grabs. Lawyers do, to be sure, employ all of those forms of reasoning, but the mode of analysis that is the hallmark of the Anglo-American common-law tradition is one that dates back to antiquity — dialectical reasoning.⁴²

Dialectical reasoning, which came into disrepute among philosophers beginning with Descartes, begins with controversy — with premises that are doubtful or in dispute — rather than with known or irrefutable givens. It does not aim at certainty, but at determining which of opposing opinions supported by strong arguments should be accepted. That should not lead one to regard dialectical reasoning as a mere form of rhetoric however (unless one is prepared to understand rhetoric as more than the art of persuasion). For dialectic at its best involves a “groping for the truth.”⁴³ In the human sciences, we inch our way toward such glimpses of truth as are available to us, using the means of investigating facts, critical inquiry, dialogue, disputation, and defense of one point of view against another.⁴⁴ We must concede that these efforts yield flawed

⁴¹ Benjamin N. Cardozo wrote: “Most judicial decisions must be tested by the logic of probability rather than the logic of certainty. Where there is a reasonably high degree of probability that a principle or other normative proposition will stand scrutiny as being valid or correct, and that it will therefore be applied in the future, we may speak of it as authoritative or settled.” *Selected Writings* 151-52 (1947).

⁴² See Edgar Bodenheimer, *A Neglected Theory of Legal Reasoning*, 21 J. Legal Ed. 373, 378 (1969); Chaim Perelman, *Justice, Law, and Argument: Essays on Moral and Legal Reasoning* (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1980).

⁴³ Edgar Bodenheimer, *Jurisprudence: The Philosophy and Method of the Law* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974) 393. Cf. Lonergan, *Insight* 390.

⁴⁴ Bodenheimer, *Jurisprudence* 393. Compare the reflections by John Paul II in *Centesimus Annus* on what it means to “live in truth” under constantly changing historical circumstances: “Christian truth ... does not presume to imprison changing sociopolitical realities in a rigid schema and it recognizes human life is realized in history in conditions that are diverse and imperfect.” He goes on to say that living in truth means “paying heed to every fragment of truth” that one’s faith and reason have enabled one to gain from one’s own “life experience and in the culture of individuals and of nations.” It means affirming all this in dialogue with others, and verifying our heritage of values existentially, testing them in our own lives, striving “to distinguish the valid elements in the tradition from false and erroneous ones, or from obsolete forms which can usefully be replaced by others more suited to the times” (90, 97).

conclusions, due to our own limitations and the limitations of those upon whose accomplishments we build. But we should not lose sight of the point made by an unfortunately neglected twentieth century legal philosopher, Edgar Bodenheimer:

[I]n a world threatened by a growing flood of irrational language and behavior, it is desirable to maintain a clear distinction between attitudes and decisions engendered by prejudice, ill will or unwillingness to listen to reason, and approaches to life which insist on a careful weighing of arguments pro and con before taking actions that may have serious consequences.⁴⁵

A conclusion that is 'true for the most part' represents no small accomplishment. In the realm of human affairs, it is an ideal worth striving for, and a significant legacy to those who come after us.

Many contemporary critical theorists attach great significance to the facts that legal reasoning is prone to distortion through subjective and biased elements, and that legal precedents carry forward the sins and ignorance of the past. But the critics have seized the wrong end of the stick. For the past, as Lonergan said, "is just the set of good things to be improved and evils to be eliminated."⁴⁶ And dialectical reasoning, with all its imperfections, is a powerful aid in bringing to light the flawed parts of the tradition as well as in bringing the sound and healthy parts to further development. Like the process of human knowing, which it tracks, common law reasoning is subject to bias, individual, group, and general, conscious and unconscious. But it also resembles human knowing in its potential for self-correction through recurrent and cumulative processes of experiencing, understanding, and judging of its own experiencing, understanding, and judging. As Benjamin Nathan Cardozo said in his lectures on *The Nature of the Judicial Process*, "In the endless process of testing and retesting, there is a constant rejection of the dross ..."⁴⁷ Even more important, a tradition engaged in that process constitutes its participants as particular kinds of knowers and choosers. Moreover, dialectical reasoning builds a significant measure of rationality into the common law by demanding that lawyers and judges give good justifications for

⁴⁵ Bodenheimer, Book Review, 29 *American Journal of Comparative Law* 547, 551 (1981).

⁴⁶ Lonergan, *Second Collection* 115; *Insight* 387-88.

⁴⁷ Benjamin Nathan Cardozo, *The Nature of the Judicial Process* (New Haven: Yale, 1921) 179.

their conclusions, that they adduce facts in support of them, and that they deal convincingly with counter-arguments. Thus the same common law tradition that bears the marks of power and preference has been a mighty, constant, force in the ongoing struggle for a government of laws rather than men, showing on occasion a modest ability to hold power and prejudice at bay, and to summon "the better angels of our nature."

Now, you may be wondering whether one can really speak of "creativity" as distinct from mere inventiveness within a legal tradition. What discoveries or achievements has the common law produced, apart from successful problem-solving here and there, mostly in the service of the wealthy and powerful? If we bear in mind that law is, after all, only a second or third order conversation (compared to theology, philosophy or politics), one can appreciate that it contains numerous instances of creativity, the creativity of artisans, rather than architects. I will not dwell on these garden variety forms of creativity except to note that in countless small ways they promote the orderly pursuit of dignified living. Rather I wish to suggest that the creative masterpiece of the common law tradition was the American Founding. The Founding can usefully be understood as a moment of collaborative creativity that both grew out of and irrevocably transformed a vital tradition. The Constitution, the Federalist Papers, and the landmark early decisions of the Supreme Court, could only have been produced by men who were steeped in the English common law, yet bold enough to produce a paradigm-shattering new design for government.

The contrast with the French Founding where, as that great common lawyer Edmund Burke pointed out, "The best were only men of theory,"⁴⁸ is striking. Whereas the Americans set out to and did break with England, their French counterparts set out to, and to some extent did, take leave of their own past.⁴⁹ It was the immense good fortune of the Americans that, in their attempt to construct a

⁴⁸ Edmund Burke, *Reflections on the Revolution in France* (New York: Doubleday, Anchor, 1973) 53.

⁴⁹ "No nation had ever before embarked on so resolute an attempt as that of the French in 1789 to break with the past, to make, as it were, a scission in their life line and to create an unbridgeable gulf between all they had hitherto been and all they now aspired to be. They took a host of precautions to avoid importing anything of the past into their new regime. They spared no pains to obliterate their former selves." Tocqueville, *The Old Regime and the French Revolution*, trans. Stuart Gilbert (New York: Doubleday, Anchor, 1955) vii.

democratic republic, they had the English common law tradition to work with. Very like the scientists of whom Kuhn writes, the Founders, some more traditionalistic, others more iconoclastic, brought forth a Constitution that is the unmistakable product of a tradition with a peculiar attachment to human liberty and with an unusual ability to adjust to new circumstances while maintaining continuity and internal coherence.

England's unique legal tradition had helped that country to develop and maintain a legal order possessing the toughness to weather political and social upheavals, yet the flexibility to constructively adapt and contribute to social change. The American Founders were well aware of its imperfections, but they also knew how to value the role that the common law had played in safeguarding the rights of Englishmen — life, liberty, property — through civil and religious war as well as profound social and economic change.⁵⁰ The common law was Exhibit A in support of the Founders' proposition in *Federalist No. 1*: that human beings are capable of ordering their lives together by "reflection and choice," rather than simply being subject to "accident and force."⁵¹ Yet their own design for government produced a shuffling and revaluation of all the elements of the common law tradition from which it emerged. Law and politics among the English-speaking peoples would never be quite the same again.

Tradition Bashing

How is it, then, that a tradition that had so much capacity for development has fallen into disrepute among many of its inheritors? It seems (with Lonergan/Flanagan-induced hindsight) to be of cardinal significance that for most of its history the tradition was transmitted by apprenticeship. Lawyers learned by doing. Anglo-American lawyers were never much given to introspection. Their method was latent, rather than explicit. Continentals like Max Weber were always quick to note our lack of systematics. (Erasmus put it rather harshly: "The

⁵⁰ See J. H. Hexter, "Thomas Hobbes and the Law," 65 *Cornell Law Review* 471, 489-90 (1980).

⁵¹ *The Federalist Papers*, C. Rossiter ed. (New York: Mentor, 1961), p. 33 (No. 1, Hamilton). Cf. Lonergan, *Insight*: "The challenge of history is for man progressively to restrict the realm of chance or fate or destiny and progressively to enlarge the realm of conscious grasp and deliberate choice." 228.

study of English law is as far as can be from true learning.”)⁵² The astute Tocqueville noticed that, though the United States was an exceptionally legalistic society, the Americans had not yet produced “any great writers inquiring into the general principles of the laws.”⁵³ A decade after those words were written, however, the man who was to make that task his own was born in Boston, Massachusetts.⁵⁴ And as fate would have it, that man was not only the most brilliant and influential figure in twentieth century American law, but an energetic debunker of the role of tradition, reason, and even of morality, in the law. Though I would not wish to exaggerate the influence of a single individual, I must begin my account of tradition-bashing in the law with Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.

It would be hard to overestimate Holmes’ influence on American law. He was almost larger than life — the gifted son of a famous poet and doctor; a genuine Civil War hero, wounded at Ball’s Bluff, Antietam, and Fredericksburg; a lawyer who by the time of his death in 1935 at the age of 93 had distinguished himself in every role the legal profession had to offer. As a young lawyer, working in a busy Boston firm, he produced a treatise that was immediately recognized as a classic. He then taught briefly at Harvard Law School before his appointment to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court. After twenty years on that Court (three of them as Chief Justice), he was named, at the age of 61, to the United States Supreme Court, where he served for another 29 years, leaving an indelible stamp on American private and public law. Through his gift for phrase-making, as much as through his ideas and judicial decisions, he helped to shape the minds of twentieth century American lawyers.⁵⁵ He was a virtuoso at the functional speciality of communications. His learned writing, to a great extent, set the agenda for almost all of contemporary legal scholarship. Legal realism, pragmatism, sociological jurisprudence, law and economics, and critical legal studies are all but elaborations of themes announced by Holmes.

⁵² Quoted in Donald Kelley, *The Human Measure: Social Thought in the Western Legal Tradition* (Cambridge: Harvard, 1990) 175.

⁵³ Tocqueville, *Democracy in America* 301.

⁵⁴ As if responding to Tocqueville, O.W. Holmes Jr. announced in his book, *The Common Law*: “This book is an attempt to discover the fundamental notions and principles of our system and to put them in order” (Boston: Little, Brown, 1881) 1.

⁵⁵ Judge Posner shrewdly notes that Holmes’ aphoristic style may reflect a “skepticism about the power of rational thought.” Richard Posner, *The Problems of Jurisprudence* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990) 241.

It is of the utmost significance, then, that the best known account of what we American lawyers are doing, and what we ought to be doing, was given to us by a man who declared war on tradition and reason in the law. "Wherever one looks in the law," Holmes complained (in what is still the most widely quoted law review article ever published), one sees tradition getting in the way of 'rational policy.'⁵⁶ "It is revolting," he wrote, "to have no better reason for a rule of law than that it was laid down in the time of Henry IV." The time had come to put the law on a more modern and "scientific" basis. So (in a passage that has become sacred scripture in some quarters) he advised every lawyer to seek an understanding of economics, for the "man of the future is the man of statistics and the master of economics." There was nothing normative in the legal science commended by Holmes. He was fond of using words like "twaddle" to deal with claims that morality had any basis other than preference. "One man's beliefs are as good as the other fellow's," he said in an essay debunking natural law. "That's not to say we won't fight and die for what we believe. A dog will fight for its bone."⁵⁷ Holmes' assault on tradition was combined with an attack on the very factor to which the common law owed its dynamism. "Reason," Lord Coke had famously said, "is the life of the law; nay, the common law itselfe is nothing else but reason."⁵⁸ Holmes began his own book *The Common Law* with a sentence that is engraved on the mind of every American lawyer: "The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience."⁵⁹ Now what is interesting about that celebrated formula is that, even at the height of nineteenth century formalism, no one was really claiming that the life of the law

⁵⁶ Holmes, *The Path of the Law*, 10 *Harvard Law Review* 457, 469 (1897).

⁵⁷ Holmes, *Natural Law*, 32 *Harvard Law Review* 40, 41-42 (1919).

⁵⁸ E. Coke, *The First Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England* *97b.

⁵⁹ *The Common Law*, 1. Peter Stein has pointed out that a similar statement appears in Rudolf von Jehring's *Geist des römischen Rechts*. Stein, "Logic and Experience in Roman and Common Law," 59 *Boston University Law Review* 433, 437 (1979). Holmes had checked von Jehring's book out of the Boston Athenaeum in 1879, according to Mark DeWolfe Howe, *Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes: The Proving Years* 152, 155 (1963). The statement in question makes sense when applied to the system of law elaborated by German legal scholars of the nineteenth century against which von Jehring inveighed. The German *Pandektenrecht* was a highly formalized, conceptual system in which logic had been explicitly accorded a central role. It represented the "most perfect expression" of what Max Weber had called "logical formal rationality." Max Rheinstein, *Introduction to Max Weber on Law in Economy and Society* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954), p. li. The statement was less apt as applied to the weaker sort of formalism that was then in vogue in the United States.

was logic.⁶⁰ Moreover, Lord Coke and his many followers had always emphasized that the 'reason' of the law was rooted in experience.⁶¹

It is instructive to compare Holmes' parody of Coke with an earlier attack on Coke by no less formidable a personage than Thomas Hobbes. Lawyers, Hobbes had unkindly pointed out, do not behave as though reason is the life of the law, for they shift nimbly back and forth from reason to precedent, relying on precedent to justify unreasonable positions, and resorting to reason to circumvent inconvenient precedents, depending on what seems expedient to them at the moment.⁶² Holmes' attack was more disingenuous, though, for Holmes knew full well that when Coke used the word 'reason,' he did not mean formal logic. Holmes surely knew, too, that for Coke there could be no tension between 'reason' and 'experience,' for the 'corporate reason' of the law was built upon the experience of generations.⁶³ But Holmes was a man on the move. With the same kind of fast shuffle that he used to convert 'tradition' into fossilized 'history,' he reduced 'reason' to mere 'logic' — a collection of syllogisms, axioms, and deductions.⁶⁴ That, as they say, took the whiskey out of the highball. And there was more. Holmes went on to characterize the 'experience' which he postulated as the true life of the law as an amalgam of power, expediency, preference, and opinion, "avowed or unconscious."⁶⁵ Revisiting the subject at the height of the blunt macho style that was his trademark, Holmes told a group of law students: "You will find some text writers telling you that law is a system of reason."⁶⁶ That,

⁶⁰ American legal formalism could be caricatured in this way, and perhaps that was Holmes' intent. See, on American formalism, Posner, *The Problems of Jurisprudence* 14-15; Karl Llewellyn, *The Common Law Tradition* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1960), 38-41.

⁶¹ See Hexter 482.

⁶² Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan* (New York: Dutton, 1973) 52.

⁶³ Coke's admirer, Edmund Burke, uses the word "reason" in the same way as Coke did when he describes English common law as "the pride of the human intellect, which with all its defects, redundancies, and errors, is the collected reason of the ages, combining principles of original justice with the infinite variety of human concerns." Burke, *Reflections on the French Revolution* 109.

⁶⁴ It is hard to imagine that any English or American lawyer would have disputed Holmes' contention that "The law ... cannot be dealt with as if it contained only the axioms and corollaries of a book of mathematics". *The Common Law* 1 (1881).

⁶⁵ "The felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share with their fellowmen, have had a good deal more to do than the syllogism in determining the rules by which men should be governed." *Ibid.*

⁶⁶ Holmes, *The Path of the Law*, 10 *Harvard Law Review* 457, 460 (1897).

according to the great man, was nonsense. Law is nothing more or less than 'command,' expressed in cases and statutes and backed up by the armed might of the state. The aim of our study, he told the aspiring lawyers, is nothing more than the prediction of "where the axe will fall."⁶⁷ If you want to know the law, "you must look at it as a bad man does" — it tells me that I must do this or refrain from doing that or "they will put the screws to me."⁶⁸ He exhorted his youthful audience to use "cynical acid" to wash away all the moralizing encrustations so that they could see the law as it truly is.⁶⁹ But don't think I mean any disrespect for the law, he added. I *venerate* the law, said the unapologetic social Darwinist, — "I venerate it because it has the final title to respect that it exists."⁷⁰

With tradition and reason thus dispatched, the way was prepared for the carnival of twentieth century American legal theory. Tradition, without reason to give it life, became but a heap of old exploded errors, the detritus of past power, prejudice, and interest. The 'Legal Realists' of the 1930s — fact-skeptics like Jerome Frank and rule-skeptics like Karl Llewellyn — had little to add to Holmes. Llewellyn once acknowledged on behalf of the Realists that "Holmes was the daddy of us all." He was an odd sort of daddy, though — one who deprived many of his descendants of their birthright by disparaging the tradition from which he himself had drawn great sustenance. Men like Holmes and Llewellyn, who were themselves products of rigorous training and participation in the tradition, helped to shape an intellectual horizon that reduced the likelihood that their successors would or could surpass their own achievements. Moreover, neither Holmes, for all his genius, nor the Realists who followed him, had much to offer in place of the arrangements that they correctly perceived to be in crisis.

I use the word crisis in Kuhn's sense to indicate spreading trouble in normal science. The crisis was produced by the need, increasingly acute as the century wore on, to adapt the law, once again, to major social changes: industrialization; the rise of big corporations; the growth of big government; increasing social heterogeneity. When Holmes appeared on the scene, trouble spots had already emerged in the reigning paradigm. Formalism had driven the scholarly and

⁶⁷ Ibid. 457.

⁶⁸ Ibid. 459.

⁶⁹ Ibid. 463.

⁷⁰ Ibid. 473. In the same speech he sounds another favorite 'Darwinian' theme: "We must leave the weak and foolish to their own devices." (475).

judicial reasoning processes underground with a resulting loss in the ability to use traditional adaptive techniques. Even worse, existing common law techniques were not well-suited for dealing with the novel problems generated by industrialization, or with the new forms of law that had come to rival case-law in importance: legislation and administrative regulation. With wider suffrage and the increased public regulation that was concomitant with industrialization, statutes were fast displacing court decisions as the principal starting points for legal reasoning. American and English lawyers in this respect were now at a disadvantage compared to their continental counterparts, for we had no highly developed craft techniques either for drafting or interpreting legislation.⁷¹ Our strengths had always been in dealing with judge-made law, historically our principal source of law. By the end of Holmes' long life, the American experiment had definitely entered a new phase. We were sorely in need of robust, creative, jurists, who had mastered the tradition, yet were ready to move it into a new stage of development.

A number of factors have rendered that task increasingly more difficult. In the first place, reason, the dynamic element in the common law tradition, had been downgraded by Holmes and the Realists to mere self-interested calculation, or window-dressing, or logic-chopping. The loss of the idea of a tradition that was both constituted by, and constitutive of, rationality seems in turn to have contributed to a certain neglect of the distinctive skills and techniques of the lawyer's craft. Then too, achieving any kind of consensus among lawyers has become ever more problematic as the profession has become larger, more diverse, and more aggressively profit-oriented. Meanwhile, into the academy, in the wake of the Realists, came a new generation of tradition- and reason-bashers, the critical legal theorists. To a much greater degree than their predecessors, they borrowed the main elements of their critical theory from France and Germany, countries that had never had experience with anything like the common law, and which historically had had exceptional difficulty establishing regimes in which the rule of law was respected. Moreover, many of the critical theorists had absorbed so little 'normal science' that they could not see the problems in transferring a critique of continental law to their own system. In the dark, all law looks the same.

⁷¹ M. Glendon, *The Sources of Law in a Changing Legal Order*, 17 *Creighton Law Review* 663, 665-84 (1984); Richard Posner, *The Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline*, 100 *Harvard Law Review* 761, 773, 777 (1987).

The work of many of these scholars thus illustrates Marx's dictum that history repeats itself, first as tragedy, then as farce. For in contrast to Holmes and Llewellyn, who were thoroughly imbued with the craft tradition, a number of critical theorists are the legal counterparts of those contemporary artists who no longer know or care how to draw.⁷² Some of their work has a naif quality: "Trashing is fun," one has written exuberantly in the *Yale Law Journal*.⁷³ "Context-smashing" is the program advocated by another.⁷⁴ What Cambridge legal historian H. F. Jolowicz has written about the decadence of Roman law in the post-classical period has begun to sound oddly pertinent to our own times. In the Byzantine period, Roman law came to be characterized by an insistence upon equity, not "in the restrained manner of the classical jurists, who conceive of *aequitas* as the principle of justice pervading the whole law, but with an arrogant impatience of legal subtleties ... [T]he Byzantine lawyer is not always capable of doing anything more than reversing the decision which he finds inequitable; he cannot put a new principle in place of the old."⁷⁵

Unfortunately for us Americans, bashing the legal tradition is a graver matter in our society than it is in the continental countries from which American critical theorists have drawn their inspiration. Less heterogeneous countries have many other, and more important, sources of social cohesion than their legal systems. An important insight that I owe to Joseph Flanagan is that for a people as diverse as ours, increasingly lacking a common religion, history, literature, or customs, the law has had to bear more cultural weight. In the United States, for better or worse, the law is a principal carrier of those few values that our citizenry holds in common — liberty, equality, fair procedures. The attack on reason and tradition in law thus strikes at the heart of our version of the democratic experiment.

⁷² Robert Hughes, *The Shock of the New* (New York: Knopf, 1987) ("Nowhere was the decline of depictive drawing more evident than in America." 402).

⁷³ Freeman, "Truth and Mystification in Legal Scholarship," 90 *Yale L. J.* 1229, 1230 (1981). See also Kelman, *Trashing*, 36 *Stan. L. Rev.* 293, 321 (1984).

⁷⁴ Roberto Mangabeira Unger, *False Necessity: Anti-Necessitarian Social Theory in the Service of Radical Democracy* (Part I of *Politics: A Work in Constructive Social Theory*) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987) 72, 208, 453.

⁷⁵ H. F. Jolowicz, *Historical Introduction to the Study of Roman Law* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1967) 520-21.

What's on the Horizon?

Not surprisingly, tradition-trashing, reason-bashing, and context-smashing command a more enthusiastic following in the academy than among the members of the bench and bar. The thesis that all legal rules are indeterminate has made little headway with, say, intermediate appellate judges, tax lawyers, and estate planners. It is true that the current legal landscape is crowded with all sorts of lawyers who are dissatisfied with a craftsman's role: legislators who have little appetite for the undramatic tasks of routine maintenance or the uncertain rewards of long-range planning; judges who are fonder of policy-and rule-making than adjudicating; practitioners who prefer litigation to preventive law; academics who disdain to write for the profession. But that should not lead us to assume that the life force of the common law is spent.

The bar still contains a fair number of men and women who take an artisan's pride in fine, close, work, in choosing the right materials for the task at hand, in turning their corners squarely. On the bench there are still many judges who understand that if every judge tries to be innovative, the administration of justice will suffer.⁷⁶ H. L. Mencken once disparaged the workaday judiciary, with the quip that the average American judge had "no more give-and take in his mind than in the mind of a terrier watching a rat hole." But as Paul Carrington has pointed out, it is a gross mistake to underrate the contributions of judges who toil in relative anonymity.⁷⁷ For the everyday administration of justice by men and women who are not out for personal glory "is in an important sense the model for the functioning of the rest of government; it is the beacon by which officials in the trenches are led in the direction of restrained adherence to principle."⁷⁸ Independent judges who are not afraid to exercise judgment, but who do so with modesty, are visible reminders to citizens and officials alike that we aspire to live under a rule of law, not men.

The cumulative and potentially self-correcting process of common-law reasoning may yet have some surprises in store. I'll go a bit

⁷⁶ See, Posner, *Problems of Jurisprudence*, advocating a view of judging, especially at the appellate level, as "teamwork rather than as individual heroics" (448).

⁷⁷ "Ceremony and Realism: Demise of Appellate Procedure," 66 *A.B.A. Journal* 860, 862 (1980).

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

further to suggest that there are present on the contemporary legal scene the preconditions for important new creative “moments.” If, as Arthur Koestler suggests, creativity (insight, understanding) is often sparked through “bisociation” — encounters or combinations of well-developed but previously separate matrices of thought and experience, we may take heart from global trends that are forcing lawyers from the two great Western legal traditions (the Anglo-American and the Romano-Germanic) to take more account of each others’ achievements. The mistake of the critical theorists, I would argue, was not that they looked to Europe, but that they looked away from *law*. For, where craft techniques are concerned, at least, European and American lawyers seem to be holding the essential missing pieces of each others’ puzzles. Theirs are the highly refined skills we lack for drafting and interpreting codes and statutes, ours are the finely honed techniques for dealing with judge-made law.

A potentially revolutionary insight — achieved independently, it seems, by a Belgian and a German-born American legal philosopher — is that philosophy at this particular moment in history may have more to learn from law than law from philosophy. Precisely contrary to the cheerleaders of the rights revolution who, like Ronald Dworkin, have assumed that the aim of the study of jurisprudence was to bring enlightenment to the legal process, Chaim Perelman and Edgar Bodenheimer argued that the time has come for lawyers to engage in self-conscious appropriation of the dialectical and probabilistic modes of reasoning which they have more or less unconsciously followed.⁷⁹ Philosophers should join the lawyers in this endeavor, Perelman and Bodenheimer contended, for the law, at its best, is an operating model of the only kinds of reasoning that are of much use in the “realm of human affairs.” (Bodenheimer, incidentally, could serve as a textbook illustration for Tocqueville’s, Kuhn’s, and Koestler’s theories about creativity. He was rigorously trained in the Romano-Germanic legal tradition; then, in the 1930s, as a refugee from National Socialism, he was forced to master the very different tradition of the common law. That ‘bisociation’ of ‘thought matrices’ (to use Koestler’s terms)

⁷⁹ Edgar Bodenheimer, A Neglected Theory of Legal Reasoning, 21 *Journal of Legal Education* 373 (1969) and *Jurisprudence: The Philosophy and Method of the Law* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974); Chaim Perelman, *Justice, Law, and Argument* (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1980). Alain Lempereur, a student of Perelman and Michel Meyer, has developed the theory that “questioning” is foundational for legal philosophy. See, Lempereur, *Law: From Foundation to Argumentation*, 24 *Communication and Cognition* 97 (1991).

apparently sparked his remarkable series of insights into legal reasoning.)

As for what higher viewpoints might emerge from the turn back to law and the appropriation of dialectic suggested by Perelman and Bodenheimer, who knows? Insight is mysterious not only in its origins but also in its outcome. Someday, I hope, Father Flanagan will have the whole story.

It took a tragedian like Euripides to tell of the sad and astonishing events when King Pentheus tried to keep the God of unreason outside the gates of Thebes. The story of the modern legal academy's effort to keep Reason at bay would be more suited to the comic pen of Aristophanes. But, amidst all the trashing, bashing, and smashing, knowledge is making its entrance.

THE DRAMA OF LIVING, AND LONERGAN'S RETRIEVAL OF TRANSCENDENCE

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I. THE DRAMA OF LIVING

SINCE PLATO, PHILOSOPHERS have used the metaphor of drama to describe human existence: we are all actors in a play, tragic or comic, acted out on the world stage. The metaphor has grown stale over the centuries, but still can be revitalized by a gifted thinker, because it reveals something fundamentally true about the human condition. We are all performers in a story that, with its developments and conflicts, lulls and surprises, heartbreaks and happinesses, embraces us all, and unites us in a common destiny. Of course, the metaphor of the drama mustn't be applied too literally. Our parts are not written for us ahead of time; we are obliged to invent them to quite an extent. Also, the meanings of our respective contributions to the story always remain somewhat in doubt. And whereas in the theater we witness the story's beginning and end, the world drama precedes and outlasts our existences. Finally, in this drama we are always actors, and never spectators. Existence and performance are one and the same.

Now to speak of an encompassing human drama naturally evokes the question: Just what is this one supervening story about? What is the plot of the story of human existence and human history? What can we know about it, or at least sincerely believe?

The question may sound naive. There may be a single story, but who's to say what it is? Isn't the conviction that one understands the single, overarching story of existence a sign of religious gullibility, or perhaps political fanaticism? The only supervening story that seems plausible, universally acceptable, is the story told by modern physics; but then again that's not much of a story, since it doesn't tell us why things exist, nor what human beings are for, nor what purposes our

loves, hopes, fears and desires serve — nothing about the human part of the drama. Still, anything beyond the scientifically verifiable seems fanciful at best, and at worst the stuff of fanatical superstition.

The present popularity of this sort of response to our question indicates that, as a culture, we are uneasy in our convictions that a truly common drama exists. This being true, the metaphor of 'the human drama' has a hollow ring to modern ears. What we feel ourselves to be participants in is not so much a unified human drama, rising from an abysmal but trustworthy mystery, as an accidental and temporary gathering of private lives.

This condition might be characterized as one of individuals alienated from each other due to their common alienation from a common story. It is a situation sometimes discussed, in contemporary literature, in terms of the breakdown of shared myths. If the function of myth is primarily that of binding our separate and fragmented lives through the felt apprehension of a unified story, then it is accurate to say that the myths that inform our culture have been rendered mostly ineffective. Our hearts do not assent to them; they are too various, and we are too skeptical of their origins and purposes. We partly believe a number of incompatible claims. Stories from the Jewish and Christian traditions jostle alongside images from Newtonian physics and Cartesian philosophy, Darwinian science and Freudian psychology, to produce a rich but incoherent picture of the total order of reality, which can only loosely be called a worldview. Fifty years ago T. S. Eliot described our situation: our outlook on the cosmos is upon 'a heap of broken images.'

The chaotic character of our experience of the cosmos in the twentieth century has been attested to by its major artists. Picasso's fractured portraits, Giacometti's pinched figurines, Beckett's dramas of isolation, Berg's jarring operas, and the flotsam of quotations gathered in the poetry of Eliot and Pound — just to mention a few famous but hardly outdated examples — testify to the disjointed sense of the universe that prevails among us, if also to the artistic creativity and exuberance that can discover new worlds in the disintegration of the old.

The artists have done their job magnificently, but at their best they have given private mythologies. As invigorating and solacing as those mythologies are, they are no substitute for the public mythologies that securely orient a culture in relation to the ultimacies and mysteries of the cosmos. And what the artist raises to the level of at

least private myth, the rest of us tend to suffer as mere private autobiography: a personal story of the self, styled in isolation, and, if troubled, rendered up to the psychotherapist or the priest.

The current vogue of the word 'style' reflects this situation. 'Style,' an elegant reduction of the cumbrous 'lifestyle,' has become the definitive criterion in popular culture with reference to our general dramatic artistry. 'Style' involves defining oneself exclusively through the use of certain forms of aesthetic expression. The 'values' that find their expression in 'style' are not understood to refer to stable, objective realities in a landscape of good and evil; they are preferences of the moment. The 'style' that expresses them is a surface phenomenon, as ephemeral as mood. And so the self-definition of dramatic living is reduced to the conceit of the actor; there is no common drama, only a collection of individual fantasies; no enduring story, only 'style.'

When we turn from popular to intellectual culture, we find in the most saleable trends of critical thought an unceasing attack on the notion that there could be any common substance, or common ground, to the panorama of human lives. The conception of a unified human drama, we are told, betrays a naive and unjustifiable confidence in meaning, a rationalist nostalgia for metaphysical stability, and possibly a complicity in the ideological buttressing of white male domination. In philosophical circles it has become fashionable to denounce as an illusion not only the *ultimate* metaphysical priority of unity and clarity over plurality and ambiguity, but even the *reality* of unity and clarity. The so-called deconstruction of metaphysics, of reason and of the self has culminated in doctrines that apparently presume that one can inquire seriously into the nature of events — including events of consciousness — without assuming seriously that there is a meaningful context to those events.

Still, in spite of the awesome forces of intellectual and popular culture, and in spite of the disheartening incoherence of the symbols and images that give most of us our bearings in the cosmos, we somehow continue to suppose that we are performing in a common drama, and we continue to try to orient ourselves by some vision or another of the Whole of reality. But if, as a culture, we lack spontaneously convincing myths, how is the felt experience of shared participation in a supervening story to be recovered? Let us distinguish two types of recovery: critical recovery, which is properly the task of philosophy, and dramatic recovery, which lies in the spontaneities of human living.

II. CRITICAL RECOVERY

For quite some time now contemporary culture has been described as postmodern, and our age as that of postmodernity. The prevailing outlook of postmodern culture has been summed by Jean-Francois Lyotard: "I define postmodern," he states, "as incredulity toward metanarratives."¹ That is, the most persuasive and striking characteristic of contemporary life is the suspicion, in many cases hostile suspicion, directed toward any accounts of reality or history or human experience that claim to speak from a transcendent point of view, from a position that transcends individual or cultural perspectives. But any convincing account of the universal human drama *must* have the character of a metanarrative because it must represent all humans at all times as a single community, participating in a reality that binds the meaning of each to the meaning of all. Such an account presupposes a common human element that transcends biological, psychological and cultural circumstances — an element, in other words, not intrinsically conditioned by the accidents of space and time. Only human participation in a dimension of reality that is non-finite and non-conditioned — a realm of transcendent meaning — justifies a conception of universal humanity and therewith any metanarrative. In fact, the contemporary incredulity toward metanarratives culminates a centuries-long attack waged against the affirmation of transcendent reality. A skeptical attitude toward transcendence is the heart of postmodern self-interpretation.

The contemporary rejection of transcendence has complex origins. Perhaps its major general cause was the understanding of nature introduced with the modern mathematical sciences, which inspired hopes among the few, and then among the many, that all of reality might one day be explained within a system of rational science. During the eighteenth century, growing confidence in the modern scientific method of reason as sole arbiter of what is true and real led to a rigorous assault by Enlightenment thinkers on what they perceived to be the harmful and retrograde forces of unreason in society, focusing in particular on the institutional voices of religion demanding that reason be put aside when faced with Church authority. That assault eventually broadened out into a widespread intolerance of any

¹ "Jean-Francois Lyotard, *The Postmodern Condition*, quoted in Calvin O. Schrag, "Liberal Learning in the Postmodern World," *The Key Reporter*, 54/1 (Autumn 1988).

purportedly mysterious truth, or truth declared to be beyond the grasp of logical or scientific reason. In a parallel development, the rise of historical consciousness in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries resulted in growing awareness of the culture-bound character of human understanding, and of the limitations of horizon and perspective, an awareness that gradually undermined the claims by religion and philosophy that they have access to eternal truths. Together these points of view co-operated to cast suspicion on any claims to knowledge of a transcendent reality; and though they are only two of the sources of such suspicion, they are two of the most important, and mentioning them serves to indicate some of the problems faced by a critical effort to recover the legitimacy of transcendence in a manner that speaks to thinkers of the present.

But the greatest obstacle to such a recovery lies with the language of transcendence. The traditional symbols used to mediate a sense or understanding of transcendence have lost much of their power to convince and to console. They have become devitalized, stale, opaque. Nietzsche was an accurate barometer of language when he announced that "God is dead." The words 'spirit' and 'spirituality' in everyday speech have become imprecise to the point of unintelligibility. As Eric Voegelin would say, the symbols of transcendence have become cut off from the experiences of transcendence that engendered them, from the living insights into the facts of transcendent meaning. Therefore what is most needed in a retrieval of transcendence is an analysis of human *experience* that effectively delves beneath the varieties of symbolic formulation to the fundamental, rationally undeniable, experiences of human desire and insight that have given rise to those formulations. And this, finally, brings us to Bernard Lonergan's philosophy, which provides the most coherent critical recovery in twentieth century thought of the experiential basis of the affirmation of transcendence.

Lonergan's philosophy is built upon his analysis of cognitional activity, and the center of that analysis is his identification of the core of human consciousness as the desire to know. The desire to know is our questioning unrest that is 'the prior and enveloping drive' that carries us from sense and imagination to understanding and all the uses of understanding.² From the fact and character of this quintessentially human desire, Lonergan derives his argument for the existence of transcendent being, which may be summarized as follows.

² Bernard J. F. Lonergan, *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding* (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1978) 348.

Because the desire to know is unrestricted in its intention — because it is its nature to seek an understanding of all that is — it includes in its scope not only the entire universe of objects and relations in space and time, but also the cause or origin of that universe. Desiring to know this origin, then, human understanding can come to recognize that the finite world is not a sufficient explanation for its own existence, since all finite reality is contingent reality, and contingent reality ultimately presupposes a non-contingent reality as the intelligible basis or ground of its existence. Now a non-contingent reality is a reality that is completely self-sufficient and completely self-explanatory. Our questioning, therefore, leads us to this notion of a self-sufficient, self-explanatory reality, neither contingent nor finite. Nevertheless, while questioning can bring us to this notion, we also recognize that direct insight into such a reality lies beyond the scope of finite imagination and understanding, that is, beyond human understanding. Therefore, the finite reality of the world which we experience and understand leads us, if we remain true to the exigencies of rational inquiry, if we remain true, that is, to the questioning which we are, to acknowledge an ultimate, originating reality that we understand to lie beyond our direct understanding. This reality is transcendent being, transcendent because it transcends the finite conditions of space and time, and also because it transcends our substantive understanding. We do understand it to be the cause of contingent reality and that it must exist if the finite universe is to be completely intelligible; but in itself, in its content, it is a mystery to us, the mystery of ultimate origins and final meanings, the mystery of the ground of being.

Now, Lonergan's analysis does more than show that the notion of transcendent being has its natural origin in the unrestricted character of human questioning, and that it is a proper and intelligible notion. It also overcomes a common type of objection to the idea that transcendent being is real, which arises from the assumption that only what is material, or conditioned by spatiotemporality, can be considered real. Lonergan explains how such assumptions are philosophically untenable, because ultimately the only coherent criteria for determining what has being or existence are the criteria of intelligent grasp and reasonable affirmation. By analyzing in detail how we are prone to mistakenly conceive the data of the senses to be the touchstone of reality, why such a conception is philosophically inadequate, and how reality ought properly to be conceived as that which is known through

a reasonable exercise of judgment, Lonergan dissolves the materialist mortgage on the word 'being' and validates its use in conjunction with the word 'transcendent.'

I have mentioned here with extreme brevity the elements in Lonergan's work most directly concerned with providing critical foundations for the affirmation of transcendent reality, foundations that philosophically justify the supposition that as humans we do participate in a common reality that transcends individual perspective. There are other areas of Lonergan's thought, no less important, that make it clear why it is entirely appropriate for the mysteries of transcendence to be represented by concrete images and symbols serving to guide our feelings and thoughts about the cosmos and our place in it. Full and effective human living, Lonergan insists, requires what can be called appropriate myths to mediate for us the possible meanings of transcendent mystery. Why this is so leads us to Lonergan's account of human nature.

The transcendent mystery that is an implicit concern of every questioning consciousness may not be, and of course usually is not, explicitly differentiated *as* transcendent and understood as such. Most of us remain acquainted with it simply as the boundary to our understanding of things, and as a felt apprehension of what Lonergan calls the "ulterior unknown ... the undefined surplus of significance and momentousness."³ And the significances or meanings belonging to this 'ulterior unknown' are conveyed to us almost exclusively through concrete images and symbols, for two reasons. First, our basic connection to the mystery that embraces our lives is through our feelings — through the hope and love, dread or terror, that it evokes in us, and in which we first apprehend it as the wellspring of all power — and it is through images that such feelings are engendered, recalled and perpetuated. Second, images are for human understanding primary and indispensable vehicles of meaning. Certainly, we are only aware of a basic mystery because we are intellectual creatures; but our intellects themselves are always dependent on the organic and psychic manifolds that underpin and sustain them. Human understanding is a matter of insight, and insight is an intellectual operation, but, as Lonergan emphasizes, "the image is necessary for the insight."⁴ Sensitive presentations and imaginative representations provide the

³ Lonergan, *Insight* 532.

⁴ *Ibid.* 8.

material conditions for questioning and understanding. Human understanding does not occur independently of these conditions. We are not mere intellects, vacationing in bodies; we are a unity of, on the one hand, physical and sensitive operations, and, on the other, intellectual or spiritual operations that integrate the operations of the physical and sensitive levels. This means that we only apprehend transcendent meaning through relevant images (except perhaps, as Lonergan notes, in "certain mystical states");⁵ that such images are of central importance to human beings attempting to orient themselves, affectively and cognitively, within the total order of the cosmos; and that if such images whose function is to convey a convincing set of intimations about transcendent meaning are absent or ineffective in a culture, then a serious general disorientation will result.

On this last point Lonergan's works are eloquent. We are, he writes, by nature oriented into the mystery of transcendent meaning, and much more important than our precise theoretical grasp of that fact is our imaginal and affective openness to it. As a basic truth of the human condition, the fact of transcendent meaning can only become effective for us, incarnate in the way we live our lives, through what Lonergan calls "a suitable flow of sensitive and imaginative presentations";⁶ and a widespread cultural lack of compelling and spontaneously convincing images pertaining to transcendence will ramify not only into disoriented individual lives but social and educational policies that are skewed from being based on a misapprehension of what constitutes fundamental reality and on a distorted scale of values. Neither will the mere presence of a cultural legacy of more adequate interpretations of the human situation necessarily work toward healing this disorientation and distortion, because knowledge must enjoy the active alliance of appropriate images and corresponding feelings in order to have an effect on human living. As Lonergan explains: "Even adequate self-knowledge and explicit metaphysics ... cannot issue into a control of human living without being transposed into dynamic images which make sensible to human sensitivity what human intelligence reaches for or grasps ..." And again: "[Our] explanatory self-knowledge can become effective in [our] concrete living only if the content of systematic insights, the direction

⁵ Bernard Lonergan, *Understanding and Being: An Introduction and Companion to 'Insight'*, eds. Elizabeth A. Morelli and Mark D. Morelli (New York: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1980) 269.

⁶ Lonergan, *Insight* 723.

of judgments, the dynamism of decisions can be embodied in images that release feeling and emotion and flow spontaneously into deeds no less than words.”⁷

There are two further related elements of Lonergan’s cognitional philosophy that provide crucial support and balance for his account of the importance of proper images of transcendence. The first of these is his critical separation of the image, into which insight is had, from the act of insight itself. The image is necessary for the insight, but, as he puts it, all the explaining is done by the insight; the insight is an intellectual operation that supervenes upon the image, grasping an intelligibility that is formally independent of the image. This is why the same image can function as the condition for quite different insights, and why conversely very dissimilar images can give rise to identical insights. This understanding of the relation between insight and image establishes the invaluable philosophical principle that insight into meaning transcends the historical particularity of the image that occasions it. And this, in turn, allows the truths pertaining to transcendent being that are grasped under different historical circumstances, and within the full variety of personal and linguistic horizons, to be understood as referring to one and the same reality, and as uniting those who grasp them in a genuinely common concern.

The second related issue is Lonergan’s account of correct judgment as the rational grasp, not of an absolutely unconditioned truth, but of a truth that is ‘virtually’ unconditioned — a conditioned truth whose conditions happen to be fulfilled. This account secures the objective status of sound judgments while simultaneously respecting the fact that all human knowledge falls short of infallible certitude, and cannot be absolute in any formal sense. Whenever we know anything, it is because the conditions for our knowing it *happen to be* fulfilled in this finite universe. But all such conditions, as we have seen, indirectly testify to an ultimate cause that is itself unconditioned: self-sufficient and self-explanatory. Therefore, transcendent being is implicit in every recognition and affirmation of conditioned truth. Lonergan shows how the nature of human judgment is such that it can be both objective — in the sense of transcending the particularity of the knower — and compatible with a pervasive unknown, the unknown of the mystery of the ground, the transcendent meaning upon which all other meaning depends.

⁷ Ibid. 547, 548.

These are facets of Lonergan's work that contribute to what I have been calling a philosophical recovery of the truth that human beings participate in a common drama, a drama rooted in transcendence. The theoretical stability and persuasive power of that recovery are not so much a consequence of Lonergan's obvious technical brilliance or the breathtaking comprehensiveness of his philosophy, as of his fidelity to the rudimentary experiences that are involved in every person's consciousness, the questioning desire and conscious operations that make one a human subject. Lonergan's arguments for acknowledging both transcendent being and the legitimacy of symbolic articulations of a common human story are in harmony with what people discover themselves to be when they attend to, understand, and verify their own experiences of consciousness.

Lonergan's championing of the fact of transcendent meaning puts him, as has already been pointed out, far from the philosophical mainstream. Current philosophical discussion remains dominated by attacks on transcendence and by the ratification, indeed the celebration, of the destruction of 'metanarratives.' This trend gives sanction, it is acknowledged, to a frightening sense of disorientation within the cosmos; but it does so, many philosophers would argue, for some very good reasons. Metanarratives, they would insist, imply totalism: they offer themselves as total explanations of reality. Chief among these attempts at total explanation is the project of modern science, which for many in our culture offers the only genuinely convincing 'image of the Whole of reality.' And what is this 'image of the Whole'? It is a radically disenchanted and emotionally uninteresting universe, cold, systematic and unmysterious. The totalist claims of science have left us affectively starved, these philosophers agree, with our sense of myth, play and drama — which they value highly — buried under layers of scientific dogma. The problem does not lie with science itself, which clearly has its legitimacy, but rather with its claims to being the one explanation, the one true story, the true system, that explains everything. The problem, in fact, is with totalism.

And where did science learn this totalistic spirit? From the religious metanarratives that preceded it. These, too, the postmodern philosophers continue, claimed to provide total answers about everything. What is needed today most of all is a revival of our sense of drama and mythic sensibility, but this must take place apart from the totalistic spirit, apart from systems of answers that ignore our emotional and cultural differences and stunt the sense of mystery. To

quote again from Jean-Francois Lyotard, from the final sentence in his book *The Postmodern Condition*: "The answer is: let us wage a war on totality...let us activate the differences ..." ⁸ The dominant philosophers today insist on difference, plurality, incompatibility, incoherence with respect to human knowledge of ultimate things, because to them the regeneration of a sense of cosmic drama can only occur through a move *away from* insistence on a common story. In insisting that at the very heart of human self-interpretation is myth, play, mystery and ambiguity, they are reacting against the totalistic spirit of modern thought, against the Descartes who could say that if his imagination were removed from his mind he would remain exactly the same person, and against the Hegel who could say that myth is "an impotence of thought" and that all "sensual *Gestalt* is a pollution of thought." ⁹

But in spite of the laudable aspects of this critique leveled by the postmodern philosophers against totalistic systems, whether scientific, philosophical or religious, they are in it handicapped by one profound misapprehension. They assume that because such systems are to some degree an offspring of traditional claims to knowledge of transcendent being, that consequently any affirmation of transcendent being implies a totalistic claim. While rejecting the totalistic outlook of modernity, they respect its ban on transcendence, because to their minds the affirmation of a realm of transcendent being has always been an excuse for the tyranny of the dogmas of totalistic systems. The upshot is that in their interpretations of the basic human condition they inject what are properly the ambiguities of transcendent meaning into our experience and knowledge of mundane reality. The judgments of common sense and even of science are portrayed as the thrust of mythic intention — all truth is play, all knowledge is metaphor, all intention is the play of power, and there is no solidity or certainty. In this horizon of thought, the drama of living gets revitalized (at least in theory), but at the cost of renouncing the differentiation of the transcendent realm of meaning. The yield is a fractured drama of style that, because it lacks stability of meaning, can't justify a common ethics, or even explain the objectivity of the sciences.

The problematic fact that will continue to confront these contemporary philosophers and undermine their best efforts is that we live in

⁸ Op.cit.

⁹ René Descartes, *Meditations on First Philosophy*, Sixth Meditation; G. W. F. Hegel, quoted in Eric Voegelin, "On Hegel: A Study in Sorcery," *Studium Generale*, vol. 24 (1971) 350.

a linguistic horizon predicated upon the insights in which transcendence has been differentiated, rationally and thoroughly; and no philosophical interpretations of our condition, however brilliant and sincere, will succeed in going 'back of those insights and reducing our common ground, the mysterious ground of being, to a natural, material, historical, intramundane sphere of reality. Such reductionisms finally, as Lonergan would say, "invite their own reversal," because in a post-differentiated linguistic and cultural horizon the need for a common recognition of a common story rooted in transcendence will continue to be felt.

What would that reversal look like, within mainstream philosophical culture? It would begin with the recognition that transcendent meaning is a fact, but not a fact that implies that human beings can claim knowledge of a complete and systematic explanation of reality. It would respect that transcendence means mystery: that what is truly transcendent can never be completely or comprehensively known by finite human consciousness. Secondly, it would critically emphasize the distinction between scientific theories (which seek a most adequate explanation of the relations among things), and stories of the Whole, or metanarratives (which orient us in relation to transcendence, through the articulation of a common drama). Thirdly, it would appreciate that the mediation of transcendence through stories of the Whole *must* be pluralistic, because while transcendence itself is one, a drama of the Whole can only be convincing to a person or a society if it succeeds in integrating the particulars of local experience and history into a comprehensive story. In other words, though metanarratives claim comprehensive scope, they are not totalistic, at least when properly understood. The logic of religious metanarrative, of myth, embraces plurality; it is not exclusivistic, as is the logic of scientific theory, where one explanation is always the most adequate. *Because they mediate a mystery*, distinct metanarratives can still be mutually compatible, and compatible as well with the rejection of totalism. Thus the postmodern reversal of reductionism could produce a critically responsible pluralism.

This said, however, we ought to remember the difference between the critical achievements of philosophy and what takes place at the level of ordinary human living, of what Lonergan calls everyday dramatic artistry. Critical recovery, on the part of Lonergan or anyone else, is to be sharply distinguished from dramatic recovery, which in this case would be our contemporaries actually experiencing and

making sense of their lives as participants in a common story. What is recognized by the few in the intellectual pattern of experience is not to be confused with what is felt by the vast majority with everyday consistency in the dramatic pattern of experience. Let us very briefly look once more, then, at the prevailing trends in popular culture, to see what the prognosis is for the renewal of a sense of community based on the spontaneous and shared apprehension of transcendence.

III. DRAMATIC RECOVERY

It would appear that, at the level of popular culture and spontaneous dramatic living, images of transcendence that actually function as consolidating myths, convincingly orientating people within the cosmic Whole, are becoming ever more rare. The one 'drama of humanity' continues to splinter into what is perceived more and more to be a mere aggregate of private lives. Partly this is due to the still-increasing influence of the secular scientific 'story' of the Whole which so pervades contemporary life. But even for those who seek beyond it, the inherited images of transcendent meaning, attacked so relentlessly by Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment thought, have in the broader culture lost much of their power to enchant and console. Symbols such as 'God' and 'spirit' are more and more felt to be expressions of private mythology rather than of universal communion. The *political* privatization of religion, well consolidated after two centuries, is being followed now by the *psychological* privatization of religion.

The signs of uneasiness over this state of affairs are everywhere. Aside from the negative signs of social breakdown, increased violence, disintegration of family institutions and so on, there are the positive signs of a restless longing and search for some 'spiritual' truth or tradition that will perform the existential functions once performed by rejected images of transcendence. Westerners experimenting with Eastern religions, twelve-step groups and their like, and most visibly a broad variety of 'new age' adherents, share in common a rejection of both the scientific 'cover story' that purports to explain the Whole, and the traditional institutionalized mediation of transcendence. The scientific and traditional religious dogmas are being rejected by members of these groups because neither effectively mediates for them a felt apprehension of a common drama, a true drama of transcendent origin, destiny and union.

Of course, the vague deisms and pantheisms, occultist enthusiasms and smorgasbord spiritualisms that so often characterize these efforts to regain a felt connection with transcendence appear seriously inadequate in light of a critically differentiated appreciation of the problems of transcendence and of the complex theoretical achievements of the Western philosophical and theological traditions. Nevertheless, these efforts should be seen, perhaps, as moving in the direction of dramatic recovery, since they are all characterized by a serious acceptance of the questions that point to transcendent mystery, by a refusal simply to pay lip-service to traditional images of transcendent meaning when these are not felt as existentially convincing, and by a refusal to abandon the conviction that, as common participants in a common story, that story must somehow be able to be told. Perhaps, after all, we are witnessing the messy beginnings of a capacity for simultaneously embracing both a particular story as the universal drama *and* the existence of a plurality of such stories: a capacity which would constitute the affective, dramatic counterpart to a critically responsible pluralism among intellectuals.

At any rate, we must continue to keep distinguishing between, on the one hand, a philosophical recovery of transcendence and corresponding grounding of a worldview consistent with the fact of transcendence, which Lonergan for one has achieved, and on the other hand a dramatic recovery of felt participation in a common story. After all, we don't confuse the critical achievements of Plato and Aristotle with a new dramatic cohesion or sense of unified meaning in the Greek culture that continued to disintegrate around them. While remembering, informed by the critical insights, that the unrestricted desire to know is present in each of us, and that it naturally seeks to meet and embrace the mystery of transcendent meaning, we must still remain sensitive to the degree to which our contemporaries are unable to make sense of their lives in the cosmos as they imagine it or to find a way to greet their own selves in the communion of all, and continue to do our best to help the question meet the appropriate image.

LONERGAN'S EARLY ESSAYS ON THE REDEMPTION OF HISTORY

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THIS YEAR'S WORKSHOP is devoted to "The Legacy of Lonergan," and most of the presentations have been devoted to the legacy Lonergan left behind and to some assessment of the state in which it exists today. I would like to offer a reflection, under the same title but reversing the metaphor, that will speak of the legacy that Lonergan himself received. I will concentrate on three of the pieces that were found posthumously in "File 713 — History."¹ Two of them have now been edited and published;² the third, which I will cite from a photocopy, is entitled "Philosophy of History."

As Fred Crowe has observed, these essays are likely to surprise those who have thought of Lonergan principally as a cognitional theorist or as a methodologist, whose attention was concentrated on the structure and dynamics of individual consciousness. Here one finds a Lonergan who is interested in a general theory, a metaphysics of history, and whose abstract lines are regularly illustrated by references to contemporary events and figures. Crowe asked some questions that might arise in any reader:

...one wonders what became of this work of Lonergan's youth, how he turned from what was so topical to what was so remote, and why he kept these papers all his life, if he had abandoned the direction he seemed to have taken in them. Or did he abandon it, did it endure as an underlying purpose, and can one find it all-pervasive in his later work?³

I am myself inclined to answer that he did not abandon this interest and that it endured as an underlying, if not necessarily all-pervasive

¹ For a brief description, see Frederick E. Crowe, *Lonergan* (Collegeville: Liturgical Press, 1992) 24-27.

² "Lonergan's *Pantôn Anakephalaiôsis* [The Restoration of All Things]," *Method: Journal of Lonergan Studies* 9 (1991) 134-72; "Lonergan's 'Analytic Concept of History,'" *Ibid.*, 11 (1993) 1-35.

³ Crowe, *Lonergan*, 27.

purpose. One may cite Chapters VI and VII and the Epilogue of *Insight*; the lectures on the Philosophy of Education; the recurrence of the dialectic of progress, decline and redemption in *Method in Theology*, and many other references. To these I would add some incidental comments. At the end of the twelfth thesis of his *De Verbo Incarnato*, Lonergan wrote five lines for a *scholion* "De potentia Christi hominis," the last two of which were: "We also need a treatment of the historical causality which Christ the man manifestly exercises."⁴ One day when I asked him about the theology of redemption, he disabused me of the idea that Aristotle's four causes were adequate and sending me instead to the idea of historical causality.

I don't think that Fr. Lonergan would object to the effort to uncover his debts. He himself remarked that "ninety-eight per cent of what a genius knows, he believes."⁵ And in one of these early essays he remarked that "whether rightly or wrongly, [men] think in a herd. The apparent exception is [the] genius, who however is not the fine flower of individuality but the product of the age and the instrument of the race in its progress."⁶ In the two published early works on history, the idea is powerful that "*Quidquid movetur ab alio movetur.*" I am interested here in some of the things that may have moved Lonergan to interest himself in history. The result, I hope, will not be a diminishment but an identification and fuller characterization of Lonergan's originality.

THREE CONTEXTS

Lonergan began his philosophical studies at Heythrop between 1926 and 1930; after three years of regency back in Canada, he did his theological studies in Rome from 1933 to 1937, returning after a year's tertianship in France, to work on his doctoral dissertation. The early papers on history appear to date from the time in Rome before he undertook his study of St. Thomas on operative grace.

The years Lonergan spent in England, France, and Rome were ones of great world-historical drama, of significant ecclesiastical development, and of major breakthroughs in Catholic thought. I wish to say a few brief things about each of these contexts.

⁴"Ulterius desideratur consideratio de causalitate historica quam Christus homo manifeste exercet;" *De Verbo incarnato* (Gregorian University Press, 1961) 362.

⁵*A Second Collection*, ed. W.F.J. Ryan and B. Tyrrell (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1974) 219.

⁶"Lonergan's 'Analytic Concept of History,'" 12.

The General Crisis

By the mid-1930s the sense that the world, or at least the western world, was in a state of acute crisis was very widespread. The First World War had been fought, Americans were told, for two connected purposes: to end all wars by making the world safe for democracy. But 1935 saw the Italian invasion of Ethiopia, and a year later the Spanish Civil War would break out. Long before then totalitarian regimes had consolidated their power in Russia, Germany, and Italy, and a great debate was underway about the future of democracy. The League of Nations, created to promote international cooperation, had already proven its inability to inhibit a recrudescence of nationalism all over Europe. And all these political developments were matched by a now global economic crisis that brought into question the other great engine of modern progress, liberal capitalism. Christopher Dawson summed up a not uncommon view:

Western civilization to-day is passing through one of the most critical moments in its history. In every department of life traditional principles have been shaken and discredited, and we do not yet know what is going to take their place.⁷

This sense of crisis made Oswald Spengler's *The Decline of the West* more than an isolated expression of pessimism on a grand scale. The literature of crisis is very extensive: N. Berdaiev, *The New Middle Ages* (1924); J. Benda, *La trahison des clercs* (1927); S. Freud, *The Future of an Illusion* (1927), *Civilization and its Discontents* (1930); K. Jaspers, *Die geistige Situation der Zeit* (1931); R. Niebuhr, *Moral Man and Immoral Society* (1932); *Beyond Tragedy* (1936); Ortega y Gasset, *The Revolt of the Masses* (1930); J. Huizinga, *The Crisis of Civilization* (1935); E. Husserl, *The Crisis of European Sciences* (1936). People were thinking on a grand scale.

The Church's Response

The period during which such works were being published coincided with the pontificate of a remarkable man, Pope Pius XI (1922-1939). His reign is often seen as a recovery and extension of the great

⁷ Christopher Dawson, "General Introduction," in J. Maritain, et al., *Essays in Order* (New York: Macmillan, 1931), v.

effort, initiated by Leo XIII, to accomplish what had formed the motto of Pius X, *Instaurare omnia in Christo*: To Restore All Things in Christ. Pius XI's own motto was *Pax Christi in Regno Christi*, The Peace of Christ in the Reign of Christ. From his first encyclical, through the establishment and spread of the Feast of Christ the King (1925), his condemnation of *Action française* (1926), his great social Encyclical, *Quadragesimo anno* (1931), his condemnations of nationalism, fascism, nazism, and communism, Pius XI set out a grand vision of a Catholic solution to the great crisis of modern civilization. It would represent a third alternative to the discredited alternatives of a liberalism that was so individualistic that it could not ground a common culture and a collectivism that left no room for the person.⁸

In the mind of the Pope, here echoing commonplaces of modern Roman Catholicism, the root of modern evils was located in man's "lamentable separation from God and Christ: Neither God nor Jesus Christ being recognized by the law or by the state, and authority claiming to be derived from man alone, the very foundations of authority have been destroyed." There no longer existed an international institution similar to "that true society of nations which was the community of Christian peoples" in the Middle Ages; only the Church has the teaching that can bring a remedy so that "all things shall be fully subjected to God, who 'beholds the heart,' and shall be inwardly informed by His teachings and laws, with the result that all things, the minds of all men, private individuals and rulers, even the public institutions of society, shall be penetrated by the sense of religious duty, so that 'Christ is all things and in all' (Col. 3:11)." Pius XI identified in those who pay no heed to the Church's social teaching "a kind of moral, judicial, and social Modernism, and We condemn it as strongly as We do dogmatic Modernism."⁹

In 1925 the Pope gave devotional and liturgical force to his vision by instituting the feast of Christ the King. Relating this action to the basic orientation he had given his pontificate, he offered a biblical and

⁸For a contextualization of this view, along with ample bibliography, see Yvon Tranvouez, "Du Christ-Roi aux prêtres-ouvriers," in *Catholiques d'abord: Approches du mouvement catholique en France (XIXe-XXe siècle)* (Paris: Ed. Ouvrières, 1988) 107-31; Daniele Menozzi, "Percorsi della 'società cristiana': Da Leone XIII al concilio Vaticano II," in *La Chiesa cattolica e la secolarizzazione* (Torino: Einaudi, 1993) 136-97.

⁹For the Pope's first Encyclical, *Ubi arcano*, see *Social Wellsprings, II: Eighteen Encyclicals of Social Reconstruction by Pope Pius XI*, ed. J. Husslein (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1942) 5-26.

theological exposition of Christ's Kingship, insisting that it applied not only to individuals and the Church but to all of society and its rulers: "When once men recognize, both in private and in public life, that Christ is King, society will at last receive the great blessing of real liberty, well-ordered discipline, peace, and harmony." The new feast would be a yearly reminder of the root cause of modern evils:

In ordaining that the whole Catholic world shall revere Christ the King, We minister to the need of the present day, and at the same time provide an excellent remedy for the plague which now affects society. We refer to the plague of secularism, its errors and impious activities.

This evil spirit...has not come into being in one day, it has long lurked beneath the surface. The empire of Christ over all nations was rejected. The right which the Church has from Christ Himself, to teach mankind, to make laws, to govern peoples in all that pertains to their eternal salvation, that right has been denied. Then gradually the religion of Christ came to be likened to false religions and to be placed ignominiously on the same level with them. It was then put under the power of the state and merely tolerated more or less at the whim of princes and rulers. Some men went even further, and wished to set up in the place of God's religion a natural religion, consisting in some instinctive affection of the heart. There were even some nations who thought they could dispense with God, and their religion should consist in impiety and the neglect of God.

The rebellion of individuals and states against the authority of Christ has produced deplorable consequences.... They are the seeds of discords sown far and wide; those bitter enmities and rivalries between nations which hinder so much the cause of peace; that insatiable greed which is so often hidden under a pretense of public spirit and patriotism, and gives rise to so many private quarrels; a blind and immoderate selfishness making men seek nothing but their own comfort and advantage and measure everything by these; no peace in the home because men have forgotten or neglect their duty; the unity and stability of the family undermined; society, in a word, shaken to its foundation and on the way to ruin.

We firmly hope, however, that the Feast of the Kingship of Christ, which in future will be yearly observed, may hasten the return of society to our loving Savior.... [If] the faithful were generally to understand that it behooves them to fight courageously under the banner of Christ their King, then, fired with apostolic zeal, they would strive to win over to their Lord those

hearts that are bitter and estranged from Him and would valiantly defend His rights.

Moreover, the annual and universal celebration of the Kingship of Christ will draw attention to the evils which secularism has brought upon society in drawing men away from Christ and will also do much to remedy them. While nations insult the beloved name of our Redeemer by suppressing all mention of it in their conferences and parliaments, we must all the more loudly proclaim His kingly dignity and power, all the more universally affirm His rights.¹⁰

To these grand articulations of principle corresponded a new movement of practical Christian engagement. Pius XI was the great pope of "Catholic Action," praised by him in his first Encyclical. New specialized forms of this apostolate began in Belgium where in 1924 the Abbé Cardign had received approval of the Young Christian Workers. The movement quickly spread into France and elsewhere and soon received the enthusiastic support of the Pope. As one historian puts it, "The Young Christian Workers were for the generation of the 1930s at once a symbol and a sign. Symbol of a grand hope, the Christian reconquest of the popular masses, the alliance of the Church with the people drawn to communism against the liberal bourgeoisie. Sign of a new method, of the new and twofold strategy on which Emile Poulat has insisted, that moved from works (*oeuvres*) to movements and from the powerful (*notables*) to militants."¹¹ The YCW was paralleled by other apostolic movements that involved students, farmers, sailors, and others in a new apostolate to milieux, an apostolate of "like to like." These movements of popular lay engagement were outwardly directed; they were not simply parish societies designed to protect people from infection by modernity, but apostolic movements engaged in the various circumstances of the modern world in order to save them by winning them back to Christ.

I think it important to stress the sense of identity and purpose that Pius XI's vision inspired and the enthusiasm that the apostolate he encouraged evoked. In part this was a reaction to the largely defensive posture that Pius X had favored, both in thought and in practice. (Benedict XV was almost wholly preoccupied by the Great War.) The *Non possumus* which that Pope imposed in the realm of Italian politics

¹⁰ Encyclical *Quas primas*, in *Social Wellsprings*, 30-46.

¹¹ Y. Tranvouez, "Entre Rome et le peuple (1920-1960)," in *Histoire des catholiques de France du XVe siècle à nos jours* (Paris: Privat, 1980) 464.

might also sum up his response to the efforts to reach some sort of accommodation with modern world, what he labeled "modernism." But the sense of identity and the enthusiasm surely also corresponded to the real needs of the time. Modern society and culture had almost defined themselves by their separation from traditional Christianity. Many Catholics saw in the multiple discrediting of almost all of the assumptions of liberal progress — by the Great War, by the Depression, by the failure of democracy and the rise of totalitarianism — a confirmation both of their judgment on the course of history since the Reformation and of their conviction that the only adequate remedy was to bring western society back to its foundations in Christ. The older ones among us will remember how sodalities and other movements and organizations were inspired by this goal; they even had their own battle-hymn, composed by Daniel Lord: "An Army of Youth."

The Revival of Catholic Thought

Little of all this was evident, however, in the typical textbooks in theology. Apart from an occasional corollary on liberalism or the chapter on Church-State relations, treatises on revelation, on Christology, on redemption, on the Church, on grace, on eschatology reflected very little of the public, historic role which Leo XIII and Pius XI had urged upon Catholics. The textbooks were structured by questions that were asked, it seemed, simply because they had been asked before. Theology was no part of the intellectual worlds that were shaping the course of history. It was what Henri de Lubac called a "separated theology," and theologians were off in their own world, all the more content and confident there because an extrinsic understanding of the relationship between nature and grace had taught them not to look for links between ordinary human experience and the supernatural realm on which they reflected. It was indicative that, in his first important published article, in which he argued that theology and apologetics were intrinsically connected and that theology had to be not only an understanding of the faith but also an understanding of all other things by the faith, de Lubac anticipated objections that he was confusing distinct orders of reality, indulging in naturalism, and replacing divine authority as the motive of faith with intrinsic evidence.¹²

¹² Henri de Lubac, "Apologetics and Theology," in *Theological Fragments* (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1989) 91-104.

There was, of course, also the caution that the anti-modernist repression had imposed on Catholic theologians in the second two decades of the twentieth century. It was only at the beginning of the 1930s that a few of them began to stick their heads out of the bunkers. Two courageous articles attempted to take stock of the modernist crisis. Bruno de Solages, rector of the Catholic Institute in Toulouse, traced the extent of that crisis to the low state of clerical studies in the nineteenth century. He also noted that the suppression of modernism had had a dampening effect on Catholic scholarship and argued that any similar crisis could only be prevented in the future by raising the level of Church education. M.-D. Chenu, master of theology at Le Saulchoir, drew a parallel between the modernist crisis and the crisis at the University of Paris in the thirteenth century. He departed from the canonical demonization of the problem by arguing that it represented a normal crisis of growth, provoked this time by the arrival of historical consciousness, just as the importation of Aristotelian philosophy and Arabic science had provoked a crisis of growth in the thirteenth century.¹³

If such essays were signs that a genuine theological revival was perhaps now possible, the call of Pius XI that Catholics engage themselves in the larger social and cultural context suddenly triggered a veritable explosion of Catholic thought in the late 1920s and throughout the 1930s. I wish to give some illustrations of this dramatic development, of which the theological revival is only a part and without which the achievements of the Second Vatican Council would not be conceivable.

The most important figure in the English-speaking world was Christopher Dawson. From his first published articles in the early 1920s, Dawson had been interested in the sociology of religion and in the relations between religion and culture; in 1922 he published a critique of Spengler's *Decline of the West*. In 1928 his first book appeared, *The Age of the Gods*, a book which Lonergan was later to say "introduced me to the anthropological notion of culture and so began the correction of my hitherto normative or classicist notion."¹⁴ A year later Dawson's *Progress and Religion* initiated a series of books in which he continued to explore the relations between religion and culture and to argue the necessity of recovering, in forms adapted to new

¹³ M.-D. Chenu, "Le sens et les leçons d'une crise religieuse," *La vie intellectuelle* (10 Dec. 1931) 356-80.

¹⁴ Lonergan, "Insight Revisited," *A Second Collection*, 264.

conditions, the Christian culture which had inspired the formation of Christendom. In 1930 he began to edit *Essays in Order*, a series of works, many of them translations of books by European Catholics, that addressed the larger social and cultural crisis.

Perhaps the most important European figure was Jacques Maritain. Maritain's conversion to the Catholic Church had been mediated by a French Dominican of intransigent theological and political views and a sympathizer of Maurras' *Action française*. Two early works of Maritain, *Antimoderne* (1922) and *Trois Reformateurs* (1925), reflect these influences. But when, in 1926, Pius XI condemned the integral nationalism of Maurras' movement, Maritain submitted; in fact he wrote several pieces to defend the papal action. One of them, *Primauté du spirituel*, began a series of new reflections on the relation between Christianity and culture that were to reveal him increasingly open or at least less indiscriminate in his criticisms. He too began to explore the relations between Christianity and progress and to argue the Christian origins of some modern movements, such as democracy. By 1935 he was able to present a sustained argument that Christendom could take many different forms and that under the new historical ideal of pluralistic and democratic society, it would take a "profane" form, bringing the light and grace of Christ to the world not through political structures but through the conscience and commitments of Christians. The ideal of Christendom remained powerful, but it was now a "new" Christendom that was to be sought.

But Maritain's proposal, while perhaps the most famous, was by no means the only one Catholic effort to think grandly about Christian responses to the contemporary challenge. Emmanuel Mounier's personalism inspired the foundation of the journal *Esprit* in the early 1930s. Etienne Gilson published a small book entitled *Pour un ordre catholique* in 1934 and in 1939 wrote an article that was still inspiring seminarians twenty years later, "The Intelligence in the Service of Christ the King."¹⁵ Under a pseudonym Marrou published a work entitled *Fondements d'une culture chrétienne* (1934), while Eugène Masure offered *L'humanisme chrétien* (1937) and de Solages, after co-authoring *Le christianisme dans la vie publique* (1938), published, on the eve of World War II, *Pour rebâtir une chrétienté* (1939). There were differences in the approaches and proposals of these various works, but they were at one in the conviction that the Church was the bearer of a

¹⁵ E. Gilson, *Christianity and Philosophy* (New York: Sheed & Ward, 1939) 103-25.

message and grace that were absolutely necessary for the redemption of society and culture from the crisis in which it stood.

Three other figures must also be mentioned, not least of all because of the influence they were to have on the theological revival. M.-D. Chenu, a formidable Thomist scholar in his own right, had turned down an invitation to become an assistant to his doctoral mentor, Garrigou-Lagrange, and returned to Le Saulchoir. There he founded a center for Thomist studies that differed from all others at the time by its commitment to what would become known as the *Annales* school of historiography. Aquinas would be studied with all philological and exegetical rigor, but as a participant, not in a history of disembodied ideas, but in a historical, social and cultural encounter that for Chenu was paradigmatic. The intellectual courage of Aquinas and the evangelical creativity of the mendicant orders became models of what the Church most needed to display in the face of twentieth-century challenges. Chenu saw in the Young Christian Workers movement a contemporary example of the Church's ability to adapt itself to new exigencies, and from the middle of the 1930s he began to propose a notion of theology which, with complete theological strictness, recognized the Church's life in the world as a *locus theologicus*.¹⁶ Echoing Maritain, he entitled one of the earliest of these essays, "Dimension nouvelle de la chrétienté" (1937) and in it argued for the need for the Church to become incarnate in milieux from which it had too long been absent, particularly the world of the workers.¹⁷

Chenu's student and colleague, Yves Congar, also reflected these interests and commitments. In 1935 he published a theological commentary on a survey conducted in *La vie intellectuelle* on the reasons for unbelief in contemporary France. Congar offered as an explanation that over the last three centuries a modern world had emerged in independence from and even in opposition to the world of the Church. The embodiment in society and culture (Christendom) that the Gospel naturally produces was now lacking to great numbers of contemporaries. And faith would not become a genuine possibility for them unless and until a new incarnation of the Church had been effected.¹⁸

¹⁶ M.D. Chenu, "Position de la théologie," *RSPT* 2 (1935) 232-57; *Une école de théologie: Le Saulchoir* (1937). Paris: du Cerf, 1985.

¹⁷ M.-D. Chenu, "Dimension nouvelle de la Chrétienté," *La vie intellectuelle* 17 (1940) 133-46.

¹⁸ Yves Congar, "Une Conclusion théologique à l'Enquête sur les raisons actuelles de l'incroyance," *La vie intellectuelle* 37 (July, 1935) 214-49.

Finally, in the mid-1930s Henri de Lubac began to publish the articles that in 1938, under Congar's urging, would appear as his book *Catholicisme: Les aspects sociaux du dogme*. The volume was a sustained argument that the central Christian dogmas of sin and redemption, of Christology and ecclesiology, of sacraments and eschatology, should not be reduced to the confines of isolated individuals, but that they provided a vision which illumined both the depth of the person and the breadth of the human community. It was a betrayal of the integration that defines Catholicism to restrict it to a private, interior sphere: the central dogmas had social implications. Two years later, de Lubac's *Corpus mysticum* would take its honored place in a the abundant literature which for some twenty years had restored a sense of the organic nature of the Church.

The 1930s were an exciting decade in the Catholic Church, the break-through decade in the history of Catholic thought in this century. By the end of the decade almost all of the movements to which the achievements of Vatican II are often traced were already underway: the biblical renewal, the liturgical revival, historical studies, especially in the Fathers and in medieval thought, the ecumenical movement, the rise of the laity, the rethinking of Church-world relations, etc. It is important to note that many, if not all, of these were interrelated; people passionately interested in one tended to be interested in the others. For example, the liturgical movement, which since the Council is often associated chiefly with internal Church renewal, was considered to be an essential part of the movement for the redemption of society and culture. In other words, the movements that were to revitalize the Church aimed also to address the general context in which the Church was to accomplish its purpose. It was not an introverted Church that was at the center of preoccupations, but a Church that needed to be renewed and reformed precisely in order effectively to bring its unique contribution to the common historical project.

This is all a larger context in which to place the early essays of Lonergan on history. Its pertinence is reflected in an argument found in the Epilogue to *Insight*:

[While] the Scriptural, patristic, and dogmatic materials for a treatise on the Mystical Body have been assembled, I would incline to the opinion that its formal element remains incomplete as long as it fails to draw upon a theory of history. It was at the fullness of time that there came into the world the Light

of the world. It was the advent not only of the light that directs but also of the grace that gives good will and good performance. If its principal function was to carry the seeds of eternal life, still it could not bear its fruits without effecting a transfiguration of human living and, in turn, that transfiguration contains the solution not only to man's individual but also to his social problem of evil. So it is that the Pauline thesis of moral impotence of Jew and Gentile alike was due to be complemented by the Augustinian analysis of history in terms of the city of God and the city of this world. So it is that the profound and penetrating influence of liberal, Hegelian, Marxist, and romantic theories of history have been met by a firmer affirmation of the organic structure and functions of the Church, by a long series of social encyclicals, by calls to Catholic action, by a fuller advertence to collective responsibility, and by a deep and widespread interest in the doctrine of the Mystical Body. So too it may be that the contemporary crisis of human living and human values demands of the theologian, in addition to treatises on the unique and to treatises on the universal common to many instances, a treatise on the concrete universal that is mankind in the concrete and cumulative consequences of the acceptance or rejection of the message of the Gospel. And as the remote possibility of thought on the concrete universal lies in the insight that grasps the intelligible in the sensible, so its proximate possibility resides in a theory of development that can envisage not only natural and intelligent progress but also sinful decline, and not only progress and decline but also supernatural recovery.¹⁹

Nearly every theme we have seen emerge in the movements of Catholic thought and practice in the 1930s are reflected in these lines, but it took the discovery of the file on History to show how long Lonergan had been thinking about this issue and how his first efforts were influenced by that milieu. In the still unpublished paper, "Philosophy of History," there is a section that removes all doubt. Addressing "the antimony between a merely traditional mentality and a mentality that is thinking in terms of the future and of problems of which the mere traditionalist has not the ghost of a notion," Lonergan criticized a merely reactionary attitude on the part of Catholics:

You can protect the good either by simply sitting back or by advancing with the good; but to advance with the good you have

¹⁹ Bernard Lonergan, *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding* (New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1958) 742-43.

to have a theory of progress and a will to progress; these were lacking. Thus it is in the theory of social order, in the re-establishment of all things in Christ, in the leadership of Christ, King of the historical process, Prime Mover of the new order, that Pope Pius XI has laid the foundations for a triumph over an old, inevitable, and regrettable antimony. For it is only in the philosophy of the church that can be attained the realisation of that conception which Plato could not realise. It was true when Plato penned his Republic but it is even more manifestly true today that "Men and cities can not have happiness unless philosophers are kings." To the world in its present plight of economic distress and political insecurity the Church offers not philosophers but philosophy, nay, *hê hagia Sophia*, the Word made flesh, Truth consubstantial with the Father and the Spirit, as eternal King, as ruler of the historic process now that history has entered on its final stage of realising abstract ideas.

The same context is also apparent in his essay on the restoration of all things in Christ:

In the first place, any reflection of modern history and its consequent 'Crisis in the West'²⁰ reveals unmistakably the necessity of a *Summa Sociologica*. A metaphysic of history is not only imperative for the church to meet the attack of the Marxian materialist conception of history and its realization in apostolic Bolshevism: it is imperative if man is to solve the modern politico-economic entanglement, if political and economic forces are to be subjected to the rule of reason, if cultural values and all the achievement of the past are to be saved both from the onslaughts of purblind statesmen and from the perfidious diplomacy of the merely destructive power of communism. But to establish the intellectual unity of men by appealing to reason is impossible; men refuse to be reasonable enough to take the League of Nations seriously, and that is too elementary a notion

²⁰ The editors confess ignorance of Lonergan's reference here; it would seem to be to an essay, "Crisis in the West," by Peter Wust, a German Catholic philosopher (1884-1940), which appeared in *Essays in Order*, 95-152. Wust was a friend of Jacques Maritain, who reports on a conversation between Wust, Berdaiev and himself in the late 1920s: "We wondered how to reconcile two apparently contradictory facts: that modern history seems to be entering, in Berdaiev's words, a *new Middle Ages* where the unity and universality of Christian culture will be rediscovered and this time extended to the whole world, and that the general movement of civilization seems to be dragging it towards the universalism of the Antichrist and of his iron rod rather than towards the universalism of Christ and of his liberating law and to be forbidding in any case the hope that the world will be unified in a universal Christian 'empire'"; *Oeuvres complètes*, IV (Paris: Ed. Saint-Paul, 1983) 91.

to be called a metaphysic. The only possible unity of man is dogma: the dogma of communism unites by terrorism to destroy; the dogma of race unites to protect, but it is meaningless as a principle of advance, and it is impotent as a principle of human unity; in plain language, it is not big enough an idea to meet the problem; it is a nostrum that increases the malady. There remains only the dogma of Christ. We have here the significance of Pope Pius XI's proclamation of Christ as King, King as the rallying point for all men of good will, King of the historic process. We have here the significance of Pope Pius XI's proclamation of Catholic Action, for Catholics are the leaven that leaveneth the whole mass. Finally, we have here the significance of Pope Pius XI's command that 'all candidates for the sacred priesthood must be adequately prepared ... by intense study of social matters.' This command has not yet been put into effect, nor can it be till there is a *Summa sociologica*: without that we would only flounder in the blundering and false science that created the problem.²¹

A few other indications that place elements of Lonergan's early thought in a larger context. He shared with most of the Catholic thinkers of the time the genealogy of evil that had brought about the contemporary crisis, as in this anticipation of his idea of "successive lower viewpoints":

The unity of human nature and operation — a unity that unfolds through a material to an intelligible plurality — is the connatural instrument for a victory over sin: for in this one nature and operation sin is not an isolated and instantaneous emergence of evil; it dilutes itself in time and spreads out into a reign of sin till sin culminates in monstrosity and topples over from its own enormity. Thus the antimony of church and state, in modern times, through the dialectic of sin, became first the heresies, then the liberal states, and finally Bolshevik Russia where sin in its pure form is organized by error, rules by terrorism, and attains security by the perversion of youth: the Bolshevik is ridiculous in his premise that man is merely an animal, but he is terrible in his power to make man merely an animal; and, if you blame the Bolshevik, you are blind: for Bolshevism is the social consequent of liberalism, and liberalism is the social consequent of heresy, and heresy in the social consequent of the opposition of church and state, and the opposition of church and state is inevitable as long as men are

²¹ "Lonergan's *Pantôn Anakephalaiôsis*," *Method* 9:2 (Oct. 1991) 156-57.

children of Adam — a predication that neither churchman nor statesman can avoid.²²

Lonergan also shared with most other Catholic thinkers in an unrelenting critique of liberalism. He understood it to be “the effective negation of the control of reason as right reason.” As such, it tended to collapse either into what Lonergan called “modernism,” the identification of knowledge with positive science, or into Bolshevism, which substitutes power for theory. Liberal modernism has nothing to offer of its own; it is a pawn between Bolshevism and Catholicism, and can rely only on unintelligible principle of national sovereignty — Lonergan here echoing the vigorous suspicion of nationalism of Pius XI and of some, but by no means all, Catholics.

Finally, Lonergan also shared the view that only in Christianity could an answer be found for the modern social crisis:

‘Without me you can do nothing.’ This is true not only of the supernatural order of attaining the beatific vision. It is equally true of the social order; all things must be restored in Christ or there can be no restoration.... Man can choose only between the service of reason and of passion, only between the service of God or of sin, only between the kingdom of Christ and the kingdom of Satan.²³

In fact, one could argue that the purpose of these early essays was to show how and why this was true, to outline a metaphysics of human history and of human solidarity that would explain the need for a new head of humanity and the operations of his causality upon history.

The editors of Lonergan’s early essays have attempted to identify references left unspecified in the typescripts. I have one or two notes that may be of help. The first is the origin of the German word *Zersplitterung*, used several times by Lonergan, with atomisation as an English translation. I have not located a use of the German term, but simply point out that the idea of the shattering by sin of the original divinely created unity of the human race and of Christ’s reintegrating work is a central theme in the early chapters of de Lubac’s *Catholicisme*. It appears that this section was first published in articles that

²² “Lonergan’s *Pantôn Anakephalaiôsis*,” 161-62. See also “*Pantôn anakephalaiôsis*,” 145: “...the theory of liberalism is a consequent of the sixteenth-century heresy with the consequent religious wars while the theory of communism is a consequent of the pharisaical religiosity of capitalist exploitation and oppression.”

²³ “Lonergan’s *Pantôn Anakephalaiôsis*,” 159-60.

appeared in April and May 1936 and shortly afterward as a pamphlet. It is possible, then, that Lonergan was familiar with it. On the other hand, as de Lubac's pages reveal, the idea was quite traditional.

Perhaps more important is a lead provided by Lonergan's referring in "*Pantôn anakephalaiôsis*" to a work entitled "Crisis in the West." As noted above, this appears to be a reference to an essay by Peter Wust, a German Catholic philosopher, that was published as the second of the *Essays in Order* edited by Christopher Dawson. Wust was the author of several works, among them *Die Auferstehung der Metaphysik*, *Die Ruckkehr aus dem Exil* (on the Catholic revival in Germany), and *Die Dialektik des Geistes*. Elements of the argument of the last of these appear in Wust's essay, and they lead one to ask whether Wust's own project might not have had some influence on Lonergan.

For example, the second part of Wust's major book offers what he himself calls "a metaphysics of history," in which the metaphysical unity of the human race plays a major role, the idea of objective *Geist* as embodiment of acts of meaning is developed, a distinction between the ideal case and the factual development of humanity is argued, and the co-dependence of human beings plays a central role. On the last point, Wust makes much of the community of spirit among them. For Wust, as summarized in E.I. Watkin's introduction:

This community, "*nexus animarum*," is constituted by three factors. There is a "*commercium spirituale*," or "intellectual intercourse," mediated by a common world of expression and significance, mankind united by common languages and art-forms, by a common logic and corpus of sciences; in general, by mutual understanding, its methods and its instruments. There is a "*motio physica*," a nexus of physical inter-relationship — men share a common physical environment which makes them physically dependent one on another. And there is a "*motio metaphysica*" or inter-relationship of wills. No man can achieve any purpose whatsoever by himself. The volitions of other men, either in present actuality or in their effects, condition mine. For in these three forms this bond of souls embraces time as well as space, binding one generation with another as well as the members of each generation among themselves. In virtue of this triply-constituted communion of spirits, the free choices of the individual become for good or evil the objective destiny of his fellows. After his death not only do the effects of his choices remain, but insofar as they are incorporated in objective works — institutions, writings, works of art, speculative systems, etc. — they

constitute an "objective spirit or mind," which, when brought into contact with the living intelligence and will of others, lives again for them as a force influencing for good or evil their own deeds and achievements."²⁴

This idea of the community of spirits that constitute the human race enter into Wust's idea of redemption in ways that are startlingly similar to Lonergan's. Let me simply quote a central section that follows a reference to acknowledgments, even in pagan antiquity, of the dark and evil side of human nature:

Now, when the decline of the earliest type of Western civilised humanity set in, or to all intents and purposes had become an accomplished fact, there suddenly occurred in the very midst of this decadence the most astounding miracle of all time — the appearance of the *homo perfectus*, the *homo absolutus*, the spiritual progenitor (*Stammvater*) of humanity. Halfway through the decline of classical civilisation that event took place, which, seen with the eyes of faith, must be regarded as the most revolutionary occurrence in the entire history of the world.

We are to-day, one and all, too apt to forget the fact that history, in its deepest sense, does not consist merely of secular happenings, but that it is always at the same time a sacred process, a spiritual happening. For it is only on the surface that history is a *motio physica* of wars, battles, national disorders, political catastrophes, and so on. Below, in the depths that are accessible to the mind alone, it is a truly majestic *motio metaphysica voluntatis*, a passionately stirring will-drama of the spirit. And, if this is so, then the really decisive factor in this will-drama will be that tremendous tension which continually exists in one form or another between the whole organism of wills that is the human race and the absolute will of God.

Now we learn from revelation that in the dimness of remote antiquity human history began with just such a grave tension, revealing precisely that dialectic movement which we experience today. As a result of the first transgression, the spirit of discord suddenly precipitated itself into the head of the human organism. At the same time a tremendous upheaval of the human organism as a whole occurred, which effected a sweeping change

²⁴ *Essays in Order*, 80-81. Compare "Lonergan's 'Analytic Concept of History,'" *Method* 11: (1993) 12: "We make ourselves out of our environment: the physical environment that makes the geographical differentiations of men and manners and customs; the social environment of the family and education, the race and tradition, the state and law."

in the aboriginally clear and straightforward relation between God and man. As a result, a greater atonement became necessary, an *anakephalaiosis* or reintegration of the race under a new head, that the disharmony arising out of the first fault might be removed.

The most truly epoch-making occurrence of that sacred history which is wrought in the depths of the human spirit, the action that was to bring this state of tension to an end, took place in the midst of time. It was Christ's act of redemption. Since, however, we have lost our understanding of the metaphysics of history, this fact of redemption — in reality of central historical importance — will scarcely appear to us as historical. At first, of course, in the actual moment of its accomplishment, this spiritual and sacred event was recognised in an act of faith by but a few people. Yet this handful immediately began to diffuse such a glow of faith that, as if by a single great miracle, henceforth continually operative, the sun of Christianity rose out of the dark night of paganism, and an entirely fresh chapter of history was begun....

Christian self-knowledge meant the discovery for the first time of the complete extent of man's metaphysical structure, and of the entire actual and potential range of his history.²⁵

The idea of Christ's redemption introducing a new organic community of wills is central in Lonergan's early essays, and it rests on a metaphysics, which, if more dependent on Aquinas than Wust's seems to have been, contrasts Adam's historical causality and Christ's in terms of pre-motions and of the solidarity of human beings. This leads me to suggest that perhaps *anakephalaiōsis* should not simply be translated as 'restoration,' but at least as 'recapitulation,' or by a paraphrase to indicate that it means that humanity has now been given a new head, a new originating principle.

I offer these comparisons in the hope that someone might be able to follow them up, both by a consultation of Lonergan's papers to see whether there is any other evidence that he knew Wust's work and also by a closer reading of Wust's metaphysical dialectics of history to see whether there are any other points of similarity.

²⁵ Wust, "Crisis in the West," 101-104. In the last pages of *Die Dialektik des Geistes*, a similar reference to the *anakephalaiōsis* appears, "*eine vollkommene Neu-Behauptung der menschlichen Gattung*," in virtue of which Christ is "*die sichtbare Achse der Weltgeschichte*;" *Die Dialektik des Geistes* (Gesammelte Werke, III/2; Münster: Regensburg, 1964) 387-88.

I have not included in this paper a discussion of the particular ways in which Lonergan pursued his sketch of a theology of history, which is where his originality lies. Like Wust, he attempted to provide a metaphysical basis, elaborated through several dialectics, for the historical redemptive significance of Christ; but his approach seems to have been more Thomist than Wust's Augustinian approach. It is significant, however, that Lonergan even made the effort, because the generality of Catholic thinkers who tried to think out the implications of Pius XI's teaching about the Kingship of Christ or to provide a theory for the practical redemptive efforts of Catholic Action were often content to argue on the level of dogmatic assertion. Lonergan's effort, before he sat down to a close study of Aquinas, already shows the concern to give concrete substance to the dogmatic assertions.

On the other hand, by comparison with his later work, these early essays are clearly works of Lonergan's youth. The epistemological basis on which he builds differs from that of the full-blown theory of *Insight*. And the argument is constructed primarily by way of metaphysics; it would only be much later that Lonergan would come to recognize something which perhaps is already present in Wust, the need for the transposition of the question into terms of interiority and of the worlds constituted and mediated by meaning and value.

Historicity and Eternity: Bernard Lonergan's Transpositions and Differentiations

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INTRODUCTION

"St. Augustine says: *Make man your way and you shall arrive at God*. It is better to limp along the way than stride along off the way. For a man who limps along the way, even if he only makes slow progress, comes to the end of the way; but one who is off the way, the more quickly he runs, the further away is he from his goal."

St. Thomas Aquinas on John 14,2

GREAT HUMAN GENIUS certainly challenges. To study any genius is to be 'mentally challenged' — and this certainly applies to the theological legacy of Bernard Lonergan.¹ How much more mentally challenged are we by Divine Infinite Intelligence. Thomas Aquinas returned to the metaphor of limping: theologians are constitutionally 'limpers' — for they seek to contemplate Divine Mysteries. They are like Jacob wrestling with the angel. All through the night they wrestle, and at daybreak Jacob limps away, just so, a theologian dedicated to the contemplation of God can only limp from the encounter with the Triune Mystery.²

Among the many legacies of Bernard Lonergan, certainly his commitment to Christ and the responsible way he followed his vocation to theology as a human, Jesuit, and Catholic intellectual genius. From my earliest correspondence with Fr. Lonergan at the Trappist monastery in Georgia, and my first conversation with him in Rome in

¹ This essay is excerpted from a larger study on the challenge of doing Catholic theology.

² Cf. *Summa Theologiae* II-II, 180, 7 ad 4.

September 1964, what impressed me most was how profoundly he united in his own horizon intelligence, faith, and prayer. His life was a testament to the profound truth that in faith and worship and prayer we human beings attain the highest wisdom and goodness capable of fulfilling our intelligent and rational natures.

There is an enormous challenge to do Catholic theology genuinely. Indeed, it was this challenge that motivates the best work in theology. For an abiding theological and political problem (understanding 'political' in the classic sense) of our time is the dialectic between Catholicism and modernism/liberalism. Postmodern explorations are hardly departures from the concern for contingency and historicity which mark modernity broadly conceived. Indeed, overshadowed as the postmoderns are by Nietzsche, one might call them ultra-modernists.³

The first section will analyze Lonergan's work of transposition, and how it provided him with an understanding of historicity. The second section will study some of the central differentiations required for doing Catholic theology up to the level of our time, in the course of which I shall indicate the importance of an explanatory, non-imaginative understanding of God's eternal presence.

1. TRANSPOSITIONS AND HISTORICITY

The challenges facing Catholic theology are many indeed, but few rival those posted by a liberal culture that is marked by both naturalism and historicism, the offspring of nominalism. One of the consequences of modern liberalism has been a rather wholesale rejection of Catholic traditions and a way of reconstructing that tradition which makes it appear as anything but intellectually challenging.

³ Cf. Fred Lawrence "The Fragility of Consciousness: Lonergan and the Postmodern Concern for the Other" *Theological Studies* 54/1 (March 1993) 55-94. On postmoderns as ultra-modernists, cf. Matthew Lamb "Communicative Praxis and Theology" in Don Browning & Francis S. Fiorenza (eds.) *Habermas and Theology* (New York: Crossroads, 1992) 90-124.

1.1 The Problematic & Lonergan's Blunt Challenge:

If Catholicism before Vatican II seemed to be under the spell of 'restoration' and anti-modernism, after the Council it seemed to capitulate very quickly to a liberal 'assimilation.' Studies indicate how not only Church authorities, but also the participants in the modernist movement itself, did not grasp the nature of the changes occurring in the contest between Catholicism and modernism.⁴ Indeed, with the demise of Communism as a world movement, old and new questions are raised regarding the relations between Catholicism and liberalism, especially in America.⁵

The political theology of Johann Baptist Metz aimed, in part, at providing a more differentiated analysis and dialectic to discern how Catholicism could not surrender to the privatization of faith so typical of the modern world. Neither Restoration nor Liberalism are adequate responses by the Church to modernity.⁶ Among contemporary theologians and historians, however, few make the strong claim issued by Fr. Lonergan regarding the resistance of church authorities to modern changes.

These changes have, in general, been resisted by churchmen for two reasons. The first reason commonly has been that churchmen had no real apprehension of the nature of these changes. The second reason has been that these changes

⁴ Cf. David G. Schultenover *A View from Rome: On the Eve of the Modernist Crisis* (New York: Fordham University Press, 1993); Gene Burns *The Frontiers of Catholicism: The Politics of Ideology in a Liberal World* (Berkeley: California University Press, 1992); R. Scott Appleby, *Church and Age Unite! The Modernist Impulse in American Catholicism* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992).

⁵ Cf. the ongoing debates between David Schindler, editor of the American edition of *Communio*, American neo-conservatives. Mark Lowery, "The Schindler/Weigel Debate: An appraisal" in *Communio* Fall 1991 425-472 with responses by Schindler and Weigel. Also David Schindler "The Church's 'worldly' mission: Neoconservatism and American culture." *ibid.* 365-397; Michael Novak "Schindler's conversion: The Catholic right accepts pluralism" *Communio* Spring 1992 pp. 145-178 with a response by David Schindler.

⁶ Cf. Matthew Lamb "Politische Theologie jenseits von Restauration und Liberalismus" in E. Schillebeeckx (ed.) *Mystik und Politik: Theologie im Ringen um Geschichte und Gesellschaft* (Mainz: Grunewald, 1988) 95-105.

commonly have been accompanied by a lack of intellectual conversion and so were hostile to Christianity.⁷

This is quite a challenging statement regarding, not only the modernist crisis, but the entire problematic of Catholicism and modernity in, as Lonergan states, the series of fundamental changes which have occurred over the last four and a half centuries. The first reason he gives seems to correspond to widely accepted analyses of the challenge of modernity. Echoing Newman's categories, Lonergan writes that churchmen had "no real apprehension of the nature of these changes." A real apprehension would have required, not only a practiced familiarity with modern human self-understanding, modern science, modern historical criticism, and modern philosophy. It would have also have required attention to the second reason Lonergan gives.

This second reason contradicts most of the presuppositions of the modern and postmodern age regarding Christianity and Catholicism. Intellectual conversion is the discovery and appropriation of the related and recurrent operations of human intelligence in act. Because the profound changes in modern self-understanding, modern science, modern historiography, and modern philosophy were accompanied by a 'lack of intellectual conversion,' that is, because those advancing these changes lacked the full self-knowledge that only comes with the mind knowing itself, so the changes they introduced were hostile to Christianity. How could one more drastically turn the tables on modern secularism and agnosticism. Intelligence in act is not hostile to Christianity. The diminishment of Christian faith, far from freeing human intelligence for ever more full and wise use, is a diminishment of that intelligence and reason. The Enlightenment was not as enlightened as it pretended.

Such a challenging claim puts enormous responsibility upon theologians. If modern changes were hostile to Christianity because they were accompanied by a lack of intellectual conversion, then it is understandable that such a conversion is a *sine qua non* of doing theology up to the demands of our time. The issue, as with any real apprehension and assent, can be met neither by common sense strategies nor by the most coherent and comprehensive theories, though both of these are elements.

⁷ Bernard Lonergan *Method in Theology* (New York: Herder & Herder, 1972) 317.

The issue facing theology in our time, and the rather massive legacy of Lonergan, begins with the need for an intellectual apostolate that cuts no corners. We cannot ride cultural waves that do not measure up to the demands of intellectual conversion. Opinion surfing to catch the newest wave of cultural enthusiasm or skepticism only contributes to decline. Since intellectual conversion is "normally the fruit of both religious and moral conversion"⁸ attention to the intellectuality of both our moral and our religious transformations becomes rather integral to the task before us. As Fr. Fred Crowe remarks in *The Lonergan Enterprise*:

With this kind of thinking we enter the area where Lonergan's work will make its most powerful, not to say brutal, impact, once we grasp its significance or, perhaps, stop dodging its challenge.⁹

Fr. Crowe goes on to pose a blunt challenge of his own. Are we theologians prepared to answer honestly the question "Is my own theology the reflection or rationalization of my life choices?" Do Søren Kierkegaard and St. Augustine 'haunt' our minds and hearts, so that an

"Augustinian confession of what we have been, of the past that has made us what we are" is "required as an integral part of theology when we enter upon the tasks of dialectic and foundations? Maybe by now," Fr. Crowe writes, "you will agree that the impact of Lonergan's method, as I see it, will be brutal indeed."¹⁰

There is simply no substitute for authentic theologians, and authenticity is ever a slow and arduous withdrawal from inauthenticity.

Thanks to the Missions of the Son and Spirit, we theologians living at the end of the twentieth century are graced with both a Church which, no matter how much in need of repentance, the Spirit guides infallibly towards the Kingdom of God, and with theologians from two millennia of Catholic traditions who have been genuine in

⁸ Ibid. 267-268.

⁹ Frederick Crowe, *The Lonergan Enterprise* (Cambridge: Cowley, 1980) 90.

¹⁰ Ibid. 90-91.

their intellectual, moral, and religious apostolate. For, while conversion is "intensely personal, it is not purely private," so that it is only within the ongoing process of century and millennia old traditions "that notable developments occur."¹¹ So the tasks of dialectics and foundations are not only exercises in a personal examination of conscience and consciousness, they are also challenges to ascend ourselves to the high achievements that constitute the legacy of all the notable developments in theology.

It seems to me that it was precisely in this latter task that the theological legacy of Fr. Lonergan is so challenging. God only knows when his genial discovery of doing theology as a process of functional specialization will be implemented in theology and religious studies faculties. That its implementation is to be desired in Catholic faculties is evident, I believe, as we begin to appreciate the tensions which have developed since Vatican II. It has been pointed out how the Council was the fruit of two very different orientations in the decades leading up to its convocation. On the one hand, there was the importance of *ressourcement* aimed at recovering the vast religious and theological riches of the past. On the other hand, there was the call of John XXIII for *aggiornamento*, for the Council to bring this tradition up to date. From the perspective of modern philosophies, this twofold orientation is something of a contradiction in terms. Fr. Crowe has called our attention to what he terms 'the Janus Problematic' as the Church moves from a past-oriented to a future-oriented culture.¹²

From the Enlightenment on all modernizing, all bringing up to date, involved a rejection of the ancients, of what the past had bequeathed us, especially the Roman Catholic Church. Voltaire's comment on Catholicism — *écraser l'infame* ('crush the infamous thing') — became a widely shared sentiment. So what is the Church now doing? This bastion against the 'up-daters,' the modernists, is now embarking upon a double orientation which seems to cry out for a Kierkegaardian either/or. Can we Catholics really have it both ways? Can we dedicate ourselves to *ressourcement* and to *aggiornamento* without suffering schizophrenia? Is not this precisely the root of the

¹¹ Lonergan, *Method in theology* p. 269.

¹² Read the three essays dealing with past and future, as well as the Janus problematic in Michael Vertin (ed.) *Frederick Crowe: Appropriating the Lonergan Idea* (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1989) pp. 252-296).

dichotomy if not schism between conservatives and liberals within Catholicism? A dichotomy that is all too obvious in the newspapers, journals, societies, and departments dealing with Catholic matters.

To go to the root of the conflict is to call for conversion, and Lonergan indicated how the two phases of functional specialization are capable of bringing both orientations into cooperative collaboration. The mediating and mediated phases offer a dynamic unity for any science or discipline which draws upon the past (*ressourcement*) to enlighten and guide the future (*aggiornamento*).¹³ For Lonergan, there could be no ultimate or basic antimony between past and present, for him there was no either/or here, only a very Catholic both/and. So he would write of "Tradition and Innovation."¹⁴ The Leonine program *vetera novis augere et perficere* was neither a merely tactical move nor a superficial aside in Lonergan's legacy. Liberals often speak of the 'burden' of the past and tradition; yet Lonergan called attention to the empowering presence of the past. Conservatives often speak of the dangers lurking in the present as it moves toward the future; yet Lonergan attended to the promise of the present. In the by now oft quoted passage, it is neither the solid right nor the scattered left, but the not too numerous center which will work out the transpositions from past to the present in careful and critical manners.

1.2 Transpositions¹⁵

The basis of Lonergan's entire legacy is the invitation to rational self-appropriation. And it is within the context of this shift toward interiority that Lonergan explicates his notion of 'transposition.' In a 1979 lecture entitled "Horizons and Transpositions" he situated the notion within the context of the horizon analysis:

Now a change of horizon takes us out of the field of deductive logic. As long as one is simply logical, one remains within the

¹³ Ibid. pp. 136-145. Also his "Method in Catholic Theology" in *Method: A Journal of Lonergan Studies* 10:1 (Spring 1992) 1-26. Frederick Crowe *Old Things and New: A Strategy for Education* (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1985).

¹⁴ B. Lonergan "Aquinas Today: Tradition and Innovation" in Frederick Crowe (ed.) *Third Collection* (New York: Paulist, 1985) 35-54.

¹⁵ I am grateful to Mark Morelli for providing, through Fr. Fred Crowe, an initial index of the notion of transposition in the works of Lonergan.

same horizon. As soon as one changes one's horizon, one begins to operate in virtue of a minor or major change in one's basic assumptions. Such a change may be just a jump but also it may be a genuine transposition, a restatement of an earlier position in a new and broader context.¹⁶

If a genuine transposition is the restatement of an earlier position in a new context, how are we to differentiate between genuine and inauthentic transpositions?

Finally, be it observed that as a change of horizon cannot be demonstrated from a previous horizon, so the genuineness of transpositions cannot be a simple logical conclusion. What is basic is authenticity. It is a summit towards which one may strive and, only through such striving, may one come to some imperfect participation of what Augustine and Aquinas named Uncreated Light.¹⁷

He defines genuine transpositions by doing one. Indeed, it is my opinion that this is one of the most defining transpositions of Bernard Lonergan's entire intellectual and spiritual life. In *Method in Theology* he wrote of achieving authenticity in self-transcendence, and how the religious effort toward authenticity is an apostolate constituted by prayer, penance, and a religious love of all shown in good deeds.¹⁸ Indeed, it is not conversion itself that is the ultimate criterion in Lonergan's foundations. For conversions themselves may be either authentic or inauthentic.¹⁹ In the above quotation he defines authenticity as a transposition of the Augustine's and Aquinas's understanding, which was deeply affirmed in the Patristic and Scholastic traditions, that summit of our human soul wherein we experience our intelligent consciousness is a created participation in Uncreated Light.

Transposition is rendering explicit, in a fuller context, what was latent but operative in another context. In *Insight* transposition involves attentiveness to the pure and unrestricted desire to know, and so is the shift from latent, through problematic to explicit metaphysics.

¹⁶ B. Lonergan "Horizons and Transpositions" 1979 (unpublished manuscript) 1.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ *Method in theology* 104, 119.

¹⁹ Ibid. 131-132.

Lonergan sees his whole effort to develop a philosophy of philosophies as a transposition.²⁰ Just as no one would be so foolish as to claim that only with Lonergan did human beings begin to experience, understand, judge, decide, love, so it would be equally foolish to imagine that interiority, or the pure and unrestricted desire to know, began only with Lonergan.

Indeed, I would be prepared to argue that the work of Lonergan as a whole, especially in theology, was primarily a labor of transposition. Rational self-appropriation is a transposition of the ancient call to a self-knowledge of the soul.²¹ The pure and unrestricted desire to know is a transposition of both Augustine's *illuminatio divina* and Aquinas's more systematic *lumen intellectus agentis* which is, as Aquinas realized, *quaedam participatio luminis divinae*.²² What Lonergan did, in his reaching up to the mind of Aquinas, was to uncover the synthesis Aquinas made of Aristotle's light of agent intellect and Augustine's appeals to knowing the truth through the divine light. Moreover, his notion of time as a psychological present owes much to a transposition of Augustine's meditations on time.

²⁰ *Insight* 415-416, 713.

²¹ Cf. *Insight* xx-xxiii: "For the present enterprise is concerned to unravel an ambiguity and to eliminate an ambivalence. St. Augustine of Hippo narrates that it took him years to make the discovery that the name, real, might have a different connotation from the name, body. Or, to bring the point nearer home, one might say that the objects of its inquiry need not be imaginable entities moving through imaginable processes in an imaginable space-time. The fact a Plato attempted to communicate through his dialogues, the fact that an Augustine eventually learnt from the writers whom, rather generally, he refers to as Platonists, has lost its antique flavour and its apparent irrelevance to the modern mind. Even before Einstein and Heisenberg it was clear enough that the world described by scientists was strangely different from the world depicted by artists and inhabited by men of common sense. But it was left to twentieth-century physicists to envisage the possibility that the objects of their science were to be reached only by severing the umbilical cord that tied them to the maternal imagination of men ... [There is a personal psychological problem of discovering just what we actually do when we know] ... The hard fact is that the personal psychological problem cannot be solved by the ordinary procedure of affirming the propositions that are true and denying the propositions that are false, for the true meaning of the true propositions always tends to be misapprehended by a consciousness that has not yet discovered its need of discovering what an Augustine took years and modern science centuries to discover."

²² Cf. Lonergan, *Verbum: Word & Idea in Aquinas* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1967) 72-74 and references given there.

The validity of these transpositions depends upon more than a marshalling of the relevant texts. It will do no good to imagine that these transpositions are some esoteric abstraction with no reference to the real world. Quite the contrary. Anyone who wants to know the truth of these texts must move from a knowledge of the texts to a knowledge of what the texts signify. The light of agent intellect is transposed into the pure and unrestricted desire to know; we can begin to identify this deepest of all desires in the unlimited range of human questions. For every question we answer generates more questions. We — and this 'we' concretely designates the entire human species — will not find full satisfaction of this deepest of all desires until we understand everything about everything. There is, then, a similar reality being signified in very different cultural contexts. That reality is the reality of human intelligence, and its profoundest ground is nothing but pure and unlimited capacity to question. And there is no question that does not anticipate an answer, an intelligibility to be understood. The reality of human intelligence longs for, strives towards, and anticipates with each and every question a summit of pure and unrestricted intelligence. It is this summit of Uncreated Light in which we dimly participate. Every correct insight which occurs is an infinitesimal ascent of that Summit. And, as the early Lonergan remarked, and the later Lonergan reaffirmed, the only fully satisfying context in which to situate the development of human intelligence is the total sweep of human history.²³

1.3 Historicity and Historical Knowledge:

Historicity, as Lonergan uses the term, has at least three elements: (1) empirically it is a massive variable which applies to each and every aspect of human historical existence; (2) formally historicity is the realm of human ontology, the world constituted by meaning and motivated by value; and (3) methodologically it involves not only continuous change, as studied by genetic methods, but also discrete change or 'reversals,' which require, in a way that nature does not, the development of dialectical methods. Historicity evokes the high and

²³ "Lonergan's *Pantôn Anakephalaiôsis*" in *Method: Journal of Lonergan Studies* 9:2 (October 1991) 139-172.

very distant goal of the German Historical School to reconstruct interpretatively all the cultures of the human race as humankind's ongoing self-realization.²⁴

Historicism claims that historicity leaves us only with incommensurable series of conventions, and so without culture transcending norms. Such an historicism, however, only attends to the empirical element in historicity. It holds up historicity as a variable, but does not go on to ask *of what* it is a variable. Historicism limits the empirical to data of sense and, in its misconstrual of nature as conceived by modern naturalism,²⁵ fails to acknowledge the human nature verified in what the ancients called the self-knowledge of the soul, which Lonergan transposes into rational self-appropriation.

What is the *reality* of history? If historical consciousness and critical history are discoveries of modern culture, we moderns are far from having understood adequately just what it is we have discovered. Insofar as historians date events, the use of time as movement is relatively unproblematic. History raises more questions as we explore just what is real history and what is not. The point of Augustine's eleventh book of his *Confessions*, contrary to Paul Ricoeur, is not that measurement runs up against a Neo-Kantian aporia or dilemma, but that measurement is simply unable to ground the reality of time-as-presence:

It is now, however, perfectly clear that neither the future nor the past are in existence, and that it is incorrect to say that there are three times — past, present, and future. Though one might perhaps say: "There are three times — a present of things past, a present of things present, and a present of things future." For these three do exist in the mind, and I do not see them anywhere else: the present time of things past is memory; the present time of things present is attentive reflection; the present time of things future is expectation. If we are allowed to use words in this way, then I see that there are three times and I admit that there are. Let us go further and say: "There are three times — past, present, and future." It is an incorrect use of

²⁴ "Natural Right and Historical Mindedness" in *Third Collection* (New York: Paulist Press, 1985) 169-183.

²⁵ Cf. Ernst Troeltsch *Der Historismus und seine Probleme* (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1922) 102-110; also Hans-Ludwig Ollig, "Perspektiven des Historismusproblems" in Werner Löser, Karl Lehmann, Matthias Lutz-Bachmann (eds.) *Dogmengeschichte und katholische Theologie* (Würzburg, Echter Verlag, 1985) 37-77.

language, but it is customary. Let us follow the custom. See, I do not mind, I do not object, I find no fault, provided that we understand what is said —namely, that neither what is to come nor what is past is now in existence. It is not often that we use language correctly; usually we use it incorrectly, though we understand each other's meaning."²⁶

The reality of history is known, for Augustine, in human presence. The reality of history is known in an ongoing human presence, a dialogue down the ages, in which the time-span embraces all of humankind. Neither Augustine nor any other pre-modern knew of modern critical history. They did not move from history as presence to the many self-correcting processes of learning which make up critical historical knowledge. But they did assent to the truths proclaimed by the Church as the word of God. By the mind Augustine does not mean a monadic mind (we humans are not angelic, each in her own species), but the species-being of humans (*anima-animus*) which includes all human minds. When we say that such and such a human event happened in 1274, we are making an historical judgment. But the past event no longer exists, it did or did not exist. And our judgment is based, not on our own verification of the event itself, but on a complex nest of beliefs and judgments which constitute historical experience and historical knowledge.

The reality of the past, as of the future, is experienced, understood, and known in the ongoing time-span of human presence. This is not an idealism, for the present of the past is a series of subsuming operations of historical experience, through historical understanding to historical judgment. In judgment the historian is not 're-enacting' the past (*à la* Collingwood), she or he is grasping that there is sufficient evidence to state that such and such did or did not occur. There are differences in determining the object or process going on.

When historical judgments require close attention to empirical data of sense, as in the first phase of critical history, the status of historical judgments will be the same as that of the empirical sciences. When one moves to second phase critical historical judgments, they require attention to the data of consciousness; with these it is possible to attain more than 'the best available opinion.'

²⁶ St. Augustine *Confessiones* XI, 20 (my translation).

The presence of the past is *memoria*, the presence of the future is *expectatio*; both are *praesens* in the present of the 'attentive reflection' constitutive of the human present.²⁷ The notion of presence as memory, attention, and expectation is not simply that of only one person, but, as just mentioned, of all concrete patterns of personal and communal and human species-wide operations down the ages.

Lonergan's two chapters on history and historians in *Method in Theology*, in my opinion, set up the terms and relations which can transpose and differentiate for our times the insights of an Augustine into time as presence.²⁸ Indeed, I would say that only by understanding the realities Lonergan is grappling with in those chapters, will a contemporary theologian be in a position to understand adequately Augustine's meditations on time. In an early unpublished manuscript Lonergan speaks of the development of human intelligence as embracing the totality of the history of humankind.²⁹

Method in Theology begins a discussion of history by distinguishing history from nature, and transposing Augustine's insights into a reflection on the psychological presence of human awareness as a 'now' which is distinct from time as the measure of motion. Just as the 'now' of conscious attention is qualitatively different from any measured instant, so anticipation and memory are modes of human presence and conscious operation that include and go beyond

²⁷ Note, most translations of *contuitus* use 'sight' which fails to do justice to other uses Augustine makes of this word to mean something like 'an awareness attentive to what is going on within and around one.' Sight is a very poor translation since Augustine critiques the naive realism of sight and body in book VII, 10.

²⁸ On the importance of St. Augustine's work for Bernard Lonergan, cf. Salvio Biolo, *La Coscienza nel 'De Trinitate' di S. Agostino* (Rome: Gregorian University Press, 1969) and Richard M. Liddy *Transforming Light: Intellectual Conversion in the Early Lonergan* (Collegeville: The Liturgical Press, 1993) 50-73.

²⁹ In contrasting angelic and human intelligence he wrote in the early *Philosophy of History*: "The angelic intellect is instantaneous. It understands all that is to be understood in its individual world simply by being that individuality; it is intellect in act. The human intellect is intellect in potency; it is gradual; it arrives at its perfect act through a series of interactions between objective situations giving rise to intellectual theories and intellectual theories changing objective situations. Finally, as the angelic intellect knows all its to-be-known in the single instant of its being (aevum) so the human intellect works through its stages of development in the instant of its being **which is all time**. Thus, intellectual achievement is not the achievement of individual men for individual men are unintelligibly different; **intellectual achievement is the achievement of the race, of the unity of human action**; the individual genius is but the instrument of the race in its expansion."

individuals.³⁰ Writing, building, etc. are all acts of constitutive and effective meaning which others can understand, thereby continuing the presence of the past. Memory is rendering the past present as past in human history. It is not confusing the past and the present, memory is neither archaism nor anachronism. It would be a mistake to hold that the totality of human history is present to any one or group of human beings.³¹ Lonergan is careful to distinguish interpreting the meaning of a text and knowing the historical process. The meaning of a text relates to intentional acts of communication; the meaning of historical events might well not have been intended by any of the actors in the events at all. The drama of human life, while embracing concretely all human actors, is not something intended by any one human agent, least of all by an Hegelian *Weltgeist*.

This does not impinge Augustine's understanding of history as presence, nor does it mean that one has hurriedly to leap into the Divine Presence. Human consciousness is not exhausted in human intentionality. The conscious human presence of each and every member of the human race constitutes what Lonergan terms 'historical experience.' Historical experience embraces not only the existential history expressed in ongoing autobiographies, but also the living traditions by which humans cooperate down the ages in maintaining and changing languages, customs, institutional conversations, etc. The process from historical experience to historical knowledge is one of objectification, especially in critical history, which aims at discovering what had been historically experienced but not properly known.³²

Historical experience does not occur when humans are in a deep and dreamless sleep. All human acts are conscious acts, but we are

³⁰ *Method in Theology* 177: "Anticipations are not merely of the prospective objects of our fears and our desires but also the shrewd estimate of the man of experience or the rigorously calculated forecast of applied science. Again, besides the memories of each individual, there are the pooled memories of the group, their celebration in song and story, their preservation in written narratives, in coins and monuments and every other trace of the group's words and deeds left to posterity. Such is the field of historical investigation."

³¹ Pannenberg's *Universalgeschichte* tends to be an idealist abstraction, an anticipation of an end of history as if we were limited or stuck on a flowing continuum which, at some point, God is going to stop. This is to fail to understand adequately, in my judgment, history as presence or operation as distinct from history as movement.

³² Cf. *Method in Theology* 195.

conscious of much, more than we know or that we intend. From autobiographies there is a shift to biographies, in which the 'times' in which a particular 'life' was lived receive much more attention than an autobiographer could have given them in her own self-reflection. The 'times' are social and cultural processes, which are

not just a sum of individual words and deeds. There exists a developing and/or deteriorating unity constituted by cooperations, by institutions, by personal relations, by a functioning and/or malfunctioning good of order, by a communal realization of originating and terminal values and disvalues. Within such processes we live out our lives. About them each of us ordinarily is content to learn enough to attend to his own affairs and perform his public duties. To seek a view of the actual functioning of the whole or of a notable part over a significant period of time is the task of the historian.³³

The move from pre-critical history to critical history, the discovery of the modern age, set up self-correcting processes of historical learning and judgment by which the pre-critical historical knowledge that aimed at communicating the meanings and values of a particular group or institution, was displaced (not replaced) by an effort to know historical events as they actually occurred or failed to occur. That is, the functional specialty of history aimed at the development of historical judgment and knowledge, rather than aiming at communicating or edifying others, was established. The establishment of critical history gives raise to historians as a profession dedicated to accurate historical knowledge, with all the manifold modes of institutional patterns of cooperation in faculties, publications, reviews, etc.

I mentioned above that we have not yet adequately understood just what it is that was discovered. This is especially true in regard to theology. I should like to single out three issues.

First, Lonergan indicates how the process of critical history, of progressing from historical experience to historical knowledge, should occur twice. "In the first instance one is coming to understand one's sources. In the second instance one is using one's understood sources intelligently to come to understand the object to which they are relevant."³⁴ The first phase of critical history is the very familiar one of

³³ Ibid. 184.

³⁴ *Method* 189; on objects, also 156-158, 161-162.

identifying authors or historical agents, situating their actions and/or works in time and place, studying their historical contexts and sources, etc. But all of this is only in order to direct attention to what should be the critical historian's main objective, a second phase, aimed at "understanding the process referred to in one's sources."³⁵

While a critical historian might not need to know faith, the spiritual life, or the Mystery of the Trinity to do textual criticism, establish sources, compare one set of texts with another set of texts (after all, anyone who can read can do that!), it is something else if he or she is going to engage in a history of faith, prayer, or theology as an *intellectus fidei*. If the critical historian has no knowledge of God, no familiarity with God in faith or prayer, then the critical historian is anything but 'critical' in the full sense of that word. The so-called critical historian is in fact an ignorant historian when it comes to the second phase.

Then he or she is like an historian of mathematics who knows little about mathematics. Such a person might well be able to do a smash up job at comparing various mathematical texts, at dating and placing them more or less precisely, at working out certain social and/or cultural processes that were going on at the time the mathematical texts were being produced, at who used which text to get what advantage in this or that situation, how such a text was used in the production of weapons, what the weapons did, etc. Undoubtedly, such a history would be very readable for those who are not interested in knowing the history of mathematics so much as in knowing what else was going on when such and such a mathematics was being done. But no one would claim that such a history would merit the name of a genuinely critical history of mathematics.

³⁵ As an example, take autobiographies, a critical historian would set about situating Augustine's *Confessions*, Teresa's *Life*, and Rousseau's *Confessions* in their very different historical, literary, cultural, contexts, what sources they drew upon, what texts are more reliable, etc. This is fairly standard stuff in historical theology. One can read the results of such critical historical field work in the surveys and articles and books given to graduate students to introduce them to a subject, e.g., Peter Brown's *Augustine: A Biography*. But can the critical historian make the move to the second phase or instance of critical history when what an Augustine or a Teresa are so obviously discussing is their friendship with the Triune God? What is moving forward in the historical communities of the faithful who down the ages continue to read and meditate upon these works in their contexts of their own deepening friendship with God? Unfortunately, moderns are not good at critical historical studies done in what Lonergan terms the second phase.

I am afraid that there are not many genuinely critical histories of theology done yet. And the sad thing is that what passes for critical histories are usually histories that are critical of theology, that simply assume that what is really real is a secular horizon in which it is at best a private opinion, and at worst a neurotic or psychotic delusion, when St. Augustine or St. Teresa speak of their ever deepening friendship with the Father, Son, and Spirit. Why is it that theology and religious studies are so lacking in self-knowledge that they alone, of all the disciplines, now seem so ready to mistake ignorant histories for critical histories? This is hardly a *docta ignorantia*.

I am not stating that one must be moral or holy to write a critical history of morality or of the saints, any more than I am saying that one must be an alcoholic to write a critical history of alcoholism. I am saying one must *know* the realities operative, the processes occurring, in morality, holiness, or alcoholism. Similarly, if one is going to do a critical history of faith, prayer, or theology, one had best know something about the realities of faith, prayer, or theology. Instead, what we have is a widespread conceptualism and what I would call 'comparative textology' rather than genuine theology. Is there not a very urbane, academic milieu established which studiously avoids moving from first phase to second phase critical history in things religious?

This leads us to a **second** question regarding history and theology, the realization that historians are always revealing things about themselves as they write their critical histories. If one reflects on the many communities of critical historians of religion and theology today, it is their knowledge, their expertise, which is suppose to be up to the task of knowing what has been going on in the histories of religions, in the histories of theologies down to the present. The concrete combination of all their expert knowledge is 'the present of the past in memory' as far as critical history is concerned.

This is why Lonergan, I believe, singled out the functional specialty history with two chapters. For the second chapter is concerned with historians. It seeks to sort out how naive realism, empiricism, and idealism cannot account for what critical historians are doing when they do good critical history. Historical understanding does not admit of systematic objectification, so historians cannot fully abstract from their own personal, social, and cultural histories. While Lonergan fully acknowledges that critical histories are 'ecstatic' in the

sense of the good historian's ability to move out of the viewpoints common to her time and place in order to understand another, he emphasizes that the specific difference of historical knowledge from mathematical, scientific, and philosophic knowledge is that the very complexity of the human history written about always implicates the historian's perspective.

Perspectivism is not another name for relativism.³⁶ Concretely, only God knows each and every event which occurs in the whole of human history. Historians are not out for an explanatory understanding in the manner of mathematicians and natural scientists and philosophers. Historians are developing the vast descriptive worlds of common sense narratives. Historians are finite, so they select, and what they select is as variable as they and their own development is variable.³⁷ The errors of historicism and relativism are a consequence of historians and cultures with widely shared but mistaken notions about what knowing and objectivity and reality are. Relativism and historicism result from such cognitional myths.

Lonergan adverts to 'the historian's own self-revelation' in whatever he writes. Lonergan calls attention to how historians, however admirable in their willingness to correct and change, still "they are not detached from the dominant ideas of their own age."³⁸ The key is not, however, to impose some grand theory upon historians but to encourage the self-correcting process of learning. This is what history as a functional specialty is about. There is the ongoing refinement of historians's judgments. What Lonergan is doing is transposing and differentiating Newman's illative sense and Aristotle's *phronesis* into contemporary critical historical scholarship.

So it is not surprising that Lonergan ends up repeating himself. He has a section on 'horizons' in the chapter on historians, and then has another section 'horizons' beginning the next chapter on dialectics a few pages later.³⁹ The horizons of historians are important precisely in the fields of religion in the twentieth century. The Enlightenment and Romantic ideals of 'presuppositionless history' were nothing more

³⁶ For a contrasting view, cf. Bernard McGinn, "Critical History and Contemporary Catholic Theology: Some Reflections" in *Criterion* vol. 21 (Winter: 1981) 18-25.

³⁷ *Method* 216-218.

³⁸ *Ibid.* 222.

³⁹ *Ibid.* 220-224 and 235-237.

than myths meant to feed the many biases operative within post-Enlightenment cultures.

It was the myth of the Cartesian universal doubt — applied so quickly to matters Medieval and religious — which promoted the notion that we moderns are obviously in a position to know reality so much more adequately than our predecessors. Indeed, in matters theological it was ‘the principle of the empty head,’ as Lonergan phrases it, that seems to have inspired the widespread acceptance of very ignorant historical critiques of religion. Marx hardly did criticism a favor when he remarked that the presupposition of all criticism is the critique of religion. There was simply nothing to know about religion except that it was some sort of superstition. Faith was ‘obviously’ opposed to all intelligent, free thinking men. We humans can think about salvation and God, just as we can think about a lot of ideas that do not exist. Thinking takes the place of understanding and knowing. If idealist thought that God exists, it was because they thought ideas were more or less real (more if one was an absolute idealist, like Hegel, less if one was a critical idealist like Kant). Materialists and empiricists believed that modern sciences had established that movement was a necessary property of the really real. So it is hardly surprising that some earnest theologians in an empiricist culture would affirm that God exists and is real because God eminently moves.

For critical historians to become real theologians, they are going to have to develop personally and communally against the drift of many Enlightenment presuppositions still biasing modern cultures. The dominant ideas of our cultures, perhaps especially in the academy, are hardly conducive to overcoming a situation in which conservatives do not conserve the traditions, nor the liberals advance the traditions, because neither have sufficiently critical knowledge of the traditions. The European wars of religion, the religious inauthenticity of so many who called themselves Christians and religious, evoked, not an intellectual authenticity but an intellectual laziness in matters religious. The critical memory of humankind is, as far as critical historical knowledge in the second phase is concerned, suffering amnesia in many subjects. A genuine critical history of religion has not developed as fully as the critical histories of other fields.

Third, critical historical knowing involves analogies between the present and the past insofar as they are partly similar and partly dissimilar. The differences between past and present might well block an

adequate understanding of the past, as in modern rejections of God and revelation based upon a determinist and materialist misreading of science and the universe. Paul Ricoeur recently inquired into *The Reality of the Historical Past*,⁴⁰ indicating how similarity and dissimilarity, the Same and the Other, lead to a notion of 'the Analogue.' Analogy involves what he terms a dialectic of identity (Same) and distancing (Other). Lonergan is especially wary of too quickly affirming similarity between cultures. Transcendental method is anything but the proverbial Hegelian idealism in which all cows are gray. Lonergan warns:

Insofar as evidence is produced for dissimilarity, the historian is talking history; but in so far as he asserts that there must be similarity or that there cannot be dissimilarity, then he is drawing upon the climate of opinion in which he lives or else he is representing some philosophic position.⁴¹

Because of the role of analogy in historical knowledge, Lonergan also adverts to how ideal-types do **not** describe reality, they are theoretical constructs aimed at making a mass of possible events into a coherent, intelligible system. Because of the rather heavy dose of conceptualism in modern cultures, note the two warnings he gives: (1) even if an ideal-type does hit off the main features of historical reality, there are all kinds of events and persons it does not explain; there is a danger is reducing history "to what essentially is an abstract scheme." (2) The richer and more illuminating the ideal-type, the greater the difficulty of applying it.⁴² A theory of history needs to be judged, not only on its explanatory power, but also for its scientific, philosophic, or theological basis. Insofar as they understand the dangers of con-

⁴⁰ Milwaukee: Marquette Univ. Press, 1984.

⁴¹ Ibid. 225-226. Beware of historians who, with little concrete and verified evidence, assert that just as such and such an event (say, a form of oppression) is occurring in his or her culture, then it is obviously occurring in past cultures. Respect for analogy, with its presumption of dissimilarity, acts as a check to the careful historian so that she or he will attentively go from historical experience, through understanding, to historical knowledge of the past. Rudolph M. Bell's *Holy Anorexia* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985) illustrates a study ignoring dissimilarity and analogy; and Caroline W. Bynum's *Holy Feast and Holy Fast: The Religious Significance of Food to Medieval Women* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987) illustrates attention to the differences between modern and medieval cultures. On difference and contingency, cf. Fred Lawrence *op. cit.*

⁴² *Method in Theology* 228.

ceptualism and of the wrong-headed efforts to produce 'big anti-comprehension machines,' historians will, through self-correcting processes of learning, come to discern how much 'the dominant ideas of our times' may have distorted their understanding of the past.

When we read historical reconstructions, we are also reading the historian's self-revelation whether he or she intends it or not. We are not monads peering out at other monads, sublimely unaffected by the dead. Whenever we study history we are also studying some aspects of ourselves. Good critical historians welcome us to *the real condition* of historical inquiry: the historical presence constitutive of humankind's historical experience. The analogy of historical knowledge also makes very clear how we cannot now live in the past. Archaism, as well as anachronism, fails to do justice to both the past and the present. If we fail in our conversations with the dead who lived before us, we shall have only disjunctive and distorted conversations with our contemporaries.

2. DIFFERENTIATIONS AND ETERNITY

2.1. *Wisdom ever ancient ever new*

For theologians the conversations with those who have proceeded us down the centuries is daunting indeed. For historicity, once freed from the restrictions of historicism, once fully committed to the concrete universality of the self-realization of humankind, ushers us into the presence of what Voegelin termed 'the tension of the ground' and Lonergan a more comprehensive principle:

Further, if what the several principles [of intelligibility, of factual truth, and of the good] attain are only aspects of something richer and fuller, must not the several principles themselves be but aspects of a deeper and more comprehensive principle? And is not that deeper and more comprehensive principle itself a nature, at once a principle of movement and of rest, a tidal movement that begins before consciousness, unfolds through sensitivity, intelligence, rational reflection, responsible deliberation, only to find its rest beyond all of these? I think so. The point beyond is being-in-love, a dynamic state that sublates all that goes before, a principle of movement at once purgative

and illuminative, and a principle of rest in which union is fulfilled.⁴³

The whole movement of history ushers us into the divine Mystery. The purgative, illuminative, and unitive stages of the soul's ascent to God are transposed into the comprehensive principle for understanding the entire process of self-transcendence in human history.

History as presence is history as ongoing conversation. This is why Lonergan will recommend, especially when oppositions are less radical, that dialectics be transposed into dialogue:

For every person is an embodiment of natural right. Every person can reveal to any other his natural propensity to seek understanding, to judge reasonably, to evaluate fairly, to be open to friendship. While the dialectic of history coldly relates our conflicts, dialogue adds the principle that prompts us to cure them, the natural right that is the inmost core of our being.⁴⁴

This inmost core of our being is precisely the desire for God, for Infinite Understanding generating Infinite Truth spirating Infinite Love. Conscious intentionality as self-presence-in-world is really and not figuratively a created participation in Divine Infinite Consciousness. God is more intimate to us than we are to ourselves.

Elsewhere I have written of the contraction of modern consciousness with the loss of God-consciousness. I traced how autobiography from Augustine to Teresa of Avila narrated their lives as an ongoing conversation with God. Their histories were quite literally prayers. The Reality of God created and redeemed their reality. Quite different are *The Confessions* of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, which established the canon for modern autobiographies. Consciousness is contracted to recording minutely times and places, and any reference to God is as cold and distant judge.⁴⁵

The difficulty of really coming to terms with theological education in our time is not only the enormous specialization which the human

⁴³ Lonergan, "Natural Right and Historical Mindedness" in *Second Collection* 174-175.

⁴⁴ Ibid. 182. Note how this is a transposition of the classical understanding of natural right into intentionality analysis. Lonergan refers to the treatment of Leo Strauss in *Natural Right and History* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953).

⁴⁵ Cf. M. Lamb "Resurrection and Christian Identity as *Conversatio Dei*" in Johann B. Metz (ed.) *Concilium: Resurrection or Re-Incarnation?* October 1993 130-144.

sciences and scholarships demand. The danger is that we end up with theology being farmed out to professional specialists who become experts without souls. Theology as such ceases and we end up with comparative textology and a God-free, church-free, value-free study of religion. This is not a process of differentiation, but one of de-differentiation. For the process fails to attend to the inner most core of human being and human history, to the comprehensive principle which orders the whole natural and human universe toward ever fuller intelligence and love. Failure to attend to the self-transcending dynamism of the human spirit does not mean that one is, so to speak, free to attend more carefully to the lower manifolds of being. The lower and higher are within a patterned whole. Reductionists do not do justice to the objects of their disordered attention. So materialists do not correctly understand matter, idealists do not correctly understand ideas, sensualists do not correctly understand the senses, etc. Reductionism is a process of de-differentiation. It would be as silly to imagine that reductionists do justice to the objects of their attention as it would be to claim that alcoholics do justice to alcohol.

To bring this closer to theology: naturalists do not do justice to nature, empiricists do not do justice to experience, scientism does not do justice to science, historicists do not do justice to history, humanists do not do justice to humanity, secularists do not do justice to this world, fideists do not do justice to the faith. Now, one of the great losses in the conflict between the pre-moderns (or ancients) and the moderns was the loss of the classic concern for the whole in the modern period. Specialization came coupled with massive doses of naturalism, empiricism, scientism, historicism, humanism, and secularism. An institution with two millennia of memory like the Roman Catholic Church could and did condemn all this as modernism. It was in this sense that Lonergan at the end of *Insight* referred to modernism as "the counterpositions becoming fully operative"⁴⁶ Yet, condemnations, as curses against the darkness, do not of themselves shed light or reverse the counterpositions.

Just as God did not die in modernity, so also moderns neither killed their soul nor destroyed their desire to question and to love. There is no pure counterposition. The intellectual achievements of the modern age in the natural sciences, technologies, historical

⁴⁶ *Insight* 743.

scholarship, economic productivity, and political freedoms mark a genuine progress. To meet the liberal modernist challenge head on required, to use Lonergan's metaphor, "removing the flight from understanding without destroying the organs of intelligence." Specialization was indeed a good, but for its goodness to come to full fruition there has to be integration. And integration could genuinely occur only in the context of the whole. In short, science and scholarship and political expertise are more than ever in need of wisdom.

It is in the service of wisdom that Lonergan first attentively learned from Plato, Aristotle, Isaiah, John, Paul, Augustine, Aquinas. The task of transposition could only succeed if accompanied by an understanding of differentiation. If moderns ignore the whole and wisdom as they ignore God and their own minds and souls, it was not that the early moderns were given shining examples of wisdom by the late Medievals and Renaissance scholars. Catholics and Protestant leaders were locked in the wars of religion, and prior to that there was the growing eclipse of wisdom in the displacement of metaphysical questions by logical analysis, in the spread of nominalism, in the conceptualism of deductivist philosophies and theologies. The ancient organs of intelligence that once pulsed with a vibrant understanding and living wisdom had hardened into merely dominant organs of power and privilege. Philosophers and theologians measured up less and less to the demands of their genuinely wise predecessors. Instead of the immense effort of recovery and transposition, the modern genius tended to negate and dismiss.

No dialogue or conversation took place between the wisest of the ancients and the brightest of the moderns. The past was severed from the present. Tradition was negated by innovation. To the extent that modern culture is secularist and anti-tradition, the very doing of theology, the very process of mediating the significance and role of religion to such a cultural matrix, will be committed to transform that culture. The fact that theology is a discipline that, as Lonergan wrote, "draws upon the past to guide and enlighten the future"⁴⁷ also makes the doing of theology critical of the truncations and limitations of memory-phobic cultures. The phase of mediating theology in research, interpretation, history, and dialectics is precisely a way of

⁴⁷ Cf. *Method: Journal of Lonergan Studies* 10:1 (Spring 1992) 24-25, note 5.

differentiating the tasks involved in appropriating the past in a living and wise fashion.

This concern to appropriate the past is not an antiquarian interest. As C. S. Lewis put it so wisely, we moderns have to read the old books if we are to have any chance of catching on to the long ongoing theological conversations. If one comes into a conversation at eleven o'clock that has been going on since eight, you miss most of what is really going on. Moreover, as he writes, what appears to undifferentiated moderns as new may in fact be variations on very old themes.⁴⁸ Cardinal Newman illustrates this in his analysis of modern liberalism as variations on Arianism and Socinianism.⁴⁹

The importance of the ongoing philosophic and theological conversation in its full sweep and process of differentiation is not simply an antiquarian interest in old texts. What is crucial is the *scola sapientiae* the school of wisdom in which we come to learn the realities which the wise texts, both ancient and modern, signify. We are changed as we try as best we can to reach up to the realities understood and loved by the great minds and hearts of the human race. We have to come to understand and know something of the realities only the love of intelligence, goodness, and holiness can uncover. The great minds and hearts of history do not call attention to themselves, but to the self-transcending quest for truth, goodness, holiness. The conversation carries all of us along and, if we are fortunate, increasingly defines us rather than we defining it.

The conversation is, after all, not only human. Indeed, there has been a radical displacement of human desire and human conversation

⁴⁸ C.S. Lewis in his introduction to St. Athanasius *On the Incarnation* (Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir's Orthodox Theological Seminary, 1989) 3-5.

⁴⁹ Cf. Robert Pattison *The Great Dissent: John Henry Newman and the Liberal Heresy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991) e.g. 179: "The modern world constructed by liberalism is as Newman foresaw a network of inferences without a beginning. The modern believes everything and nothing. He adopts a new philosophy monthly or yearly. He builds his inner and outer worlds new again daily and is as quick to discard his first principles and adopt their contraries as he is to rear cities and demolish forests. Divines have in fact disappeared as spiritual leaders, to be replaced by textuaries whose interpretations are limited only by the self-imposed restriction that no words mean anything beyond their variable human significations. Feeling has become the measure of morality and technology the measure of the human spirit. ... The liberal position, which seems to promise the ceaseless activity of material evolution, in fact guarantees only the stultifying inertia of skepticism masquerading as progress."

in which we lose our humanity if we neglect to listen honestly to the Divine Word and attend to the Divine Spirit. Augustine put it pointedly: all the human striving for excellence in the moral and intellectual virtues, all the long and laborious efforts to attain not only life but the good life, end in death and disintegration if the Word is not incarnate among us. The intellectual virtues darken into skepticism, and the moral virtues harden into stoicism without the Spirit inspired grace of the theological virtues. History is a conversation and process whose beauty and philharmonic wholeness will only reach its fullness and perfection in the eternal *communio sanctorum*..

2.2. Differentiations of Ongoing Contexts:

Fr. Fred Crowe has provided us with a valuable sketch of Lonergan's effort to introduce history to Catholic theology, and the centrality of the differentiations of consciousness in that endeavor.⁵⁰ The process of differentiation, while most fully operative in consciousness and intelligence, is characteristic of emergent probability and world process as a whole with its explanatory genera and species.⁵¹ Differentiation nuances finality.⁵² This is important, for consciousness and intelligence are integral to nature. Lonergan is transposing a more integral classic understanding of nature into the contemporary context. The natural and human sciences are differentiated, they are not separated and set in opposition. History as well as nature, mind as well as matter, are within the whole of being.

What Lonergan writes about his notion of sublation applies as well to his notion of differentiation: the higher preserves and elevates the lower without negating the lower; the later differentiation does not negate the earlier, but places it in a newer and fuller context.⁵³

⁵⁰ Frederick Crowe "All my work has been introducing history into Catholic theology" (Lonergan, March 28, 1980) in this volume.

⁵¹ *Insight* 287-292.

⁵² *Ibid.* 474: "Eighthly, finality is nuanced. It is not some single simple-minded formula. It is as concrete, as differentiated, as various, as are the multitudinous beings of this world."

⁵³ Lonergan *Method in Theology* 241: "I would use this notion [of sublation] in Karl Rahner's sense rather than Hegel's to mean that what sublates goes beyond what is sublated, introduces something new and distinct, puts everything on a new basis, yet so far from interfering with the sublated or destroying it, on the contrary needs

Sublation and differentiation manifest the uniqueness and relatedness of the old and the new, the lower and the higher within the fullness of world process patterned intelligibly, intelligently, and ordered toward the perfection of being-in-love. Catholicism at its best is *kaqj* {olon communicating a wisdom that is attentive to the whole of creation-redemption. Any effort to negate the old, just as any effort to abort the new, is profoundly contrary to Catholic wisdom.

Fr. Crowe analyses the transcultural process and its twofold character in Lonergan: the transcultural process from revelation to where we are now, and the other from where we are now to where we want to go. He concentrated upon the latter.⁵⁴ Similar to the two phases of functional specialization, the two are distinct phases of one transcultural process: in the present we study the past to guide and enlighten the future. For we cannot know where we want to go if we do not know where we are, and we cannot know where we are unless we know where we have been.

There are ongoing contexts, as Lonergan calls them, which constitute the history of Catholic theology. Those ongoing contexts mark, it seems to me, major differentiations in the history of Catholic theology. The differentiations constitutive of the ongoing contexts are not to be identified with the differentiations of consciousness. Whenever Lonergan discussed the latter he also reflected upon the former.⁵⁵ Combining the ongoing contexts with the stages of meaning we have three major contexts or stages: (1) the differentiation of Church doctrinal contexts from Scripture; (2) the differentiation of Systematic theologizing from Doctrines and Scriptures; and (3) the of differentiations of historicity and interiority from Systematic, Doctrinal, and Scriptural contexts.

To do theology 'up to the level of our times' will require of theologians a much greater attention to the differentiations demanded by the ongoing contexts in the historical development of the discipline. The later contexts do not negate or destroy the earlier, rather they take them up into a fuller context. The process of affirmative sublation

it, includes it, preserves all its proper features and properties, and carries them forward to a fuller realization within a richer context."

⁵⁴ Frederick Crowe "Transcultural Process and the Structure of *Insight*: Isomorphic?" unpublished paper for 1992 Lonergan Workshop.

⁵⁵ *Method in Theology* 312-314; *Third Collection* 243 ff.; *Doctrinal Pluralism* 48-53.

can only be adequately grasped when the contexts are understood as the ongoing process of Divine-human conversation constitutive of redeemed human history.⁵⁶ Theology as a scholarly discipline is acquired through long years of study; the *habitus theologicus* is not infused. So, as Lonergan oft reminded us, there is always the pull toward de-differentiation. That is what general bias in fact is. As authenticity is ever a withdrawal from inauthenticity so differentiation is ever a withdrawal from de-differentiation.

2.3. *The Differentiation of Doctrine from Scripture:*

This entire paper has been dealing with central aspects of the differentiation of historicity from systematics. I should like now to sketch how, within the context of historicity and interiority, one is to understand the previous two differentiations.

The differentiation of doctrine from Scripture is understood by Lonergan in a very unique and important way. A major concern on the part of many theologians dealing with Lonergan at a 1970 conference was the relation between doctrines and method.⁵⁷ Ten years later Lonergan expressed concern that Catholic theologians no longer unanimously accepted the dogmas of faith.⁵⁸ Most often Lonergan would analyze the differentiations of consciousness and ongoing discovery of mind within the context of doctrines. Differentiation is complex, and what was going forward in Church dogmas requires enormous differentiation to understand correctly. For "the

⁵⁶ While revelation as the outer word of Holy Scripture ended with the death of the last Apostle, the ongoing Mission of the Church throughout history enables those Scriptures to be appropriated in untold new and different cultures. Indeed, Sacred Scripture as the Word of God is materially in the words on a page, formally and fully it is within the believing and hoping and loving Church reading and praying the words in the Spirit. This is not unique to Scripture. All the sciences and scholarships and cultures are formally and fully in the minds of the respect communities carrying the sciences, scholarly disciplines, cultures.

⁵⁷ The papers of Fred Crowe, Charles Davis, Alois Grillmeier, David Tracy, Langdon Gilkey, and George Lindbeck all address this issue, cf. P. McShane (ed.) *Foundations of Theology* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1971).

⁵⁸ Cf. William Kelly (ed.), *Theology and Discovery: Essays in Honor of Karl Rahner* (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1980) 55.

intelligibility proper to developing doctrines is the intelligibility immanent in historical process."⁵⁹

Church doctrines or dogmas are only misunderstood if they are treated as merely a 'hellenizing' of the Gospels — a thesis called by John C. Murray a 'learned absurdity'⁶⁰ The point was more than inculturating the Gospel in Greek culture, what was at stake in the great Christological and Trinitarian conciliar dogmas was not a hellenizing of the faith but a faith-inspired discovery of mind — the origins of Christian realism.⁶¹ The failure on the part of many theologians to understand and appropriate the significance and role of dogma is linked with the eclipse of judgment and wisdom.

Much of modern philosophy and modern science seem to me marked by a flight from the responsibility of judging. That flight has been cloaked under the high name of method. At least in the human sciences, in philosophy, and in theology, that flight, I believe, should be repudiated.⁶²

The undifferentiated can too easily conclude that because dogmas have no meaning for them they must be meaningless. They are only confirmed in their ignorance when persons with differentiated consciousness do not understand other differentiations, as when scientists and scholars exclude development in other differentiations such as prayer, theory, or interiority, and so set aside the achievements gained.⁶³

Theology either hardens into a fundamentalism/dogmatism or shifts from truth to meaning, as biblical exegetes uncovered the multiple meanings of scriptural texts and historians grapple with the many texts and events constitutive of Christian history. Which meanings are 'more meaningful' depended upon which set of categories seem more plausible, with a succession of conceptual contenders.⁶⁴ The

⁵⁹ *Method in Theology* 319.

⁶⁰ Cf. John C. Murray, *The Problem of God* (New Haven: Yale, 1964) p. 54 ff; also Lonergan "The Dehellenization of Dogma" in *Second Collection* 11-32.

⁶¹ *Ibid.* 239-261.

⁶² Cf. *Method: Journal of Lonergan Studies* 10:1 26 note 15. This was from an earlier draft of "Method in Catholic Theology."

⁶³ Cf. *Doctrinal Pluralism* 64-65.

⁶⁴ Empiricism, romanticism, idealism, pragmatism, existentialism, process, structuralism, marxism, historicism, deconstructionism, etc.

discerning functions of dialectics are ignored as foundations mean commitments to one or another set of meanings, and moral theology or ethics becomes either casuist or decisionist. While meaning is sought after, and commitment called for, the truth of judgment is left to the vagaries of power. It is exceedingly difficult, as the works of Michel Foucault demonstrate, for moderns to distinguish truth from power. This is especially so for religious truths. The European wars of religion led to an Enlightenment which would critique revealed religion and proclaim war as intrinsic to the human nature. The adjectives 'dogmatic' and 'doctrinaire' took on their pejorative meanings.

To the modern mind, steeped in historicism, the doctrines of faith are just sets of propositions, affirmations of faith, which could at best be interpreted as 'symbols,' 'metaphors,' 'myths,' or 'ciphers' of some unknowable and unknown mystery. Lost is the realization that doctrines express true realities, that the affirmations of faith are confessions of the realities of God's creative and redemptive Presence. While modern theology would exalt religious experience, it would also confine such experience within the narrow limits of a conceptualism innocent of judgment. Meaning, cut off from judgment, is unable to raise the question of truth, and is left instead merely to disclose varieties of possibilities. Among these different meanings, like shoppers in a mall, one is left to choose those to which one will be 'committed.' Go to the church and/or doctrine of your choice. The trouble is that such commitment, severed from judgment, becomes merely 'voluntary' and 'arbitrary.' So, in the end, power dominates and truth is silenced. Ecumenism can only aspire to tolerance, and religious indifferentism spreads as intelligence is denied its innate drive to truth in the one context most fundamental to life: religion.⁶⁵

The incomprehensibility of God is not the same as a supposed 'unknowability' of God. Few if any would argue for the 'unlovability' of God. God's Mystery and Incomprehensibility is the infinite fullness of Intelligence and Love. As Augustine remarks: we do not love the unknown, rather we love to know the unknown.⁶⁶ This marks the difference between a Christian mystic and a Kant or Nietzsche. The *via negativa* is never severed in Catholic theological traditions from

⁶⁵ It is precisely in this context that Pope John Paul II's *Veritatis Splendor* is such a challenging and important call to truth in religious and moral life.

⁶⁶ St. Augustine *De Trinitate* X, 1, 3.

the *via affirmativa*.⁶⁷ In the beatific vision we shall come to know and love the Father, Son, and Spirit as they know and love Each Other. We shall not discover that they were a Quaternity or whatever. The light of glory will fulfill and not contradict the light of faith, just as the light of faith fulfills and does not contradict the light of reason.

Faith is a knowledge born of love, so the doctrinal mediations of this faith are judgments enlightened by a God gifted love which loves, not our conceptions or images of God, but God as God is in Godself. For, as St. Augustine remarks, we do not want just to know how things appear to us, nor do we want to only love things as we imagine or picture them. We want to know what in fact the thing or reality as is in itself, and we desire to love persons as they are in themselves, and not just how they relate to us. The movement from the economic to the immanent Trinity is analogous to the move from imagining people as they relate to us and our world to knowing and loving the people as they are in themselves. This is the mark of maturity, and it is clearly laid out in St. Augustine and then further systematized in St. Thomas Aquinas. Faith as a knowledge born of love, and doctrines as judgments of that faith, affirm that God is God for us only because God is God in Godself. Whoever argues that we can only know and love a God for us fails to grasp, not only God, but 'us' in our self-transcending dynamism toward the really real and the truly good. Our knowledge and love of God is not granted the ontological status we demand of any mature human interpersonal friendship if we denigrate the immanent Trinity.⁶⁸

⁶⁷ On the inseparability of the apophatic and kataphatic within Catholic mystical theology, cf. Harvey Egan "Christian Apophatic and Kataphatic Mysticism" in *Theological Studies* 39/2 (1978) 399-445.

⁶⁸ Cf. Lonergan *Second Collection* 31-32: "...Dewart asserts an unbridgeable difference between the way in [sic] God is in himself and the way in which he is in our knowledge. This, of course, while absolutely possible, is not possibly known within our knowledge, and so the reader may wonder how Dewart got it into his knowledge. The fallacy seems to be Dewart's confusion of thinking and knowing. In our thinking we may distinguish a concept of divine existence from a concept of divine essence. In our knowing we may affirm (1) that we think in the above manner and (2) that there is no distinction between the reality of the divine essence and the reality of the divine existence. The contrast is, then, not between God in Himself and God in our knowledge, but between God in our knowledge and God in our thinking. Nor is there anything unbridgeable about this contrast or difference; for the thinking and judging occur within one and the same mind, and the whole function of our judging may be described as determining how much of our thinking is correct."

In other words, our knowledge and love of God requires at the very minimum all the efforts at critical realism and objectivity which any sane person would require in any interpersonal friendship. Dogmas perform, therefore, a decisive normative function even, and perhaps especially, for those who are not converted:

Accordingly, while the unconverted may have no real apprehension of what it is to be converted, at least they have in doctrines the evidence both that there is something lacking in themselves and that they need to pray for illumination and to seek instruction.⁶⁹

The purpose of doctrines, whether in fourth century Greece or thirteenth century Europe or twentieth century America, is to affirm the eminently intelligible reality of the Divine Mysteries of Triune God and the mighty deeds of God in creation and redemption. Historically I know of no defined Church doctrines which had as their purpose a simple accommodation of the Gospel to any particular culture. They have always been a call to conversion, to the worship of the true God and what God has wrought. An Athanasius would really scratch his head in amazement at theologians claiming he was accommodating the Gospel to Greek culture. Having to flee his diocese at least five times, seeking refuge with the monks and nuns in the desert from the imperial armies, having written a treatise *Against the Greeks*, he and his opponents would surely find epithets like accommodating and hellenizing quite hilarious.⁷⁰ While Dogmatic theology has classicist presuppositions, the doctrinal theology required today is very much historically-minded.

It is historical inasmuch as it grasps the many different contexts in which the same doctrine was expressed in different manners. It is dialectical inasmuch as it discerns the difference between positions and counter-positions and seeks to develop the positions and to reverse the counter-positions.⁷¹

⁶⁹ Lonergan *Method in Theology* 299.

⁷⁰ Note the *Contra Gentes* of Athanasius such be translated *Contra Graecos* as the best manuscript traditions have *kata Ellhnwn*.

⁷¹ *Method in Theology* 333.

2.4. The differentiation of Systematics from Doctrines.

Historically conscious contemporary theologians have much differentiating to do in order to do doctrinal theology. I recall a conversation I had with Fr. John Courtney Murray in Salvador Mundi Hospital during the last session of the Council. Fr. Lonergan had passed on to him a copy of an essay I had done on the analogy for the Divine Self-Gift. Murray also liked it and told me how to shorten it for publication in *Theological Studies*. I responded that no matter how shortened it was it was still going to be very technical, dealing with the analogies developed by Maurice de la Taille, Karl Rahner, and Bernard Lonergan. Murray's response, which I only wish I had written down, was to the effect that he was very concerned that the public effect of the Council on theological formation in the States was going to be detrimental to serious systematic theology. All serious systematic theology was going to go out the window with the manualist pseudo-systematics.

Murray's concerns were prophetic. Taking history seriously means that genuine advances and achievements can and are lost. Not only is there a process of differentiation but also reversals. It was not the Council that occasioned the reversal. I believe Lonergan is correct when he locates the distant beginnings in the failure of fourteenth century theologians to understand and appropriate the systematic differentiations achieved by Thomas Aquinas.

Take, for example, the so-called psychological analogy for the Trinity. Augustine achieved a real breakthrough in his *De Trinitate* when he showed how all material and imaginative metaphors were not proper analogies. For an analogue in the strict sense one had to attend to the immaterial reality of human soul knowing and loving itself: "For what is so intimately known, and what knows itself to be itself, than that through which all other realities are also known, that is, the soul itself?"⁷² This self-knowledge of the soul was suffused with a love of the Divine Good in which we live and move and have our being. "We must cling to this Good by love, that we may enjoy the Presence of that from which we are, in the absence of which we would not be at all."⁷³

⁷² *De Trinitate* VIII, 6 my translation.

⁷³ *Ibid.* VIII, 4 my translation.

Aquinas took up the systematic exercises begun in Augustine's *De Trinitate*, books eight through ten, and developed both an understanding of analogy which clearly distinguished it from metaphor, and a very cogent systematic understanding of the Triune Mystery as revealed in Scripture and taught in the doctrines of the Church. Analogies for the Divine must be taken from what is highest in creation, that is, spiritual creatures and spiritual activities.⁷⁴ Neither our senses nor our imagination are apt analogues for the Divine. Metaphors, on the other hand, are drawn from sensible and imaginative sources. Yet, as Lonergan's *Verbum: Word and Idea In Aquinas* indicated, most subsequent theologians were not up to the systematic differentiations achieved by Aquinas. Lonergan's doctoral dissertation had shown similar failures in regard to the systematic differentiations of Aquinas's theorem of the supernatural.

2.5. An Illustration of Systematic Differentiation: God's Eternal Presence.

By way of illustration, I shall sketch how there are similar achievements in the systematic understanding of God's eternity. In an historically conscious age it is theologically very important, in my judgment, to understand how Augustine is advancing a theologically systematic understanding of Divine Eternity that, while acknowledging certain Plotinian notions, is *systematically* very different from a Platonic or Plotinian position. Again, as in doctrines, the foundation for such a systematic theology of Divine eternity is intellectual, moral, and religious conversions as attuning us to the Divine Reality in whom we move and live and have our being.

God is infinite and creation is finite. The notion of God means, among other things, that God is the infinitely simple cause or ground or reason of all that is and occurs. God is absolutely transcendent to the whole of creation, and the systematic distinction between natural and supernatural develops the theoretical notion of the 'natural' as an ordered pattern of natures and events in the created universe, and in those patterns what is higher sublates (without negating) what precedes it. There are things we can naturally know about God, and

⁷⁴ Cf. *Summa theologiae* I, 13 (especially art. 6) & 16.

other things which we can know only supernaturally, through faith. We are both creatures of God and called into intimate friendship with the Triune God. If faith is a knowledge born of this loving friendship, it is a knowing none the less. To know that God is and is the simple cause of all this is (metaphysics) and to know God as Triune friend (faith and theology) — both are acts of knowing. Faith as a knowledge born of supernatural love is a healing elevation of our natural knowledge born of questioning. Neither grammar nor logic are adequate to understanding a discourse on God that attends to the horizons of those questioning and loving God.⁷⁵

The type of knowing operative in metaphysics and in theology requires a normative grasp of knowing what we do when we know that we know. Conflicts and disagreements in metaphysics and in theology can be traced to failures to attain this normative grasp. Intelligence as such is infinite. Created intelligence is infinite in its potentiality, always finite in its achievements. Created intelligence is potentiality for the infinite, and this is experienced in the relentless drive of questions. The human race will never run out of questions, as we may run out of material resources such as oil or coal. For every question correctly answered more questions follow.

The normativity of intelligence is precisely this ongoing openness to all further questions. The openness is never indifference to contradictions, for then intelligence itself would cease. There would be no difference between an open mind and a closed mind, for mind itself would not be minded. Besides the intelligibility informing all beings, there is the more profound intelligibility that is also intelligent. The vast expanses of space and time in the entire material universe, and the manifold intelligibilities constituting the ontological perfection of the ordered relationships as one moves from physics through chemistry and botany to zoology, do not account for the emergence of mind, of an intelligibility that is itself intelligent.

The openness is precisely an openness to questions all of which seek and demand correct answers. Nothing less than correct answers realize the potentiality of the questions. Infinity in the realm of intelligence is far different from infinity in the realm of quantity or of

⁷⁵ Neither grammar nor logic nor metaphysics are adequate to the doing of theology at the present time. Each, of course, is to contribute to the enterprise. Grammar insofar as theologians speak and write, logic insofar as they think, and metaphysics insofar as they know realities and not mere names or ideas.

matter. For in intelligence the infinity of questions is not so much acted upon as itself active. It is an intelligible and intelligent desire and love for answers. It is a desiring love for meaning, intelligibility, truth, that will only reach fulfillment when it truly understands and knows. The norm is not in the answer but in the desiring question. The answer may be partial and incomplete, it may even be wrong, but the partiality, incompleteness, or falsehood will be discovered by the ongoing questioning desire.

What is proportionate, therefore, to the infinity of the questioning is an act which is itself infinite. Only when we understand everything that there is to understand will the normative questioning desire be completely fulfilled. Only when the answer is the infinitely active Answer will the normativity of the active questioning be properly fulfilled in transcending itself. The infinity of questions is possible only as created intelligence oriented into, and completely dependent upon, the Infinite Knowing that is God. In questioning the very activity of our questioning, we arrive at the point where cognitional theory and metaphysics enters the specifically religious realm.

When we question our own activity of questioning, when our intelligence is heightened into a questioning of its own nature, then that very *act* of questioning is the key to the analogy of conceiving God as an infinite act of knowing and loving. For it is our conscious intelligence in act which is the natural created (and so finitely active) participation in the Infinite Act of Divine Intelligence. Attention should be directed toward the questioning since it is our questioning that is infinite potentiality. Each and every insight, understanding, judgment that occurs in us is finite, and so a certain 'suffering' or *pati* because those acts do not actualize the native infinity of intelligence as such, the infinite range or scope of our questioning mind. The answers are acknowledged as limited and finite because of the further relevant questions which spontaneously occur in our active intelligence. The limitation of each answer is known in correct judgments, and we know that our judgments are correct, that we have weighed the evidence sufficiently, because the further relevant questions presuppose those judgments. The differentiation of understanding and knowing is crucial, for it is only when that differentiation is known that the infinity of intelligent desire to understand is properly related with the finitude of all created and concrete correct answers. The notion of being is not merely a conceptual content, a meaningful and intelligible

idea. The notion of being is as universal and as concrete, as unrestricted and as spontaneous, as the infinite desire to know.⁷⁶ While being is known in judgment, the notion of being precedes and underpins all human experience, understanding, and judging.

So, human intelligence as knowing is the best analogate to aid our understanding of God. There are no questions in God, only the infinite fullness of active intelligence. Divine Intelligence does not 'suffer' the way created intelligence suffers. There are no further relevant questions unanswered by Infinite Divine Understanding. There is no 'passivity' or 'potentiality' in God. God is pure, infinite Act. Because Divine Intelligence is infinite actual understanding, Divine Love is pure enjoyment. There is no desire unrequited by Divine Love. Just as human intelligence presupposes the objects of its questioning, so human loving presupposes the objects of its desire. God presupposes nothing. Divine Intelligence and Love is utterly self-sufficient, and only because of this transcendent self-sufficiency freely creates everything.

As God is simple, infinite understanding and loving, so God is eternal. There is no extension or duration in God. This divine eternity, as divine infinity and simplicity, cannot be imagined; nor can it be understood and conceived, except by God. We can, however, affirm that God is eternal and understand analogically that affirmation. There are major breakthroughs in the philosophical and theological grasp of this analogical understanding of the affirmation that God is eternal. Those breakthroughs are in the works of Augustine, Boethius, and Thomas Aquinas. Unfortunately, subsequent philosophers and theologians did not measure up to their achievements in this issue.

Divine eternity was not adequately understood except in the context of revealed religion. In Greek and Roman cultures there were the philosophical achievements which recognized that God transcended change and multiplicity. There could not be more than one infinite Being, and this Being was both immutable and simple.⁷⁷ Neither Plato nor Aristotle were able to grasp an understanding of judgment as more than the synthesis of concepts. Hence the notion of being was in some way a conceptual content. Plato would insist upon the absolute intelligibility of the eternal separating it from the temporal. Aristotle

⁷⁶ Cf. Lonergan's *Insight*, chapter 12.

⁷⁷ Cf. Plato's *Timaeus*, *Phaedo*, *Laws VII*; Aristotle, Cicero, Plotinus.

would acknowledge the divine *noesis noeseon* as eternal unmoved mover of the whole and so would seek to ascribe some aspect of eternity to the concrete whole of the universe. Without a clear attainment of judgment as affirming and denying being, the efforts of philosophers and theologians to understand the divine either make the divine into Absolute Idea, the transcendence of which is its separation from all finite beings; or they made the divine into an Absolute Intelligence which somehow informs the whole universe, immanent in all that is. In Plato the divine eternal is a unity beyond, and in opposition to, all multiplicity. In Aristotle the divine eternal is the *noesis noeseon* as the immanent unmoved mover of all that is. Where Plato can contrast the eternal and the temporal to the point of opposing them, Aristotelian scholarship has been unable to determine if the master ever even differentiated the eternal and temporal. This has been the philosophical options ever since: a transcendence without immanence or an immanence with a very dubious transcendence.

Perhaps the apogee of philosophical speculation on a divine eternity is attained in the seventh chapter of Plotinus's *Third Ennead*. The divine eternal selfsame is the whole as present without extension or duration. This is contrasted with the mutability of time. Similar to Plato and Aristotle, Plotinus could only treat of judgment as synthesis of concepts, so that the notion of being was a conceptual content to be know by a direct act of understanding (*ennoiein*) rather than by the indirect way of analogically understanding that we know in judgment. The divine eternal being is that which 'always exists' beyond all extension and duration. The eternal and the temporal are opposites, and the task of the true philosopher or mystic is to leave behind all the temporal for the super-intuition of the eternal.⁷⁷ Eternity is 'intelligible nature' (*Fusin noeten*) which is contrasted with and transcends time, which is identified as the whole order of the heavens and earth. The antithesis of understanding and what is understood is heightened into the antithesis of the eternal and the temporal. Plotinus did not overcome but only intensified the contrast between the eternal and the temporal in Plato.

To understand eternity required both an appropriation of intelligence as not intrinsically conditioned by space or time, and a grasp of the concreteness of being known by judgment. Only if these

⁷⁷ *Third Ennead*, chapter 7 On eternity and time.

came together would there be the proper analogate for understanding God as the eternal creating the temporal. The revelation of God's covenant with Israel, and the universality of the new covenant in the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus Christ, evoked both these differentiations. The judgments of faith were affirmations of a Loving God acting in history, which judgments were indeed inspired by supernatural faith and so called forth an ongoing effort to understand, however imperfectly and analogically. The pedagogy of the Jewish Scriptures reveals an ever deepening understanding of God from the tribal through the liberating warrior and the protector of the nation to the mysteriously transcendent God of the prophets and wisdom literature. The transcendent God is immanent in the messianic suffering of Israel. This process of graced differentiation included both serene contemplation and the intense and passionate questioning of itself and God in psalm, prayer, sacrifice, and suffering — the entire concrete history of a people covenanted with the mysterious and loving God.

The incarnation of the Word in Jesus Christ revealed God's absolutely supernatural and definitive redemption of the human race, not by removing evil and sin through power, but by transforming evil into good through the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus. The covenant is now friendship with God the Father through incorporation into Christ and the gift of God's own Love flooding human hearts by the Holy Spirit. The temporal manifestation of the Triune God's redemptive presence in the words and deeds of Jesus Christ became the outer words — living on in church, Scripture, and sacrament — which can only be recognized as true in the light of faith. The true judgments of faith are grounded in the graced real presence of the Triune God elevating human knowing and loving into a participation of their own Infinite Understanding generating Infinite Truth spirating Infinite Love.

In the incarnation of the Word, who enlightens every human being coming into this world, the eternal is incarnate in the temporal. Triune absolute transcendence is invisibly and visibly immanent in human history. The visible mediations indicate how the word of God as true is conditioned by history. Christian theologians were challenged to go beyond the antimonies of Platonic and Aristotelian conceptions of the eternal and temporal.

Augustine initiates a major breakthrough. His own discovery of intelligence was marked by both the Platonic concern for the spiritual nature of human intelligence and the Christian insistence upon the word of God as known in true judgments of faith. Truth, *Veritas*, is ultimately the Word calling humankind to eternal life. The light of reason and the light of faith both come together in the life praxis of intellectual, moral, and religious conversion narrated in books five through nine of his *Confessions*. For Augustine the graced conversion to divine revelation enabled him to understand the intrinsic goodness of the whole of creation. Evil results only from the free disordered acts of intelligent creatures rejecting divine friendship.

Both faith and reason prompted Augustine to inquire into the wonders of the world and ourselves in order to understand the wonders of God's creative and redemptive presence. In his writings Augustine narrates the ongoing mutual self-mediations of Jesus Christ and Christians constituting the church in the kingdom or city of God, who, in their many conscious acts and decisions, are in conversation with the Triune God who is more intimate to each of us than we are even to ourselves. Augustine's inquiry into the nature of intelligence is always in the interpersonal context of this ongoing mutual self-mediation of his friendship with God.

The analogate for understanding God's eternal present is the intelligent human experience of knowing that I know myself to be now present to myself.⁷⁹ The movement of time does not intrinsically condition or constitute who I am, for the past exists only in my present memory, and the future exists only in my present expectation. In transposing this to Divine Presence Augustine does not, as Plato and

⁷⁹ *Confessions*, VII, 10: on how the experience of true judgment is grounded in the divine eternal light: "Whoever knows truth knows it [the interior light of intelligence], and whoever knows that light knows eternity. Love knows it! O eternal truth and true love and beloved eternity! You are my God; for You I long day and night." Then book ten explores the dialectical mutual self-mediations of inner and outer (*intus et foris*) to set the context for book eleven in which the experience of mind measuring time is explored in order for Augustine to conclude that the presence of mind in knowing is not intrinsically constituted by time but a created participation in God's eternal presence. XI, 31: confesses God as the "*incommutabiliter Aeterno, hoc est vere Aeterno Creatori mentium*." In the *City of God*, book eleven, 26 there is the strong affirmation of knowing that I know: "For just as I know that I exist, so I know that I know." Unlike Descartes, Augustine uses knowing rather than thinking, and only knowing (*nosse*) is related to existing (*esse*) and loving (*amare*).

Plotinus did, negate the significance of the temporal. Rather he presents God as *Totum Esse Praesens*, the fullness of Being as Presence freely creating, sustaining, and redeeming the universe and all of human history in the Triune Presence. All extensions and durations, all past, present, and future events, are present in the immutable and eternal understanding, knowing, and loving who are Father, Word, and Spirit.

Boethius carried forward Augustine's breakthrough by providing philosophical precision, by indicating how a correct analogate sublates the positions of Plato and Aristotle. There is the immanence of the whole of the created universe in the absolute transcendence of God's knowing presence:

Eternity is the whole, simultaneous and perfect possession of limitless life ... Since then every judgment comprehends those things subject to it according to its own nature, and God has an always eternal and present nature, then his knowledge too, surpassing all movement of time, is permanent in the simplicity of his present, and *embracing all the infinite spaces of the future and the past, considers them in his simple act of knowledge as though they were now going on*. So if you should wish to consider his foreknowledge, by which he discerns all things, you will more rightly judge it to be not foreknowledge as it were of the future but *knowledge of a never-passing instant*..⁸⁰

Thomas Aquinas placed the teachings of Augustine and Boethius on the eternity of God in the systematic framework of discourse on God. When it comes to the divine, it is not our acts of understanding on which we must rely so much as on our acts of judging. In this life we do not know *what* God is (essence and meaning defined in relation to acts of understanding) but *that* God is (existence and fact defined in relation to acts of judgment). Anselm's proof for the existence of God was not adequate because it had failed to articulate this context of judgment in our knowledge of God. The proofs for the existence of God which Aquinas gives are all indicative of how only God is the complete and satisfying answer that, when known, would leave no further questions to be asked. The fact of correct judgments regarding motion, efficient causality, necessity and possibility, scales of perfection, and finality all indicate that judgments of fact and of goodness or value

⁸⁰ *Consolations of Philosophy*, V, chapter 6 (emphasis mine).

presuppose, by the very unlimited character of our desire to know, that God exists as the infinitely perfect and fully intelligent Being grounding all correct finite judgments. Because we know God in correct judgments of reason and of faith, we can by reflection on the light by which we make those judgments know what God is not and so remove all limitations from our knowledge of God.

Besides the systematic context of judgment, Aquinas also attended to the nature of intelligence as the immaterial image of God. Like Boethius he sought to show how a Christian theology of the eternal God sublates the positions of Plato and Aristotle. In the *Summa Contra Gentiles* much use is made of Aristotle in the proofs for *Deum esse*, how we know God “via remotionis” (I, 14); this is followed by a series of chapters dealing with how God transcends all finite beings, beginning with God as eternal and ending with divine simplicity and perfection (I, 15-28). In the *Summa Theologiae* the order is reversed, indicating how the simplicity, perfection, and goodness of God leads to the divine presence immanent in all being, and ending with God as immutable and eternal (I, 3-11). Aquinas clearly states that “not only is God eternal, but God is his eternity.” Only God is eternity as the fullness of being (*esse*) or life totally present. God’s ubiquitous presence is really the presence of all finite existence in the creative act of God, which act is identical with God’s own being. Because God is pure being (*esse*) understanding (*intelligere*) and loving (*amare*), the creative act is a supremely free act, since God in no way depends on creatures while all of creation depends on God. As eternity is identified most properly with God, so time is identified most properly with material creation.⁸¹

God’s eternal presence is knowable by created intelligence (I, 12) for created minds can know God since there is a natural desire in all created intellects to ask what something is once it is known that it is. But only the absolutely supernatural light of agapic love and of glory will enable us to know God as God is (I, 12, 5). Moreover, since this is in proportion to our desire, the greater the agapic love or desire is, the more fully God will be known as God is (I, 12, 6). The ascent of the mind to God is clearly a series of sublations from the light of reason, through the light of faith and agapic love, to the light of glory. The higher in no way negates but elevates the lower. To affirm the eternal

⁸¹ And *aevum* with cosmic bodies and angelic natures (*Summa Theologiae* I, 10, 5).

God as Aquinas did requires the systematic context of a differentiated self-knowledge, and the role of judgment as participation in intelligent consciousness or light in that differentiated self-knowledge.⁸²

Unfortunately, the subsequent history of philosophy and theology did not attain or maintain these systematically differentiated contexts. Judgment was not adequately understood by subsequent scholastic philosophers and theologians, who attended more to arguments about motion than to the mind measuring motion. Augustinians emphasized the absolute transcendence of God, and the need for spiritual ascent through love to God. Less attention was paid to Augustine's affirmations of knowing that we know (judgment), so that when Descartes's *cogito ergo sum* was enunciated most could not distinguish thinking from knowing, and eternity was increasingly defined as the simple and total negation of time. Thomists opposed Cartesian thinking with the dependence of the mind on sensations, perceptions, and images. So realism came to imply an empiricism unable to deal with the systematic tasks of metaphysics and theology. Divine immutability was imagined as an absolute concept or idea, rather than as the fullness of being, understanding, and loving. Universals could not be concrete but only nominal, as metaphysics and theology was farmed out to the grammarians and logicians.

The stage was set for Spinoza's claim that any transcendence of nature was a contradiction of nature.⁸³ Not only is God eternal and infinite, but all that flows from God is eternal and infinite, so that eternity now means both an imaginative total simultaneity and unlimited duration. The genuine theology of the supernatural was lost in a *Deus sive natura*. The genuine character of judgment was eclipsed, with the result that mysticism retreated into a private arcanum and faith was deemed to be arational or irrational. The emergence of the empirical sciences and historical consciousness initially solidified this eclipse of judgment, for knowledge was limited to what can be verified by appeals to sensible data. Lessing's comment that "accidental truths of history can never become the proof of necessary truths of reason" highlighted the opposition between the historical particularity or positivity of revealed religions and the reduction to the imaginal by the conceptualism of rationalism. The opposition between the eternal and

⁸² Cf. *De Veritate* 10, 8.

⁸³ *A Theologico-Political Treatise* chapter VI, 87.

the temporal flowed into an opposition between the universal and the particular. Modern self-presence was contracted in Rousseau's *Confessions* in which reality and truth were not ultimately normed by intelligence in conversation with God but by dates and places. The temporal took on absolute proportions, so that, as Metz has remarked, moderns seem caught in the endless continuum of a history in which transcendence is decapitated into material progress.⁸⁴

To reach up to the minds of an Augustine, Boethius, or Aquinas involves as well reaching up to our own intelligence as not intrinsically conditioned by space and time. There is the fact that once correct understanding occurs, the place and time of its occurrence do not enter into the act of correct understanding itself. So we do not have to return to our study in order to understand what we grasped last night in that study. If intelligence were intrinsically conditioned by space and time, then we would need different sciences and scholarships for different places and times. There is not one chemistry for France and another for England. Moreover, the difference intelligence makes for the human species is decisive, for it is not so much a higher system in the grades of being, but a recurrent source of higher systems.⁸⁵ If species are solutions to problems of living, then the human species, thanks to intelligence, need not change its species with ever new sciences, civilizations, philosophies, or theologies. Indeed, because human intelligence is not intrinsically conditioned by space and time, the gifted light of faith, as well as the light of glory in the beatific vision of God in no way negate the natural light of intelligence which they heal and elevate.

That our intelligence is extrinsically conditioned by space and time is evident in the long process of questioning, of coming to understand, of verifying our hypotheses. Human intelligence develops, not only in our individual lives, but also throughout the course of human history.⁸⁶

The challenge to theology posed by historical consciousness is twofold. First, there is a need to understand how the extrinsic

⁸⁴ Johann Baptist Metz *Gotteskrise* (Munich: Patmos, 1994).

⁸⁵ Cf. Bernard Lonergan *Insight* 538 ff.

⁸⁶ Development of intelligence in history does not mean automatic progress. Intellectual achievements can be lost and in need of a recovery or retrieval. Indeed, this is the case with a philosophical and theological understanding of eternity.

temporal conditions of human intelligence relate to the intrinsic transcendence of human intelligence. That is, the challenge is to shift from the data of sense to the data of consciousness, including both the intellectual experiences of understanding and judging and deciding, as well as the gifted illumination of those activities in those believing and loving God as only God can know and love. Second, how does this provide a set of terms and relations which enable one to gain an analogical understanding of God as eternal in such a way that divine eternity does not negate but creates the totality of time, including all of human history in such a way that human freedom is not denied but affirmed.

I have sketched how Augustine, Boethius, and Aquinas provided a systematic context for these terms and relations. Correct judgments, even of particular and concrete events, transcend the time and place of their utterance. The totality of the Divine Being as Presence creates and embraces the concrete universality of all created beings in all of their multiple acts whether natural or free. There is no time in God's own being, and so in this sense God is timeless. But once material creation exists, all of time is present in God's eternal presence. Time is only by, with, and in eternity; as creation is only by, with, and in God.

To take historical consciousness seriously, the analogy used cannot simply remain an analogy of being, a metaphysical analogy. The analogy of being is an analogy which emphasizes how we as human beings participate in the existence of the entire created universe. Stars, rocks, flowers, birds, cows, humans — all are constituted by potencies, forms, acts. The metaphysical constituent elements are, therefore, not fully adequate to deal with human history as specifically differentiated from material nature, which is intrinsically conditioned by space and time. The analogy of being seems to fall short of aiding contemporary theology to deal with the emergence of historical consciousness. The analogy of being can too easily, as in the case of some Thomists, ignore the context of judgment and the light of reason, so that metaphysics and analogy are reduced to logic.

Nor is a Barthian analogy of faith adequate. If human natural knowledge of God is impossible, then any analogy between the mysteries of faith and human intelligence is basically futile. Ironically, the Barthian 'Nein' to an analogy of natural knowledge of God only solidifies the modern dichotomies between faith and reason. Theology,

especially Catholic theology, would have to give up the ghost of any claims to a serious *intellectus fidei*. Then the supernatural and the natural are, as far as anything can be said about them, completely separate and incommensurable. Divine being and human being are equivocations pure and simple, touching only paradoxically and elliptically, as the early Barth stated, in the mystery of the incarnate Word. Kierkegaard's 'infinite qualitative difference' between God and man turns faith and mysticism into private decisions and/or irrational leaps, as the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob departs from the God of philosophers.

With Bernard Lonergan, I would argue for an analogy based upon our natural knowledge of God. This analogy, properly understood and developed, would check the tendencies in modern cultures to either treat religious discourse as utilitarian, or to dismiss it as fanatical fundamentalism.

The analogy emphasizes the priority of human knowing subjects or agents, and corrects the tendencies in discussions of grace and the supernatural to reify entities, e.g., sanctifying grace, theological virtues, light of faith or of glory, as if these creatures were really mediating God to us human beings. Why are they, in our present history absolutely supernatural? There is no 'mysterious = stop all questions' answer. They are absolutely supernatural because there is only one nature for which they are 'natural': the Divine Nature, God. God created the universe, not some emanation from God. God redeems us, not some created emanation from God. Our friendship with God is with God, not with some created emanation of God.

But are all of these operations attributed to God identical with God's eternal Divine Nature? Yes, for in God there is no real distinction of the Divine Being and Divine Action or Operation. For the Divine Nature is a simple, single act "that at once is unrestricted understanding and perfect affirming and perfect loving; and it is identical with the primary intelligible and the primary truth and the primary good."⁸⁷

Does all of human history, with all of its contingency and freedom, thereby get swallowed up in the Divine, necessary, eternal being? Not at all, for the analogy from our natural knowledge of God emphasizes how God's Nature is Intelligence in Act. Just as we humans can choose

⁸⁷ *Insight* 659.

a contingent course of action attentively, intelligently, and reasonably, so *a fortiori* can God freely do so eternally. The entire *De Auxiliis* controversy, as well as the Enlightenment theodicy problematic, rest upon not only false, mechanistic misunderstandings of God's Being, but also, and closer to home, false and mechanistic misunderstandings of human reason and freedom. The Cartesian dualism between *res extensa* and *res cogitans*, between thinking ideas and extension-duration, led to a fixation upon the *Denkender Geist Gottes* as infinite power. Whether one was a nominalist-voluntarist, and claimed arbitrary power for God, or a rationalist and claimed necessary power for God, the point was, as Hegel stated so forcefully, Reason is infinite power (*Macht*) to realize Itself in history. This modern detour from nominalism into idealism and nationalism is now uncovered as a Nietzschean end without a finale, a massive dead-end.⁸⁸

The analogy of natural knowledge of God, or of contingent predication, derives Divine Eternity from the Divine Simplicity. For the truth of any contingent statement that from 'all eternity' — a very misleading phrase since eternity is 'all at once' (*tota simul*) — God understood and knew and loved such and such to happen, is simply that such and such happen. What is required is not some physical premotion by which the Divine Engineer moves such and such to occur, nor some *scientia media*, some mid-range thinking, by which the Divine Bureaucrat knows how to stage things so such and such occurs. No, all that is required for the truth of the statement is for it to happen. The universe of human history is completely contingent, God does not force any of us to do anything. God simply and eternally understands, knows, and loves everything that occurs in human history.

The analogy drawn from our natural knowledge of God confronts us with the limitations of our natural understanding, knowing, and loving. The gap between our essential freedom and our effective freedom is one that, if we humans are on our own, will never be closed. A critically realist understanding of how we humans actually live and treat one another would hardly inspire confidence in human intelligence and love. Indeed, modernity seemed to surrender to the counsel of despair, as its major minds conceded that power rather than

⁸⁸ Cf. Metz, *op. cit.*; also Edith Wyschogrod *Spirit in Ashes: Hegel, Heidegger, and Man-Made Mass Death* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985).

understanding and love is the means of forcing reason and order on what Hegel termed the 'butcher's block' of history.

Without the Missions of the Son and Spirit, without the Self-Communication of God in history and the higher viewpoint provided by faith as a knowledge born of Unconditional Love flooding our hearts, the social and historical surd of history would give death and destruction the final word in the intersubjective and interpersonal presence and conversation that is human history. We are not alone as a human race. We are called into the Interpersonal Community of the Triune God, called to share with Christ in Infinite Understanding generating Infinite Truth spirating Infinite Love. Only God, no creature, can bring life out of death, love out of hate, goodness out of evil. The leap of faith, as the analogy from our natural knowledge of God emphasizes, is not an irrational leap. It is a leap into intelligence and reason. The light of faith does not blind our human intelligence, it heals and strengthens our understanding.

CONCLUSION

The philosophical and theological legacy of Bernard Lonergan cannot be adequately understood and appropriated without being challenged to enter into the ongoing discovery of mind in history under the aegis of both reason and the revealing light of faith. The analogy of natural knowledge of God brings together both the analogy of being and the analogy of faith, both a metaphysics concerned with the proper understanding of the natural and a theology concerned with the mutual self-mediation of Divine and human persons knowing and loving each other. This is both intellectually and spiritually demanding. It is time for us to realize that theological debates have infinitely more at stake than mere quibbles on ideas or exercises in power or empowerment. What is at stake is our understanding of the Eternal Triune God and the genuine proclamation of the Word of God calling us to eternal friendship and communion. What is at stake is the mutual indwelling presence creating and redeeming the whole of reality. As Bernard Lonergan has written:

Once this is grasped, it follows that the divine persons, the blessed in heaven, and the justified here on earth are mutually

present in each other as the known is present in the knower and as the beloved in present in the lover. Attention is to be given to this knowing and loving both with respect to its ultimate goal which is that good that is the good through its essence and with respect to its proximate goal which is a common good of order, the kingdom of God, the Body of Christ, the Church. Moreover, the consequent mutual indwelling differs in accord with the nature and state of each individual: for the divine persons are mutually present in each other on the basis of consubstantiality; the justified are present in God and in each other on the basis of intentional act of existence and on the basis of the kind of identification proper to love; we are in the Word as known to him and beloved by him both on the basis of his divine nature and on the basis of his human nature; the Word is in us in our knowledge and love for him as a sensible man as we are reaching toward a knowledge and love of God who dwells in inaccessible light. (1 Tim. 6:16) And because the prior knowledge and love is easier for us in that it includes our sensitive memory of the past and our imagination of the future, we are led by it to that higher knowledge and love in which we now no longer know Christ in the flesh but our own inner word proper to the divine Word is spoken intelligibly in us on the basis of an emanation of truth and our own love proper to the divine Love is spirated on the basis of an emanation of sanctity. For the divine persons are sent on the basis of their eternal processions so that they may meet us and dwell in us on the basis of similar processions that are produced in us through grace. But those who proceed from and are sent by the Father do not come without the Father to whom all glory belongs through the Son and the Spirit.⁸⁹

⁸⁹ *De Deo Trino* (Rome: Gregorian University Press, 1964) vol. II, 255-256.

Lonergan's Foundations For Constitutive Communication

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A THEORY OF COMMUNICATION

FOR LONERGAN THE structure of the human good is the formal component in the dynamic transition from human potentialities to the concrete human society, and community is the ideal basis of society. Community is actualized in shared meanings and values parsed out in terms of common experiences; common or complementary understandings (so that there may be, for example, divisions of labor, and ethnically or otherwise-based sub-cultures, as long as everyone understands each other well enough to cooperate); common judgments of fact (e.g. "All men are created equal.") and value (e.g. "The rights of all people are to be respected."); and common commitments (e.g. "I pledge allegiance ..."). Obviously, in any given society, community is more or less imperfect. Even so, "through communication there is constituted community and, conversely, community constitutes and perfects itself through communication."¹

According to Lonergan, since cooperation is the source of power in society, community as the ideal basis of society is also the carrier of power.² But the shared meanings and values which constitute community may be authentic or unauthentic. In contrast to Weberian legitimacy theory in terms of charismatic, traditional, and bureaucratic authority, for Lonergan it is the authenticity of common meanings and values that both renders power legitimate and whose absence makes authority merely authoritarian.

The premise of all modern political theory as oriented exclusively to 'effectual truth' is the primacy of sheer power. As a result, and to the extent that other points of view do not become socially dominant, as Fergus Kerr has written, "the pattern of our thinking and feeling about

¹ Bernard Lonergan, *Method in Theology* (New York: Herder & Herder 1972) 363.

² Bernard Lonergan, "Dialectic of Authority," *A Third Collection: Papers by Bernard Lonergan*. F. E. Crowe, ed. (New York: Paulist 1987) 5-12.

community [will be] dominative. We [will] think and feel excludingly and dividingly.”³ One might suppose that Rousseau’s theory by which citizens conform their desires to a general will would be different, but even in it there is the need for the Legislator’s strategy of “honoring the gods with his own wisdom,” and, in the limit, of “forcing people to be free.” Even there, as the first sentence of the first part of *Social Contract* concedes, the problem is that of legitimate instead of illegitimate bondage, since for all Machiavellians government is by nature oppressive. My point here, though, is not to prepare an argument for a utopian polity in which there is no coercion, but rather one in which the pressure of evidence and love is seen as the real basis of authority instead of sheer power. In order to do this, distinctions about communication have to be made.

Eric Voegelin has distinguished three fundamental types of communication.⁴ He notes that contemporary discussions of communication tend to focus on three kinds: (1) *substantive* communication that regards the unfolding or building of one’s own personality; (2) *pragmatic* communication which is “a technique for inducing people to behave in such a manner that their behavior will agree with the communicator’s purposes, as for instance political or commercial purposes”;⁵ and (3) *intoxicant* communication which consists of “*divertissements* — the diversions which intend to overcome emptiness through activity.”⁶ With modifications, these distinctions can help us to coordinate communication more perspicuously with the levels of the structure of the human good.

To begin with, this quite suggestive threefold distinction needs to be understood more functionally instead of in Voegelin’s more moralistically weighted terms. Therefore, all three types of communication may be seen to be valuable, because it stands to reason that, especially in a differentiated and pluralist society, not all communication ought to be doing the same thing. At the same time,

³Fergus Kerr, “Language and Community,” *From Culture to Revolution, The Slant Symposium* 1967 T. Eagleton and B. Wicker, eds. (London: Sheed and Ward, 1968) 58-80.

⁴Eric Voegelin, “Necessary Bases for Communication,” *Problems of Communication in a Pluralistic Society*. R. C. Seitz, et al., eds. (Milwaukee: Marquette University 1968) 53-66.

⁵ *Ibid* 54.

⁶ *Ibid* 57.

each of the three types may be perverted, so that Voegelin's point also retains its full critical validity.

First, then, Voegelin's *substantive* communication covers all communication having to do directly with personal and communal self-constitution. I would like to rename this *constitutive* communication, to avoid misleading connotations of the word 'substantive.' This would include all communication in which finding our concrete solution to the problem of human living is at stake. It is what is at issue in dialectic or the good rhetoric in Plato's *Gorgias*. It is the communication by which the moral substance of any community is created and maintained inasmuch as it raises and answers questions about terminal values. Extraordinary examples of such communication would include the letters, diaries, and pamphlets circulating among the German student group who resisted the Third Reich, known as 'The White Rose';⁷ Vaclav Havel's "Letter to Gustave Hasek," as well as his journals, letters, and plays;⁸ Abraham Lincoln's "Gettysburg Address"; Martin Luther King's "Letter from the Birmingham Jail"; the poetry of Osip Mandelstam, for which Josef Stalin hounded him to death, and Nadezhda Mandelstam's autobiographical writings. Substantive or constitutive communication addresses us existentially as originators of value who determine the inner poise of our selves and the world in which we live. Such communication is aimed at the constitutive function of meaning; and it corresponds remarkably to the dimension of the human good that concerns liberty, orientations and conversions, personal relations, and terminal values. In other words, it regards practice (*praxis*) or doing rather than production (*poiesis*) or making. It is cognate with practical and theoretical wisdom rather than with technical expertise.

Second, *pragmatic* communication is focused on the effective function of meaning. It has precisely to do with producing or making. As such it is much more restricted than the practical scope of constitutive communication. In fact a large part of cooperation regards transforming the potentialities of the natural environment into our standard of living. And so an economy involves pragmatic communication in capital formation, in the production and distribution of producer and consumer goods, in trade and finance. Managing the technology, the economy, and the political structures of a society

⁷ Beate Ruhm von Oppen, "Student Rebellion and the Nazis: 'The White Rose' in its Setting," *St. John's Review* (Winter 1984) 2-20.

⁸ See *Living in Truth*. J. Vladislav, ed. (London: Faber & Faber 1897) 3-95.

always requires pragmatic communication, even if the issues always ultimately at stake are never completely reducible to that kind of communication. Pragmatic communication corresponds with the second level of the human good: plasticity and perfectibility, skills, roles and tasks, institutions, and the goods of order. It is cognate with technical expertise and know-how.

Third, *recreational* or *leisurely* communication is, as it were, communication on holiday. It tends towards the relaxed presence of the self, towards vital values, towards particular goods as prescind from their conditioning goods of order, and even perhaps from the higher levels of value. Such communication has a positive valence if we presuppose the authenticity and properly ordered self-love of the communicators. Just as activities such as relaxing in the sun, returning to the world of immediacy, getting caught up in the carefree ecstasy of play or sports, enjoying a good meal, and having the occasional drink are taken to be an integral part of the pleasure of human living, so too watching television and listening to the radio, reading mysteries, chatting, engaging in small-talk, bantering, joking and kidding around, flirting, caressing and being caressed can be innocent, pleasure-filled forms of communication.

Just as there are good forms of communication, there are evidently also bad ones. In each of these three kinds of communication, when the communicators get derailed into unauthenticity, communication goes bad: recreational communication becomes *intoxicant* in Voegelin's sense, pragmatic communication becomes *manipulative* or *strategic*, in the sense of concealing from one's interlocutor information he or she needs to make a responsible decision; and constitutive communication becomes *decadent*.

Regarding these different types of communication it is important to keep in mind that just as the structure of the human good expresses an analysis of concrete realities, the distinct terms and relations of which refer to what exists together in the concrete, so too, in the rightly oriented or converted life, the forms of communication exist together, with constitutive communication providing the context and orientation for pragmatic and leisurely or recreational communication. But when disorientation prevails, constitutive communication becomes the exception rather than the rule, and manipulative and strategic communication work excludingly and dividingly, driving people in their loneliness to increasingly intoxicant communication.

Before applying these notions of communication to the situation of civil and cultural communication in the West today, we need to examine the theological foundations of this communicative theory of politics.

THE HUMAN-DIVINE CONVERSATION

By constitutive communication human identity and orientation are peculiarly at stake; in it the precariousness of constitutive meaning and value in the transformation of human being and of the world comes to the fore. In light of the fact that the highest end of human life, namely, the God who is the goal of human striving, is always profoundly mysterious, since even the revelation of that God in Jesus Christ, the incarnate Word, remains inescapably obscure, constitutive communication has to it an ineluctable riskiness and tentativeness or modesty. None the less, two aspects of human being are made plain in the Jewish and Christian revelations of our mysterious "one thing needful": first, human life has the structure of both a conversation and a story; second, God has chosen to enter into the human story, to make human beings sharers in the divine conversation.

Precisely as irreducible to pragmatic and recreational communication, constitutive communication integrates both pragmatic and recreational communication as facets at a higher level. Again, constitutive communication is marked by an exuberance or elasticity that goes beyond the merely efficient or functional. As historical, constitutive communication elicits what Rowan Williams calls "deliberate and dateable innovations in practices over and above what is functionally necessary, a story of the development of theme and convention in the doing of things, as if the mere getting a job done were not enough."⁹

This note of exuberance is the harbinger or sign of so much that is crucially human. Recall Aristotle's remark in his *Ethics* that he would have relatively mature people take their bearings not from just any opinions about morality, but from the opinions of people who are noble and just. Think, too, of the ancient distinction between the *bonum utile*

⁹ J. Greenhalgh, E. Russell, eds. (London: St Mary's, Bourne Street 1987) 32-44 at 33. Rowan Williams, "The nature of a sacrament," *Signs of Faith, Hope and Love. The Christian Sacraments Today*.

which is pragmatic or utilitarian good and the *bonum honestum* which is the good humans are fit for, or constitutive good as decent and noble. Or along the same lines, how much are philosophy as the love of wisdom and theology as faith seeking understanding matters of experiential discernment of the differences in feeling implied by these distinctions. This is the zone of moral seriousness and holiness. In every one of these examples, the relevant discernment entails the appreciation and criticism of any finite good. And apropos this issue of discernment, Lonergan writes, "As appreciation is a spring of action, so criticism is a source of restraint; and, as the infinite God is beyond all criticism, radically man is free."¹⁰

So it is that Thomas Aquinas can identify Aristotle's wonder as the beginning of all philosophy with the natural desire to know God by his essence. This implies that the dynamics of appreciation and criticism as expressive of the tension built into wonder and the desire to know God require on our part a kind of attentiveness and candor that Lonergan says becomes habitual in the measure that the actual orientation of our consciousness over time coincides with the exigences of the pure, detached, disinterested desire to know and to be affectively united with God. This means that the feeling that keeps us actually rather than merely potentially free results from what Plato calls a *periagoge* — the *metanoia* of the whole person. Let us unpack these matters a bit more.

APPRECIATION, CRITICISM, AND THE EMBODIED DYNAMISM OF THE RESTLESS HEART AND MIND

Our native power to appreciate and criticize any finite good is rooted in an inner indeterminacy of mind and heart to anything less than infinite goodness and truth, sheerly and simply, immediately and intimately present: what the Christian tradition has called the vision of God's countenance, the society of his heart (Austin Farrer). Humans are open to the divine because their minds are an immanent source of transcendence. The mind's indeterminacy that renders us potentially free in relation to any merely finite good therefore does not arise from simple inertia, but from its dynamic orientation towards and participation in transcendence.

¹⁰ Bernard Lonergan, *Collection*, 115.

We experience this dynamic orientation in a bodily way whenever we keep on being puzzled and stay perplexed because our desire to understand has not been satisfied; we experience it when we are doubtful or hesitant to come to judgment and withhold our assent because the evidence is not complete or at least not compelling; we experience it in our consciences, when we are unsure that some course of action is 'really for us' or 'just right,' and so we refrain from deciding until we have done more reflecting and discerning. As Thomas Gilby writes, "the mind, says Thomas, is entire in every part of the body, and it philosophizes best when the heart is knowing and the head is loving."¹¹

This native indeterminacy renders our minds and hearts restless until we rest in God. Yet along with the restless heart, there is a panoply of other desires and fears to distract us: we are built to be pure, but we turn out impure; we are supposed to be detached and disinterested, but we continually find that our self-regarding passions have overtaken us. We find it impossible to gain the requisite purity of heart on our own steam. As a result, the human thing, is an arena of both glory and dust, of grandeur and degradation: *corruptio optimi pessima*.

Be that as it may, the excess and exuberance built into human self-constitution is conversational by nature. The human transformation of self and world calls forth, as Rowan Williams says, "unceasing response and reflection in the form of further doing";¹² but at the same time, our most original thoughts and deeds are themselves responses: "by the time we are aware of our independence, we are what others have made us."¹³ And so the relentless search for and creating of meaning and value is "drawn into an extending web" of common experiences, common understandings, common judgments, common decisions and commitments: "we are conscious of living in time, with memory and hope — not just as individual psychological possessions, but as part of the structure of language and understanding as such, part of that human belonging that makes us the sort of beings we are."¹⁴

¹¹ Thomas Gilby, OP, *Phoenix and Turtle. The Unity of Knowing and Being*. (London: Longmans, Green 1950) 103.

¹² Williams, "The nature of the sacrament," *Signs of Faith, Hope and Love* 33.

¹³ Austin Farrer, *Love Almighty and Ills Unlimited* (London: Collins & Son 1962) 114.

¹⁴ Williams, "The nature of the sacrament," *Signs of Faith, Hope and Love* 34.

The epitome of this human historical conversation as excessive and exuberant is perhaps best manifested in our doing and making of things — ourselves included — that have no apparent point beyond themselves save their nobility and beauty: works issuing from imagination charged with intelligence, reasonableness, responsibility, and love. According to Suzanne Langer, such works are objectifications of the purely experiential pattern of human vitality; and so they are also explorations of the potentialities of meaning and value through the virtualities of story and language.

Rowan Williams under the inspiration of the Welsh poet David Jones notes how “the human being has freely and gratuitously reflected on and enlarged his and her existence in producing significant (communicative) shape.”¹⁵ This artistry project has what David Jones called “a without-endness”¹⁶ to it. As Williams goes on:

it becomes itself ... a sign, something claiming to be ‘read,’ questioned and answered — a sign (for the believer) of human anchorage in an unlimited working, an unconditional power of innovation: all art is ‘a sign of the form-making activities usually predicated of the Logos. It is then the form-making which is also a sign-making that causes man’s act to be bound to God’s.’

The quotation from David Jones to which Williams refers is worth hearing in full:

Implicit in the activity called art, and belonging to the very essence of that activity there is that which makes it a ligament. As we have said above, it is the whole purpose of a ligament to bind in order to secure freedom of action; and that to sever a ligament is to make impossible any further action or freedom to act. Attempt to sever the concept, *ars*, from what is implied under the root meaning of *religio* and there is no *ars*, there is an empty term only or, at most a convenient label.¹⁷

The most marvelous results of the human conversation have the quality of sign and sacrament because they really come about through the commitment to ourselves as embodied spirits. As I have mentioned above in citing Gilby, Thomas Aquinas argued cogently that soul and body are not two things whose relation to each other is an inexplicable mystery, but two principles of the one reality that is the human being.

¹⁵ *Ibid.* 35.

¹⁶ See David Jones, “Art and Sacrament,” *Epoch and Artist*. (London: Faber & Faber 1959) 143-179 at 156.

¹⁷ *Ibid.* 160.

As Lonergan says, "the biological cannot be ignored and yet ... it can be transformed."¹⁸ Hence, for all of us, human significance is embedded, rooted in, and stems from the famous *conversio ad phantasmata*.

INSIGHT INTO PHANTASM: LONERGAN VERSUS RAHNER

This Aristotelian and Thomist teaching about insight into phantasm was the central theme in the early work of two of our century's greatest Roman Catholic theologians, Karl Rahner and Bernard Lonergan — astonishingly enough, utterly independently of each other.¹⁹

Rahner's *Geist im Welt* is a metaphysics of knowledge which elucidates the structures of human presence-to-self as presence-to-world. When expounded into a philosophy of religion in *Hörer des Wortes*, this *Erkenntnismetaphysik* begins to point to the conversational character of human being in relation to the absolute horizon of our knowing and choosing. But there is much to be said in favor of Avery Dulles's claim that the center of Rahner's thought as grounded in his philosophy is his theology of symbol: this unfolds the sign-and-sacrament nature of the divine-human relationship.

In this guise the fullness of the conversational reality of being human and becoming divine is presented globally and compactly by Rahner, but not as differentiatedly as it might have been. Thus, Rahner's friend and erstwhile disciple, Johann Baptist Metz — one of whose most important services was to care for the re-publication of the second editions of *Geist im Welt* and *Hörer des Wortes*, furnishing numerous explanatory footnotes composed in light of Rahner's later work — points to shortcomings in Rahner's theology from the standpoint of political theology. The role assigned by Rahner to the absolute divine horizon both as nature and as grace fails to do justice to the contingency and risk proper to human existence in dateable time. It does not convey bluntly enough the sense that for us humans something is really at stake in our responding (or not) to the dangerous

¹⁸ Bernard Lonergan, *Insight. A Study of Human Understanding*. (New York: Philosophical Library 1957) 187.

¹⁹ See Karl Rahner, *Geist im Welt*. (Munich: Herder and Herder 1935); and B. Lonergan, *Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas*. D. Burrell, ed. (Notre Dame 1967) a publication in book form of a set of articles published in *Theological Studies* in the 1940s.

memory of Jesus's life, death, and resurrection. But just these dimensions of the mystical and political structure of human existence come to the forefront in a more focally conversational approach than Rahner provides.

The epigraph of Lonergan's *Insight* is taken from Aristotle's *de Anima* III, 7 concerning insight into phantasms which supplies the central clue for Thomas Aquinas' *Summa theologiae* I, 83.7. This passage was also the point of departure for Rahner's commentary upon it in light of both Martin Heidegger and Joseph Marechal in the work that became *Geist im Welt*. Karl Rahner's strategy in effecting Pope Leo XIII's program of *vetera novis augere et perficere* was to show the relevance of Thomas's ideas about the being of knowledge and the knowledge of being to the post-Kantian, Heideggerian context of German philosophy. Lonergan's strategy was not quite the same as Rahner's. In the so-called Verbum articles of the mid- and late 1940s, he first took on the task of "understanding Aquinas"²⁰ and of "grasping what in the light of [his] conclusions, the *vetera* really were."²¹ Only then did he publish his "independently elaborated system of thought"²² – *Insight*, published in 1957 – that would "aim at a transposition of [Aquinas's] position to meet the issues of our own day."²³

Whereas Karl Rahner used Thomas's *conversio ad phantasmata* passage to elaborate an ontology of matter and spirit, Lonergan was more concerned with Aquinas's ideas on understanding in the fuller context of his Trinitarian theology. But in even greater contrast with Rahner, Lonergan demonstrated that Aquinas expressed himself in metaphysical terms and relations on the basis of having achieved a personal reconnaissance of the psychological facts regarding the *verbum intus prolatum* borrowed by Thomas from the speculations on the Trinity by Augustine. Lonergan focused on his discovery of Aquinas's indications that he himself had performed this reconnaissance, and offered enough evidence for what he discovered, that Lonergan could thematize the structures of human consciousness as *conversational* in a way that no scholastics, ancient or modern, have ever managed to do. Even Rahner, who had come so close, did not; nor

²⁰ Lonergan, *Verbum* 220.

²¹ Lonergan, *Insight* 748.

²² *Ibid.*

²³ Lonergan, *Verbum* 220.

did Lonergan's acknowledged predecessors, Pierre Rousselot, J. Peghaire, and Peter Hoenen, who had cleared the path for him in Thomist studies so that, as he somewhat exaggeratedly put it, "all that was needed was to put together what had lain apart."²⁴

What had lain apart? Besides Hoenen's advertance to the need for a grasp by intelligence of the intelligible nexus in the phantasm, there were Rousselot's discovery that in Thomas's writings intellect or intelligence was far more central and basic than concept; and Peghaire's demonstration "that understanding was both the principle and the term of all discursive thought."²⁵ Homing in on Thomas's intellectualism and the centrality of understanding, Lonergan uncovered not just how Thomas Aquinas was an intellectualist, but how most of his Thomistic scholastics were unmistakably conceptualists. This is why Aquinas could elaborate the psychological analogy of the inner word in Augustine's Trinitarian theology in a manner not only far surpassing Augustine, but also not yet superseded in our day. On the one hand, Thomas Aquinas had to go far beyond Augustine's illumination theory of truth by basing all he had to say about knowledge on Aristotle's principle of identity; on the other hand, he had also to go beyond Aristotle, developing his thought in order to work out a theory of judgment capable of doing justice to Augustine's concern for truth. Aquinas had been able to make explicit both a twofold inner word and "two elements of determination and light found in the act of understanding."²⁶

THE HELP AQUINAS GOT FROM ARISTOTLE

The critique by post-Wittgensteinian linguistic analysis and by continental philosophical hermeneutics of Augustine's picture of the way we acquire language, as cited by Wittgenstein at the beginning of the *Philosophical Investigations*, is now taken for granted. As a result, any talk about consciousness or introspection is understood to be just a variant of Cartesianism, which is the early Enlightenment's version of Augustine's picture. However, what Aquinas learned from Aristotle for his psychology and ontology of knowledge makes him quite able to

²⁴ *Ibid* 218.

²⁵ *Ibid* 217-218.

²⁶ *Ibid* 83.

make good sense of Wittgensteinian theologian Fergus Kerr's attempt to rebut the basically monological picture of the knowing subject :

Wittgenstein reminds the reader that all meaning, even the gesture of pointing something out, must have conceptual links with the whole system of the human way of doing things together. There is nothing inside one's head that does not owe its existence to one's collaboration in a historical community. It is established practices, customary reactions and interactions, and so on, that constitute the element in which one's consciousness is created and sustained: my sense of myself, not to mention the contents of my mind and memory, depend essentially on my being with others, of my physical kind.²⁷

Neither Aristotle nor Aquinas held that consciousness is an already-in-here-now mental container with a range of possible already-out-there-now objects that have, as it were, to be brought over into the container by means of a repertoire of names arbitrarily linked with objects through a fictive combination of ostensive gesture and memory. This altogether false account of how human beings come to know fails to do justice to the two "elements of determination and light found in every act of understanding," mentioned above.

Aquinas noted Aristotle's argument that because human beings move from not understanding at one time to actually understanding at another, there has to be a passive principle of understanding as well as an active principle.²⁸ Our potency to understand 'moves' into act. But this is where Aquinas found Aristotle so much more instructive than Augustine. Aristotle makes clear that if our understanding 'moves' from potency into act, then this is because it *is moved*. What is effected or actuated by the motion is that knower and known become identical in the intentional order, as opposed to really, because the human soul is a form capable of *receiving* any form: *potens omnia fieri*.²⁹ This means that as finite — that is, as moving/being moved from potency into act — every act of understanding has to be a *pati*: something our consciousness suffers or undergoes.³⁰

²⁷ Fergus Kerr, OP, *Theology after Wittgenstein* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell 1986) 76.

²⁸ In *III de Anima*, lect. 10, #728 cited in Lonergan, *Verbum* 83, note 170.

²⁹ In *III de Anima*, lect. 13, #790 cited in Lonergan, *Verbum* 85, note 188.

³⁰ In *III Sent.* d. 14, a1, sol. 2; *Summa contra gentes* II, 98; *Summa theologiae* I, 79.2 corpus—all cited by Lonergan, *Verbum* 85, note 183.

Consequently, Aquinas (and Lonergan following him) can be in full agreement when Austin Farrer makes Fergus Kerr's and Wittgenstein's point as follows:

Our humanity is itself a cultural heritage; the talking animal is talked into talk by those who talk at him His mind is not at first his own, but the echo of his elders. The echo turns into a voice, the painted portrait steps down from the frame, and each of us becomes himself. Yet by the time we are aware of our independence, we are what others have made us. We can never unweave the web to the very bottom Nor is it only parental impresses of which we are the helpless victims. How many persons, how many conditions have made us what we are; and, in making us so, may have undone us.³¹

In Aristotle's and Thomas's teaching about the genesis of human knowing, therefore, one side of the integrally dialogical and historical nature of being human is clearly revealed: we receive sense impressions; and acts of understanding, just as the questions that give rise to them, *occur to us*.

Although this is only the passive dimension of understanding and its expressions in the inner words of definition and judgment, it provides a central clue to what Aquinas and Lonergan mean by introspection. In general, Aristotle in his *Ethics* had noted that we perceive our "own seeing and hearing and moving and understanding."³² More specifically, as Aquinas taught, "we can know what understanding is by understanding anything and reflecting on the nature of our understanding, for the *species* of the object understood also is the *species* of the understanding intellect And, indeed, we can have no knowledge of our intellects except by reflecting on our own acts of understanding."³³ If we do this — which is something like what Ludwig Wittgenstein was about when he reflected upon what factually happened in learning language or in understanding a rule — we are in a position to deconstruct the accounts of understanding that are not based on "our knowing ourselves as in act by our own acts."³⁴ For instance, we then can realize that understanding is "not a matter of considering ocular vision and then conceiving an analogous spiritual vision that is attributed to

³¹ Farrer, *Love Almighty and Ills Unlimited* (London: Collins/Fontana 1967/1966) 114.

³² *Nicomachean Ethics* IX, 9 (1170a 29-34) cited in Lonergan, *Verbum* 77.

³³ Lonergan, *Verbum* 76.

³⁴ *Ibid* 77-78.

a spiritual faculty named intellect.”³⁵ This mistaken procedure lies at the root of the purportedly Augustinian cognitive or foundationalist model shared by Descartes, Locke, Hume, and Kant, which has been devastated by Wittgenstein, Heidegger, and the deconstructionists. Instead, by understanding our acts of understanding we can discover “the act of insight into phantasm and the definition as an expression of the insight, that almost catches intellect in its forward movement towards defining and in its backward reference to sense of the concrete realization of the defined.”³⁶

THE HELP AQUINAS GOT FROM AUGUSTINE

To do this, and then to be able to delineate correctly the precise empirical data upon which an account of “possible intellect” is based, was an amazing feat on the part of Aristotle to whom Thomas is indebted in the carrying out of his own reflection on knowing. Aristotle also provided a theory of “agent intellect.” But, with the help of Augustine, Aquinas moves beyond Aristotle’s theory of agent intellect by “arguing for an identification of agent intellect with the ground of intellectual light.”³⁷ Besides our intellects’ being moved in the reception of an intelligible species with its extrinsic origin on the level of sense so emphasized by Aristotle, there also has to be an “immanent cause of what we call the flash of understanding,” namely, what Thomas calls “the light of our soul.”³⁸ With Aquinas’s help here Lonergan came to realize that we can know our own intellectual light by our own intellectual light, “not indeed to the extent that that light is an object, but inasmuch as that light is the element making *species* intelligible in act.”³⁹

We can become explicitly conscious of intellectual light by its experienced effects on the level of reflective understanding and judgment: the evidence of first principles, the motive of assent, the immanent ground of certitude; but more crucially as the principle of

³⁵ *Ibid* 76.

³⁶ *Ibid* 76-77.

³⁷ *Ibid* 79.

³⁸ *Summa contra gentes*, II 77, ad fin., cited in Lonergan, *Verbum* 79, note 149.

³⁹ *De Veritate* q. 10, a 8 ad 10m (2ae ser.), cited in Lonergan, *Verbum* 80, note 153.

inquiry and discourse.⁴⁰ Judgment was not properly explicated by Aristotle, and Lonergan points out that it was not in his *Commentary* on Aristotle's *de Anima* that Aquinas related agent intellect to judgment, but in his independent writings.⁴¹ It was in taking up Augustine's solicitude for *veritas* that Aquinas transcended Aristotle's theory of knowledge. Yet Aristotle helped him to replace the Augustinian vision of eternal truth⁴² by the light of intellect: "we know, we understand, we judge all things by a created light within us which is a participation, a resultant, a similitude, an impression of the first and eternal light and truth."⁴³

Through Lonergan's retrieval of Aquinas we have learned that on our human level of understanding, insight has to be something suffered or undergone, because intellect as intellect is infinite.⁴⁴ But because of Augustine's influence Aquinas was clearer than Aristotle had been that because human intellects are only finite, "in his direct acts of understanding man enters into identity with the intelligibility of only this or that material nature."⁴⁵ For our finite intellects it is only in an act of reflective understanding that we understand the nature of understanding as *potens omnia faciens et fieri*.

Extraordinary: despite our finitude — and this is precisely where Aquinas parts ways with all process theologians — we can experience the native infinity of intellect:

It appears in that restless spirit of inquiry, that endless search for causes which, Aquinas argued, can rest and end only in a supernatural vision of God. It appears in the absolute exigence of reflective thought which will assent only if the possibility of the contradictory proposition is excluded.⁴⁶

In the case of the spirit of inquiry, the act of understanding is enabled to "grasp its own conditions as the understanding of this or that sort of thing," and to "abstract from the irrelevant and express itself in a definition of essence."⁴⁷ But in the case of the absolute exigence of

⁴⁰ Lonergan, *Verbum* 81.

⁴¹ *Ibid* 83.

⁴² See Charles Boyer, *L'Idee de verite dans la philosophie de saint Augustine*. (Paris: Beauchesne 1920), especially Chapter IV, "La verite illuminatrice," 156-220.

⁴³ Lonergan *Verbum* 83-84.

⁴⁴ *Ibid* 85.

⁴⁵ *Ibid* 86.

⁴⁶ *Ibid* 86-87.

⁴⁷ *Ibid* 83.

reflective thought, the act of understanding is enabled to “grasp its own transcendence-in-immanence, its quality of intellectual light as a participation of the divine and uncreated Light,” and to “express itself in judgment, in a positing of truth, in the affirmation or negation of reality.”⁴⁸

‘INTELLECTUAL LIGHT AS A PARTICIPATION OF THE DIVINE AND UNCREATED LIGHT’: THE CONVERSATIONAL SITUATION

This realization is grounded in what was discovered by Aquinas and retrieved by Lonergan about the answers to the three conversational questions: What are we doing when we are truly understanding? What are we doing when we are truly speaking? What are we doing when we are truly listening?⁴⁹ Answering these questions brings out into the clear light of day our restless spirit of inquiry and absolute exigence of critical reflection. This is why Austin Farrer can write of human speech:

Man, once endowed with speech, starts making an inventory of the universe. The speaker, having labeled everything else, labels himself, and becomes an item on his own list. He is now no more than a pebble on the beach, a part of the description he constructs; he falls under the net of an impartial rule of an equal justice binding on himself as much as on his neighbour. That justice is the child of speech, is evident; less evident, perhaps, that charity is; but no less true. If I talk, I can give a description of the world in which I am not the centre. But equally, if I talk, I can give a description in which my neighbour is; can make him a focus, an eye, a heart, a man round whom the universe revolves; another self, an object of sympathy and concern. He is the centre of things, just as much as I; but if so, neither he, nor I, nor any other man is *the* centre. Speech makes a further advance, and spins a story in which our fellow creatures and we are equally the characters; and having reached that level, is found to be saying over, however haltingly, the speech of that creative Word, who commands the existence, and assigns the parts of all.⁵⁰

Farrer’s potent words reflect the comprehensive dimensions of the human conversational situation. We have the capacity to do what

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

⁴⁹ See Philip McShane, *Music That is Soundless* (Lanham, MD: University Press 19xx).

⁵⁰ Farrer, *Love Almighty and Ills Unlimited* 109-110.

Rowan Williams calls "talk[ing] things into new connections" by "work[ing] on our world in what seems as insatiable desire for new perception and new possibilities of action."⁵¹ As Farrer explains, "The hoard which dazzles our eyes tempts our fingers, stirs our wonder."⁵²

Some students of Wittgenstein and the later Heidegger want to locate this capacity and this wonder in a hypostatized language, seemingly without remainder. There is something true about the claim, already stressed often in these pages, that language functions as a horizon for human consciousness. But as H.-G. Gadamer has pointed out, this linguistic dimension of human thought, knowledge, action, and love has to be placed quite explicitly within its proper context of living conversation in order to be actualized, and so conversation is the only place and time that this linguistic claim holds true.⁵³ With equal primordially both language and conversation are empowered by what Lonergan calls the eros of the mind: a pure, detached, disinterested desire to know and be affectively united with all there is. Without it, there would be no questioning, no inquiry, no wonder.⁵⁴ Without it, conversation would degenerate, because the authenticity of our conversations depends on the degree in which parties to them "obey the dynamic criterion of the further question immanent in" intelligent awareness.⁵⁵

JUSTICE AND THE EROS OF THE MIND AND HEART

Because justice demands the rational discourse by which we enter into that intelligibly ordered universe we belong to with our neighbor, Farrer's claim that "justice is the child of speech" is grounded in the reality Lonergan expresses so potently: "We are committed ... by an inability to avoid experience, by the subtle conquest in us of the Eros that would understand, by the inevitable aftermath of that sweet adventure when a rationality identical with us demands the absolute, refuses unreserved assent to less than the unconditioned and, when

⁵¹ Williams, "The nature of the sacrament," *Signs of Faith, Hope and Love* 34.

⁵² Farrer, *Love Almighty and Ills Unlimited* 109.

⁵³ Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*. Revised translation by J. Weinsheimer and D. Marshall. (New York: Crossroad 1991, 2nd ed.) 383-388.

⁵⁴ Lonergan, *Insight* 74; Gadamer, *Truth and Method* 299-301, 362-379.

⁵⁵ Lonergan, *Insight* 221.

that is attained, imposes upon us a commitment in which we bow to an immanent Anagke."⁵⁶

HUMAN ARTISTRY AND THE EROS OF THE MIND AND HEART

But this affirmation of the relevance of the Eros of the mind and heart to human speech and deed as just is no less true in the pursuit of the arts and of making generally. As we reflect upon the *poiesis* that Rowan Williams with David Jones insists is always a sign-making, let us recall that for Aristotle Aquinas's *intellectus agens* is *nous poetikos*.

We begin with a quotation from David Jones on the work of art:

For one of the more rewarding notions implicit in the post-Impressionist idea was that a work is a 'thing' and not (necessarily) the impression of some other thing. For example that it is the 'abstract' quality in painting (no matter how 'realistic') that causes the painting to have 'being'; and which alone gives it the right to be claimed an art-work, as a making, a *poiesis*, along with the triple spiral in the New Grange tumulus, Palestrina's music for the Improperia, the columns of the Parthenon, the arranged character of Julia's love-knots, the taut hemp knot for a tackle, any liturgical act, or the thatching of a roof.⁵⁷

Jones explains the significance of this abstract form or quality as follows:

[I]t is an abstract quality, however hidden or devious, which determines the real worth of any work. This is true of Botticelli's Primavera, of the White House of Uffington, of the music of Monteverdi, of Finnegans Wake, of the 'Alfred jewel,' of the glass goblet I am now trying to draw, of the shape of the liturgy, of the shape of a tea-cup. The common factor implicit in all the arts of man resides in a certain juxtaposing of forms.

In theory 'abstract art' is no more than a conscious assertion of this truth. It is the assertion, in isolation, of a real, and indeed a first, principle. The least 'abstract' work (in the contemporary sense) could not be made apart from this principle, for without it a 'thing' having integration and a life of its own, could not be.⁵⁸

⁵⁶ *Ibid* 331; compare 74, 221, 474.

⁵⁷ David Jones, "Art and Sacrament," *Epoch and Artist* 171-172.

⁵⁸ David Jones, "Abstract Art," *Epoch and Artist* 265.

When in *Verbum* Lonergan writes, "The object of understanding is supplied and offered to us, as it were materially, by the imagination; formally, as object of understanding, it is completed by intellectual light,"⁵⁹ we see what grounds the possibility of the 'abstractness' David Jones makes us attend to. Even more suggestively in this vein though, Lonergan continues: "Perhaps, agent intellect is to be given the function of the subconscious effect of ordering the phantasm to bring about the right schematic image that releases the flash of understanding; for agent intellect is to phantasm, as art is to artificial products." A convergence between Lonergan's point here and Jones's insight into the nature of artistic and poetic sign-making is suggested by Jones's reaction to one of Walter Sickert's paintings at an exhibition recorded in a letter to H.S.E. on 24 October 1929: "Sickert has a rather nice painting in the London Group — the only thing there that seemed to have an 'idea' — isn't it awful — these yards of 'able' paintings of various kinds that seem only seen with the eye of the flesh."⁶⁰

CONSTITUTIVE COMMUNICATION AS ARTISTRY: THE VALID SIGN

Philosophy today, to be sure, speaks of interpretation, of apprehending and judging something-as-something (with Heidegger, Gadamer), of metaphor (with Paul Ricoeur), or of the 'metaphorical twist' (with Monroe Beardsley). John Coulson focuses upon Coleridge's remarkable statement at the end of Chapter XIII of the *Biographia Literaria*, where he says that the secondary Imagination "dissolves, diffuses, dissipates in order to re-create; or, where this process is rendered impossible, yet still at all events it struggles to idealize and to unify. It is essentially *vital* even as all objects (*as* objects) are essentially fixed and dead." In another context, David Jones links artistry with the "search for a *valid* sign," where 'valid' is taken out of the legalistic context of a much older Roman Catholic sacramental theology and placed in the dramatic context of constitutive and communicative meaning.

⁵⁹ Lonergan *Verbum*, 81.

⁶⁰ David Jones, *Dai Greatcoat. A self-portrait of David Jones in his letters*. Rene Hague, ed. (London: Faber & Faber 1980) 47.

In the utterly non-conceptualist and non-rationalist framework of Aquinas and Lonergan, we can now realize that interpretation, taking-as, metaphor-making, fictively redescribing, and the activities of the secondary Imagination are the work of our 'created participation in uncreated light' as engaged with feelings evoked by images and images called forth by feelings, and coming up with insights and judgments expressed in what Jones calls variously the 'work,' the 'thing,' the 'valid sign' — an artifact which transforms the human field of constitutive and communicative meaning.

This fact of our minds' and hearts' being 'created participations in uncreated Light' is the basis in reality for Jones's talk about art when he says it is "a sign of the form-making activities universally predicated of the Logos. It is the form-making which is also a sign-making that causes man's art to be bound to God."⁶¹

DRAMATIC ARTISTRY AND 'CREATED PARTICIPATION IN UNCREATED LIGHT'

This same reality of the constitution of our minds and hearts is also the ontological basis for Farrer's wonderful image already quoted above: "Speech makes a further advance, and spins a story in which our fellow creatures and we are equally the characters; and having reached that level, is found to be saying over, however haltingly, the speech of that creative Word who commands the existence, and assigns the parts of all."

In relation to this "story in which our fellow creatures and we are equally the characters," Lonergan in *Insight* discusses the overall displacement away from sheerly biological finality manifest in the human impulses of hunger and sex, and of the need for shelter and clothing. This displacement is effected by "an artistic or, more precisely, a dramatic component"⁶² in human living which radically conditions the motives and purposes and orientation or direction of a person's life: "Capable of aesthetic liberation and artistic creativity," people's "first work of art is (their) own living." As I have been stressing throughout, this dramatic artistry is social before it is personal, since "the characters in this drama of living are moulded by

⁶¹ David Jones, "Art and Sacrament," *Epoch and Artist* 156.

⁶² Lonergan, *Insight* 187.

the drama itself.”⁶³ This is true in the general sense of what we have been saying all along about the role of language, but also in the sense that our artistry is “inspired by example and emulation, confirmed by admiration and approval, sustained by respect and affection.”

Crucial to dramatic artistry is reflection and deliberation and evaluation heading towards decision. Above I have spoken about this in terms of the dynamics of appreciation and criticism, but here we need to show how aesthetic liberation and artistic creativity are connected with the way that in the “collaboration of imagination and intelligence” prior to reflection, criticism, and evaluation, “the dramatic pattern is operative, outlining how we might behave before others and charging the outline with an artistic transformation of a more elementary aggressivity and affectivity.”⁶⁴ The world’s artists have the prior task of assembling materials in the most primal sense expressed by David Jones in his “Preface to the Anathemata”:

The forms and materials which the poet uses, his images and the meanings he would give to those images, his perceptions, what is evoked, invoked, or incanted, is in some way or another, to some degree or other, essentially bound up with the particular historic complex, which he, together with each other member of that complex, belongs. But for the poet, the woof and warp, the texture, feel, ethos, the whole *matiere* comprising that complex, comprises also, or in part comprises, the actual material of his art.

I believe that there is in the principle that informs the poetic art, a something which cannot be disengaged from the mythus, deposits, *matiere*, ethos, whole *res* of which the poet is himself the product.⁶⁵

When Jones here speaks of “the mythus, deposits, *matiere*, ethos, whole *res* of which the poet is the product” he is talking about the historicity of persons as molded by their drama, about the stamp of their character, so “that the materials that emerge in consciousness are already patterned, and the pattern is already charged emotionally and conatively.”⁶⁶

The artist, as well as all of us engaged in the dramatic artistry of constituting our lives, starts from this. But whereas we “each _ discover and develop possible roles [we] might play, and under the pressure of artistic and affective criteria, work out [our] own selection

⁶³ *Ibid* 188.

⁶⁴ *Ibid* 189.

⁶⁵ Jones, *Epoch and Artist* 116-117.

⁶⁶ Lonergan, *Insight* 189.

and adaptation,” our own “imaginative projects of dramatic living,”⁶⁷ the artist uses the media of colors and shapes, sounds and movement, of unfolding situations and actions, and all that goes into dwelling on earth humanly to “lift up valid signs.” If they are valid in Jones’s sense, these signs give our “imaginative projects” — Jones’s “mythus and deposits comprising [our] cultural complex” — what Lonergan calls “a still freer realization in painting and sculpture, in music and poetry,”⁶⁸ in dance and architecture. The artist liberates us by “a spontaneous, self-justifying joy.”⁶⁹ If there is a *res* signified or symbolized, according to Lonergan, “it is an expression of the human subject outside the limits of adequate intellectual formulation and appraisal.” This expression is to be both conveyed and received “through a participation and, in some fashion, a reenactment of the artist’s inspiration and intention.”⁷⁰

The artistic work liberates our senses and our intelligences, because, in sign-like invitation to us to make sense of it in question and answer, it relocates our own processes of dramatic artistry for a moment within “wonder in its elemental sweep.” Thus, David Jones’s sacramental analogy for art links us to Johann Baptist Metz’s notions of religion as interruption and of dogmas as “dangerous memories.” What Jones says about poetry really holds true for all *poiesis*:

Poetry is to be diagnosed as ‘dangerous’ because it evokes and recalls, it is a kind of *anamnesis* of, i.e. is an effective recalling of, something loved. In this sense it is inevitably ‘propaganda,’ in that any real formal expression ‘propagands’ the reality which caused those forms and their content to be.⁷¹

Art’s danger arises, Lonergan reflects, because its built-in obscurity, precisely in “exhibit[ing] the reality of the primary object for [our] wonder,”⁷² exposes us to the *tremendens et fascinans*. It reminds us that we are “questions to ourselves.” By testifying to our freedom, it may also make us anxious by disclosing to us that “as [we] can do, so [we] can be what [we] please.”

In summary, then, art points us toward the meaning of the first word in the “conversation that we are”: the creative Word of God. In

⁶⁷ *Ibid* 188.

⁶⁸ *Ibid* 187.

⁶⁹ *Ibid* 184.

⁷⁰ *Ibid* 185.

⁷¹ Jones, *Epoch and Artist* 118.

⁷² Lonergan, *Insight* 185.

bidding us to re-contextualize our lives in the light of the "deep-set wonder in which all questions have their source and ground," it reveals that the nature of our human minds and hearts as 'created participations in uncreated Light' lies at the root of the riskiness — the openness to glory and the proneness to degradation — to which our freedom exposes us.

NATURAL AND SUPERNATURAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIVE COMMUNICATION

My attempt to lay bare the foundations of constitutive communication has centered upon the mind and heart of the human being as 'created participation in uncreated Light.' Classically and abstractly considered, this center is philosophical and not strictly theological, because its intelligibility as such implies nothing supernatural but only the natural dynamism of the conscious intentionality verifiable in any human being. In principle, its formulation does not entail reason illuminated by faith or instructed by revelation. It only requires instead three conditions: first, the self-appropriation of one's rational self-consciousness culminated by intellectual conversion;⁷³ second, the refusal to brush aside arbitrarily any questions — even and especially those questions about the intelligibility of the whole and about what is simply highest and best: in short, the question of God;⁷⁴ third, a true conception and affirmation of God's nature as the infinite act of understanding and love, divinely transcendent, and so not intrinsically conditioned by space and time.⁷⁵

Nevertheless, as we have argued in different ways, one of Lonergan's most crucial breakthroughs was to see the implications for classical philosophy of the shift into historical consciousness.

[A]t least we may say that philosophy has invaded the field of the concrete, the particular, and the contingent, of the existential subject's decisions and of the history of peoples, societies, and cultures; and this entry

⁷³ This corresponds roughly to the reading of oneself demanded for reading *Insight* chapters 1-11.

⁷⁴ This corresponds roughly with the reading of knower-and-known in *Insight* chapters 12-19.

⁷⁵ This corresponds roughly with the import of *Insight* chapter 19.

of philosophy into the realm of the existential and the historical ... extends the role of philosophic reason into concrete living.⁷⁶

Indeed, one's philosophy becomes existential and historical, once it asks about man, not in the abstract, not as he would be in some state of pure nature, but as in fact he is here and now in all the concreteness of his living and dying, the very possibility of the old distinction between philosophy and theology vanishes.⁷⁷

What does this mean for the claim that the human mind and heart are a 'created participation in uncreated Light'? To begin with, the three philosophical conditions for understanding and affirming it concretely are virtually never fulfilled unless other existential conditions also happen to be fulfilled. Hence, merely stating those three conditions still suffers under too great a measure of abstractness. Especially the two technical terms, 'created' and 'uncreated' as used here in fact are theological, because, as is true for the doctrine of creation itself, the concrete conditions for their being known certainly is the light of faith and the concrete mediation of Christian meanings and values traditionally called revelation.

TODAY'S 'CULTURED DESPISERS OF RELIGION' AND FOUNDATIONS AS SUPERNATURAL: RADICAL SELF-HONESTY

This theological ballast may be offputting to today's "cultured despisers of religion." I refer specifically to people who have been scandalized by the inhumanity perpetrated upon humankind by those who consider themselves religiously motivated: Serbian Christians "ethnically cleansing" Bosnia-Herzegovina of Muslims; Catholics and Protestants at war in Northern Ireland; Hindus and Muslims at each others' throats in India; many kinds of Christians, Muslims, and Jews brutalizing each other in Palestine and Lebanon: one could go on and on.

Whether or not they are themselves fairly authentic or are authentically mediating some unauthentic tradition, some cultured despisers of religion are repelled by Christian cruelty, arrogance, and hypocrisy. As they try to confront the complexities and subtleties

⁷⁶ Bernard Lonergan, *Collection* 261.

⁷⁷ Lonergan, *Ibid* 266.

invoked in their own self-constitution and communication, cultured despisers find they do not encounter forms of Christian mediation marked by a profound and longterm engagement with radical self-honesty. At the same time many contemporary cultured despisers are men and women who have sincerely dedicated themselves to the struggle against racism, sexism, classism, and all the many violations of justice that daily devastate our planet. For them, E. M. Forrester's slur rings loud and clear: "poor, little talkative Christianity."

In deference to these cultured despisers let me point out that this presentation of the foundations of constitutive communication is not based on delusions about the terrible perversions of Christian meanings and values perpetrated upon the human race by unauthentic Christians: as I have said, *corruptio optimi pessima*. And yet for anyone truly concerned about the unauthenticity and injustice in the world, the scandal of Christianity's moral poverty only serves to underline that we are all — Christians and non-Christians alike — laboring in a radically postmodern situation.

The catalyst for our century's turning from modernity to postmodernity has been the climb to cultural ascendancy of a radical hermeneutics of suspicion. This form of suspicion is more far-reaching than even Descartes' methodical doubt that spawned modern rationalism and positivism. Descartes assumed that ultimately a 'sure and firm foundation' could be found in a truncated consciousness. But this assumption has been laid to rest by Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud; and then by Heidegger who was followed in turn by thinkers like Jacques Derrida and Jean-François Lyotard in the deconstructionist mode; and Michel Foucault in the genealogical mode.

From the perspective of the postmodern hermeneutics of suspicion the impossibility of the old distinction between philosophy and theology is taken to mean that there is no longer any possibility of distinguishing between ideology and truth or non-ideology. One is left to discriminate among ideologies based on greater or less pretensions to mastery and domination in an endless search for freedom. Our only provision on this quest is our power of suspicion and our ability to imagine things otherwise. This quest is utterly quixotic because, if we are honest with ourselves, we will admit that any new imaginative projects we might come up with will be incapable of keeping from the self-deceptive masking of a rock-bottom will-to-power.

Even so, to the extent that modernity is a projection of both the *truncated* subject championed by Descartes, Hobbes, Locke, and

company, and the *immanentist* subject espoused by Rousseau and Romanticism, by Kant and the idealists, and by all the forms of 19th and 20th century neo-Kantianisms, the postmodern critique of modernity is correct. But we have to ask whether the postmodern movement is not itself a projection of the *alienated* subject brought to light by Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud.

If we are ultimately unable to tell the difference between arbitrary and non-arbitrary choices, and if we cannot ever know whether or not we are kidding ourselves; if, in the final analysis, our every thought, word, deed, or omission is a masquerade — then the promise of freedom and justice in the world is not only without value but meaningless. Then the two options set forth by Nietzsche of a life of resentment without bound or limit, or a life of moderate resentment would be all that remains to us. We would resign ourselves to ultimate unauthenticity.

If, on the other hand, we can appeal to our inbuilt capacity to appreciate and criticize, which presupposes no more than a desire for self-honesty, then there may be a way forward from the impasse of unauthenticity. Then constitutive communication can exist in a way that keeps it from being reducible to pragmatic or strategic communication, which is calculatingly manipulative; or to intoxicant communication which is aimed at distracting us from our inevitable states of alienation.

But any appeal to the desire for self-honesty is fraught with difficulties. It is precisely our postmodernity that keeps us alert to the props by which we are liable to try to dodge the challenge to radical self-honesty. The postmodern implication that when philosophy becomes fully existential and fully concrete “the very possibility of the old distinction between philosophy and theology vanishes” functions as a double-edged sword.

It presents mountainous challenges for Christian reflection. It challenges classicist theology to give up its conception of Christian revelation and tradition as a deposit of propositional truths mediated under the guise of ahistorical orthodoxy. It challenges the cognate classicist conception of Christian apologetics, which was a form of post-Cartesian rationalism, attempting to set forth an array of proofs regarding the existence of God, miracles, the divinity of the Divine Legate, the founding of the Church for the continuation of Christ's message and mission, and all the rest of it. But the arch-rationalist Spinoza demonstrated that revelatory truths cannot be

rationalistically either disproven or proven. And Newman had pointed to the ancient and solid Christian consensus about this when he selected St. Ambrose's statement as the epigraph for his *Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent: Non in dialectica complacuit Deo saluum facere populum tuum*. The following statement by Newman is as correct today as it was when he first made it: "Logic makes a sorry rhetoric with the multitude; first shoot round corners, and you may not despair of converting by a syllogism."⁷⁸

By letting itself in for the Cartesian belief in apodictic foundations (a belief, incidentally, that was never shared by Aristotle and the greatest ancients), Christians practically sought to avoid the risk-filled character of constitutive communication. Most seriously, though, buying into the myth of rigor and proof was unfortunate, because it buttressed an arrogant, bullying attitude toward unconvinced interlocutors who, if they could not be convinced, were considered to be victims of invincible ignorance or of moral turpitude. In contrast, for constitutive communication, *cor ad cor loquitur*.

The postmodern turn to head and heart as 'created participation in uncreated Light' advocated here, then, means plunging into the hermeneutic circle of believing to understand and understanding to believe. Hence, the foundations of constitutive communication are imbedded in a living tradition which — though by no means culturally dominant — is directly relevant to human living in a postmodern context which, in its best moments, cultivates the realization that the pursuit of freedom and justice has to be rooted in radical self-honesty; and radical self-honesty is only possible in the ambience of love and forgiveness.

SUPERNATURAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIVE COMMUNICATION AND THE NEED FOR REDEMPTION

It is important to note that while the appeal to supernatural foundations being made here is ethical, it is not at all moralistic. Instead, it is based, on the one hand, on the recognition that the exigences of self-honesty and love are something that day-in and day-out I fail to live up to, at the same time as I grow in the conviction that they need to be lived up to. The failure on my part and that of others to

⁷⁸ Newman, *Grammar of Assent* 66.

live up to the demands of love and honesty in no way justifies a revision of those demands. On the other hand, this deeply felt recognition of the existential gap between what I should be and what I am would, by itself, be a recipe for despair were it not for the possibility and reality of our being 'taken in hand' by God's inner Word of the Holy Spirit, and by the outer Word who is Christ Jesus.

In the concrete hermeneutic circle, therefore, the order of nature represented by the luminous dynamism of our embodied conscious intentionality, and the order of grace represented by the experience of a loving Father's forgiveness, freely given to us in the mission of his Son and the mission of their Spirit, though analytically distinct, are mutually entwined in each other in the concrete. Concretely we come to know about this mutual entwinement of nature and grace in the radical self-gift of God to us in the life, passion, death, and rising again of Jesus of Nazareth. This is made manifest to us in Christian fellowship, Christian scriptures and sacraments, in the gentle persuasion of testimony and of a witness that opens up to us not so much a system or an authoritative teaching office disposing of a *depositum fidei*, but an atmosphere, a general way of regarding the world, an organic fullness of values that culminates in the supreme charity of unrestricted being-in-love. Here being constituted personally and communally by what we respond to is epitomized. Because our response is summoned by the Spirit who enables us to hear and obey the Word: "Jesus baptized, tempted, forgiving and healing, offering himself as the means of a new covenant."⁷⁹

This new covenant is in continuity with the historic faith of Israel as a covenanted community whose very existence as a people was due solely to God's initiative and promise. But there is also a discontinuity, because in the Israelite Jesus of Nazareth the covenanted faithfulness of God is judging and renewing humankind in a new and comprehensive and definitive way. As Rowan Williams writes:

What Torah was Christ is; and what *Israel* was Christ is. He is the sign both of the active pressure and creative grace of God, a new 'law,' and also of obedience, love and gift as the shape of a possible community, a new Israel. He proclaims the imperatives of the kingdom, realizes them in his life and death, and so begins to make the possible community actual in the post-Easter experience of his followers Even more than the passover of the first

⁷⁹ Williams, "The nature of the sacrament," *Signs of Faith, Hope and Love* 40.

covenant, the signifying of [Jesus's] life and death exposes us to the action of that liberty in us.⁸⁰

This "reign of God" inaugurated by the elicited acts of meaning and value — the sign-making spoken of above — of the Word made flesh, gets focused in the cross and the resurrection: these acts of meaning and value both offer to us and effect forgiveness; but they also make plain just how God would shape a human biography. Jesus expresses in human terms what it means to live under the 'reign of God' by responding to God in love: to live "life as an utterly unrestricted giving-away of self," to again invoke Rowan Williams's formulation.⁸¹ Here there is a release from the deadly tandem of violence and guilt which modern life and politics seeks to 'manage' by strategic and intoxicant communication rather than to face head on in constitutive communication.

The communication of the community formed around the reality of Jesus's forgiveness and total self-giving does not claim any adequacy of response to God's creative love except in Jesus and his Spirit. Through the historical cross and resurrection, Jesus and his Spirit enter into relationship with us. The Holy Spirit changes our hearts of stone into hearts of flesh, and Jesus's life as a converting sign changes our orientation from wrongheaded love of self even to the contempt of God towards love of God even to the contempt of self (to use Augustine's famous formula). From him we get a glimpse of what it means to live utterly in the presence of and for the Father.

Jesus's meanings and values embody "the mutual gift and givenness"⁸² that constitutes the divine Trinity. By sharing in them, we become engaged in the build-up of radical human solidarity in "the body of Christ."

The acme of constitutive communication as human, therefore, is really prayer: the prayer by which we open ourselves and look to Jesus as a converting sign, and orient ourselves to the call of the Father. This prayer is radically gift. It is the desire, bestowed on us by the Holy Spirit, to listen to the Word and devote ourselves to the Father. It is the sharing in the free and unmerited mission of the Son and Word of God incarnate to transform and redeem the world. It is the

⁸⁰ *Ibid* 41.

⁸¹ Rowan Williams, "God and Risk," *The Divine Risk*. R. Holloway, ed. (London: Darton, Longman & Todd 1990) 11-23 at 15.

⁸² Williams, "The nature of the sacrament," *Signs of Faith, Hope and Love* 40.

pilgrimage to the Father who will finally be "our Light and Life and our Eternal Home."

The experience of prayer gives us more than a hint that the epitome of constitutive communication is what constitutes the divine self-meaning as the Trinity of Persons whose entire existence without remainder is to be in relationship to each other. Picking up on this hint, we may begin to grasp that the totality of human history is to integrate the created universe into the constitutive communication of the Holy Three in God.

In the hermeneutic circle in which I live out my life, what Lonergan calls our "openness as fact" — that is, our capacity to appreciate and criticize which energizes our natural freedom — is placed in the context of "openness as gift" — that is, "our fellowship ... with the Father, and with his Son, Jesus Christ" in the Holy Spirit.⁸³ Then the light which naturally empowers our appreciation and criticism of every finite good or course of action is supported and amplified by the supernatural and gracious light of the interior Master. Our human conversation gets joined to the divine, Trinitarian conversation. Our ongoing appreciation and criticism become a process of what Ignatius Loyola called "the discernment of spirits." We are integrated into a fellowship or communion of people who "have heard and seen and handled the Word of Life"; they offer us in turn a fellowship with their friends who as Persons are identical with Love and Truth itself. Christ in us, as Farrer writes, is "a power and a life moving us to practical goodness and honest speech _ [and] a light which judges our dark patches, and a mercy that forgives us our sins."⁸⁴

CULTURAL MEDIATION AND THE CLASSICAL CONTROL OF MEANING: THE WORLD OF THEORY

In another way of putting this, we can say that in a conversational conception of human existence, human beings constitute themselves by asking and answering questions and living by the answers they come up with. The images, symbols, and narratives of a culture provide the

⁸³ On openness as fact, as achievement, and as gift, see Lonergan, "Openness and Religious Experience," *Collection* 198-201.

⁸⁴ Austin Farrer, *A Celebration of Faith* 209.

elemental framework or matrix for the human conversation. Constitutive conversation, or our conversation regarding our concrete solutions to the problem of living together, is framed by overarching cultural stories that set the context for modes of social cooperation in social institutions, roles, and tasks. Constitutive communication for human beings is having conversations and living in the light of stories.

The fact that the conversation we are always holding with ourselves takes place in social space and cultural time complicates matters inasmuch as cultures advance from global and compact ways of asking and answering question to more clear and differentiated ways.

As Lonergan says, "The higher culture develops reflective techniques that operate on the mediate operations (with respect to what is represented or signified by imagination, language, and symbols) in an effort to safeguard meaning."⁸⁵ So, for example, the ordinary persuasiveness by which we sort out our options in human living develops into an art of rhetoric, which reflects upon the performance of persuasion to compare and classify kinds, and to specify the functions and requirements affecting argumentation, composition, and style. Thus, the *deliberative* rhetoric appropriate to members of a lawmaking assembly will have its own proper objects and reasoning and purposes that simply do not match those of *juridical* rhetoric to be used before tribunals of judges, or those of *epideictic* rhetoric suitable for the public at large.⁸⁶

But much more importantly for the development of Western culture, the act of resistance to public disorder that emerged in Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle in fourth century Athens introduced a profound modification of rhetoric in the distinction between the sophist and the philosopher. This contrast made constitutive communication a theme because the philosopher, as a lover of wisdom, insisted that persuasive speech be attuned to the true and the truly good. By the Socratic discovery of the What-question which sought true and certain knowledge of things by their universal and necessary causes, the Greeks erected the logical ideal of science with its core of apodictic proof into the standard against which rhetorical persuasion was to be judged, by way of dialectic as the theory of merely probable argumentation.

⁸⁵ Bernard Lonergan, *Method in Theology* 28.

⁸⁶ See Roland Barthes, *La Retorica antica*, Paolo Fabbri, trans. (Milan: Bompiani 1972) esp. 85.

This way of adjudicating “the more basic differences between worlds mediated by meaning”⁸⁷ introduces the distinction between the world of common sense and the world of theory; thus Western culture arrived at a new stage of meaning⁸⁸ which has made available all the resources of what Lonergan has termed the “classical control of meaning.”⁸⁹

CHRISTIAN TRADITION AND THE CLASSICAL CONTROL OF MEANING

In the case of the Christian tradition, the images, symbols, and stories of Jesus and of those in fellowship with him who strove to communicate his meanings and values to others inevitably are exposed to distortions and attempts to domesticate their import in ways that betray the original intentions. But they also lead to efforts called forth in response to derailed meanings and values, efforts to clarify just what meanings and values are central to a specifically Christian identity, and what meanings are beside the point. In both cases, the articulation of Christian identity undergoes sea-change as it defines what it is over against what it is not.

At the heart of Christian identity are the constitutive and communicative meanings and values involved in people's existential relationship with the Lord Jesus. Although it is never adequately reducible to being lived out individually and communally in any organized form, — be it doctrine, or concordant testimony, or cultic practices — still we must not think of these constitutive and communicative processes in terms of the voluntarist and privatized religious convictions dominant in the West today.

It is evident, for example, that the Trinitarian character of Christian religious experience was not just a private affair. Indeed, the thrust of Christian Trinitarian belief was to radicalize the break with the cosmological symbolizations of Mesopotamian and Egyptian religions already at work in Jewish life as lived in the presence of a God who takes the initiative and strikes a covenant. Therefore, besides the normative definition of true communal belief, also at stake in the

⁸⁷ Lonergan, *Method in Theology* 29.

⁸⁸ *Ibid* 85-99 on the stages of meaning.

⁸⁹ On classical vs. modern control of meaning, see *Ibid* 29.

Trinitarian and Christological controversies of the fourth and fifth centuries is the demystification of the cosmos and of Caesar as the image of God on earth.

In their practical effectiveness and their social construction of reality, Jews and Christians both are engaged in a de-sacralization of the forces of the cosmos. But like Jewish faith, Christianity involves not merely a shift from undifferentiated cosmological control of meaning to a logically schooled anthropological control (which entails the capacity to get beyond the constraints of anthropomorphic symbolisms in the effort to let God be God), as occurred paradigmatically in the rise of Greek philosophy.

But they are soteriological movements as well. Christians are called to face the de-sacralized, secular realm in a healing way. Nevertheless, as a community or communities committed to Jesus, early Christianity was alien and in exile from its Jewish matrix and from the world to which it understood itself to be sent.

As I have said, then, Christianity's deepest meanings and values displace and render problematic existing sacral and political structures. Christianity necessarily starts out as utopian and diaspora-like — aspects of its being that J. B. Metz likes to emphasize in stressing its apocalyptic character. Its challenging message causes it to be exposed to rejection and hostility. As time goes on, Christianity has to relate its common experience of Jesus in quite complex ways to the cult, law, and scriptures of Israel and to the meanings and values proper to what Eric Voegelin has called the "ecumenic age."⁹⁰ It has to generate a public, social, identifiable context through institutional, narrative, and practical norms. And so over time there do eventually emerge networks of 'apostolic churches' with rites of initiation, eucharistic fellowship, and gradually their own scriptural canon. These 'valid signs,' to apply David Jones's terms again, are both engendered by, and create the conditions for communication between Christians. For, in fact, Christianity, as "a 'rival' world of interlocking and supportive communities,"⁹¹ lives in and through constitutive communication.

⁹⁰ See Volume IV of Voegelin's *Order and History* (5 volumes [Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University 1956-1987]): *The Ecumenic Age*, 1974.

⁹¹ See Rowan Williams, "Does it make sense to speak of pre-Nicene Orthodoxy?" *The Making of Orthodoxy. Essays in Honor of Henry Chadwick*. R. Williams, ed. (Cambridge University 1989) 14.

The bedrock of Christian communication is dramatic. As Rowan Williams tells us so perceptively:

What the canonical normative tradition suggests is a mode of preaching in which the priority is less the communication of principles and injunctions than the bringing of the hearer into 'dramatic' relation with the subject of the story — offering the hearer a new self-definition determined by his or her stance towards Jesus, offering a place within the story itself, as a recipient of forgiveness and of judgment, as colluding with the betrayal of Jesus and sharing in the power of the risen Lord. As in the Deuteronomic formulae of the Old Testament, the addressee of the words uttered in the narrative past is the hearer in the actual present.⁹²

But in order for that drama to preserve its saving difference from other social and cultural meanings and values, Christianity had to be concerned with the *cognitive* function of meaning⁹³ — precisely for the sake of safeguarding the efficacy of its constitutive and communicative functions. To quote Williams again:

there is more growth to be undergone towards the stature of Christ, and the hearing of the story is part of the work of Christ's 'spirit' generating that growth. But for that hearing to go on being a hearing of the *same* story, canons of authorization are necessary for those who tell it or enact it; otherwise the story loses its distance or differences, and so its converting power, by becoming simply a story I choose to tell myself.⁹⁴

If we can agree with Williams that the relationship of believer to the Lord "continues to be *constituted* by historical mediations — gospel and canon, sacrament, succession, communion, debate and exchange, with all the ambiguities involved in the life of historical and visible social realities, the problems of power and guilt and forgetfulness," it is no less true that historically Christian concern for the cognitive function of meaning that tells us what is to be believed has in the conciliar period availed itself of the classical control of meaning. In other words, in its quest for identity, the Christian community has moved from repetition of symbol and narrative to reflection upon propositional truth; it moved from the world of common sense into the world of theory, pushed by the logically schooled character of the conflicts that began to arise in its teaching and preaching. Questions of such acuity

⁹² *Ibid* 15-16.

⁹³ Lonergan, *Method in Theology* 76-77.

⁹⁴ Williams, "Does it make sense ...?" *The Making of Orthodoxy* 16.

and precision were being raised that they could not be adequately answered on the basis of statements within the canonical scriptures alone. Concern for Christian identity therefore brought about a more differentiated preoccupation with the Word of God as true.⁹⁵ As a result, the Trinitarian and Christological controversies ushered in the transition from *canon* to *creed* as a crucial criterion for the interpretation of Christian meanings and values.

For our present theme — namely, the foundations of constitutive communication — this great shift by which Christians concentrate upon the scriptural affirmations as true is of great moment. It marks the entry of Christian constitutive communication — however modestly — into the world of theory in which the exigencies of the pure, detached, and disinterested desire to know, and to know the truth for its own sake, hold sway. Thus, Christianity is shown to be not only patient of differentiations of consciousness, but there grows up the specifically Christian tradition of *studium* or intellectual life in which the love of learning and the love of God (to use Dom Jean Leclerc's wonderful title) mutually mediate each other. Here we may point with some pride to the tradition of Christian education that reaches from Clement of Alexandria and Origen through Augustine and his *de doctrina Christiana* down to the founding of the medieval universities. But, more specifically, we have to link the Yes and No of the dogmas with Augustine's preoccupation with *veritas*, and reflect that the Aristotelian *bios theoretikos* as the highest and most choiceworthy life can be sublated by the 'spirituality' of the Christian.

Human conversation as impelled by appreciation and criticism has been inserted into the Christian conversation. As Christian that conversation is made possible by the record and image of Jesus himself as "a parabolic story [— in the sense of a "realistic secular narrative inviting the reader to 'find an identity' within it"⁹⁶], yet remembered in diverse and less than wholly coherent narrative forms."⁹⁷ As parabolic story, Jesus appears "as a questioning and converting presence in ever more diverse cultures and periods." Together with the Spirit poured out within us the meanings and values of Jesus have a constitutive impact on our lives.

⁹⁵ On the "Word of God as Truth" see chapter three of Frederick E. Crowe, SJ, *Theology of the Christian Word. A Study in History* (New York: Paulist 1978) 43-57.

⁹⁶ Williams, "Does it make sense ...?" *The Making of Orthodoxy* 16.

⁹⁷ *Ibid* 17.

Thus Christianity is a tradition of dramatic import, operating by “shared attention to the questioning story of a crucified and resurrected Lord,”⁹⁸ but it has transgressed the world of common sense and been provoked to a differentiated attention, in wondering how that story may be assimilated in diverse social spaces and cultural times without losing its cognitive identity. In this way, Christianity has added a differentiated concern for cognitive meaning to its variegated performance of constitutive and communicative meaning.

By entering the world of theory, a differentiated quest for understanding has been set loose, and the task of “accounting for the hope that is in you” can then only be fulfilled by explanatory hypotheses that stretch imagination beyond its normal limits. And so in the interplay of credal formulae within a dogmatic theological context and the desire to understand the intelligibility of the revealed mysteries, however inadequately, there arises within the Christian trajectory of meaning a tradition of speculative — or what later on comes to be called ‘systematic’ — theology.

Within this stream rather differentiated questions regarding the central Christian mystery of the Trinity emerge, in a way that both goes beyond catechetical understanding and is ultimately intended to enrich that understanding. This is the context within which Augustine, in order to provide a commentary on the Prologue to John’s Gospel that would avoid subordinationism or Arianism, surpassed the traditional Stoic distinction between the *verbum prolatum* and the *verbum insitum* to distinguish further between the *verbum insitum* which is human rationality and a *verbum intus prolatum* that proceeds within rational consciousness. In this way he arrived at the first analogy for the Trinitarian processions that was not based on an intrinsically material kind of being. This psychological analogy was assumed by Thomas Aquinas in his theorizing about the Trinity and perfected with the help not only of Aristotle but with his own practice of introspection. And in our century Lonergan has retrieved Aquinas’s psychological findings, as well as his systematic theology of the Trinity.

⁹⁸ *Ibid* 18.

CHRISTIAN TRADITION AND THE MODERN CONTROL OF MEANING: THE WORLD OF INTERIORITY

Now I mention this history of Christian theology and its long grapple with the mystery of the Trinity because it is directly relevant to the foundations of constitutive communication. But in order for that relevance to be properly shown, we have to make clear that Lonergan has helped Christian theology make another cultural transition: the passage from the response to the systematic exigence for understanding by which theology entered the world of theory, to the response called forth by Christian theology in its need to integrate the differentiated worlds of common sense and of theory, to face the emergence of historical mindedness and the integrity of historical-critical method, and to "pick up the pieces" after the breakdown of the classical mediation of meaning.

For Lonergan, the third stage of meaning calls for the full-scale entry into the world of interiority in an explanatory manner. Interiority is not something new to ancient and Christian tradition, because mystics and theologians had entered it at least performatively and descriptively long before the advent of the third stage of meaning. Lonergan claims, for instance, that Aristotle could not have gotten so many facts about knowing so right had he not practiced introspection in a major way. Augustine did it in a descriptive fashion in working out his reply to the Academic skeptics; and he could not have written his *Confessions* or books VIII to XV of the *de Trinitate* unless he was an adept at introspective reflection. The great sixteenth-century Carmelite mystics also made performative entry, thematizing their experience in either poetic or metaphysical terms. So too did Ignatius Loyola in his subtle yet utterly down-to-earth *Spiritual Exercises*. Newman did so dramatically in his *Apologia pro vita sua* and began to approximate a theoretic mode in the *Grammar of Assent*. Lonergan himself — prompted by the extraordinary fruit borne by performative achievements in Ignatius and Newman, and in Aristotle, Augustine, and Aquinas — has not only entered, but explored and explanatorily thematized this world of interiority.

Lonergan's own achievement, however, was conditioned by the massive development of the modern sciences and "the clarification of more general issues by philosophic inquiries and debates," which in turn were made possible by "a prior evolution of language and

literature and ... the security and leisure generated by technological, economic, and political advance."⁹⁹

For Lonergan the explicitation of the world of interiority means formulating "the nature of the originating subject" not only beyond the *truncated* subject of Descartes, Locke, Hobbes, and Hume, and beyond the *immanentist* subject of Rousseau and Kant and Idealists generally, but also beyond the *alienated* subject of Freud, Nietzsche, Heidegger and the deconstructionists and genealogists.

Lonergan attributes his capacity to reach adequate self-knowledge to 'the luck' of having been educated in the stream where Plato's, Aristotle's, Augustine's, and Thomas Aquinas's achievements invited him as an inquirer intent on understanding them to make his own. Now under the auspices of Pope Leo XIII's 1879 encyclical *Aeterni Patris* that exhorted Catholic philosophers and theologians to operate *ad mentem divi Thomae*, many people had undertaken to do this. Yet now, in the wake of the virtual drying up of that tradition since Vatican II, it becomes evident how unique Lonergan's return to Aquinas was. Why? Because Lonergan formulated his question regarding Thomas Aquinas's psychological analogy for the Trinity in such a way that he was compelled to enter not just Aquinas's world of theory, but the world of interiority as well: "More specifically," he writes in the Epilogue to *Verbum*, "my purpose has been to understand what Aquinas meant by the intelligible procession of an inner word."¹⁰⁰ As far as I know, no other Thomist has asked precisely this question. But what is more important for our purposes here is Lonergan's explicit recognition of the performance required in order to answer his precise question:

Now to understand what Aquinas meant and to understand as Aquinas understood, are one and the same thing: for acts of meaning are inner words, and inner words proceed intelligibly from acts of understanding. Further, the acts of understanding in turn result from empirical data illuminated by agent intellect; and the relevant data for the meaning of Aquinas are the written words of Aquinas. Inasmuch as one may suppose that one already possesses a habitual understanding similar to that of Aquinas, no method or effort is needed to understand as Aquinas understood; one simply has to read, and the proper acts of understanding and meaning will follow. But one may not be ready to make that assumption on one's own behalf. Then one has to learn. Only by the slow, repetitious, circular labor of going over and over the data,

⁹⁹ Lonergan, *Insight* 535.

¹⁰⁰ Lonergan, *Verbum* 215.

by catching here a little insight and there another, by following through false leads and profiting from many mistakes, by continuous adjustments and cumulative changes of one's initial suppositions and perspectives and concepts, can one hope to attain such a development of one's own understanding as to hope to understand what Aquinas understood and meant. Such is the method I employed.¹⁰¹

Why is Lonergan's Aquinas-inspired entry into the world of interiority, by which we use the structure of our conscious intentionality as conscious to discover just what its own formally dynamic structure is, so important? Because Aquinas, in reaching a refinement in his account of rational consciousness — the *emanatio intelligibilis* — that made explicit what Augustine could only suggest,¹⁰² uncovered the heart of constitutive communication.

APPROPRIATED INTERIORITY AND THE HEART OF CONSTITUTIVE COMMUNICATION

Performatively, constitutive communication means "reciprocally opening ourselves to others, appreciating them, considering them, putting ourselves in the way of feeling the pull of their humanity, and being willing to act in accordance with our resulting sense of that person."¹⁰³ I am proposing that in order to discover the foundations of constitutive communication, we should enter the world of interiority with Aquinas and Lonergan to answer as adequately as it is presently possible the three basic questions about conversation: what are we doing when we are really understanding? What are we doing when we are speaking authentically? What are we doing when we are truly listening to and dedicating ourselves to — or, in Farrer's term — 'regarding' — one another?

How shall we do this? We will have to move from these performances ingredient in constitutive communication to a reflection upon what is actually going on, asking exactly what structures are

¹⁰¹ *Ibid* 215-216.

¹⁰² *Ibid* xiii.

¹⁰³ This formulation comes from Austin Farrer's discussion of 'regard' in "A Moral Argument for the Existence of God," *Reflective Faith. Essays in Philosophical Theology*. Charles C. Conti, ed. (London: SPCK 1972) 114-133 at 121.

actually at work in those performances. In one of the most remarkable statements he ever made, Lonergan put his finger on the root issue: "We know by what we are; we know we know by knowing what we are; and since even the knowing in 'knowing what we are' is by what we are, rational reflection on ourselves is a duplication of ourselves."¹⁰⁴

We will be exercising our pure quality of intellectual light in inquiry, in acts of insight into phantasm, in acts of defining thought, in acts of reflective reasoning and understanding, in acts of judgment both of fact and of value, and by introspection — a heightening of self-awareness — we will discern this quality as an "inner nisus towards the infinite," as an "undying restlessness and absolute exigence" of the human mind and heart that reveals "a dynamic orientation, a natural desire, that nothing short of that unknown vision can satisfy utterly."¹⁰⁵ This uncovering of the native openness by which we are most ourselves is the focusing upon and allowing to hold greater sway in us of a tension which acts as a "potentially boundless base" for knowledge, love, constitutive communication. This felt or experienced tension, as Lonergan writes, "is between our immanent intellectual light and the uncreated Light that is the object of its groping and straining."¹⁰⁶ "It is also," he adds, "the most convincing sample in us of the stuff of which the Author of the universe and of our minds consists."

In our effort to grasp what lies at the basis of authentic conversation and constitutive communication, therefore, we reflect on the enactment of 'the created participation in uncreated Light' that makes us what we are as persons constituting ourselves through asking and answering questions, and making decisions in light of the answers we attain. Whenever we truly understand, "the inner word of definition is the expression of an insight into phantasm, and the insight is the goal towards which the wonder of inquiry tends."¹⁰⁷ Again, whenever we truly know, "the inner word of judgment is the expression of a reflective act of understanding, and that reflective act is the goal towards which critical wonder tends."

The key to this process of reflection is the actuation of awareness and the realization that as we come to know and decide, our awareness changes in quality. On the level of direct understanding, there is "the

¹⁰⁴ Lonergan, *Verbum* 88-89.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid* 89.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid* 90.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid* 94.

awareness of intelligence, of what strives to understand, of what is satisfied by understanding, of what formulates the understood, not as a schoolboy repeating by rote a definition, but as one that defines because he grasps." On the level of reflective understanding there is the awareness of reasonableness, "of a single law of utmost generality, the law of sufficient reason, where the sufficient reason is the unconditioned." Demanding the unconditioned, rational consciousness "advances to a grasp of the unconditioned _ [and] terminates in the rational compulsion by which grasp of the unconditioned commands assent."¹⁰⁸ On the level of deliberation and evaluation, there is conscious freedom and conscientious responsibility. Responsible consciousness affirms things as worth while for sufficient reasons grounded in an apprehension of value by our intentional responses, or otherwise it suffers the pangs of an unhappy conscience.¹⁰⁹

WISDOM IN THE THIRD STATE OF MEANING: THE APPROPRIATION OF INTERIORITY AS CONVERSATIONAL

To reach an elucidation of the foundations of constitutive communication, therefore, demands a heightening of the tension which is the core of authenticity. Our consciousness is stretched out between the poles of what is highest in us and what in God is most like us, and to appropriate reflectively that tension is wisdom. This wisdom in us is accidental, since we do not need to or have to acquire it; and it is acquired, if at all, only gradually. As Lonergan says, "Toward it we are moved in a dialectical oscillation, envisaging more clearly now one pole, and now another, with each addition to either at once throwing more light on the other and raising further questions with regard to it."¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁸ Lonergan, *Insight* 322.

¹⁰⁹ Lonergan, *Method in Theology* 35.

¹¹⁰ Lonergan, *Verbum* 90.

APPROPRIATION OF INTERIORITY AS CONVERSATIONAL AND TRINITARIAN

Because this wisdom in fact is situated in the midst of a specifically Christian tradition of thought, we need to absorb and digest the way that seeking and finding the foundation of constitutive communication in the human being as *imago Dei* is linked inextricably with the mystery of the Trinity: "In the measure one grasps the character and implication of the act by which intellectual light reflects by intellectual light upon intellectual light to understand itself and to pronounce its universal validity, in that measure one grasps one of the two outstanding analogies to the procession of an infinite Word from an infinite Understanding."¹¹¹

Remember that Aquinas and Lonergan were drawn to appropriating the human wisdom entailed by the appropriation of rational self-consciousness for the sake of attaining "the limited but most fruitful understanding that can be attained when reason operates in the light of faith."¹¹² In our faith that the Son is sent to us by the Father and that the Holy Spirit is sent to us by the Father and the Son, we know that there somehow are intelligible relations of origin or processions in God. The psychological analogy helps us to understand "that the divine Word as proceeding is because of divine understanding as uttering, that divine Love as proceeding is because of divine goodness and understanding and Word as spirating." Once we have an analogy that "truly gives a deeper insight into what God is," we are in a position to elaborate a systematic theology of the divine missions in history that would illuminate the structure of the historical process by which God elevates the human community into the divine conversation. I would insist that future Christian political theology would require such a Trinitarian systematics as an irreplaceable component. But here, we must be content with some reflections on the foundations of constitutive communication.

The wisdom elaborated here, then, is a prolongation of natural theology.¹¹³ It is a natural theology whose concrete possibility as actuated in Aquinas and Lonergan was concretely conditioned by revealed truths, but which is in principle attainable by the natural

¹¹¹ *Ibid* 87.

¹¹² *Ibid* 208.

¹¹³ *Ibid*.

light of our intellects. Even so, its so-called natural attainment would require the existence of an intellectual probity on our part that is virtually impossible to reach on a habitual basis. As Lonergan puts it, we have "come to the end of the age of innocence, the age that assumed that human authenticity could be taken for granted."¹¹⁴ Concretely, our desire for intellectual probity gets met with the sorry influence upon us of ideologies of success and resentment from without and collusion and rationalization from within. We are in need of redemption in the serious sense of an absolutely supernatural solution to the problem of sin. In order for our intellectual honesty to become operative habitually, we need what Lonergan described as "the experience of a community, in which faith and hope and charity dissolve rationalizations, and reconcile the estranged and the alienated, and there is reaped 'the harvest of the Spirit that is _ love, joy, peace, patience, kindness, goodness, fidelity, gentleness, and self-control' (Gal 5:22)."¹¹⁵

Within the experience of this community, then, there is made concretely possible not just the appropriation of the norms which are immanent and operative in our conscious intentionalities, but "a further wisdom attained through the supernatural light of faith, when the humble surrender of our own light to the self-revealing uncreated Light makes the latter the loved law of all our assents."¹¹⁶

This supernatural wisdom, as Lonergan says, "is a gift of the Holy Spirit, making us docile to His movements in which, even perceptibly, one may be '*non solum discens sed patiens divina*.'"¹¹⁷ In *Method* he speaks of this as an "experienced fulfillment of our unrestricted thrust to self-transcendence," or mystical experience: "an actuated orientation towards the mystery of love and awe."¹¹⁸ Once we receive this gift, the dialectic between finite and divine poles of our minds and hearts gets shifted into the rhythms of love as complacency and love as concern.¹¹⁹

The complacency we may experience on account of the gift of God's love Lonergan discusses briefly in referring to Thomas Aquinas's

¹¹⁴ Lonergan, *A Third Collection* 156.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid* 33.

¹¹⁶ Lonergan, *Verbum* 91.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid*.

¹¹⁸ Lonergan, *Method in Theology* 115.

¹¹⁹ See Frederick E. Crowe, SJ, "Complacency and Concern in the Thought of Thomas Aquinas," *Theological Studies* 20 (1959) 1-39; 198-230; 343-395.

Commentary in *Psalmos*¹²⁰ where he expounds Psalm 33:9: *Gustate et videte quoniam suavis est Dominus* — Taste and see how the Lord is sweet:

“Taste” refers to inner experience, to an *experientia consortii divini*; it supplies the *memoria* in act. “See” refers to a consequent judgment, to a *certitudo intellectus*; it supplies the inner word. “How the Lord is sweet” refers to the second effect of experience, the ineffable act of love, the *securitas affectus*.¹²¹

But since our religious conversion is ordinarily not a matter of a momentary shift to perfection, but a life-time battle against our unauthenticity, the gift of the Holy Spirit unfolds mainly in the mode of love as concern. Concern must get over “barriers to purification, barriers to enlightenment, barriers to loving God above all and our neighbor as ourselves.”¹²² In the process we consult and interpret our feelings of spiritual dismay and spiritual elation¹²³ to see how they are related to the pulls and counterpulls that are the affective results of the inner light:

there is a pull or attraction that, if followed, puts an end to questioning; and there are counterpulls that, when followed, leave questions unanswered and conscience ill at ease. The former alternative is what Voegelin means by a movement luminous with truth, or again by existing in the truth. The latter is existence in untruth. As he contends, this luminosity of existence with the truth of reason precedes all opinions and decisions about the pull to be followed. Moreover, it remains alive as the judgment of truth in existence whatever opinions about it we may actually form. In other words, there is an inner light that runs before the formulation of doctrines and that survives even despite opposing doctrines. To follow that inner light is life, even though to worldly eyes it is to die. To reject that inner light is to die, even though the world views one’s attainments and achievements.¹²⁴

¹²⁰ (Venice: 1775) 334.

¹²¹ Lonergan *Verbum*, 93; also note 214.

¹²² Lonergan *A Third Collection*, 236.

¹²³ *Ibid* 237.

¹²⁴ *ibid* 190.

CONSTITUTIVE COMMUNICATION AND EXISTENCE IN TRUTH

Constitutive communication, then, is communication consonant with the movement luminous with truth. Concretely, it is threatened by the objective falsehood of what today is called 'structural sin,' as well as by our own complicity with the counterpulls. Just as concretely, constitutive communication is placed in the setting of a twofold pull and a twofold grace. The twofold pull: "being drawn by the Father, listening to him, learning from him, and being drawn by the Son, crucified, dead, and risen." The twofold grace: "an inner operative grace that plucks out hearts of stone and replaces them with hearts of flesh; and the outer graces of the Christian tradition that brings the gospel to our ears."¹²⁵

When conceived comprehensively in light of the existential realities of sin and grace, constitutive communication is located from the Christian perspective in the context of personal relationships with Father, Son, and Spirit of the divine Trinity. The general relationship of all created things to God, and the specific relationship of creatures with the created light of intelligence, reasonableness, and responsibility to uncreated Light shifts consciously into interpersonal relationships with the Holy Three. This means that constitutive communication becomes transformed by the real effects of the Trinitarian missions of the Son and the Spirit by the Father; and the network of Trinitarian relationships constitutive of divine Self-meaning becomes the framework or home within which human persons exist in truth.

The divine relationship of Father to the Son becomes ours in the gift of divine adoption. Now for us to live is to share in the mission of the Incarnate Word on earth. Similarly, the divine relationship of Son to Father specifies our destiny eschatologically: our end is the divine Homecoming with the Son to the Father in the gift of the light of vision. We understand and affirm all this because of the incarnation of God's true judgment of value in the Word made flesh in the living, suffering, dying, and rising Jesus of Nazareth. But the degree to which we find ourselves pulled almost magnetically to the incarnate Meaning of the Son, is caused within us by the gift by which the Father and the Son both "spirate" the Holy Spirit and pour out that personal Love into

¹²⁵ *Ibid* 195.

our hearts in grace. And just as the Holy Spirit is personal relation to the Father and the Son, so we too are oriented towards and respond to their drawing us by the Spirit's gift of charity, faith, and hope. By them we share in that personal relationship of the Spirit to the Father and the Son.

This conscious integration of our individual and collective self-meaning — that is, of our constitutive communication — into the Trinitarian relationships, makes our lives continuations of the mission of the Son and the mission of the Spirit. Just as the Son had to move from serene and ineffable possession of the end of human living into learning how to communicate that ineffable end to us human beings in human terms, so we move from the gifts of charity, faith, and hope towards incarnating the meanings and values of Jesus in our concrete living. Full of the Spirit of the Father's and his own personal Love for us and all creation, Jesus "conspires" with the Father to pour out that Spirit upon all humankind, first in an incognito fashion by simply offering that Spirit to all people within the depths of their hearts; and then in an unveiled way by the eucharistic form of Jesus' human life, namely, of being taken, blessed, broken, and given away. The death and resurrection of Jesus reveal the Holy Spirit as the gift the Father and Son want to bestow on us, so that when the forlorn disciples on the road to Emmaus say to each other, "Were not our hearts burning within us when he opened to us the scriptures?" we recognize the working of the Holy Spirit in them and in ourselves.

SUMMARY OF THE THEOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIVE COMMUNICATION

Since this is just a sketch of the theological foundations of constitutive communication, we cannot go into the 'spirituality' implied by Christian existence as a prolongation of the missions of Son and Spirit. We can only now recall briefly what has been set forth here and indicate a future line of development.

Our point of departure has been the conversational structure of the dramatic artistry of human existence in relation to the aesthetic liberation and artistic creativity of which it is susceptible. We saw that the key, both phenomenologically and ontologically, of the conversational structure of dramatic artistry is the human heart and mind as a 'created participation in uncreated Light.' Humanly

structured conscious intentionality unfolds over time in sense experience, inquiry, insights into phantasms, expressions of our understandings, critical reflection, examining and grasping the sufficiency of the evidence, and judgments of fact and value, grounding decisions and actions as more or less luminous. It is the concrete possibility of Pascal's *grandeur et misere* that is humankind. In the concrete, that unfolding of the dynamism of conscious intentionality is the key to the human projects of radical self-honesty and justice among human beings, on the one hand. But on the other, to the extent that people have used their liberty to be irresponsible, unreasonable, unintelligent, and inattentive, there is the build-up of social and cultural absurdity and evil. The human conversation breaks down, and it ceases to flourish to such an extent that it requires divine intervention to be redeemed. For Christians that divine intervention is experienced in the revelatory encounter with Jesus and the Holy Spirit who both turn human conversation around by the gifts of charity, faith, and hope and make us partakers in the divine conversation by which God is the Holy Three.

However, the community in Jesus and the Spirit oriented towards the Father exists in social space and cultural time. So, as human culture moved through the differentiations that constitute specifically different stages of meaning, this community did too. It had to pass into theoretically differentiated consciousness by responding to the systematic exigence of meaning in the development from scripture to creed or *symbolum* in the Conciliar movement of the first six centuries, and from *symbolum* to *summa* in the theology of the middle ages. Again, after the Enlightenment's turning of the distinction between philosophy and theology into a separation or divorce caused the rise of the critical question about human knowing opened up by the seeming abyss between the world of theory and the world of common sense, and pressed by the emergence of modern science, there has been the need for the Christian community to pass explicitly and thoroughly into the world of interiority, so that it could respond more adequately to the critical exigence of meaning. By doing so it has moved into the third stage of meaning. In the work of Lonergan in particular the need to integrate into constitutive communication the differentiations that have arisen has been faced in so far as he has responded to the methodical exigence of meaning.

Lonergan has located wisdom in the third stage of meaning illuminatingly and solidly in the unity of differentiated consciousness

or of interiority as conversational. To people who conceive of wisdom in terms of the second, classical, stage of meaning this placement of wisdom in the unity of differentiated consciousness feels like a vertigo-inducing displacement, because what the third stage allows to become altogether clear is that there are *no extrinsic criteria* by which human existence is to get its bearings. Instead there is only 'living in the Light' — the light of responsibility and reason which is a 'created participation in uncreated Light'; and the light of faith, which is the eyes of unrestricted being-in-love with God.

In order to live up to the level of the times, therefore, constitutive communication has to appropriate the unity of differentiated consciousness as conversational interiority. Similarly, the theology by which Christianity mediates between itself and the cultures in which it is embedded, has to become methodically controlled and functionally specialized. In indirect discourse it listens or responds to the historical meanings and values of Christian revelation not only in prayer and liturgy, but by the specialties of research, interpretation, history, and dialectics. Not content to listen, but empowered and commanded to communicate, it is challenged to speak and act in direct discourse by the specialties of foundations, doctrines, systematics, and communications.

But since theology is not the full science of human being, it has to enter into collaboration with the humane and social sciences. As itself integrated with scholarly and social sciences, theology would help apply dialectic in the historical and social sciences and in the analysis of social process.¹²⁶ In collaboration with the relevant sciences, theology would help to develop policies and plans to be carried out in a manner that respects both social and political subsidiarity and the self-correcting processes of learning. Just as the Christian community has to be both learning (*discens*) and teaching (*docens*), so too do the policy-making and planning functions in a polity.

Constitutive communication today has to be both differentiated and theologically transformed — not in the sense of the imposition of one religious body's tenets on a pluralistic society, but in the sense of the concrete mediation of religious and personal values into the *civilis conversatio*. This would of course require the development of a political culture in society where meanings and values irreducible to the

¹²⁶ Lonergan, *Method in Theology* 365.

Machiavellian limits of 'effectual truth' enter into the public sphere of conversation.

Liberal democracy at its best is open to the development of such a political culture, and has ambiguously pointed to it as a condition of its own possibility. That "Publius" is the speaker of *The Federalist* indicates a concern for public interest and civic virtue in a fashion that cannot be reduced to the limits of the self-regarding. In the traditional American ways of presenting the laws and trying to make provisions for an educated public, our nation has manifested a historic concern for the cultivation of the kind of political culture which engages in civil conversation as envisaged in these pages.

On the other hand, "Publius" was also a student of classical liberal political economy, the processes of which have in fact been less ambiguously Machiavellian. And so our Constitution is also designed in accord with the economistic slant built into Montesquieu's vision of the large commercial republic based on the emancipation of greed and ambition, and on Adam Smith's conception of a natural system of liberty that presupposes the automatic coordination of self-interested production and exchange exclusively by the sub-political workings of the market. So in tension with the higher view of republican and democratic politics enshrined in our Constitution, there is also the tendency to reduce political culture by subordinating politics, law, and education to the exigencies of economics. And so, I shall need to examine the spheres of law, economics and education in the light of primacy of constitutive communication.

SPIRITUALITY AND THE PRIMACY OF THE DRAMATIC PATTERN OF LIVING

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PART ONE: HOW ARE WE SAVED

It is generally assumed that soteriology, the doctrine of salvation through Christ, presupposes Christology, the doctrine that states who and what Christ is. This is quite logical. It is only because he is a divine person that his life as a human being is salvific. But this order conceals another, inverse order. Existentially, dramatically, Jesus only becomes known to be a divine person through the experience of his disciples as they are drawn into his life in its climactic moment on the cross and beyond. In other words, while the doctrine of salvation depends on the doctrine of Christ's divinity, the confession of his divinity comes out of the experience of being saved. A doctrine of salvation dependent on a doctrine of Christ's divinity is becoming sterile for lack of the inverse, subject-centered order.

But what is the experience of being saved? And, instead of getting bogged down in the analysis of contemporary salvation experiences, let us ask: What *was* the experience of being saved on the part of the disciples? And let us avoid all dichotomy between experience and its interpretation, and ask: What was the first, the primary, interpretation, or shared understanding and judgment, by these men and women, of what had happened and was growingly happening to them and to their world?

First, then, who was Jesus for them as they came to know him? He was some sort of a claimant on their allegiance, with the category of Messiah the one readiest to hand. But we have to get beyond this image, dependent on a particular tradition and shared history, and set this influence of Jesus in a wider and deeper human context. We are led to this not just through psychological interest, but because, in Jesus' experience, God was the core of psychology, and the question is: What would be the impression made, on people whose attention he had secured and held, of a person for whom the being we call God and pray to when we

remember to do so, is the world he lives in, his total environment as a person? Since God *is* the mystery in which we live, and because of which alone we exist at all, the effect of this God-intimate person will be to evoke *in them* whatever it is in all of us that *knows* our total dependence on the mystery. The God-intimate person awakes in his intimates *their own* sense that they exist in God alone.

I say 'whatever it is' in us that 'knows' what Jesus knows overwhelmingly, because it is highly mysterious, even more mysterious than what we call the unconscious. What is our *cognitive* witness to our groundedness in mystery? Eric Voegelin has based volumes of history-of-consciousness on the notion of such a witness, and slowly he is being recognized as quite surpassing Toynbee. Not surprisingly, surely, since his basic "tension toward the divine ground" (an awkward use of the word 'tension' on which he doggedly insisted in battles with translators) is the most summary statement possible of the human condition, the most radical elucidation of all our experience and our politics. It is the absence of this radical understanding of all that goes on between people that allows scripture scholars, and even theologians, to say that we are not in a position to know what went on in the minds of Jesus' disciples. Of course we are not in a position to know this if we are not in position — or, as Lonergan would say, "on the position," by which he means a normative, rarely fully attained, sanity of mind, which knows other minds without fuss.

So we have the contagion of the existentially God-centered person to which, being radically God-centered without realizing it, the disciples are attracted. What does this do to them, to fishermen, terrorists, prostitutes, tax-collectors? For an answer to this crucial question, I invoke the Greek patristic understanding of the Genesis story of the Fall. Radically and constitutionally 'in God' by reason of intellectual consciousness, understanding our finitude in him, we 'fall' out of this consciousness. And outside this consciousness, exiled from our true self, we see death as our ultimate horizon and our God, survival as our top priority, violence and war as justified, Machiavelli prepared for the cunning knowledge-not-from-God, the pseudo-knowledge of good and evil; we are, in short, under the reign of death, to be thematized and codified by Hobbes. Human life is "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short." Still, in an important sense, we do come, "Trailing clouds of glory," as Wordsworth says, and certainly we lose ourselves in the mazes of a weary

bureaucracy. This is our story. This is myth, the myth of the fall, doing its job.

And this is the scene that the new man, the second Adam out of heaven, disturbs by making vivid in the minds of ordinary people a world he calls the Kingdom, a God-consciousness that knows no limit, and so does not know the reign of death. The effect is to force people to see, in a perspective they barely understand, the full horror of a world where Caesar and all his power is still as large as life, and, for little people, much larger than life, imposing unpayable taxes and disfiguring the land with naked crucified bodies.

Are we surprised that they behaved wretchedly when crisis came? They were hopelessly out of their depth, not in the sense that he was 'above their heads,' (that ubiquitous cop-out phrase) but in the sense of being in God in a world that, in its own estimate, is not God's.

When Jesus falls a victim to Caesar's world, to the reign of death that is, in God's perspective, illusion, *they* fall. And a fall from what a height they have not understood until it shows itself only now in the severity of the fall from it.

We cannot begin to understand the joy of the first Easter, if we do not understand their abysmal solidarity with his fall from glory onto the cross. There is a mutual involvement there, a 'burial with him' that is *not* ritually mediated, but is his fall in their fall, their fall in his fall. The Easter sense of a rising in which *we* are involved originates in that original mutual involvement. The liturgical axiom, now so trite to our ears, that we must die with him in order to live with him, was originally coined in fear and blood. The liturgical rhythm of descent and ascent is picked up by the psyche as one 'picks up' the tune of a sublime adagio into which has gone the agony of composition and the crucifixion of acquiring technique. There is, on the other side of the wall of dogma, this quasi-sexual death-into-life on which the dogma depends. We forget this, and in our half-conscious liturgy we continue to hum the tune. And then when someone comes along and says that all we are doing is dramatizing the eternal cycles of the soul for which 'the historical Jesus' is expendable, we capitulate, as did the disciples themselves. We are always ready to run away from ourselves. There are so many interesting questions to run after.

That mutual involvement in the fall out of glory is something I have been dancing around for years, I now realize. The genius of Augustine having taken the drama out of our fallenness deprived me of the mythos in which to set the scenario for the crucifixion. But put the reign of death in place of Augustine's sin transmitted by sexual intercourse, and the drama of Calvary comes to life and scatters all but the protagonists — and their very scattering is their replication, their mimesis, of *his* fall into the hands of 'the brutal soldiery.' This is the place to take the measure of that whole style of the Challoner Stations of the Cross on which my generation's piety was brought up, which, God knows quite why, we still use at Downside — for the Old Boys!

Challoner's text, like the conventional Passion Play at the start of the film *Jesus of Montreal*, is a dramatization of the dogma of salvation-through-blood — Jesus receives the cross "with meekness, nay with a secret joy, for it is the instrument with which he is to redeem the world." These words are obscenely true: dogma, after all, *is* 'off-scene,' it comes *out of* the drama. To turn it back into drama is to obtrude the off-scene, the obscene, onto the stage. (And the priest in Arcand's film who was prepared to put on that play every year must have felt phony, because he had, in his youth, been in 'show-biz' and emulated Olivier.)

The serene certainty of Easter comes of *that* feeling one with the risen one which is only possible because of the involvement, deeper than willing, with him in his fate. The disciples certainly were not "one with him in his death" in the way of prayer, *askesis*, contemplation, but in the sordid particular of self-discovery at the climax of a relationship critical for humanity, in which they happened to be the *dramatis personae*. The sense in which his death *was* theirs is a sense whose radical nature still escapes us as we try to peer through the wall of dogma to the drama because our tradition has forgotten that the drama makes the dogma, not vice-versa. And it is this sense of organic solidarity that makes it so obvious that his rising brings us with it, that its sacrament is our baptism into it, that it is the watering of a new paradise. The theme of my paper then is the reopening up of the track from the dramatic pattern of experience to doctrine.

The failure of our piety to reach the resurrection is really its failure to fall in his fall, to have fully activated in us the fall from glory, whence there is no arising but of the whole Body. Never

really losing our individuality in the Passion, we see the risen one as an individual, merely a corpse revived, in which, quite properly, we cannot believe.

This interwovenness of his 'fall' and ours suggests further reflection on the interpretation of the famous Philippians 2:6. For centuries, this early Christian hymn has been taken to be referring to Christ's descent from divinity to humanity and to the worst of humanity on the shameful cross. Latterly, another interpretation has been suggested: that Christ is the second Adam who, being in the form of God *as the first Adam was*, did not, *as the first Adam did*, regard this divinity *as his*, but lived our life truly, accepting death. But neither interpretation measures up to the reality, which is the first Adam and the second Adam in dramatic juxtaposition, in which the fall of the second Adam takes the fall of the first into a loop that takes in hell and brings all to glory. Kenosis (emptying-out) and fall do not belong, *respectively*, to Christ and to us. Christ's fall from glory *traverses* the way taken by a desperate humanity, out of paradise into the wilderness of this world.

The fall of the new Adam to a cross rehearses the fall of man in its dramatic not its conceptual understanding, the dramatic Greek-patristic understanding of it as 'the story of our life,' the fall out of God into a death-bound universe, once we understand this undistracted by the intriguing question as to *how* we fall out of God. The point is that we do, that every poet worth his salt knows that we do, and that this is the essential rhythm of humanity, the tragedy that God turns into a divine comedy. This transformation involves the coinciding of Christ's kenotic fall (in their minds, when the police arrive at the garden) with ours. Our piety has blinded us to this coinciding. But not St. Paul, who writes that "Him that knew no sin, God made sin for us that we might become the justice of God in him." Paul is, I feel, the only New Testament author who is using his brains at full stretch on the Christian experience. And the experience was there, he was stunned into it as it was already shared in a community of faith. And what was 'there' as that first, pre-sacramental involvement of men and women with Christ which was their humiliation in his, their shame in his, their fall in his, their undergoing, with him as giving full expression to it, of that fall out of glory that is the story of being human. The insistence on the descent into hell is their way of 'rubbing it in' that he has taken

us all the way through the land that the psalmist's God could not colonize.

There is ingrained in us the tendency to deny our very first Christian experience. Our first involvement with him showed us up in a way we still will not face, revealed the original sickness that had to "grow worse," as Eliot says — the denial of God implicit in the most respectable grooming of the reign of death. There is still a place in us that we will not visit, though God in Christ has been there. Only so far as we go there can we find our deeper selves in the Christian sacrament. Until we have been there, the resurrection will continue to be a myth in the Joseph Campbell museum. Perhaps we *will* not recognize how much we have hated the glory to which Jesus awoke us, when the world was all there was. Perhaps we are like people who prefer to forget what they saw of themselves and each other in a concentration camp.

We have to look in, and back, to that involvement with Christ on the other side of the of dogma which, instead of being 'a window on the mystery,' has been turned into a wall; we have to recover dramatically that original mutual involvement in the shame of the cross. A Christianity whose first participation in the death of Christ is ritual is nothing but a mystery religion.

Christ catches us in his fall out of glory into the degradation of the cross and the desolation of the underworld. This fall dramatizes our condition, fallen out of glory into a universe bounded by death. It is his self-identification with us in our shame that leaves us in no doubt of our association with him in his return to glory. We have never quite grasped this. Our inveterate activism has led us to think that it is through *our* self-identification with *him* in his Passion that we come into the risen life, whereas the more awesome truth is that it is through *his* self-identification with *us* in our degradation that we are lifted up.

Julian of Norwich understood this in her parable of the servant: God identifies himself with us in our fallenness. When I thought of Julian here, I had quite forgotten how explicit she is about the fall of Christ. Here is what she says,

When Adam fell, God's Son fell; because of the true union which was made in heaven, God's Son could not be separated from Adam, for by Adam I understand all mankind. Adam fell from life to death, into the valley of this wretched world, and after that into hell. God's Son fell with Adam, into the valley of the womb of the maiden who was the fairest daughter of Adam, and

that was to excuse Adam from blame in heaven and on earth; and powerfully he brought him out of hell.

It is this deeper rhythm of the crucifixion and resurrection, reinforced no doubt by Jesus's overt self-identification with the Suffering Servant, that so generates an originating sense of the *passivity* of Christ as to hail him as 'Lamb of God.' 'Lamb of God,' we chant wearily, untouched by the spine-tingling thrill with which early Christian converts living in an ancient Middle Eastern culture would have responded to this metaphor."¹ I shall never forget a moment during the sheep-shearing at Mount Savior Monastery, when this came to me as I looked at the animal, held upside down, the eyes puzzled and somehow neutral, as the electric sheers were driven through its thick coat of wool, to leave it naked and shivering in the spring wind. How miserable our conceptual theology is at mediating the mystery, compared with the miraculously right image! Nevertheless, the concepts depend for their life upon the right image.

What it all comes to is this. The fundamental truth about us is not, as Luther thought, our sinfulness, which Christ cannot share. It is our lostness to God in the realm of death, which he can and does share. Sin is our unintelligible negative response to our death-bound condition, our "Yes, this *is* all, God is not!" This exactly fits that Greek-patristic reading of the great Romans text: through an original sin — unintelligible — we are fallen into the world with death for its ultimate horizon, *because of which (eph ho)* all sin, all *accept* death as God. Death-as-ultimate-horizon lets sin make as much sense as sin can make, though the final acceptance of untranscendence by the self-transcending self remains an awful, unintelligible mystery, a black hole in the soul. And 'making sense' in this perverse way, death-as-horizon *is* the fundamental truth about us, death as final limit and not sin. So Christ gets *under* us, whose sin is more shallow than this dark environment which tempts us into sin. Thus, as I say, Julian of Norwich sees *deeper* than sin to this lostness in the world which Christ shares, thereby 'taking us in his fall' up to the heights of God.

This understanding of our salvation explains why recovering alcoholics and other victims of addiction seem to have a more contemplative access to the healing Christ, why the 'sinners' of the

¹ Alwyn Marriage, *Foreword to New Christian Poetry*, (London: Collins), 11.

Gospel are similarly privileged, why the 'poor in spirit' are judged the lucky ones, and why the central insight of liberation theology (associated for me with Jon Sobrino, who escaped by the skin of his teeth from the El Salvador massacre) was the recovery of the oppressive situation as the original seedbed of the resurrection. The resurrection had become triumphalistic through unavowed osmosis with the Constantinian principle. How easily Jesus gets detached from the little people and joined to the big ones!

And now I must step back and consider my approach. Fundamentally, the human condition is cognitively and really rooted in God and so has the two poles of glory and shame. The Jesus drama is set on this scene. It has the glory-intimate protagonist shamed, and glory-desiring others undergoing a dynamic interaction in which he is in them, and they are in him because his fall from glory to shame takes them in their shame into his glory. This is role-reversal, big time! Or as the poet sees it, "In a flash at a trumpet crash, I am all at once what Christ is, since he was what I am."

A soteriology centered upon sin cannot allow this role-reversal because Jesus isn't a sinner. The divine action in Christ does not target sin; it delivers the finite being from the power of death into equality-in-friendship with the infinite. In this process, sin, *which always was* nothing, is revealed as nothing.

Now this is a *psychological* description. It is also very close to the Gospel text *and* to the most creative theological understanding of the Pauline triad of sin, law, and death. In explicating the Jesus drama with its aid, we do not falsify that drama, or project onto it a particular psychological idea. We simply let it be, let it breathe in the psyche.

At a session, crucial for me, of the College Theology Society in the United States three years ago, I was taken to task for psychologizing the Jesus story, claiming, as my critic put it, to know the psychic state of men "about whose very names we cannot be certain." My method was quite 'skewed.' Inasmuch as I did not present the drama in terms of the 'metapsychology' above developed out of Voegelin, Jaspers, and Lonergan, I was heard as psychoanalyzing Jesus and his disciples, and so was open to this charge.

But the text presents the drama in terms unusually psychological for the time; it cries out for *some* psychological

interpretation. As I put it on that occasion, it is not perhaps rushing ahead of the data to suggest that people tend to feel strongly about the crucifixion of a close friend! While imagination can lead us right off the track, the *failure* to use imagination in interpreting an affair that is through-and-through a dynamic interaction of persons and interests will lead to a loss of focus. The 'resurrection' comes to be nothing but the name they gave to *some* experience of Jesus after his death, we do not know what. Such an outcome surely amounts to an important failure to respond to the *drama* of Easter.

Yet, in so far as I understood him, this seemed to be the view of my critic. It is also the view of theologians I much respect. But I don't believe it. Even at the time it was clear to me that, however questionable it might be to use Jung's concept of the Self to elucidate that drama, it is hopeless to use *nothing*. This is simply to lapse into a Kantian agnosticism in regard to the knowability of others in their negotiation of our transcendent ground.

What we need is an adequate metapsychology. Is this not the appropriate theological successor to a controlling metaphysics? In an article in *The Downside Review*, "Four Steps Towards Making Sense of Theology," I try to do this by asking theologians to realize they are being autobiographical whether they know it or not. We had better recognize this fact and build on it by attending to the dramatic pattern of experience and the consequent recovery of ritual.

As you are nailed upon the tree
 You fall from glory. So do we,
 And cannot tell these two apart,
 This is the language of the heart
 That understands the Fall anew
 As done in us and done to you,
 And seeing you descend to hell
 We deeply know that all is well.

PART TWO: RESURRECTION AND THE WEST

The resurrection of Jesus from the dead, although the central mystery of Christian faith, has never quite impressed itself on the mind of

Western Christianity. I may claim to be representative. A passionate and sustained interest in theology has never been rewarded in studying the resurrection, ever since, in my mid-twenties, I learned from Columbia Marmion, whose work was a primary inspiration for me as a young monk, that the risen life of Christ "must have delighted the angels." A somewhat pale description of that for the sake of which Oscar Romero was gunned down at the altar.

The fact of the matter is that we do not inherit an image or an idea of the human condition in relation to which the resurrection can appear in all its breathtaking wonder. As watered down in the tradition at its unfortunately usual worst, the notion of original sin is dramatically inept, and so does not set the stage for the drama of Easter.

Recently I had the good fortune to read an account by an Orthodox theologian, of the condition known to us as original sin, that is pretty unanimously held by Orthodox theology. The key-text, as for us in the West, is the Pauline, "As through one man sin came into the world, and through sin death..." and then a crucial clause, "in whom all have sinned." For Augustine, the 'in whom,' *in quo*, refers to Adam, and so the text is made to say that we all *inherit* sin from Adam — and with it death. But that bit isn't too important. It only leads to interesting speculations about whether, if it had not been for sin, we would have 'had to die.' Actually Augustine is basing his interpretation on a mistranslation of the Greek *eph ho* as *in quo*. *Eph ho* is quite vague, something like 'because' in the sense of 'for.' The point is that it does not by any stretch of eisegesis apply to 'Adam' in the sentence. It simply says, "for all have sinned."

So "death comes to all, for all have sinned." Now my Orthodox theologian makes the daring suggestion — which a classics friend of mine finds a bit shaky — that the *eph ho* refers to the immediately preceding *thanatos*, death. So "Death came to all, and through *it* all have sinned." and what *this* means brings us to the heart of the matter (OK, Greek scholars, I am only claiming that this is a much more helpful eisegesis than the Latin one, which in any case is simply a mistranslation.)

We have to think of man as 'fallen' *out of* a state in which God is the climate of mind and heart and all things are seen in this light, *into* a state for which reality presents itself and defines itself otherwise. Phyllis Tribble, who is by far the best biblical theologian in the States — her *God and the Rhetoric of Sexuality* is what the French call

hors classe — describes the 'knowledge' offered by the Serpent as "a knowledge of which God is not the source." This should send shivers down the spine, for such is not knowledge at all. It is 'the knowledge of good and evil,' which Bonhoeffer says the Christian has to learn to invalidate.

But even more important — and quite inseparable from this — is the role that 'death' now plays in the key Pauline sentence. For it is death that now replaces God as the all-controlling reality. This world into which we are 'fallen' has death as its ultimate horizon, survival therefore as the top priority: This renders violence and war legitimated, oppression the norm, especially of women by men (as Genesis makes clear), and law the only possible moral guide as we choose between good and evil in a world of which God had said, of everything in it, that it was 'very good.' Paul's triad, "law, sin, death" leaps to mind once we get free of the wretched mistake of Augustine.

Thus "through death all have sinned." Death, imposing itself as our ultimate horizon, brings sin to birth in us, makes us survivors-at-all-costs, able to be good only through law. (Kant's categorical imperative is one of the finer fruits of the deadly tree!) My friend maintains that this idea of the reign of death as the climate of sin is more or less unanimously held by Orthodox theologians, even if his referring of *eph ho* to *thanatos* is straining the text.

The moment I understood this, I saw, as if for the first time, the Paschal candle in the spring darkness with the words *Lumen Christi!* This is the darkness that the risen Christ dissipates, restoring through blood and sweat and torture and death in shame, the world out of which we are fallen.

And we must not be bothered by the question whether the 'unfallen' condition was ever historically the case. In any meaning we can give to 'historical,' this is beside the point. Perhaps the Eastern theologians have not been so bothered by this question as ours have, because once we sense the sheer drama of describing our life as "under the reign of death," as involved in an infinitely subtle dialogue with this partner, this less-than-God who calls all the shots, then the tidy speculative question as to how it was before we fell hardly arises. The point is, I think, that when the account given of our plight is *already* theoretical-sounding — this 'sin' which we have all 'inherited' from an Adam who at least Pius XII thought had to be a historical person — then it provokes the raising of further speculative questions and

spinning-out useless unverifiable hypotheses — the sort of thing that Richard Dawkins understands by theology.

Augustine is the key figure for the Western alternative to this view. Geniuses think big, and when they make mistakes they are big ones. Instead of the communication of sin through the reign of death, through the Godhead of death, Augustine had it communicated through *birth*! Original Sin was transmitted by sexual intercourse. How insensitive theologians can be to the imagination! If you tell people that sin is transmitted through sexual intercourse, there's *no way* they're not going to understand this to mean that sexual intercourse is evil.

In any case, the West only gets to the *Lumen Christi* through this ridiculous notion which Jaroslav Pelikan has wittily characterized as "original sin as a kind of spiritual VD."

Now the huge advantage of leaving Augustine's vision for the one I have tried to describe is that 'death' takes on a *humanly qualitative* as opposed to a purely organic meaning. We are into the world of Bergmann and *The Seventh Seal* (that chess-game with death on the wild seashore has always haunted me). Death-as-ultimate is a partner with whom our whole consciousness is shot through. And always, always, things in us we are hardly aware of are giving him 'the last word.' Of course, for us simply as animals — and we are — he *has* the last word. But we always let this last word extend itself to where his writ does not run, to that "apex or base" of the soul whose only reality is God and all things in God.

Let us now fit the death and raising of Jesus into this Greek patristic view of the human condition. Jesus created in his followers the experience of 'unfallen' man, who sees everything in God. This has been called the contagion of Jesus. With his death, doubled by its horrible and shameful character, his followers *dropped* into the world that man is 'fallen' into. The Greek patristic doctrine of the human being as fallen out of God into death raises the question, is this fall historical? Were we, in some earlier time, *in* God? The answer has to be No. But this fall, this 'chute,' *has* happened, to the disciples of Jesus. And so they were the chosen witnesses to our restoration to God. They who knew the fall knew to proclaim the restoration.

This is crucial. The belief that Jesus by his cross and resurrection saves us from sin fails to show the *connection* between the event and the condition it is said to remedy, *until* we see the transaction in its

primary form, with *Jesus occasioning* the fall which we recover from in him.

It is not enough to see God as undergoing the human experience of death. We have to see what Jesus' death does *to us*. That is, we have to see it dramatically. We have to think of people seeing Jesus 'seized' by death our God-displacer, our pseudo-God. Jesus, through his unique and contagious God-intimacy, gave them something to fall *out of, into* the Kingdom of death.

Until the Jesus crisis, the contradiction in the human condition between life under God and life under death is not brought to a head. It takes the form of a subtle and inconclusive alternation. As I shall go on to show, it approaches the crisis in the psalms, with their extraordinarily overt confession of a God who is all, yet outside whom the dead are fallen. The crisis is fully and finally upon us with the death of Jesus.

The most acute experience we can know of the displacement of God by death — the displacement to which all sickness and pain is the temptation — is the experience of seeing God's miracle-man seized by death. It is very important to see that this is not the same thing as *the thought* that, since this man is God, his death is death triumphing over God. This is really a theologically manufactured experience. It is doctrine dramatized, whereas we are in search of the drama whence doctrine is born.

The original experience does not have to be theologically set up. It happens in all its horror, then in its beauty, and theology is born. It is the dramatic, existential thing that *happens* to people who see the man who has, it seems, tricked them into seeing all the world as God's seized and extinguished by God's rival for the attention of fallen man, death. You don't need to have hypostatic union in your head to be torn asunder by the crucifixion, or reassembled God's way in the resurrection. Hypostatic union is a subsequent marginal note to this experience, for the benefit of people who think in Greek. But for them and for the rest of us who don't, we all must reappropriate our ritual. Only ritual lets the dramatic transformation occur. And yet if our contact with Christ is only ritual, it is void because, as I said earlier, if our first contact with the death of Christ is ritual Christianity is nothing but a mystery religion.

And now perhaps we begin to see what we are saying when we say that God has been human and 'tasted' death. The doctrine of Christ's 'descent into sheol' has been weakened by being too easily and

pictorially dramatized. It is primarily a qualitative statement about the darkest implication of the cross, an unimaginable self-identification of him who is all life with the dark whose taste is our familiar. Isn't this what Hans Urs von Balthasar meant when he said that the Descent into Hell is the main Christian mystery for our time?

And of course we are to understand the empty tomb in terms of death as humanly qualitative. The tomb, the barrow, the earliest record we have of humanity on the planet, is supremely emblematic of the awful finality of death. The mausoleum is dedicated to Death as God. Think of "*Le cimetiere marin*," a great poem of Valery, which underlines the grotesqueness of the cult of death with its plumed horses. So here, where the reign of death has been broken into by a divine suffering of death — which *because* it is such a suffering is so much more than a restoration of the *status quo ante* for this radical human self-understanding — we are deprived of the expected object of our funeral pomp.

The *dramatic* quality of this is such that I wonder just what it does to the question Is the empty tomb legendary? Of course it *could* have been thought up. C.H. Dodd does not exclude this possibility, though he inclines away from it. But if it was, then it belongs to a later period when, as is clear from one apocryphal gospel, a legendary and triumphalist character had crept into and corrupted the resurrection belief itself. So you get "empty-tomb-legendary equals the resurrection as a piece of triumphal magic." It is tempting to contrast this with, "resurrection-the-end-of-the-reign-of-death equals the empty tomb as remembered experience."

In place of a pious pretty legend, then, you have the shock and the terror, almost a divine joke at our expense. And Rowan Williams is in no doubt that this is the climate of the Gospel accounts, especially Mark. As he says in *Resurrection*, "A sense of disorientation and shock pervades all our stories. The risen, the exalted one, addresses the community *from the outside*... and the focus of this sense of shock in all our accounts is the empty tomb."

We need to think a lot more about this. And the controlling principle of our thought must be the shift to a deeply human, tragic, qualitative understanding of 'our death' that he has 'destroyed.'

But most importantly of all, this shift enables us to contextualize the Easter event in the whole Jewish religion-culture. For the religious consciousness of Israel shows with surprising clarity the self-understanding of man as 'fallen' in the sense in which I am using that

word. On the one hand, in no other culture is the absoluteness and sovereignty of God so clearly affirmed. On the other hand the counter-claim of death upon us, even as we pray the psalms, is acknowledged. Repeatedly we have the theme, "The dead do not praise you Lord." Especially we should recall the devastating negativity of Psalm 88. The pray-er, in other words, consciously inhabits two worlds: one, of God from whom nothing is independent, for whom nothing is 'outside,' the other, of sheol, the land of oblivion, out of God's sight. There is something spiritually schizoid about this. Egyptian religion is the converse of this. Neither the transcendence of God, nor the finality of death, are recognized. The worshiper is assured of an after-life not too unlike this one, and the absoluteness of God is not featured. Only in Israel is the human 'fallen' condition recognized in all its paradoxicality.

This prepares for the climactic resolution of the paradox in the resurrection. Here the scandalous autonomy of death, its playing the role of God, asserts itself over him who is "too good for it, too great for it, too special for it" — one recalls the insight of Philippians 2, 6 here, the kenosis of the transcending one. This early Christian hymn registers the earliest *sense* of who Jesus was for the community. His descent into the underworld is the drama of God's *reclaiming* that world, as man's single consciousness is restored. Why did they so insist on that descent, if not to express the deep spiritual certitude of our restoration to unity? Let him now, now that we are converted, *go all the way*, across the Lethe of our fallen mind, to claim all for the one who alone is the source of all knowing, in whose presence the knowledge of good and evil reveals itself not as a knowledge of God, a non-knowledge, a cheat. The claim of the Law on the sinful debtor to death is dissolved by one who is, in the words of the psalmist, now robbed of their bitterness, "free among the dead" (Ps 88!)

But, it must be asked, is this not making too big a claim for the consciousness of the disciples of Jesus risen? *Are they transformed? Do they manifest a "single consciousness,"* overcoming the dual consciousness of religious man since the beginning of divine awareness? Stephen Mitchell argues in his *The Gospel According to Jesus* that the transformation of the disciples, which really is the main argument for the resurrection, does not show itself, in what they have left for us to study. After all, do we not find them, just before the Ascension, asking, "Are you now going to restore the kingdom to Israel?" To this, Rowan Williams has the best answer surely. These are

not men and women undergoing 'enlightenment,' as do the disciples of the Buddha. They are men and women responding to a mysterious presence, a Person who is overtaking them; and they are trying to 'unpack' (Williams' word) what is happening to and among them. The risen life of Christ shows itself in thus stretching them beyond themselves. It is only known in "the burning of the heart" to which it cannot be reduced, as the beloved is only known in the soft awakening of the heart to which she may not be reduced. They are stretched beyond themselves toward the new single consciousness, the unification of the creatures divided between God and death, who, "through fear of death have been slaves their whole life long." (Hebrews 2,15)

This looks like a circular argument. On the one hand, because God has tasted death, all now is well. On the other hand, because all now is well — for we've seen him and the tomb is empty — it must be God that has tasted death. But this is the circularity of a powerful experience taking possession of itself. When I stumbled on contemplative prayer, I knew that "all is well because I have been touched" and "I have been touched because all now is well." Language itself registers this by becoming ambiguous, as in the famous "Many sins are forgiven her because she has loved much."

All we are really doing is taking what was originally predicated of 'life' — the new life of Christ imparted to the faithful — and predicating it of 'consciousness.' Paul's calling on us to "savor the things above, where Christ is at the right hand of God" is the call to allow the new single consciousness, the new freedom of God embracing death, to take hold of us. And God's embracing of death, as an *anthropological* event, is enacted first in the brutal reality of Golgotha.

We cannot sufficiently savor the fact that God in person, a second, revelatory person prefigured by the Old Testament hypostases of Word, Torah, Wisdom, Shekinah, has tasted our death. For if our God has tasted our death, we are healed forever of the psychic division that has God on one side, death on the other, with God as order over against chaos.

Breathed into by the Spirit of the resurrection, the psalms 'relax,' their problem solved. They continue to remind us, however, that, healed though we are in principle, much in us continues to think in divided ways. The new condition is rather like that of the recovering alcoholic. As there is no such thing as a recovered alcoholic, so there is no such thing as an 'arrived' Christian.

But to 'pick up' the original Jesus-force I am using the psychological fulfillment that, I am claiming, comes *from* that force. The issue is that our religious consciousness is polarized between 'God' and 'death.' If this idea makes such sense of the cross-resurrection event, the question arises whether the latter is only the projection of the idea onto a story, and so subject to all the hazards of modern criticism, to the erosion of reductionism.

To this I must reply that any approach that does *not* run into this problem is disqualified from the start. We should expect to encounter the challenge of Feuerbach that Barth thought theology had not met right here at the wellspring of our faith. It is the turn to the subject, with its new definition of objectivity as perfected subjectivity, that enables us to face the challenge of Feuerbach. From now on any serious theology will be explicitly conscious of fulfilling psychological needs in the doing of theology. The only transcendence worth having is one that shows itself *in* the conscious meeting of our need. After all, what serious tribute can I pay to any person that does not avow the fulfillment I enjoy through that person?

Thus, when I find myself being autobiographical about the Easter Vigil, it is a very long-standing and well-tried relationship that I am exploring. When I test out my own endless vacillation between my God and my death, it is my relationship with Jesus that I am exploring. A notion of the objectivity of Jesus that did *not* check-out in my prayer and sleepless nights is a notion that makes as much sense as a midday sun that gave no heat.

Nevertheless, the *use* of this frankly subjective approach requires much discipline. The subjectivity I am calling on must have a lot of monastic culture and experience and dogmatic certitude in it. This makes it only too liable to impose on Jesus, so that we get the theological equivalent of the Whig interpretation of history. Still, as I insist, the canonical documentation of faith's first moment is already implicitly psychological — very much so for the time. No amount of *Wissenschaft* is able to interrupt the most intimate meeting in this world, between the faith community and its first generation.

In the end, there are two irreconcilable theologies of the resurrection: one comes from those who know him, the other from those who do not. I have nothing against those who do not. The Church does not exactly make him easy to know, and there are skeptics I know who are closer to him than many believers. And we need all the criticism we can get. Reductionism is a corrective to thought directed

by enthusiasm. But all this said, the difference has to be stated, and re-cognized. As I like saying to my students, the only way to find out if he rose from the dead is to ask him.

COLERIDGE, NEWMAN, AND LONERGAN: CONSCIENCE AND IMAGINATION IN THE MORAL ARGUMENT FOR GOD'S EXISTENCE

Philip C. Rule, SJ

MY PURPOSE THIS morning is threefold. First, to examine the moral argument for God's existence as developed by Coleridge and Newman through the lens of Lonergan's transcendental method and Walter Conn's treatment of conscience which finds Lonergan's method foundational to modern developmental psychology. Secondly, to consider briefly the weight of the moral argument in contemporary society. Thirdly, to reflect, again briefly and considering only Newman, on the role the imagination plays in the life of faith.

My own perspective and expertise is that of literary historian and critic, not philosopher or theologian. I, therefore, approach this topic, before this audience, in the spirit of the disclaimer Newman penned to a copy of the *Essay on Development*: "This is a *philosophical* work of a writer who was *not a Catholic*, and did not pretend to be a *theologian*, addressed to those who were not Catholics."¹

I

Until the seventeenth century the term 'conscience,' from the Latin *conscientia*, served both in the sense of consciousness as we understand it today and conscience as a moral governor. In using the word 'conscience,' both Coleridge and Newman returned to that earlier usage which blurred the distinction between inner self-knowledge and moral awareness and a sense of duty. This understanding of conscience, which includes both conscience and consciousness as interrelated ideas, exemplifies a significant pattern in their thought and that of other Romantics — a leap across the eighteenth century

¹ In the library of the Birmingham Oratory.

and Enlightenment back to the Renaissance which as R.F. Brinkley pointed out was for the early nineteenth century not separated from the greater part of the seventeenth century.² While they used conscience in the traditional Christian sense of the voice of God within, an internal moral governor, they were both astute students of the human spirit, each gifted with a highly developed consciousness which each explored and described as few writers before them had done. The coalescence of the ideas of conscience and consciousness in their thought and writings is the point of a study I have recently completed, *Coleridge and Newman: The Centrality of Conscience*. This coalescence is the philosophic expression of the metaphoric union of mind and heart, a metaphor common to much nineteenth-century British poetry and fiction.

For these two men, to articulate a "proof" for the existence of God was, in the final analysis, rather to clarify their own understanding of the personal experience of believing in God and to present a method or process by which others might analyze their experience for themselves and see if God is a valid part of that self-understanding. Both men took the "objectivity" of revelation for granted, but neither put much value on external "evidences" to draw people effectively and affectively to embrace the call which is revelation. Thus the self is the starting point of both religion and theology. In an 1825 sermon Newman said that "self-knowledge is the root of all religious knowledge; and it is in vain, — worse than vain, — it is a deceit and a mischief, to think to understand the Christian doctrines as a matter of course, merely by being taught by books, or by attending sermons, or by any outward means, however excellent, taken by themselves."³ In a letter of 1859 he says "we are so constituted that we do naturally argue from ourselves to God, and Scripture encourages and sanctions this process."⁴

Their approach is a propaedeutic rather than a proof. Such an approach to revealed religion led to a rhetorical style that stressed affectivity and formation over mere information and concepts, personal involvement of the reader rather than passive detachment or mere curiosity. It is this emphasis on what one might call a homiletic rhetoric that guides my reading of the major texts in the second half of

² *Coleridge and the Seventeenth Century* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1955), xxiii.

³ *Parochial and Plain Sermons*, I, 42.

⁴ *The Theological Papers of John Henry Newman on Faith and Certainty* ed. Hugo M. de Achaval, SJ and J. Derek Holmes (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976) 162.

my study. What follows here is a compressed exposition of the two "proofs."

In 1820 Coleridge began dictating a manuscript designated as the *Opus Maximum*, the content of which he had described twenty-five years earlier as a course of studies for young men that would cover "Man as Animal," "Man as an Intellectual Being," and "Man as a Religious Being."⁵ Thomas McFarland says these headings "precisely denominate the idiosyncratic amalgam of scientific investigation, philosophy, and theology that characterize both Coleridge's general commitment of thought and the detailed content of the *Opus Maximum* as we have it."⁶ But they can also be interpreted as the levels of consciousness one passes through in the normal unfolding of conscious intentionality, a process of successive steps in self-transcendence which lies at the heart of Lonergan's ideas on self-appropriation and transcendental method. One is first conscious of sensation (animal), of sensing or perceiving. Careful observation of the objects of the senses is the beginning of scientific investigation of the sub-human order of the universe. Next, one is concomitantly and increasingly aware of the self trying to understand or understanding what one has sensed, and judging the validity of what one has understood, which is the beginning of the philosophical investigation of the universe. Thirdly, and I would add "moral" to Coleridge's term "religious," — though they are distinct conversions in Lonergan — one is conscious of making decisions based on judgments, a step which leads to choosing, acting, loving — further steps in self-transcendence.

Although Coleridge begins with a more traditional overview of the world that starts with objects, it is clear even from the very fragmentary presentation in the rest of his manuscript that the real starting point for his philosophical system is human consciousness, that is, the knowing subject prior to the object known. In the section which McFarland labels "man as intellectual being," Coleridge's starting point is the fact that our moral orientation is antecedent to understanding. "The one assumption," he says, "the one postulate, in which all the rest may assume scientific form, and which granted we may coercively deduce even those which we might allowably have assumed

⁵ The manuscript of the *Opus Maximum* is in the Victoria College Library of the University of Toronto. The parenthetical numbers in my text refer to the manuscript volume and page number. The text of the *Opus Maximum*, edited by Thomas McFarland, will appear soon in *The Collected Works of Samuel Taylor Coleridge*.

⁶ *Romanticism and the Forms of Ruin* 357.

is the Existence of the *Will*, which a moment's reflection will convince us is the same as Moral Responsibility, and that again with the reality and essential difference of moral Good and Evil" (2.13). Although he calls the existence of the will a postulate, the composite reality which is freedom and moral responsibility is in fact a simple given of human consciousness; and when he states this he brings together the terms conscience and consciousness: "The fact," he says, "with the demand of which we commence our investigation is the existence of conscious responsibility and of its existence every conscious and rational being must himself be the judge, the consciousness being the only organ by which it can be directly known, but the consciousness of conscience is itself conscience" (2.31-32).

Why would Coleridge put moral responsibility, or the will and conscience, before understanding? First of all, because knowing begins with an implicit act of faith in the validity of our knowing. He says that "in all reasoning, even in the simplest physical sciences the argument must commence with some assumption, which is supposed and may be demanded, but cannot be proved, so in the present subject. But as it belongs to the moral world its postulates are of necessity different from those of geometry in this one respect that though both may with equal right be demanded, the latter can not be extorted" (2.91). As he said earlier, "to believe is the rule and to disbelieve an exception perhaps, still however an exception" (2.88). What we first believe in is ourselves and our capacity to know. We are free to do this: "These assumptions we have found comprised in the one position — Man is a responsible agent & in consequence *hath a will*. Have I a responsible will? — Concerning this each individual must be himself both querist and respondent" (2.92). Quoting, then, from his "Essay on Faith" he says "Faith is to be defined as 'fidelity to our own being, as far as such being is not and cannot be the object of the sense.'"⁷ This is immediately related to the ontological reach of faith, for he concludes that "hence by clear reference it supposes fidelity to being universally as far as the same is not the object of the senses and herewith whatever is necessarily affirmed or understood as condition, concomitant or consequence of the same" (2.108). We freely choose to believe or trust our human capacity to know and judge. This freedom is belief in oneself and is part of our human makeup. As Karl Rahner says, "when freedom is really understood, it is not the power to be able to do this or

⁷ Found in *The Complete Works of Samuel Taylor Coleridge*, ed. W.G.T. Shedd (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1858), V, 557.

that, but the power to decide about oneself and to actualize oneself.”⁸ We are responsible for what we do and what we become. But only free beings can be responsible.

Just how, we must ask, is conscience “the root and precondition of all other consciousness?” (2.111). Because it is precisely that which distinguishes us from animals. It defines what it is to be human: “The conscience, I say, is not a mere mode of our consciousness, but presupposed therein. — Brutes may be and are *scious* but not conscious” (2.138). To the extent that our nature is in part animal, as regards our senses we function more in proximity to the merely instinctual patterns of biologically extroverted experience. But what emerges in response to the occurrence of questions — understanding, judging, deciding, loving — renders us self-transcending, self-correcting subjects. In entering upon the often agonizing process of understanding and judging we are conscious that our assenting to the validity of our knowing or constantly trying to correct it is a matter of our freedom. We cannot be deaf to a sound if our ear is healthy nor blind to color and dimension if our eye is healthy, but we can be deaf to the voice of conscience to the point of suppressing it entirely. Nevertheless, to be conscious of conscience is the ground of all human knowledge: “It appears then that the first step, that even the initiative of this process the becoming conscious of conscience partakes of the nature of an act. It is an act namely in which and by which we take upon ourselves an allegiance, and consequently the obligation of fealty, and this fealty or fidelity implying the power of being unfaithful is the *primary* and *fundamental meaning of faith*. But it is likewise, paradoxical as it may appear, the commencement of experience and the indispensable precondition of all experience” (2.132-134). While admitting that such a position is not only paradoxical but also flies in the face of other thinkers, Coleridge flatly asserts that “such however is my conviction and this is the distinctive and constitutive basis of my philosophy” (2.134).

The question of self-definition then involves the question of “defining” God and thus the argument from conscience is in a sense the reverse side of the coin. Coleridge bears quoting at length on this point:

If I am asked how I know that I am I can only reply ‘because I am.’ This is the absolute ground of my knowledge, but if I were asked for the cause, not

⁸ *Foundations of Christian Faith* 38.

only of my knowledge, but of the thing known, and in this sense the question were put, 'How came you to be?' — The answer must be 'Because God is.' And vice versa the knowledge is derived from the former knowledge as the cause is known in and through its effects 'quod prius est in ordine essendi posterius est in ordine sciendi.' Man, with all finite self-conscious being, knows himself to be because he is a man; but he is a man because God is and hath so willed it. It is the great I am only, who is because he affirmeth himself to be, & affirmeth himself to be or rather than in that he is. Thus in like manner because we have a conscience we know there is a God, i.e. that God is the reality of conscience on the principle that the necessary condition of a certain truth must itself be true. (2.137-9)

The alleged or apparent lack of conscience in some people, that is, a failure to reach moral self-awareness occurs perhaps because "nothing can become the object of consciousness but by reflection" (2.46), a point dealt with briefly here but later at length in his *Aids to Reflection*.

Coleridge finishes his epistemological analysis by showing the relationship between will and reason. In God, Will and Reason are identified, therefore, "the reason in man is representative of the will in God. It follows therefore that the conscience is the specific witness respecting the unity or harmony of the will with the reason, effected by the self subordination of the individual will, as representing the Self to the reason, as the representative of the will to God" (2.144). This voluntary submission of reason to the will of God, subordinates will to the reason and conscience and is in fact constitutive of ourselves as persons. We are not just animals or thinking machines; we are experiencing, understanding, judging, willing, spiritual beings. And since this fidelity, fealty, allegiance to a superior moral being is faith, it follows in Coleridge's mind that "Faith in all its relations subsists in the synthesis of reason & the individual will, or the reconcilment of the reason with the will by the subordination of the will to reason" (3.22). This recurring insistence on the rockbottom importance of the will is nowhere more clearly stated than in his complete rejection of *a posteriori* proofs for God's existence from the sensible world. He agrees wholeheartedly with Luther, whom he calls "this mighty minister of Faith" that "without that inward by which we know ourselves responsible & thus know, what no understanding can reach, the reality of a will. In vain should we endeavor to make the notion of a divinity out of any material which the senses can convey or the world afford" (3.33). The only cogent argument for the existence of the divinity is a moral one. "All speculative distinction," he continues, "must begin with

Postulates that derive their legitimacy, substance, and sanction from the *conscience*: and from which ever of the two points the reason may start, from the things that are seen to the One Invisible or from the idea of the absolute One to the things that are seen, it will find a chasm which the Moral Being only, which the Spirit and Religion of man alone can fill up or over-bridge" (3.38-39). Coleridge has thus insisted over and over on the intimate relationship between the intellectual and the moral in the human person. The only bridge between a finite personal being and a transcendent personal being is, or can be, conscience, the consciousness of which constitutes one a person. It is also the only bridge between I and Thou, between two subjects in their subjectivity, the ultimate expression of which is love. To love is to recognize the other as person and not as thing, a distinction Coleridge called 'sacred' and repeated many times throughout his writings.

But, again, what of the universality of such an argument for the existence of God? What of those who are not conscious of conscience, or whose conscience does not suggest to them the other? In an untitled chapter on the origin of the idea of God in the human mind, Coleridge comes to grips with this vexing question. His answer is that there is a capacity in all to recognize and experience moral responsibility, free will. "Through all of nature there is a manifestation of power preexistent in the product," he asserts; and he goes on to exemplify this with an analogy similar to the ones he used in the *Biographia* and *Aids to Reflection*. "The young bull," he explains, "ere yet its horns are formed, the stag-chafer in its worm state makes its bed chamber prior to its metamorphosis exactly as much longer as is required for the length of the horn which is yet to be produced" (3.63). What realizes or actualizes this capacity or potency? It is love, beginning first of all with parental love. This love entails an "other," a Thou, and is ultimately a process of self-transcendence by which one rises through progressive steps until one arrives at the supreme or absolute Other or Thou, which is God.

Describing the role of parents, especially the mother, in stimulating love and selfhood in the infant, Coleridge says "ere yet a conscience [sic] self exists the love begins & the first love is love to another" (3.65).⁹ Even in the infant faith is prior to intellection; for, "Faith,

⁹In the text of the manuscript 'conscience' appears in an adjectival form; but the word is crossed out and 'conscious' is written in the margin in a hand different from that of the one taking Coleridge's dictation. There is no instance in the OED of

implicit Faith the offspring of unreflecting love is an antecedent and indispensable condition of all its knowledge: the life is the light thereof" (3.66). There is in each human being an instinctual potency, oriented toward God, which is brought into activity first by parental-filial love. Echoing the analogy just cited, Coleridge asks: "Why have men a faith in God, there is but one answer, the man & the man alone hath a Father & a Mother. All begins in instinct but do all therefore begin alike? Oh no! each hath its own & the instincts of man must be human, rational instincts. Reason itself mutely here prophesying its own future advent" (3.67).

The true beginning of both philosophy and religion, then, is love, which alone conditions a person to be responsive to that which ultimately corresponds to and activates the spiritual potential in each of us: "The reverence of the invisible, substantiated by the feelings of love, this which is the essence and proper definition of religion, is the commencement of the intellectual life, of humanity. If you love not your earthly parent how *can* ye love your father in heaven"? (3.79) Out of the interpersonal relationship of child and parent grows distinction and alterity, I and thou, the self and the other as one grows in a sense of one's own individuality and uniqueness through a life-long interplay between oneself and the other selves who are our fellow human beings — a process of ever self-transcending moral self-awareness. Operative in these interpersonal relationships is the "responsible will [which] is the essential and indispensable ground & condition of [one's] Personality" (3.158).

Another contributory step in this process of becoming aware of oneself as a "spiritual" being, a being conscious of will, or moral responsibility, is reading of a specific type. Distinguishing between what one experiences in reading scientific or purely abstract material and what one experiences in reading imaginative literature he says:

In a word try only to produce the state of our consciousness, while we were following Euclid through the 37th proposition and then our state while we were perusing the pages of Tacitus or contemplating the creation of Milton. Examine wherein the essential difference consists. Is it not that in the one there is an entire absence, the absolute negation of all conception of cause & effect, of all causation final and efficient, or rather to express the same truth under yet a higher formula an absence not only of all succession, i.e., the objects themselves (3.170).

'conscience' being used as an adjective, but one might conjecture that it is a Coleridgean neologism rather than a mistake.

In such reading as Euclid the imagination is almost completely instrumentalized by reason (or virtually eliminated for most human beings!) In literary reading the will and the imagination are engaged. I would suggest here, without expanding on the point, that the imagination enters in so that the whole person is engaged and ultimately asked to respond not merely in a detached, dispassionate, or sheerly rational (or as Newman would say, 'notional') way but in an involved volitional manner. An imaginative text is personal and evokes, literally, a personal, imaginative response. And since, for Coleridge, personhood is rooted in the will, the deepest response is moral. Thus we can see why he says with reference to those who would deny "rational" proofs in matters of religion, that "the wiser plan, as we have before had occasion to remark is to say, or rather to remain silent and be content to know that the respondent must make himself a better man before he can become a more intelligent one" (3.151).

In summary, then, for Coleridge the definition of a person and the definition of Christianity are opposite sides of the coin. He says, quite simply, "that there, & only there where a reason & a Will are copresent distinctly but in relation either of union or oppugnancy, a personality is affirmed" (3.188) Correspondingly:

Subjectivity, or in relation to the order of conviction, the *responsibility* is assumed as the condition & staple ring in the chain of the Christian faith. This being denied directly or by a previous disbelief of the necessary inference from the fact of moral responsibility, namely the will, & therefore a power strictly spiritual, the concept of a corrupt and fallen nature is impossible, or rather the words are without meaning, and of course the whole scheme of redemption becomes equally hollow, first as having no object & 2ndly as having no conceivable agent (3.192-193).

In the final analysis, Coleridge's conception of a human being as sensitive (animal), intellectual, and religious (moral) suggests that human beings are both historically and existentially religious beings — finite, free spirits oriented by their concrete nature to an absolute free spirit, God. To deny the former makes the latter impossible, indeed, unnecessary. To deny the latter is to rob the former of all true meaning and dignity and reduce it back to a sea of materialism. No freedom, no true humanity. No freedom, no God. To be aware of oneself as free, as conscious of conscience, to be a moral self-conscious being, is to be latently or potentially aware of God. Lonergan says that "as the question of God is implicit in all our questioning, so being in

love with God is the basic fulfillment of our conscious intentionality.”¹⁰ This statement sums up perfectly Coleridge’s position and, as we shall now see, Newman’s too.

Newman’s brief working paper “Proof of Theism” in his philosophical notebook, twenty-two manuscript pages written in 1859, stands by itself, unlike Coleridge’s treatment in the *Opus Maximum* which is part of a much larger, comprehensive understanding of human nature and religion.¹¹ But it crystallized his thought from the previous twenty-five years and laid the groundwork for the *Grammar of Assent* of 1870. Again, like Coleridge, Newman seems to begin with the Kantian argument but says, “Ward thinks I hold that moral obligation is, because there is a God. But I hold just the reverse, viz. there is a God, because there is a moral obligation” (2.31).

Newman’s starting point is phenomenological: “I am conscious of my own existence. That I am involves a great deal more than itself” (2.31). Analyzing this consciousness reveals a number of “various faculties, which seem to me parts of my own being and to be at least as much facts as that being itself” (2.31). The facts involved in the fact of being are such things as I remember, I feel, I understand, I reason. One does not have faith in these activities nor does one have directly a knowledge of being, “because being is not known directly, but indirectly through its states” (2.33-35). Thus Newman is neither a fideist nor an intuitionist. He explains further that *sentio ergo sum* like *cogito ergo sum* is not argumentation or deduction or faith: “I do not advance from one proposition to another, when I know my existence from being conscious of my feeling, but one and the same act of consciousness brings home to me that which afterwards at leisure I draw out into two propositions, denoting two out of many aspects of the one thing” (2.35). One can proceed from *sentio ergo sum* to *cogito ergo sum* and the analysis is the same, for “consciousness and reasoning are those portions of the idea of being which are most essentially bound up with it.” In denying that one has faith in one’s cognitive faculties Newman appears at first to differ from Coleridge. Where Coleridge says “to believe is the rule and to disbelieve the exception” (3.68), Newman says that “there is no *faith* properly in these exercises of my being, so there is no skepticism about them properly — and it is as absurd to speak of being

¹⁰ *Method in Theology* 105.

¹¹ The text of the “Proof of Theism” appears in *The Philosophical Notebook*, edited by Edward Sillem (New York: Humanities Press, 1970), 2 volumes. Parenthetical numbers refer to volume and page number.

skeptical of consciousness, reasoning, memory, sensation, as to say I skeptical whether I am" (2.37) There is an implicit trust here in the integrity of the human cognitive processes and consciousness. Not bound up with the reality of consciousness, however, is the reality of external objects or 'reality' which "is an object of faith." Pressed hard this begins to look like idealism or the beginnings of radical skepticism. What Newman does not distinguish between is consciousness and experience. In a marginal annotation he says "what is internal to the mind is an object of consciousness which external things are not. Thus the line is broad and deep between reliance on reason and conscience and the trustworthiness of the impression of the senses or the reality *or* existence of matter. Hence the being of God, arising out of what is internal, is an external fact different in evidence *or* proof from every other external fact" (2.41). That Newman does not in fact doubt the existence of external reality — people, things — is not the issue here, it is rather the relationship between the *whole* person and God.

Setting aside the existence of external reality, Newman says "there is just one primary belief I have — not knowledge but belief — it is not in matter, or space, or time, or any of this sort of outward thing — yet it is an external and outward being, or I should not talk of *faith* — it is belief in the existence of God" (2.39). For Newman God is an intimate part of epistemology. This is strikingly stated in the *Apologia* where, speaking of his deepest religious being he mentions his "mistrust of the reality of material phenomena ... making me rest in the thought of two and only two absolutely and luminously self-evident beings, myself and my Creator."¹² In his "Proof" he says that "when I say that an external fact of the existence of God is an object of faith, and a primary object, I do not mean that it is necessarily so in the order of history, but in the order of nature. I mean that it is more intimately connected with the nature of the human mind than anything else, and while it is to be received on faith hardly is it so in fact" (2.43). What is this link between consciousness and the God external to it? Among the data of consciousness already considered — memory, sensation, reasoning, Newman also includes conscience which is "the discrimination of acts as worthy of praise or blame. Now such praise or blame is a phenomenon of my existence, one of those phenomena through which, as I have said, my existence is brought

¹² *Apologia pro Vita Sua*, ed. Martin.

home to me. But the accuracy or truth of the praise or blame in the particular case, is a matter not of faith, but of judgment. Here then are two senses of the word conscience. It either stands for the act of moral judgment, or for the particular judgment formed. In the former case it is the foundation of religion, in the latter of ethics" (2.2.47).

In analyzing further this 'feeling of conscience' he finds it operates "*under a special sanction*" (2.49). Although persons may conclude differently about what is concretely right or wrong, and while it is impossible to maintain "that there is any idea of moral right or wrong bound up in the primary consciousness which contemplates my existence" (2.49), nevertheless "the sense of a special sanction remains one and the same in all men" (2.49). What is the nature of this sanction? Why is it intimately bound up with the very nature of the mind itself? So intimately that it is like the existence of God "more intimately connected with the nature of the human mind than anything else" (2.49). As with Coleridge, conscience is that which orients us to the other. Quoting one of his University Sermons Newman says "conscience implies a relation between the soul and something exterior, and that, moreover, superior to itself; a relation to an excellence which it does not possess, and a tribunal over which it has no power" (2.49-50). Newman sees conscience as that essential part of human nature which prompts us on in the process of self-transcendence: "This is conscience, and from the very nature of the case, its very existence carries our minds to a Being exterior to ourselves; for else, whence did it come? and to a being superior to ourselves; else whence its strange, troublesome peremptoriness?" (2.53).

In his analysis of conscience Newman finds not only the idea of a lawgiver but of a future judgment. For these are not just laws of taste which are "attended by no *sanction*." Again the idea of self-transcendence enters. As the usual feelings associated with conscience and which we experience "*carry the mind out of itself and beyond itself*, which imply a tribunal in the future, and reward and punishment which are so special. The notion of a future judgment is thus involved in the feeling of conscience" (2.59). This feeling is of a personal nature, such as we have toward other persons, and so the object anticipated is personal, that is, God. As persons, we could not rationally, I might point out, feel responsibility or accountability to an impersonal force.

The proof is then compressed into an enthymeme: "If then our *or* my knowledge of our *or* my existence is brought to me by my

consciousness of thinking, and if thinking includes as one of its modes Conscience or the sense of an imperative coercive law, and if such a sense (when analyzed, that is) reflected on, involves an inchoate recognition of a Divine Being, it follows that such recognition comes upon my recognition that I am, and is only not so clear an object as is my own existence" (2.63).

Like Coleridge, Newman sees conscience as prior in nature to all other forms of human knowing in that it grounds them and orchestrates, as it were, all cognitive activity: "The being of a God once brought home to me, illuminated, as it will be, in its various aspects by reflection, tradition, etc., I have a guiding truth which gives a practical direction to my judgment and faith as regards a variety of other truths or professed truths which encounter me, as the trustworthiness of the senses, our social and personal duties, the divinity of Christianity, etc. It teaches me how to use evidence, which is imperfect, and why I must not be skeptical" (2.63-5) The human person has therefore an innate moral imperative to strive for the truth and in doing so trust the validity of one's cognitive processes.

In the "Proof" Newman does not explain how conscience and moral consciousness are early evoked by the interpersonal relationship of child and parent. But he does elsewhere in his writings allude to the parental role in the development of conscience. For example: "I had hitherto considered cultivation of domestic affections as the *source* of more extended Christian love";¹³ a child "cannot learn without the assistance of others the meaning of moral facts."¹⁴ About the image of God in the mind, he says that "whether its elements, latent in the mind, would ever be elicited without extrinsic help is very doubtful."¹⁵ Both Coleridge and Newman refer constantly to the instinctive nature of consciousness, pointing out that rational instinct, unlike animal, is not automatic and must be educed by interpersonal relationships.

Let me, by way of summary, try to spell out the similarity in Coleridge's and Newman's approaches in seven theses: (1) Moral orientation precedes intellection. (2) Moral orientation is connatural or quasi-instinctive. (3) Consciousness of moral orientation constitutes personhood. (4) Moral self-consciousness is progressive or developmental. (5) The developmental nature of moral self-consciousness involves

¹³ *Parochial and Plain Sermons*, II, 57.

¹⁴ *An Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine* 250.

¹⁵ *An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent* 115.

self-transcendence. (6) This self-transcendence carries one to other finite persons or subjects. (7) This process of self-transcendence may arrive at a distinct point of consciousness and conversion that involves the recognition of an infinite or absolutely transcendent person, namely God.

The two points about the constitution of personhood and its developmental growth put the discussion of conscience in the larger context of both men's thought and provides an entry for discussion of their views on conscience and consciousness in the light of developmental psychology and the transcendental method of philosophy.

Conscience is that which constitutes us persons as opposed to simply 'human beings,' that is, a person in the psychological sense includes the sum total of all that one is conscious of in and through all the relationships into which one has consciously entered. Becoming a person is a process of moving toward the highest degree of individuation we are capable of achieving. Newman, of course, articulates more extensively and explicitly the phenomenon of human change or growth, a basic insight which underlies not only the *Essay on Development* but all his writings. Throughout the *Essay*, and indeed in many of his writings, Newman uses the terms 'tend' and 'tendency' to describe the process of moving to fuller definition. While he could not have been influenced by Coleridge's "Hints toward the Formation of a more Comprehensive Theory of Life" (not published until 1848), there is a striking similarity between his use of these terms and Coleridge's definition of life: "By life I everywhere mean the true Idea of Life, or that most general form under which life manifests itself to us, which includes all its other forms. This I have stated to be the *tendency to individuation*, and the degrees or intensities of life to consist in the progressive realization of this tendency."¹⁶

Since the specifically human (as distinct from animal) 'tendency' is not deterministic, it must be guided by free choice. As the non-rational creature has a genetic governor moving it toward its proper individuation, the rational creature has conscience to guide it and to counter the self-destructive tendencies of free will. The conscience by nature leads us to encounter and interrelate responsibly with the others around us; it can and should lead us to encounter with the Other

¹⁶ In Shedd, *Complete Works* I, 314.

A brief consideration of three modern theories of developmental psychology strongly supports the first point. In looking at Lonergan's transcendental method we can weigh the cogency of the latter, enriching our understanding of Coleridge and Newman.

If, as Coleridge, Newman, and others hold, person is constituted by conscience; and, if conscience explicitly entails the existence of other persons, then it is clear that one cannot speak about 'person' without implicitly including persons because human beings are essentially as well as existentially 'radically social' as ethician William Luijpen puts it.¹⁷ Theologian Walter Conn shows how the developmental theories of Jean Piaget, Erik Erikson, and Lawrence Kohlberg focus on the process of becoming a self-transcending subject, a person, who depends on the presence of other persons. "Clearly," Conn observes, "conscience emerges and develops only in community — a particular community; conscience is both social and historical."¹⁸ Luijpen concurs when he says "man is essentially historical and as such he is radically social" (146). Such an approach is diametrically opposed to an 'individualistic ideology' and a static, mechanistic psychology — the same old foes Coleridge and Newman faced (114).

In summarizing his analysis of the three developmental psychologists Conn concludes that human maturity (authentically responsible humanity) is defined in terms of a person's realization of objective knowing (Piaget), genuine love and care (Erikson), and universal, consistent judgments based on ideal, impersonal grounds (Kohlberg). From his study of these writers Conn concludes that "the *criterion* of human authenticity, of the responsible person, is the self-transcendence that is effected through sensitive and creative understanding, critical judgment, responsible decision, loyal commitment, and genuine love. Put most simply my thesis is that authentic self-realization is found in nothing else than such self-transcendence" (6). Having looked at the literary and historical approach of Lionel Trilling and the developmental psychologies just mentioned, Conn concludes that they "provide adequate means of interpreting moral life, its course of historical change and personal development" (7). He proposes that "the transcendental method of philosophy — is an espe-

¹⁷ *Phenomenology and Natural Law* (Pittsburgh: Dusquesne University Press, 1967) 146.

¹⁸ *Conscience: Development and Self-Transcendence* (Birmingham, AL: Religious Education Press, 1981) 23.

cially suitable way of reflecting on the essential character of what has been recognized throughout history as moral consciousness — in a word, conscience" (7). Here again, as with Coleridge and Newman, we have a correlation between conscience and person.

According to Conn's analysis, the transcendental method as developed by Lonergan provides a foundational philosophy that grounds and coordinates the empirical findings of the three developmental psychologies. Central to Lonergan's approach is the thesis that the roots of both metaphysics and ethics lie "neither in sentences nor propositions nor in judgments but in the dynamic structure of rational consciousness."¹⁹ The dynamic structure of human knowing which is discovered in the content of human consciousness consists in ascending levels of consciousness, each of which transcends the previous level. Aware of the metaphor implicit in the word 'transcendent,' Lonergan says "transcendence, then, at the present juncture, means a development in man's knowledge relevant to a development in man's being."²⁰ This means that consciousness actually constitutes one a person both psychologically and ontologically.

Addressing objections to his theory Lonergan dismisses as '*simpliste*' the common conception of consciousness as perception.²¹ The point is that an epistemology which equates knowing with seeing "takes account of the fact that by consciousness the subject is known by the subject," but it overlooks the fact that consciousness is not merely cognitive but constitutive, "that it constitutes and reveals the basic psychological unity of the subject as subject. In like manner consciousness not merely reveals us as suffering but also makes us capable of suffering; and similarly it pertains to the constitution of the consciously intelligent subject as intelligent, the consciously rational subject of rational acts, the consciously free subject of free acts."²² A person then, for Lonergan, is a conscious, self-transcending subject, each of which terms we will consider briefly.

Lonergan, too, associates conscience and consciousness. In the table of contents of *Insight* under conscience one reads "see self-consciousness, moral." "With Lonergan," Conn observes, "there is something of a return to the original close relationship between the

¹⁹ *Insight* 604.

²⁰ *Insight* 636.

²¹ "Christ as Subject: A Reply," in *Collection: Papers by Bernard Lonergan*, ed. F.E. Crowe (New York: Herder and Herder, 1967) 176.

²² "Christ as Subject" 176-177.

moral and the non-moral meanings located in the one word — the Greek *suneidesis* or the Latin *conscientia* (a relationship maintained in a single locus in the French *conscience*). For with Lonergan conscience is consciousness or awareness, but it is to be understood as a distinctive kind of awareness, *moral consciousness*, which “is the consciousness of the responsible, existential subject, clearly differentiated in an explanatory theory (but not separated) from the other forms or dimensions of awareness (empirical, intelligent, reasonable) which characterize the conscious subject” (114-115). Not only is this consciousness both intellectual and moral, it is a concomitant quality of human activity at all levels. Lonergan says his point is clarified by Georges Van Reit who writes that “in our opinion every conscious activity is necessarily present to itself without reflexion, or, as Sartre writes it, is conscious (of) itself.”²³ This self-presence of which Lonergan speaks is not self knowledge. It is rather a quality of being, as Coleridge puts it, of being ‘conscious.’ It is what Joseph Maréchal called ‘*transparence*’ and Karl Rahner called ‘*Gelichtetheit*.’²⁴ And what Newman several times in *The Idea of a University* speaks of as ‘luminousness.’ None of these philosophers suggests that one is conscious of one’s immortality or of the soul but merely of the immaterial or spiritual operations of human understanding, which, if they were lacking, consciousness as we know it would be impossible. Part of the primary empirical data of human consciousness is that one is, in part at least, spiritual. That is, in traditional religious language, one has a soul. But as Lonergan clearly points out, one is not conscious of one’s substantial form, “for consciousness does not reveal a prime substance, it reveals a psychological subject that subsequently may be subsumed and subsumed correctly, under the category of prime substance.”²⁵ We are conscious of our ‘self’ in our actions and in the continuous process of self-transcendence.

For Lonergan, transcendence is in literal terms “a development in man’s knowledge relevant to a development in man’s being.”²⁶ In equating transcendence and development, Lonergan shows how the developmental patterns in psychology can be grounded metaphysically as parallel to the levels of consciousness uncovered in the process of

²³ “Christ as Subject” 184.

²⁴ Otto Muck, *The Transcendental Method* (New York: Herder and Herder, 1968) 99, 160.

²⁵ “Christ as Subject” 176-177.

²⁶ *Insight* 636.

self-appropriation characteristic of the transcendental method. In ascending order, these levels of consciousness are the empirical, the intelligent, the rational, the moral, and the religious. At the lowest level we are conscious of experiencing data which impinge on our senses. At the next level we are conscious of actively trying to understand this data. At the third level we are conscious of actively trying to judge the truth or falseness of our proposed understanding of the original data. At the fourth level we are conscious of the possibility of a difference between 'is' and 'ought' in our decisions to act. We become aware of our decisions being made *vis à vis* other subjects. At the highest level, the religious, we are open to or actually engaged by the gift of faith as the eyes of being in love. Thus the culmination of human consciousness, the fullness of authentic humanity and personhood, is the recognition of the interpersonal nature of who and what we are.

Lonergan, like Coleridge and Newman, finds cognition to be conditioned by the moral and religious levels of consciousness, for the fundamental nature of being human is to be questioner, and 'being' is the "objective of the pure desire to know."²⁷ The initial manifestation which points to the existential or moral level of awareness consists precisely in the intellectual drive to know, culminating in the recognition that the entire structure of human knowing is ordained to moral choice and, ultimately, love. We have arrived at the 'truth' when we have virtually no more relevant questions to ask about an issue or fact. We have arrived at 'absolute truth' when there are absolutely no more questions to be asked or answered. To ask questions about one's questions is a valid part of the process of transcendence, but to call the questioning itself into question is both inane and unreasonably skeptical. Thus the questioning person is the fundamental premise of Lonergan's transcendental method, and that questioning issues from an innate desire to know, a desire that implies both moral and religious components. Thus he can say that "as the question of God is implicit in all our questioning, so being in love with God is the basic fulfillment of our conscious intentionality." He continues with a stunningly compressed vision of the fulfillment such a process of self-transcendence bestows on the human person: "That fulfillment brings a deep-set joy that can remain despite humiliation, failure, privation, pain, betrayal, desertion. That fulfillment brings a radical peace, the peace that the world cannot give. That fulfillment bears fruit in a love

²⁷ *Insight* 348.

of one's neighbor that strives mightily to bring about the kingdom of God on this earth. On the other hand, the absence of that fulfillment opens the way to trivialization of human life in the pursuit of fun, to the harshness of human life arising from the ruthless exercise of power, to despair about human welfare springing from the conviction that the world is absurd."²⁸ To those who feel this is a prejudicially theistic reading of life which is rather "nasty, brutish, and short" as eminent Coleridgean Thomas McFarland — uniting his voice with Thomas Hobbes — asserts, might one not ask whether they have candidly weighed all the evidence — by being attentive, reasonable, and responsible in their ongoing investigation, whether they have asked and answered all the relevant questions before reaching a state of virtually unconditioned assent to their position?

Trying to get people to understand such a philosophical method without their entering into it poses real difficulty. As Conn points out, "the persuasive force and justification of such a position lies only in the personal experiment of self-appropriation which each person must perform for her or himself." "Such a disclaimer," Conn continues, "is not an appeal to the mystical, visionary gnosis of an elite group of *illuminati*, but a simple recognition of the fact that philosophical understanding is not part of our birthright but the fruit of long and arduous struggle. Its requirement of exact scholarship, rigorous analysis, and relentless personal reflection is no more unreasonable than the sciences' prerequisite of mathematical facility" (167).

II

What weight has such a moral argument in our current climate of disbelief? At the Inaugural Conference of the Boston College Jesuit Institute in 1989, critic Denis Donoghue asked: "What attitude can the Jesuit Institute take to the fact that in the received discourse surrounding literature and art it is nearly universally assumed that no intelligent man or woman can retain a religious belief? It is deemed impossible for such a person to be a Catholic. If, with a contrary intention, one points to the fact that every Sunday, and not only in remote parishes in Ireland, the churches are crowded with believers, the

²⁸ *Method in Theology* 105.

answer is that these people must be fools or fanatics.”²⁹ Theologian Charles Hefling responding to an earlier version of this paper expressed doubts whether the argument would convince post-Freudian people: “Just think what would happen to N[ewman]’s argument if every time he uses the word ‘conscience’ you were to substitute the word ‘superego.’” Hefling suggested that we would have to have a way of speaking about “‘conscience’ and ‘moral judgment’ in the context of a different, and deeper, phenomenology than the one N[ewman] presents.”³⁰ Finally, literary historian David DeLaura traces in detail Newman’s own growing conviction that his own world was on the verge of becoming a post-religious culture.³¹ Speaking as neither philosopher nor theologian but as a believer who is a literary person, I would like to ask in conclusion whether the role imagination plays in belief might not be a fruitful way of rethinking the moral argument for the modern world. By way of raising this question I will pose two difficulties without providing any resolution.

III

The imagination enters into three aspects of the life of faith: (1) belief in God, (2) belief in Christianity, and (3) the ongoing living out of one’s belief in religious community. In terms of the last point, the work of Margaret Kelleher is a splendid example of Lonergan’s thought applied to the liturgy.³² But my principal concern is with how imagination enters into Newman’s moral argument as finally developed in the *Grammar of Assent*, that is, in answering his question, “Can I believe as if I saw?”

Real assent for Newman is imaginative assent, just as real apprehension is imaginative. “Now assent to a real proposition is assent to an imagination, as supplying objects to our emotional and moral nature, is adapted to be a principle of action.”³³ That the imagination

²⁹ “Speaking to Whom,” *In All Things: Religious Faith and American Culture* ed. Robert J. Daly, S.J. (Kansas City: Sheed & Ward, 1990) 154.

³⁰ Response to Philip Rule, “Reconciling the Head and the Heart,” 1 April 1993.

³¹ “Arnold, Newman, and T.S. Eliot: A Note on the Disappearance of God,” *The Arnoldian* 4 (1977) 2-7.

³² See, for example, “Liturgy and the Christian Imagination,” *Worship* 66 (1992) 125-148.

³³ *Grammar of Assent* 214.

moves people to action is central to Newman's thought and is nowhere more fully expressed than in "The Tamworth Reading Room" letters, an extended passage from which is included in the *Grammar* to make this very point. Yet when pressed to explain how or where the imagination derives the concrete images proper to its cognitive reach, Newman simply says "the phenomena of Conscience avail to impress the imagination with the picture of a Supreme Governor, a Judge, holy, just, powerful, all-seeing, retributive."³⁴ My question is simply: *How* does the conscience do this? *Where* did the conscience get these images?

My second question is actually a series of questions. Why do so many fail to experience the 'impressing' of such phenomena of conscience on their imaginations? Is imagination in the individual and in a society a phenomenon that one gradually grows out of and leaves behind as the individual moves from childhood to maturity, and the community from barbarism to civilization? Does growing up and growing civilized, then, imply, as the modern world thinks, leaving religion behind?

Newman *seems* to talk this way. In the *Idea of a University* he writes: "Alas! what are we doing all through life, both as a necessity and a duty, but unlearning the world's poetry, and attaining to its prose!"³⁵ In the *Grammar* he laments that "we may lose in manhood and in age that sense of a Supreme Teacher and Judge which was the gift of our first years; and that the more, because in most men the imagination suffers from the lapse of time and the experience of life, long before the bodily senses fail."³⁶ Finally, in a seldom noticed historical essay on "The Turks" Newman associates barbaric peoples with imagination and civilization with reason; that is, in the process of moving from barbarism to civilization there is a movement analogous to that of a person growing up: "Rationcination and its kindred processes, which are the necessary instruments of political progress, are, taking things as we find them, hostile to imagination and auxiliary to sense," he observes, and concludes that "hence it is that civilized states ever tend to substitute objects of sense for objects of imagination." What are objects of the imagination? Newman says: "By objects of the *imagination*, I mean such as religion, true or false, (for

³⁴ *Grammar of Assent* 110.

³⁵ *Ibid* 331-332.

³⁶ *Ibid* 123.

there are not only false imaginations but true), divine mission of a sovereign or of a dynasty, and history fame.”³⁷ Might one not conclude that to grow out of barbarism into civilization is a natural process that includes outgrowing religion? And if this is true, have not Schleiermacher’s cultured despisers done only what the natural tendency of their being impels them to? If this conclusion is false, then precisely how is imagination to be reintegrated into adulthood and civilized society? Is the current state of unbelief due to the achievement of reason or the failure of imagination? I leave such questions to philosophers and theologians.

³⁷ *Historical Sketches*, I, 170, 162.

BERNARD LONERGAN AND THE RETURN OF ANCIENT PRACTICE

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IN THIS ESSAY I hope the reader will join me in a thought-experiment: one reason for calling any hypothesis a thought-experiment is, of course, that it is not verified (although thought-experiments are verifiable). The other reason for the name, however, may also be important: a thought-experiment is a hypothesis worthy of serious consideration because, if true, the hypothesis illuminates some genuine puzzles; even if ultimately not true, the hypothesis suggests some questions and possibilities worthy of further development, refinement and correction.

The major hypothesis in the present thought-experiment is this: the time may be ripe for a second reception of the work of Bernard Lonergan. The first reception proved, in Lonergan's own lifetime, enormously fruitful: on the one hand, a liberation (especially but not solely in Catholic theology and philosophy) of theological method from the increasingly dead-weight of neo-Scholasticism. The Lonerganian liberation, moreover, persuasively helped Catholic thinkers avoid the temptations to empiricism and idealism, to relativism and historicism: temptations which all too successfully awaited many a former neo-Scholastic after the deluge. That first reception was exceptional in its fruits: witness these annual Lonergan Workshops and their publication; witness the many dissertations written every year in some aspect of Lonergan's work; witness the publication of Lonergan's work by the University of Toronto Press; witness the development, refinement and sometimes corrections of Lonergan's positions on particular issues by so many Lonergan scholars and thinkers. Even the corrections, after all, take place within the basic context of the invariant self-structuring structure of consciousness and thereby of Lonergan's entirely original notion of 'method.' To read the annual papers of the Lonergan Workshop or the many articles — even books — on Lonergan yearly (as the latter are reported in the valuable and informative Lonergan Newsletter) is to observe how strong the legacy of Lonergan, based on his still

astonishing personal intellectual achievement, continues to be. The first reception of Lonergan, in sum, is alive and well, indeed flourishing.

And yet, at least to a relative outsider to this ongoing and correlative tradition of Lonergan scholarship like myself, something like a 'second reception' of Lonergan's work by other than Lonergan scholars and specialists and thinkers is perhaps necessary. Moreover, I believe that such a second reception is eminently possible in our present moment of philosophical and theological history. Although I have elsewhere defended the notion that our contemporary cultural time is better described as post-modern rather than as either modern or even late modern, I will not enter into that necessarily highly contested debate for the present study. I will, however, recall that much of Lonergan's work is concerned with the challenges posed by modernity from the scientific revolution through the modern turn to the subject and the rise of modern historical consciousness.¹ This is especially the case in *Insight* on modern science and cognitional theory and in *Method in Theology* in the many sections on historical consciousness. This is also the case with many of Lonergan's essays on secularity, on the move from classical consciousness to historical consciousness and from a classicist to an empirical notion of culture.² I do not know another theologian as persuasive as Lonergan on the philosophical and theological implications of the modern scientific revolution. And what other theologian is more convincing on how the shift to interiority in the turn to the subject of modernity can open to a cognitional theory for philosophy — and therefore to a modern notion of method — without methodologism, and a modern notion of the subject without either Enlightenment notions of pure autonomy or Romantic notions of the expressive subject? At the same time, only in the last fifteen or twenty years (when the more exact meaning of post-modern thought began to be clarified by various thinkers) have some of the amazing alliances of Lonergan's work with some characteristically post-modern emphases of contemporary thought become clearer.

One characteristic of contemporary thought as post-modern is the widely-acknowledged priority of praxis. This insistence on praxis has many, sometimes incompatible, manifestations. At the moment, I want

¹ See the many essays by Lonergan on these themes in the invaluable volumes of his essays generically titled *Collection* in the University of Toronto editions.

² See especially the essays in Bernard Lonergan, *A Second Collection* (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1974) 1-11, 55-69, 231-239.

to focus on a single but important strand of post-modernity and Lonergan: the important praxis recovery of an ancient philosophical and theological notion of 'spiritual exercises' for contemporary philosophy and theology.³

In theology one of the most promising as well as puzzling developments of the last fifteen years has been the unexpected explosion of theological, and even philosophical, interest in spirituality allied to the desire to reunite a historically separated theology and spirituality, while still maintaining some distinction between them. This more general theological development seems paralleled by the new interpretations, expansions, refinements, and sometimes corrections of Lonergan's own work in this direction of explicitly relating theology and spirituality by the studies of Frederick Crowe (in the Ignatian spiritual exercises and Lonergan), Cathleen Going, Robert Doran, Sebastian Moore, Harvey Egan, Walter Conn, Bernard McGinn, Shawn Copeland, Bernard Tyrrell, and many others. In sum, many Lonergan scholars and thinkers have demonstrated the power and promise of Lonergan's work by explicitly relating his theology to the practice and history of spirituality, and to what might be named contemporary psychologically informed spiritual exercises.⁴

Moreover, in philosophy the issue is formulated with clarity in *Insight* itself:⁵ before any authentic self-affirmation can occur, the reader must undertake a series of intellectual exercises of self-appropriation in *Insight as Activity*. This insistence on exercises was later summarized by Lonergan as the asking of the three related basic questions of philosophy: What am I doing when I am knowing? (cognitional theory), Why is doing that knowing? (epistemology), What do I know when I do it? (metaphysics as a transcendental integration of heuristic structures).⁶

Lonergan himself clarified the importance of this characteristic insistence on the performance of intellectual exercises in order to understand cognitional theory, and therefore epistemology and

³This can be found in the work of Pierre Hadot, *Exercices spirituel et philosophie antique* (Paris: Études augustiennes, 1983).

⁴See especially the several works of Sebastian Moore here: e.g. *The Crucified Jesus Is No Stranger* (New York: Crossroad, 1989).

⁵Bernard Lonergan, *Insight: A Study in Human Understanding* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1957).

⁶Bernard Lonergan, "Insight Revisited," *A Second Collection* 263-278.

metaphysics, in his response to a question raised at the Lonergan Congress of 1970:

Questions were put regarding the book *Insight*, whether it was a *way* or a *theory*, and how the exercise of self-appropriation to which it invites one generates horizons.

Now with regard to the business of *Insight*, *Insight* happened this way: my original intention was method in theology. *Insight* was an exploration of methods in other fields, prior to trying to do method in theology. I got word in 1952 that I was to go to the Gregorian and teach in 1953, so I cut down my original ambition to do method in theology and put this book together. It's both a way and something like a theory. Fundamentally it's a way. It's asking people to discover in themselves what they are. And as Fr. Heelan put it, "There's something liberating about that." The word *Lonerganian* has come up in recent days. In a sense there's no such thing. Because what I'm asking people is to discover themselves and be themselves. They can arrive at conclusions different from mine on the basis of what they find in themselves. And in that sense it is a way.

But that self-appropriation can be objectified. It's a heightening of consciousness — as one moves from attention to intelligence, to reasonableness, to responsibility, to religious experience. Those modalities of consciousness, the *a priori* that they constitute, *that* can be objectified. Not in the sense of subject-object — in here now, out there now — but in the sense that objectivity is the fruit of authentic subjectivity. That self-appropriation can be objectified and its objectification is theory.

But it is not theory in exactly the same way physics is. Its basic elements — mass, temperature, electromagnetic fields — are not within the field of experience. They are, all of them, constructs. Temperature is not what feels hot or cold. You put your hand on something metal, on something wood and one feels warmer than the other. They're both the same temperature — they're in the same room for a sufficient length of time. These fundamental concepts in physics are not data of experience.

But the fundamental terms and relations in cognitional theory are given in consciousness. The relations are the dynamisms of consciousness and the terms are the operations that are related through the dynamisms. So it is theory — but in a sense as totally different from theory (in physics) as Eddington's two tables. On one you can put your hands, rest your weight; you find it solid, brown, it weighs so much. The other consists mostly of empty space, and where the space isn't empty you have a wavicle; but what it's doing is very hard to say.

The exercise of self-appropriation gives you the structure that generates horizons. And because you have the structure that's generating horizon, because that structure is heuristic, you're anticipating. If the intelligible,

being, the good — what you mean by those terms — is what is correlative to the desire to understand, to be reasonable, to be responsible; then, in yourself, you have the subjective pole of an objective field. You have also, in intelligent reasonable responsibility, norms, built-in norms, that are yourself. They are not propositions about yourself; but yourself, in your spiritual reality, to guide you in working out what that objective horizon is, the objective pole of the horizon. It's normative, it's potential. Not absolute, in the sense that you have it all tucked away. But you have the machinery for going at it, and you know what happens when you do.⁷

Hence my basic question for this reading of Lonergan: is it not plausible to read the first four chapters of *Method in Theology*, along with the two chapters in dialectics and foundations, as implicitly and sometimes explicitly engaging the careful reader in a set of exercises different from, but analogous to, those explicated in the whole of *Insight as Activity*? Admittedly the exercises of *Method* are more implicit than explicit (or, perhaps more accurately, more cryptic than developed in detail). The exercises necessary to Lonergan's theological method, after all, demand not only the intellectual exercises familiar to *Insight* (and recalled in chapter one of *Method*)⁸ but demand as well modern psychological — even therapeutic — exercises and what I shall name (following Pierre Hadot) 'spiritual exercises' employed by the ancients. If this is indeed the case, then what I earlier called the possibility of a second reception of Lonergan's work is real: a reception in a changed intellectual climate where modernity's typical suspicion of any union of theory to praxis, much less to spiritual exercises, is now itself under suspicion.

Recall some recent examples of this modern development. A first example is modernity's characteristic reading of Anselm's *Proslogion*. Modern thinkers from Descartes and Kant through Hartshorne have typically read Anselm's arguments and reflections on God in the *Proslogion* as what Kant (not Anselm) named the ontological argument. A few contemporary interpreters of Anselm (e.g. Anselm Stolz, Karl Barth, Hans Urs von Balthasar) take notice of the possible hermeneutical import of the prayers central to Anselm's text as well as the intricate relationship of reflective thought and spiritual exercises in Anselm's Christian Platonism.

⁷ "An Interview with Fr. Bernard Lonergan, SJ," ed. Philip McShane, *A Second Collection* 213-214.

⁸ Bernard Lonergan, *Method in Theology* (New York: Herder and Herder, 1992) 3-22.

A second example: consider three well-received intellectual biographies of contemporary philosophers: Simone Petrement's life of Simone Weil, Ray Monk's biography of Wittgenstein nicely entitled *The Duty of Genius*, and James Miller's biography of Michel Foucault.⁹ What is striking about these three otherwise very different philosophers (and each, in turn, quite different from Lonergan) is a reality that Weil, Wittgenstein, Foucault, and Lonergan (unlike most philosophers of the modern West) shared: a belief in the importance of intellectual and even 'spiritual' exercises for theory itself. Foucault is the most surprising here since no such emphasis is present in his better known work on his archeological and genealogical methods. Only in his last works, partly because of the influence of Pierre Hadot and Peter Brown on ancient philosophy as a way of life, partly because of the impasses of his work on sexuality and of his own debate with the narrowness of modernity, partly because of his now widely-shared belief in the need to recover the Hellenistic period of late antiquity as philosophically important (not only classic Hellenic thought), Foucault turned, in his thought as in his life experiments, to the ancient notion of caring for and fashioning a self.

Or consider a third, closer to hand: Lonergan's own self-correction in replacing the argument for the existence of God of chapter nineteen within the context of systematic theology (that is, of the self-appropriating religious subject). This famous shift (articulated most clearly in his Gonzaga lectures *The Philosophy of God and Systematic Theology*)¹⁰ corresponded to Lonergan's more basic move to the fourth, existential level of intentional consciousness, and thereby to his new emphases on feeling, radical self-transcendence, and the dynamic state of being-in-love without restriction. This shift corresponds as well to Lonergan's realization that the intellectual exercises of *Insight* were necessary but insufficient conditions for formulating and assessing the question of God. This amazing self-correction, I suggest, can now be viewed as part of Lonergan's implicit recovery of another aspect of ancient philosophy and theology — the need for practices in the form of spiritual (including intellectual) exercises for developing an adequate theory on the relationship of reason and God.

⁹ Simone Petrement, *Simone Weil* (New York: Schocken, 1979); Ray Monk, *Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius* (New York: Vintage, 1992); James Miller, *The Passion of Michel Foucault* (New York: Harper-Collins, 1993).

¹⁰ Bernard J. F. Lonergan, *Philosophy of God, and Theology* (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1973), especially 45-69.

I do not claim that Lonergan ever made this move to ancient 'spiritual exercises' explicitly. I do claim, however, that only a move like the retrieval of ancient spiritual exercises for philosophy and theology can clarify the following characteristic, indeed central, moves in *Method in Theology*: the insistence on exercises for sorting out basic conflicts in dialectics allied to the emergent notion of intellectual, moral and religious conversion for 'foundations'; the development of exercises to clarify the positions in the first four chapters of chapters of *Method in Theology*; above all, the entirely new (even for the once 'modern' Lonergan) character of Lonergan's thought on theological method. Method relates to recurrent operations; operations are clarified by exercises.¹¹

The ground-breaking historical work of Pierre Hadot is very illuminating on the role of 'spiritual exercises' in ancient thought.¹² Given Lonergan's admiration for the work of Bruno Snell in classic Hellenic thought and Eric Voegelin on both classic Hellenic and Hellenistic philosophy,¹³ Lonergan would have been open, I believe, to Pierre Hadot's studies. At any rate, Hadot's work can illuminate crucial aspects of Lonergan's later work in *Method in Theology*.

In very summary form, Hadot, especially in his magisterial studies of Plotinus but also in his more general studies of the role of 'spiritual exercises' in the major ancient philosophical schools (Stoicism, Epicureanism, Aristotelianism, Platonism) and even in less-structured and non-institutionalized movements (skepticism and cynicism) as well as in the great synthetic position of neo-Platonism, advances the following claims.

A major difficulty for modern Westerners in reading the texts of the ancients and medievals in Western culture, as well as the texts of other great cultures — for example, not only classical but also contemporary Buddhist texts in East Asian, South Asian and even now

¹¹ *Method in Theology* 235-295.

¹² See the insightful introductions and studies of Hadot's work by Arnold Davidson, including the forthcoming (Cambridge University Press) introduction to the English-language edition of Hadot's work. I am happy to have the opportunity to express my thanks to my colleague, Arnold Davidson, for introducing me to Hadot's work in Davidson's own writing (in *Critical Inquiry* and in several introductions to Hadot's work as well as several invaluable conversations). My own summary of Hadot's significance is, at several junctures, thankfully dependent on Davidson's work.

¹³ Bruno Snell, *The Discovery of Mind* (New York: Harper Torchbook, 1960); Eric Voegelin, *Order and History* 4 volumes (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1956, 1957, and 1974).

Western forms — is the habitual belief of modern Western philosophers and even theologians that theory should be separate from practices, especially practices as specific as an ancient thinker meant by the phrase 'spiritual exercises.' The ancients (and the monastic medieval schools — although not the Scholastics!) would have found such a separation of theory and practical exercises not merely strange but self-destructive for true philosophy.¹⁴ Philosophy, as Voegelin and Hadot both insist, was for the ancients, above all a love of wisdom, a unity of thought and a way of life. The philosopher as philosopher was unclassifiable in ordinary life, fitting nowhere in ordinary life as ordinary life is usually understood. The unclassifiable character of the philosopher-sage determined, Hadot maintains, all the major schools (Aristotelianism, Stoicism, Epicureanism, Platonism) and the two major philosophic movements (skepticism, cynicism) of the entire Hellenistic period from the third century BCE (when the 'sorting out' of the schools as schools occurred) to the third century ACE (when the classic neo-Platonism synthesis of Aristotelian and Stoic schools with Platonism was achieved).

Each school maintained itself (and its fidelity to its founding sage) by a specific training in intellectual and spiritual exercises. Each school possessed its ideal of wisdom and corresponding fundamental attitude or orientation (Lonergan's horizon on the fourth level of intentional consciousness). These orientations, of course, differed depending on the ideal itself: for example, a tensive attentiveness for the Stoics or a relaxation or letting-go for the Epicureans. Above all, every school employed exercises to aid the progressive development of its philosophical proponents to the ideal state of wisdom. At that ideal state the transcendent norm of reason ultimately coincides with God. Note how this movement corresponds to Lonergan's argument on complete intelligibility and God if that argument (which is the ultimate conclusion of the intellectual exercises of *Insight*) is replaced in the context of the feelings, and values, and the exercises for moral, religious (and continuing intellectual) conversion appropriate to

¹⁴More exactly, the Scholastics introduced a set of fine distinctions (for example, between philosophy and theology, faith and reason, spirituality and theology) that unhappily in later neo-Scholastic formulations became separations.

progress in the fundamental religious orientation of being-in-love-without-restriction.¹⁵

Such exercises (thus the word) were understood by all the ancient schools as analogous to the exercises employed by an athlete for the body as well as analogous to the application of a medical cure. In contemporary culture one could expand the analogy (as Lonergan did) to the exercises needed to appropriate one's feelings in therapy.¹⁶ Since the ancients, such exercises include intellectual exercises: recall the use of mathematics to help the exercitant to move from the realm of the sensible to the realm of intelligible — in Plato (and Lonergan!).¹⁷ These exercises also encompassed more obviously spiritual exercises, including the use of images, of memory training, of reflection on the basic doctrines or beliefs of the school, as well as exercises of increasing one's attentiveness to the implications of those beliefs for life and thought. Through all such exercises the exercitant can clarify her or his relationship to the ultimate norm, for example a Stoic exercise of attention to one's personal relationship to the *Logos* pervading the entire cosmos. Among the ancients, in sum, all reflection on the relationship between theory and practice must be understood from the perspective of such exercises, especially, but not solely, meditation.

Even on the very limited basis of this summary of Hadot's analysis of the link between ancient 'spiritual exercises' and ancient theory, it is clear that Lonergan's *Insight* explicitly and brilliantly corresponds to the ancient insistence on the role of intellectual exercises for personal intellectual self-appropriation. The question recurs: does Lonergan's later work in *Method in Theology* also encourage a central role for something like spiritual exercises: not only the intellectual exercises of *Insight* (summarized in chapter one of *Method in Theology*) and the further spiritual-psychological exercises of chapters 3 and 5 and chapters 10 and 11. A complete answer would demand something like a book-length study of the exercises implicit and explicit in Lonergan's work. A briefer, thought-experiment answer is all the present essay will allow.

¹⁵ For Lonergan's own reflections here, see his *Philosophy of God, and Theology* op. cit. For the Hadot summary, besides Hadot's own work, see the introductory essays, op. cit. of Arnold Davidson.

¹⁶ *Method in Theology* 30-34.

¹⁷ *Insight* 3-33.

ANCIENT EXERCISES IN CONTEMPORARY FORM: *METHOD IN THEOLOGY*

There can be little doubt that 'Insight as Activity' demands that the reader engage in intellectual exercises in order to reach the intellectual self-appropriation of 'I am a knower.' What is surprising, from the perspective of ancient exercises in philosophy, is how many different kinds of exercises Lonergan actually uses in order to persuade the attentive reader to his position: the move to the world of the intelligible via mathematics Lonergan shares with Plato and many ancients; the exercises aiding the appropriation of the intelligence of common sense Lonergan shares with the classical tradition of rhetoric from Cicero to Lonergan's own rhetorical mentor, John Henry Newman; the appropriation of modern science and its realm of intelligibility as expressed through both classical and statistical methods in Lonergan's major appropriation of the moderns; and Lonergan's brilliant transposition of the methods of Aristotle into exercises from experiencing, understanding, and judging one's experience. Understanding and judging is unique to Lonergan among the many contemporary retrievals of aspects of Aristotle.

There can also be little doubt that chapter one of *Method* nicely if somewhat cryptically recalls the intellectual exercises of *Insight* even as the chapter also suggests the need to move beyond *Insight* to the fourth, existential level of intentional consciousness — that new level which is the principal object of attention of *Method in Theology*. Note, for example, Lonergan's comments in footnote 2 of chapter 1:

I have presented this pattern of operations at length in the book *Insight* and more compendiously in an article "Cognitive Structure." But the matter is so crucial for the present enterprise that some summary must be included here. Please observe that I am offering only a summary, that the summary can do no more than present a general idea, that the process of self-appropriation occurs only slowly, and, usually, only through a struggle with some such book as *Insight*.¹⁸

Indeed the word 'struggle' — with its suggestions of effort and exercise — seems entirely appropriate here. There are many ways (even many accurate and complementary ways) to view the role of the first four chapters of *Method in Theology*. By observing certain details in

¹⁸ *Insight* 7.

chapter 2 as well as some similar factors in chapters 3 and 4 and the later chapters in dialectics and foundations, one can observe how *Method in Theology* also encourages the reader to engage in a series of exercises for the appropriation of the fourth level of authentic self-transcendence. Although the ultimate ground of religious self-transcendence (as chapter 4 on religion clarifies) is the sheer gift of grace, still even there a graced self-appropriation of operative and cooperative grace is encouraged. And prior to the clarification of that giftedness of religious self-transcendence lie the brilliant explanations (and implicit exercises) of chapters 2 and 3.

Recall, for example, the opening lines (cryptic even for Lonergan) of chapter 2 on "The Human Good":

What is good, always is concrete. But definitions are abstract. Hence, if one attempts to define the good, one runs the risk of misleading one's readers. The present chapter, then, aims at assembling the various components that enter into the human good. So it will speak of skills, feelings, values, beliefs, cooperations, progress, decline.¹⁹

There are, of course, good intellectual reasons for each of these elements and for the order in which Lonergan presents them. Moreover, there are also good reasons to believe that proper attention to each element encourages a reader to engage in both modern psychologically — therapeutic as well as ancient spiritual exercises — and often both together. Consider, as a first example, Lonergan's discussion of 'skills.'²⁰ To begin the study with skills frees Lonergan to appropriate Piaget's brilliant work for his own purpose of clarifying the exact meanings of 'mediated immediacy.' For that turns out to be more exercise-oriented than a Piaget-like analysis of the skills necessary to group groups of differentiated operations. It resembles instructions for relearning basic skills in a manual of physical therapy!

If the early section on 'skills' initiates the needed emphasis on exercises, the central section on 'feelings'²¹ shows why skills are necessary and what kind of exercised skills are appropriate. The ancients, as noted above, needed spiritual exercises to increase attention to the fundamental orientation opened by the ultimate vision of reality achieved. A contemporary thinker like Bernard Lonergan can

¹⁹ *Insight* 27.

²⁰ *Method in Theology* 27-30.

²¹ *Method in Theology* 30-34.

clarify this ancient demand further: we need to learn better ways to be attentive to those feelings intentionally responsive to the vital, social, cultural, personal, and religious values at stake. Indeed, there Lonergan introduces just the right cautionary note of a good spiritual advisor: it is true that feelings are spontaneous but they can be enriched and refined by "attentive study of the wealth and variety of objects that arouse them and so no small part of education lies in fostering and developing a climate of discernment and taste ..."²² The dialectic of feelings, moreover, is never forgotten. For every development of good feelings there are also possible aberrations, as Scheler's analysis of the Nietzschean discovery of 'ressentiment' shows.

The next section on values²³ marks the major transition to the fourth level of intentional consciousness where value becomes a transcendental notion: the good, always concrete and intended in all questioning, is what is truly worthwhile. Section four on 'judgments of value' completes this movement by showing how understanding values demands the existence of authentic, self-transcending persons, just as Aristotle insisted one needed virtuous persons to understand virtue. Even those, like myself, who do not share Lonergan's high admiration for the work of Carl Rogers or Abraham Maslow, agree with the basic reasons for his appeal to work like theirs in our period: the need for therapeutic skills and exercises for the development of authentic, self-transcending persons.

To be sure, 'beliefs'²⁴ in this chapter resumes Lonergan's epistemological interests on the necessary role of belief for knowledge. Later in *Method* he will even add 'believing' to the list experiencing, understanding, judging, deciding — indicative of his growing acknowledgment at the time of a sociology of knowledge. Still, I suggest the central role for beliefs in chapter 4 is exactly the kind of role that true beliefs possessed for the ancients: true beliefs are worthwhile principally because they are expressive of those true judgments of value implied by the fundamental orientation of an authentic tradition of values, grounded in a vision of ultimate reality as good. (Recall the later relation between foundations, orientations, and horizons grounded in the three conversions — and doctrines or

²² *Method in Theology* 32.

²³ *Method in Theology* 34-36.

²⁴ *Method in Theology* 41-47.

beliefs).²⁵ The section on the 'human good,'²⁶ moreover, brilliantly summarized this whole development through an outline of the complex and developing order of the human good itself — an outline which could provide the basic framework needed for a new set of spiritual exercises faithful to the demand of our spiritual traditions as well as modern psychological and sociological insight.

A similar analysis of the subsequent chapters of *Method* would also be needed to clarify the full complexity and ultimately religious, graced, grounding of Lonergan's final envisionment of all reality. But perhaps enough has been said to indicate why I believe that Lonergan (whether knowingly or not I do not claim to know) appropriated from the ancients not only the crucial emancipatory distinction between common sense and theory, but, as Lonergan's love for the early dialogues of both Plato and Augustine suggests, the even more emancipatory ancient insistence that true theological theory is intrinsically related to practices that demand exercises. Skills, feelings, values, judgments of value, beliefs: one and all can be viewed as contemporary (that is, psychologically informed) transpositions of the spiritual exercises of the ancients no less clearly than Lonergan's self-transcending subject transposes Aristotle's virtuous person in order to clarify moral conversion, or than his appropriation of modern mathematics and physics transposes Plato's exercises for clarifying intellectual conversion, or than his explicit turn to the realism of interiority radically transposes Aquinas's systematic understanding of grace.²⁷ These realities should encourage further developments of Lonergan's legacy in just the way many of his students have already suggested. But more is surely needed: somewhere, sometime, someone must develop the cryptically suggested exercises of the first four chapters of *Method* into the explicitness and fullness they both suggest and deserve.

²⁵ *Method in Theology* 267-293.

²⁶ *Method in Theology* 47-52.

²⁷ *Method in Theology* 343-344.

THEOLOGY AND SPIRITUAL LIFE

Encounter with Bernard Lonergan

Pierre Robert

THE GROWING INTEREST in spirituality is not without consequences for theology. How can theology reflect upon spiritual life, and what is the relationship between the two? These are the questions that I asked Bernard Lonergan in May 1982, one year and a half before his death on November 26, 1984.

The circumstances of the interview are as follows. Lonergan was in Montreal for the launching of the French translation of some of his theological articles.¹ The officials of the Thomas More Institute, knowing that I was pursuing doctoral research on the relationship between theology and spirituality in Lonergan's work, arranged this meeting for me.² The interview took place the day after the publication of the book. We met at the Jesuit residence of the Loyola Campus at Concoridia University in Montreal, on May 19, 1982.

Some notes regarding the text

The interview was conducted partly in French, partly in English. Lonergan's French was flawless, and he was quite ready to speak in this language; but I was uncomfortable with the thought that a thinker of that caliber should have to express himself in French by way of accommodation, so from time to time I shifted the conversation back into English with a question or a remark in that language. The whole conversation is here reproduced in English.³

¹ Bernard Lonergan, *Les voies d'une théologie méthodique. Ecrits théologiques choisis*, translated from English under the direction of Pierrôt Lambert and Louis Roy (Montréal: Bellarmin; Tournai; Desclée, 1982).

² Lonergan gave many courses at the Thomas More Institute in Montreal. It was at the end of a course on knowledge that — in his own words — "I knew I had a book!" And that book is *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding*.

³ The French version of the interview appeared in *Science et Esprit*, XXXVIII/3 (1986): 331-341. I am deeply grateful to James Ernest of Boston College for his help with this English version.

This conversation was not intended for publication, so it was not tape-recorded. With Lonergan's consent, I took notes during the interview, and just after leaving I completed them, while it was all still fresh in my mind. During the weekend I put the finishing touches on the text. So I can guarantee the substantial accuracy of this account of the conversation.

Words in parentheses are part of the conversation. Inside square brackets are some explanations that are needed because of the elliptic nature of a conversation. Moreover, Lonergan was speaking with one who already had a certain familiarity with his work, so there are things that did not have to be made explicit; that is, the interview rested upon certain presuppositions. Notes have been added to explicate some of these.

The Content

As for the content, one will find Lonergan's well-known perspectives, such as the subject's five levels of consciousness: experience, understanding, judgment, decision, and religious experience. In the interview, this last level is clearly identified as that of the *Story of a Soul* (Thérèse de Lisieux) or of the *Ascent of Mount Carmel* (John of the Cross), that is, of the spiritual journey: this fundamental level underpins the others.⁴ Lonergan says that if a distinction is to be drawn between theology and spiritual life, it should not become a disjunction, for a relation between the two is needed.

In the second part, Lonergan uses his own categories to reflect on contemplation and on the place of the spiritual dimension in the human subject. But the reader may decide by himself.

A Testimony

Finally, may I be permitted to give my testimony about the man as he was at the end of his life? Needless to say, one could not help being impressed by his remarkable intelligence: nonetheless, there was in him a profound paternal goodness that made him very engaging. He was very open and attentive. He was always ready to meet those who

⁴ In this regard see chapters 1 and 10 (on conversion) of Bernard Lonergan, *Method in Theology* (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1972), cited hereafter as *MT*.

wanted to see him providing that they did not view him only as a celebrity. This testimony is backed up by this story related by Fred Lawrence.⁵ It is the story of a nurse who worked the night shift in the hospital where Lonergan was a patient. Lonergan, forgetting himself even then, listened to her and counseled her with such attention that she could only cry as she left the room.

No one will be surprised if we point out that Lonergan was without affectation in his manner. In a meeting with the small group of translators of *Les voies d'une théologie méthodique*. He could not come up with the name of a theologian, so he said: "The Frenchman there, the guy with a sore leg!" It took us a while to recognize none other than Fr. Yves Congar, O.P.

Lonergan considered the conditions to which his success had brought him with humor and detachment. Thus, to simplify his right of authorship, he had been counseled to become a legal corporation. This amused him and he said to whoever wanted to hear him: "I am a company now."

A Final Word

At the outset, I did not intend to have this text published. The purpose of the interview was to allow me to ask Lonergan certain questions and identify contours of a current research project. But Lonergan's death, the inherent interest of the questions discussed, and the fact that Lonergan did not express himself that much on these subjects elsewhere put the situation in a new light. I thought it would be useful to make the content of that encounter available to the public.⁶

THE INTERVIEW

PR:* The problem at hand is the relationship between theology and the spiritual life. Concretely, it is the fact that one can study theology for five years without ever hearing about the spiritual life. And to do such

⁵ In *The Lonergan Studies Newsletter* (Feb. 1985) 15.

⁶ According to Frederick E. Crowe (in a letter dated April 3, 1986): "It (the interview) contains a number of illuminating remarks, and information that I do not remember seeing elsewhere."

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a theology, what is needed is a critical theology of that life. ... But to pose the question in all its radicalness and simplicity: How can one be both a saint and a theologian, an intellectual?

LONERGAN: It is difficult.

In the first place it is the work of God. It is the life of prayer pushed to the limit, to the point of heroism, for holiness is heroism.

It is a fuller life than the intellectual life. The intellectual life consists firstly in understanding, secondly in good judgment, then in personal responsibility toward people of this world and toward the good Lord.⁷

Integration takes time. One can become too intellectual and neglect the life of prayer. During the period of formation, however, one must devote a serious time to study: otherwise, it will only be a pastime that does not achieve any depth.

There is a faithfulness to the life of prayer. One can go through twelve years of desolation. It is *l'Histoire d'une âme* [*The Story of a Soul*]. That is the fundamental level in life, but something else is needed in order to live the life of a human being.⁸

P.R.: So once this religious dimension has been put in its central place, intellectual life can be reintegrated. It is a matter of reorganizing one's interior life around this radical preoccupation with the love of God, with the quest for God, which is the 'long conversion.'

LONERGAN: Yes ... One has to live one's life.⁹ Two rules to advance in spiritual life: in periods of desolation, do not change anything; in periods of consolation, follow the Spirit.¹⁰

⁷ A reader acquainted with Lonergan's categories will recognize here the levels of consciousness (intellectual, rational, existential, and religious).

⁸ With this reference to Thérèse de Lisieux, Lonergan clearly identifies the fundamental level, that of religious conversion, with the *spiritual journey*. Later on, reference is made to *The Ascent of Mount Carmel*.

⁹ In a conversation the evening before the interview, Lonergan presented the relation between conversion (as passage from non-faith to faith) and the 'long conversion' (the spiritual journey) in this way:

"There is that conversion which is the starting point, and the life according to that religious aim. Spiritual maturity is union with God. That is what is *basic* to theology. See "Foundations" (*MT*, ch. 11). Look at Mark 12 ...: the commandment of love (and the parallels in Deuteronomy and Luke), everything is there!"

¹⁰ These are the rules of Saint Ignatius. Actually, the precise idea in the latter is that in periods of desolation, one must not change one's decisions, but change oneself resolutely. (*Spiritual Exercises*, Rules for perceiving and knowing in rowe manner the different movements which are caused in the soul ... Fifth and Sixth Rules.)

One must learn to discern correctly the motions of the Spirit, to distinguish between the Spirit and the many other attractions.

P.R.: But why is there such a disjunction between the spiritual life and theology? Why is there virtually nothing on spiritual life in the teaching of theology?

LONERGAN: Saint Thomas quoted Aristotle more than the Fathers. The Franciscans were opposed to that, as was the Archbishop of Canterbury.

It is the history of the *quaestio*. Abelard did his *Sic et Non*. He explained that a question arises when we have arguments for and arguments against. But on what basis do we resolve the question? So people referred to Aristotle's metaphysics in order to organize the *Sic* and the *Non*. It was called a metaphysics at that time: it is what the Germans call a *Begrifflichkeit*, as series of interlocking concepts that organize the subject matter. (The Germans are the inventors of the *Geisteswissenschaften* in the nineteenth century, whence came the renewal of exegetical and historical studies.)

A metaphysics ... But one must start from what Bergson called *les données immédiates de la conscience* [the immediate data of consciousness] and from there go on to metaphysics; otherwise one risks having presuppositions. One must go from the analysis of knowing to epistemology, and from that to metaphysics.¹¹

A good example of the medieval method of the *quaestio* is *De Veritate*, q.24, a.12. The question is whether it is possible for those who are spiritually advanced to fall. How can one be free and still rule out future sins? Saint Thomas changes his position with regard to the *Sentences*. He considers the dynamic of advance. When charity is well established, it is possible not to sin anymore, because one is carried along. Before, one needed reflection not to sin; and since one cannot always reflect, one gives up. Nevertheless, with spiritual progress, charity takes root: and this is done spontaneously — recourse to reflection is no longer necessary.

About the theory of knowledge. ... The point is to identify that the real is not the material, that the criterion of the real is not obtained by knocking on the table saying: "The concrete!" René Arnou, with whom I did a seminar long ago, understood this: the soul is more real than

¹¹ Lonergan here situates his own work with respect to the French philosophical tradition: start with those (real) data that are the data of consciousness in order to elaborate a 'positive metaphysics' (as Jacques Chevalier, in his *Histoire de la pensée*, tome 5, has said of Bergson).

matter, the angel is more real than the soul, and God more real than the angel. René Arnou wrote on the desire for God in Plotinus, and he did the article on the Platonism of the Fathers for the *DTC*.

P.R.: About the need for a metaphysics to organize the materials, you have spoken of the passage from metaphysics to intentionality analysis. This holds for the first four levels of consciousness, which belong to the structure of the human being; but is this possible with the fifth (the religious level), which is in the order of grace?

LONERGAN: The fifth level can be reflected on. One goes by the Scriptures: thus Rom. 5:5;¹² so also, "the love of Christ constrains me" [2 Cor. 5:14]. ... There are many texts. From that one can see. ...

Theology became purely logical: the *disputatio*. So a disjunction appeared. And the spiritual writers opposed that theology: it is better to experience compunction than to know its definition.

P.R.: But to experience it is what enables one to speak of it ...

LONERGAN: Well, that's the solution. ... This disjunction came about in the fourteenth century: the *devotio moderna*. So to bring about a rapprochement will take time. There must be a distinction, not a disjunction; a relation is necessary.

P.R.: Is this rapprochement desirable?

LONERGAN: One must live.

One must integrate one's life. But it takes time.

So with a new-born child: everything is there. Think of Piaget, who studied the first twenty-four months of the lives of his children. Everything is there, but growth takes a long time. Animals become adults in a few months, but for humans, it takes eighteen, twenty years. ... And a human can be many things: a pianist, a teacher. This is freedom: man is not determined *ad unum*.

Theology and the spiritual life are not the same thing. They cannot be done at the same time. And one cannot do everything. ... But the point is to integrate one's life, and that takes time.

¹² "The love of God has been poured out in our heart by the Holy Spirit that has been given us."

* * *

P.R.: How can the following of Christ, the configuration to Christ, be thought along these lines? Imitation of Jesus in its more 'intellectual' aspects: Jesus as intelligence, as master of wisdom?

LONERGAN: Oh! Christ was very intelligent: think of the parables!

But I would prefer wisdom to intelligence.

He was a teacher. But he had a good help on the side of the listeners: the Holy Spirit. It would be a great help to a teacher for the Holy Spirit to be opening the heart of his students, bringing them to understand!

P.R.: And the crucified and disfigured Christ?

LONERGAN: There is an English writer, Rosemary Haughton, who, without a profound theological formation, has written *The Passionate God*. She says that to live the Passion, to make it through that ordeal, required a great *passion*.

* * *

P.R.: Can we speak of a mystical *pattern*?

LONERGAN: It is the fourth [the differentiation of transcendence].

See *The Cloud of Unknowing*.¹³

P.R.: Could you remind me of other spiritual elements in your work?

LONERGAN: There is vertical finality, God, and horizontal finality: sensibility is for intelligence, and it is considerably enriched by it; intelligence is for judgment and it becomes greater; judgment is for responsibility and spirituality that transforms it; the fulfillment of it all is in the vision of God.

P.R.: And on this earth, mystical contemplation?

LONERGAN: It is *The Cloud of Unknowing*. ... *La prière de simple regard*. [The prayer of simple regard; the prayer of simplicity.]¹⁴ The

¹³ The word *pattern* here refers to the notion of patterns of experience (*Insight* 181-189). The religious differentiation of consciousness (transcendence) is presented more completely in *MT* 265-266.

¹⁴ Lonergan here describes contemplative prayer by reference to the traditional expression in French spirituality: *oraison de simple regard*. (For a presentation, see

absence of everything else. Not the presence of God, which would be the beatific vision, but the absence of everything else. And so the absence of discourse. A state of prayer sustained for example by the name of Jesus, the Jesus Prayer. It is the idea of the Chinese *Prayer wheel*.

The intuition of God, that is the beatific vision.

P.R.: But there are received intuitions?

LONERGAN: There is a transformation, more than intuitions.

It is the *Ascent of Mount Carmel*. There are ideas, but mainly it is in affectivity. Affectivity ascends. Everything is carried by feelings. There is intelligence and judgment, transformed, but mainly feelings.

P.R.: Spiritual feelings, different from others? ...

LONERGAN: The same, but transformed. It is what brings the *scientia sapita*, the loving knowledge.

There are judgments of value (where values are not notions but that which calls). Knowledge becomes savory when feelings come into play.¹⁵

P.R.: Along the same lines, according to Saint Thomas, there is charity, but there are also the gifts of the Holy Spirit; these are what become operative in mystical life. Is this idea of gifts recaptured in your work?

LONERGAN: I would rather speak of the Gift. An act of love that is given. From that love proceed judgments of value (the goodness of God ...).

From these judgments proceeds another charity, an action corresponding to these judgments of value, which is responsible. Just as the Spirit proceeds in the Trinity.

This idea is suggested in "Christology Today" at the end,¹⁶ where the question was to conceive a subject with two subjectivities.

Also, faith is the look, the eyes, of charity. Hope is the confidence in the one we love. The gifts are other effects of that love-faith-

Adam Tanquerey, *The Spiritual Life: A Treatise on Ascetical and Mystical Theology* (Tournai: Desclée, 1930) 1363-1369.)

¹⁵ *Scientia sapita*, savory knowledge, is the type of knowledge that is found particularly in spiritual authors such as Francis of Sales or John of the Cross.

¹⁶ "Christology Today: Methodological Reflections," a 1975 conference first published in *Le Christ hier, aujourd'hui et demain. Colloque de christologie tenu à l'Université Laval* (21 et 22 mars 1975) (Québec: P.U.L., 1976) 45-65. Reprinted in *A Third Collection. Papers by Bernard J.F. Lonergan, SJ*, published by F.E. Crowe (New York: Paulist Press; London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1985) 74-99.

confidence. The Scholastics had a tendency to subdivide everything, following in that respect Aristotle and his distinctions between the virtues.

P.R.: And knowledge of God by connaturality?

LONERGAN: The knowledge of God by connaturality comes about through charity. No created being provides a solid analogy (Saint Thomas). There is an order: wisdom that is *sapita* [savory] introduces an enlightened good will, which yields good practical or theoretical judgments.¹⁷

P.R.: But there is the traditional distinction between the ascetical and the mystical. What you are describing, isn't it rather the mystical way? Isn't there first of all a need for the good will that leads to that wisdom?

LONERGAN: There is a double movement. Think of *Method*. A movement goes from experience to understanding, to judgment, to responsibility. Conversion is at the highest level, at the fifth, if it is supernatural. And it changes the judgments of value (the natural judgments), fourth level; and so this changes the judgments of fact, third level; and this leads to an understanding of things that were not understood before, second level; which leads to more attentiveness to new things, first level. There are two movements, and there is a circulation.

Moreover, things don't necessarily happen in that order: one starts at the second level, can find himself at the fifth, and so correct the fourth or the third.

¹⁷ On this subject, one can recall this passage from William Johnston:

"Empty of conceptual knowledge, the soul is filled with supra-conceptual wisdom; poor in images and ideas, it is rich in a superior knowledge of God. And this mystical wisdom comes from charity. We know that in our ordinary lives, sympathy gives deep insight into the hearts of those we love; and it is the same in things divine. Love of God gives a rich wisdom. As the burning candle gives light; so does the love of God enlighten the soul — such is the traditional image. And this is what Aquinas calls the knowledge of 'connaturality.' In short, the silence of mystical prayer in an emptiness filled with wisdom. The void is only apparent; it is a *rich* emptiness. Emptied of reasoning, the soul is wealthy in a wisdom that comes from love." (*The Still Point: Reflections on Zen and Christian Mysticism* (New York: Fordham University Press, 1970) 33.)

* * *

P.R.: Among the spiritual elements in your work, one can mention the experience of saints. In *Method*, you are hoping for studies of spiritual journeys, of religious interiority?¹⁸

LONERGAN: The point is the difference between necessary propositions and judgments. We say: if A, then B; as C possesses A, then B. But we need to know if A exists, and if B exists; *a priori* propositions are not found elsewhere than in the *a priori*; we have to know if it exists. [Hence a necessary relation to experience in order to know; so, on the religious level, to the experience of saints.]

Necessary truths arise from the transformation of the subject — who is not necessary. Grace is given: it has to be fully accepted and lived. There is no intellectual foundation other than faith. Christ said: “My grace is sufficient for you.” We do not have to search for it; people want it, but ... “Probability is the guide of life,” Newman used to say. We act on that basis.

P.R.: There is a leap?

LONERGAN: And yet even the sciences do not give certitudes, but the best available opinion. One has to hold to it, but without refusing future improvements. Think of mathematics, larger complexes lead to the reorganization of all the rest.

P.R.: That is open-mindedness. Not being tied to closed certitudes.

But the experience of saints? ...

LONERGAN: The point is discovering in oneself one’s own acts of intelligence. And discovering the questions: *why? how?* ... They are *a priori* because they do not emerge from sensibility itself. And neither does the question *Is it so?* So they are *a priori*. Neither does the question *What do I do?* And finally, the question *Who is going to save us?* We are in a terrible mess: we cannot save ourselves. This last one is not exactly the same as the others: it requires the experience of the world and of oneself.

Logic is the art of marking time (in the army), a way of repeating what we already know.

¹⁸ MT 290. The idea, difficult to grasp at first reading, that is developed by Lonergan in his response, is the following. If the real cannot be known in a purely deductive way, one proceeds by way of experience in order to grasp what in fact exists. So one proceeds by way of reflection on oneself as subject, and, on the religious level, by religious interiority, and therefore by the experience of saints.

* * *

P.R.: Could what you say about common sense be used as a basis for thinking 'popular faith' in a more satisfactory manner?

LONERGAN: Fundamentally, there is God's grace.

We are finally sure only of practical things (common sense). It is one thing to tie one's shoes, another to formulate it adequately, which is difficult. Such is globally the relationship between common sense and theory!

There is the grace of God. It can happen any time. A missionary told of a woman he was catechizing who came to tell him that she didn't believe a word she had been told. But she came back the next day saying that she was wrong — grace came during the night!

It can happen any time to anyone.

Matthew set out to follow Christ when he called him, leaving everything behind. "But it is irrational," reasonable people will say. Still, it is an existential question: Do you want to follow him or not?

P.R.: It transcends reasons.

LONERGAN: It is rational, however ...

P.R.: If we follow during the night as in the daylight, when we understand and when we do not, it is beyond. It is rational, but there is more to it than reasons.

LONERGAN: Be careful if you quote me: I don't want to scandalize anyone.

P.R.: I am taking notes in order to broaden my horizons and to further my research, not in order to quote.(!) I will be looking for these things in your books.

* * *

As I was thanking him for the interview, he said: "Well, you pray for me!" And, as I was also thanking him for the great help his work had been to me, he replied: "Well, that's encouraging, so many people say it isn't worthwhile!" Which is really astonishing.¹⁹

¹⁹ Lonergan's contribution to this article published with the permission of the Trustees of the Lonergan Estate.

