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"The Theologian's Psyche: Notes
toward a Reconstruction of Depth
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THE THEOLOGIAN'S PSYCHE:
Notes Toward a Reconstruction of Depth Psychology

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The need for a dialectical and metascientific critique of the thought of C. G. Jung and, perhaps even more, of the praxis of Jungian analysis, can hardly be overestimated. The need becomes even more apparent when we recognize that Jung seems now to be beginning to be visited by the fate that awaits all more or less comprehensive genius: that of giving rise to diverse and even dialectically opposed interpretations (cf. Kelsey: 1968, 1972 and Sanford, with Hillman: 1972, 1975). The dialectical reflection I have in mind would be similar in scope, purpose, and depth of insight to Paul Ricoeur's all but definitive philosophical interpretation of Freudian psychoanalysis. Obviously, the present paper is no place for so massive an enterprise, yet I hope it conveys the general contours I would think such a critical interpretation would take. But more immediately, my concern is the function that a reconstructed depth psychology can play in theology.

Jung has by no means been ignored by the theological community. A recent bibliographical essay lists 442 books and articles devoted at least in part to the relations between archetypal psychology and theology (see Heisig). In an even more recent study it has been claimed not without reason that "Jung's work promises to prove as reliable a handmaid for doing theology today as more metaphysical schemes proved in the past" (Burrell: 232). As for myself, I have argued elsewhere that the generalized empirical method of Bernard Lonergan provides the horizon needed for the critical reinterpretation of the Jungian maieutic and for its critical employment on the part of the theologian, and that such a critical engagement with Jung will help the theologian construct a part of theology's

foundations (Doran: 1977a). I have also suggested how a dialectical critique of Jung will modify his psychology's interpretation of the symbolic significance of the person of Jesus Christ and of the Trinity and his convictions regarding what constitutes adequate symbolization of the deity (1977c). In the present paper I wish to expand on my previous methodological considerations, to suggest more explicitly the ontological referents of a revised notion of the unconscious, and to show how a theory of elemental symbolism can be developed from the articulation of psyche and intentionality to fill a vacuum left in those notions of psychic symbolism such as Jung's that lack an adequate explicit or even implicit grounding in basic assumptions about intentionality. In the course of the paper, I shall attempt an initial reconstruction of a central paper of Jung's.

I. Method and Psyche

A. Psyche and the Functional Specialty, Foundations

I assume a familiarity on the part of the reader with Lonergan's thought on generalized empirical method and on the place of foundations among the eight functional specialties of theology. Foundations has the twofold task of objectifying the horizon within which theological doctrines are presented, systematic theology is developed, and religious communication is engaged in; and of generating the appropriate general and special categories for this mediated phase of theology /1/. The general categories are those shared by theology with other disciplines, while the special categories are those proper to theology. As a methodologist, Lonergan restricts himself to "indicating what qualities are desirable in theological categories, what measure of validity is to be demanded of them, and how are categories with the desired qualities and validity to be obtained" (1972a:282). The base of interiorly and religiously differentiated consciousness will provide theology with categories that are in some measure

transcultural, not in their explicit formulation, but in the realities formulated. These categories will possess the utility of models "built up from basic terms and relations that refer to (these) transcultural components in human living and operation and, accordingly, at their roots they will possess quite exceptional validity" (285). Their derivation, finally, will flow from the explicit objectification of the basic terms and relations of the structure of the self-transcending intentionality of the theologian and from the articulation of the same theologian's dynamic state of religious and Christian subjectivity. There will be five sets of special theological categories, which we may roughly list as: religion, the religious community in history, divinity, revelation and redemption (290f.).

Now the claim that Jung's interpretation of Christian symbols is a matter of both positive and critical concern for the theologian concerned with generating or deriving categories that will be operative in systematic theology raises fundamental methodological difficulties which we must confront head-on, albeit initially and heuristically, at the outset of our investigation. For systematics is properly conceived by Lonergan as an explanatory discipline rather than as a descriptive exercise (1957: Index under "Description-Explanation") /2/. That is to say, the basic terms and relations of systematic theology will aim to propose hypotheses as to the relations of things to one another rather than more or less sophisticated descriptions of things in their relations to us /3/. Now, the basic terms and relations of the systematic theology that took its stand on a faculty psychology were metaphysical. But metaphysical terms and relations are not basic but derived sets of categories for a systematics based on intentionality analysis. Here the basic terms and relations will be psychological, and the psychological base is described as follows: "General basic terms name conscious and intentional operations. General basic relations name elements in the dynamic structure linking operations and

generating states. Special basic terms name God's gift of his love and Christian witness." Derived terms and relations, on the other hand, "name the objects known in operations and correlative to states" (Lonergan, 1972a: 343). But Jung's interpretation of Christian symbols, on this account, would seem to be pertinent neither for basic nor for derived terms and relations. For Jung's psychological concern is not that of Lonergan's intentionality analysis. That is, he is not engaged in naming conscious and intentional operations, nor is he concerned with the links among these operations that generate the states of intelligence in act, reason in act, originating value in act. Furthermore, Jung is frequent and insistent that his interpretation of Christian symbols does not claim to name the objects correlative to the psychological states which these symbols reflect (see 1969b:360-362, pars. 554-557). How can we claim, then, that there is a pertinence of archetypal psychology, however critically modified it may be, for the functional specialty, foundations? Moreover, even if such a pertinence could be established, how could it claim to be anything more than descriptive, to say rather than to show? Is it not the intrinsic limitation of symbolic consciousness that it is incapable of explanatory power? Does not explanation ensue only when insight into the images produces formulations which prescind from imaginative representation? Does not explanation depend upon freedom from the vagaries of imagination? Is it not true, for example, that the Athanasian rule regarding the divinity of the Son and his consubstantiality with the Father possesses implicit explanatory significance only because it is a proposition about propositions and thus a proposition that has freed itself from the imaginative representations of earlier and more primitive Christologies? /4/.

Such is the problem, and our answer will be that Jung's maieutic of the psyche can be critically modified by Lonergan's intentionality analysis in such a way as to

provide access to an explanatory account of symbolic consciousness. It is this account, this reflection of a *self-appropriation of one's own symbolic consciousness*, that will allow the derivation of categories that are at one and the same time symbolic yet invested with explanatory significance. In psychic self-appropriation, symbolic terms and relations themselves are derived which fix one another in an explanatory way, just as in the self-appropriation of intentionality general basic terms (operations) and relations linking the operations and generating states come to fix one another in the elaboration of a transcendental or generalized empirical method. The theological pertinence of Jung's psychology is that, when transposed and transformed into an element within generalized empirical method, it complements intentionality analysis by mediating in explanatory fashion the dramatic or aesthetic component of the pursuit of intelligibility, truth, and value, and it thus enables the derivation of explanatory categories which, even while explanatory, nonetheless are symbolic.

But what happens to archetypal psychology in the light of the transposition it undergoes when it becomes a portion of the self-appropriation that is generalized empirical method? It will be decisively changed by this transposition in that the worldview or myth issuing from Jung's writings will be corrected on certain fundamental accounts. Nonetheless, this change will be nothing other than a reversal of the counter-position in Jungian writings, and a consequent development and enrichment of Jung's very real discoveries into a horizon which, it would seem, he may have at times intended without ever achieving or being given it, or, if he was brought to it, without ever formulating it satisfactorily. What is this horizon?

B. Converted Subjectivity

Foundations articulates the basic horizon from which the theologian engages in doctrines, systematics and communications. It does so by objectifying the three conversions which constitute the basic horizon or foundational reality. These three conversions are religious, moral and intellectual (see Lonergan, 1972a:267-269, 142). Religious conversion, the fruit of God's gift of his love, generally precedes moral conversion, while intellectual conversion is generally the fruit of both religious and moral conversion (267f.) /5/. Nevertheless, intellectual conversion is then sublated into a higher unity by moral conversion and both intellectual and moral conversion are sublated into the higher integration provided by religious conversion. Thus:

Because intellectual, moral, and religious conversions all have to do with self-transcendence, it is possible, when all three occur within a single consciousness, to conceive their relations in terms of sublation. I would use this notion in Karl Rahner's sense rather than Hegel's to mean that what sublates goes beyond what is sublated, introduces something new and distinct, puts everything on a new basis, yet so far from interfering with the sublated or destroying it, on the contrary needs it, includes it, preserves all its proper features and properties, and carries them forward to a fuller realization within a richer context.

So moral conversion goes beyond the value, truth, to values generally. It promotes the subject from cognitional to moral self-transcendence. It sets him on a new, existential level of consciousness and establishes him as an originating value. But this in no way interferes with or weakens his devotion to truth. He still needs truth, for he must apprehend reality and real potentiality before he can deliberately respond to value. The truth he needs is still the truth attained in accord with the exigencies of rational consciousness. But now his pursuit of it is all the more secure because he has been armed against bias, and it is all the more meaningful and significant because it occurs within, and plays an essential role in, the far richer context of the pursuit of all values.

Similarly, religious conversion goes beyond moral. Questions for intelligence, for reflection, for deliberation reveal the eros of the human spirit, its capacity and its desire for self-transcendence. But that capacity meets fulfilment, that desire turns to joy, when religious conversion transforms the existential subject into a subject in love, a subject held, grasped, possessed, owned through a total and so an other-worldly love. Then there is a new basis for all valuing and all doing good. In no way are fruits of intellectual or moral conversion negated or diminished. On the contrary, all human pursuit of the true and the good is included within and furthered by a cosmic context and purpose and, as well, there now accrues to man the power of love to enable him to accept the suffering involved in undoing the effects of decline. (Lonergan, 1972a:241f.)

There would seem to be one profound and far-reaching difference between intellectual conversion on the one hand and moral and religious conversion on the other. For intellectual conversion, in the technical sense in which Lonergan uses this term, seems to be coextensive with the self-appropriation of one's cognitive being. It is not identical with intellectual or cognitive self-transcendence, for, if it were, not only intellectual conversion but knowing itself would be very rare. Intellectual conversion affects directly, not knowing, but the objectification of what I am doing when I am knowing, why that is knowing, and what I know when I do that (25). Thus:

Intellectual conversion is a radical clarification and, consequently, the elimination of an exceedingly stubborn and misleading myth concerning reality, objectivity, and human knowledge. The myth is that knowing is like looking, that objectivity is seeing what is there to be seen and not seeing what is not there, and that the real is what is out there now to be looked at. ...To be liberated from that blunder, to discover the self-transcendence proper to the human process of coming to know, is to break often long-ingrained habits of thought and speech. It is to acquire the mastery in one's own house that is to be had only when one knows precisely what one is doing when one is knowing. It is a conversion, a new beginning, a fresh start. It opens the way to ever further clarifications and developments. (238-240)

Moral and religious conversion, on the contrary, are coextensive with a state of moral and religious self-transcendence, but not with moral and religious self-appropriation. Moral conversion "changes the criterion of one's decisions and choices from satisfactions to values," whereas religious conversion "is being grasped by ultimate concern. It is other-worldly falling in love. It is total and permanent self-surrender without conditions, qualifications, reservations" (240). Such decisive transformations can be effected without the subtle capacity for detailing what has occurred that accompanies intellectual conversion. Intellectual conversion marks initiation into a distinct realm of meaning, the realm of interiorly differentiated consciousness (81-85, 272). Moral and religious conversion generally occur without such differentiation. They are self-transcendence at the fourth level of intentional consciousness, but without self-appropriation at this fourth level (see 1972a: chap. 1). Intellectual conversion, however, is more than self-transcendence at the first three levels of intentional consciousness. It is the understanding of understanding that is reflectively grasped as virtually unconditioned and then affirmed in the judgment, "I am a knower" (1957: chap. 11). It is not knowing, but the position on knowing that constitutes a part of the explicit base of a critically verified philosophy (385-390). It is properly referred to by Lonergan as a conversion that may be called a personal philosophic experience (see 1974:79).

Now initiation through intellectual conversion into interiorly differentiated consciousness as a realm of meaning distinct from common sense and theory is also an introduction to a third historical stage of meaning in the Western tradition. "In the first stage conscious and intentional operations follow the mode of common sense. In a second stage besides the mode of common sense there is also the mode of theory, where the theory is controlled by a logic. In a third stage the modes of common sense and

theory remain, science asserts its autonomy from philosophy; and there occur philosophies that leave theory to science and take their stand on interiority" (1972a:85). This initiation occurs through a basic clarification of operations that had occurred also in the first two stages of meaning, namely the operations involved in knowing. This clarification in the mode of interiority is simultaneously intellectual conversion. But also among the operations that occurred in the first two stages of meaning are the operations of morally and religiously converted subjects. As we have seen, these operations occurred *in actu exercito* and may have given rise to the kinds of clarification that issue from common sense and theoretical objectifications, but they were not objectified by interiorly differentiated consciousness. As occurring but not objectified, they did not in fact need, include or sublate intellectual conversion. What needs, includes, and sublates intellectual conversion is self-appropriating moral and religious consciousness. The question arises, then, as to whether an objectification characteristic of the third stage of meaning is possible regarding the operations of existential subjectivity. What would constitute moral and religious self-appropriation as distinct from moral and religious conversion? The key to our answer is to be found, I believe, in a fourth conversion. I call it psychic conversion. Psychic conversion, when joined with the three conversions specified by Lonergan, enables us to locate the foundational role of a transformed archetypal psychology.

First, then, I must specify what I mean by psychic conversion. Then I must show why it is the key to moral and religious self-appropriation, and briefly indicate its role in the sublation of intellectual conversion by moral conversion and of intellectual and moral conversion by religious conversion.

C. Psychic Conversion

Like intellectual conversion, psychic conversion is an entrance into the third stage of meaning. It can occur before or after intellectual conversion, but its correct objectification depends on intellectual conversion. What then is psychic conversion and what does it effect in and for the subject?

The movement into interiorly differentiated consciousness occurs through an objectification of the data of consciousness. Consciousness is the subject's presence to himself or herself in all the operations of which he or she is the subject. But there are two interlocking modalities to the data of consciousness: a cognitive modality and an affective or dramatic modality. Cognitive analysis mediates the first, whereas what we might call imaginal analysis mediates the second. Imaginal analysis can take many forms, and in our own day one of its principal manifestations occurs in those forms of psychotherapy which link affective or dramatic subjectivity with the spontaneous images and symbols originating from the psychic depths in dreams and in various states of hypnagogic experience. One way, then, to the mediation of the affective or dramatic component of the data of consciousness is through the interpretation of dreams.

Beyond cognitive analysis, however, there is intentionality analysis. The concern of intentionality analysis is not limited to the cognitive moments of our conscious being but extends beyond the levels of experience, understanding, and judgment to a fourth level of consciousness, the level of evaluation, deliberation, decision and action or praxis. Lonergan refers to consciousness at this fourth level as existential subjectivity. Moral and religious conversion refer to such subjectivity. Thus it is more accurate to speak of the first component of the data of consciousness as an intentional component, the component which intends self-transcendence in both knowing and doing.

Furthermore, the affective or dramatic or aesthetic component is best understood as psychic, for it is this component that is illuminated when we understand our dreams correctly. There is a drama to insight, to the further questions that intend truth, and to the process of evaluation, deliberation and decision that seeks to discriminate what is truly worth while from what is only apparently good. The dramatic or psychic component, while pertinent for and attending every aspect of intentionality, becomes particularly central and crucial at the level of existential subjectivity, for such subjectivity is concerned with value, and values are apprehended in feelings which themselves are certified by symbols. Thus:

Intermediate between judgments of fact and judgments of value lie apprehensions of value. Such apprehensions are given in feelings. The feelings in question are not the...non-intentional states, trends, urges, that are related to efficient and final causes but not to objects. Again, they are not intentional responses to such objects as the agreeable or disagreeable, the pleasant or painful, the satisfying or dissatisfying. For, while these are objects, still they are ambiguous objects that may prove to be truly good or bad or only apparently good or bad. Apprehensions of value occur in a further category of intentional response which greets either the ontic value of a person or the qualitative value of beauty, of understanding, of truth, of noble deeds, of virtuous acts, of great achievements. For we are so endowed that we not only ask questions leading to self-transcendence, not only can recognize correct answers constitutive of intentional self-transcendence, but also respond with the stirring of our very being when we glimpse the possibility or the actuality of moral self-transcendence. (37f.)

And:

Not only do feelings respond to values. They do so in accord with some scale of preference. So we may distinguish vital, social, cultural, personal, and religious values in an ascending order. Vital values, such as health and strength, grace and vigor, normally are preferred to avoiding the work, privations, pains involved in acquiring, maintaining, restoring

them. Social values, such as the good of order which conditions the vital values of the whole community, have to be preferred to the vital values of individual members of the community. Cultural values do not exist without the underpinning of vital and social values, but none the less they rank higher. Not on bread alone doth man live. Over and above mere living and operating, men have to find a meaning and value in their living and operating. It is the function of culture to discover, express, validate, criticize, correct, develop, improve such meaning and value. Personal value is the person in his self-transcendence, as loving and being loved, as originator of values in himself and in his milieu, as an inspiration and invitation to others to do likewise. Religious values, finally, are at the heart of the meaning and value of man's living and man's world. (31f.)

Further:

A symbol is an image of a real or imaginary object that evokes a feeling or is evoked by a feeling....

The same objects need not evoke the same feelings in different subjects and, inversely, the same feelings need not evoke the same symbolic images.... There is in the human being an affective development that may suffer aberrations. It is the history of that process that terminates in the person with a determinate orientation in life and with determinate affective capacities, dispositions, and habits. What such affective capacities, dispositions, habits are in a given individual can be specified by the symbols that awaken determinate affects and, inversely, by the affects that evoke determinate symbols....

Affective development, or aberration, involves a transvaluation and transformation of symbols. What before was moving no longer moves; what before did not move now is moving. So the symbols themselves change to express the new affective capacities and dispositions. ... Inversely, symbols that do not submit to transvaluation and transformation seem to point to a block in development. (64-66)

Symbols, moreover, fulfill a need that logic cannot satisfy, the need for internal communication.

Organic and psychic vitality have to reveal themselves to intentional consciousness and, inversely, intentional consciousness has to secure the collaboration of organism and psyche.

Again, our apprehensions of values occur in intentional responses, in feelings: here too it is necessary for feelings to reveal their objects and, inversely, for objects to awaken feelings. It is through symbols that mind and body, mind and heart, heart and body communicate.

In that communication symbols have their proper meaning. It is an elemental meaning, not yet objectified.... It is a meaning that fulfils its function in the imagining or perceiving subject as his conscious intentionality develops or goes astray or both, as he takes his stance to nature, with his fellow men, and before God. It is a meaning that has its proper context in the process of internal communication in which it occurs, and it is to that context with its associated images and feelings, memories and tendencies that the interpreter has to appeal if he would explain the symbol. (66f.)

I have quoted so extensively from Lonergan in order to demonstrate that he provides most of the material for indicating what I mean by psychic conversion. Psychic conversion is the release of the capacity for the internal communication of symbolic consciousness. It is effected when one gains the habit of negotiating one's dreams as ciphers of the dramatic component that attends one's intentional operations as a knowing and acting subject. Its progressive and cumulative result is an integrated affectivity which expresses itself as a complementarity of intentionality and psyche, the conscription of psyche into intentionality's orientation toward intelligibility, truth and value, and at the same time the synchronizing of intentionality's projects with the potentialities of one's developing affectivity. The development of affectivity, and especially its increasing capacity for objectivity or detachment, is reflected in the movement from the permeation of one's dreams by the bizarre to their bearing the aesthetic qualities and directness that reflect increasing individuation (see p. 65).

I have argued elsewhere that psychic conversion meets all the specifications for conversion laid down by Lonergan, and yet that it is different from the religious, moral and intellectual conversions which he has treated

(see Doran, 1977a:240-246). In the same work, I have indicated that psychic conversion extends the relations of sublation that obtain among the levels of consciousness to include the sublation of dreaming consciousness and its imaginal sphere of being by empirical, intelligent, rational and existential consciousness. Rather than repeat these arguments here, I will proceed to the argument that psychic conversion is the key to moral and religious self-appropriation.

D. Existential Self-appropriation

The basis of my position is clear already. Briefly the argument may be summarized in the following five steps:

- 1) aesthetic subjectivity is the basis of moral and religious subjectivity;
- 2) our affective responses to symbols and, inversely, the symbolic images evoked by our feelings are what form and structure aesthetic subjectivity;
- 3) this reciprocal relationship of affectivity and symbol manifests itself in elemental fashion in our dreams;
- 4) the capacity for negotiating these elemental symbols is the fruit of psychic conversion;
- 5) psychic conversion thus enables the appropriation of the aesthetic base of our moral and religious responses. This aesthetic base enables in turn an explicit reading of the intentionality of the heart that is existential subjectivity. The capacity for this reading is moral and religious self-appropriation.

Since a detailed presentation of each of these steps would involve a great deal of repetition, let me simply build on what we have already seen.

Attendant upon the component of intentionality moving toward self-transcendence in our raising of questions for intelligence, truth and deliberation, there is a dramatic component to the data of consciousness that is revealed in feelings. The conflict between the desire to know and the flight from understanding, and between making values or

satisfactions the criterion of our decisions, constitutes a drama of the emergence or failure of emergence of the authentic subject. The desire to know, Lonergan tells us, can invade the very fabric of our dreams (1957:4), that is, it affects not only the intentionality of the intelligent intelligibility that is spirit, but also the psychic and bodily undertow that conditions all incarnate spirit. The dreams of an intelligent spirit will be permeated with intelligence and meaning. That our dreams are ciphers of our intentionality is due to the psychic component that attends intentionality in its pursuit of meaning, truth and value. For we pursue or fail to pursue the objectives of intentionality, not as pure spirits, but as spiritual, psychic and bodily subjects. What discloses itself in dreams is the status of our desire, and our desire is not pure instinct, but the polymorphic desire of an incarnate spirit. The drama of our intentionality is the drama of the conflict between detachment and disinterestedness in our desire to know and in our constitution of ourselves and the world, on the one hand, and the attached and interfering desire of our sensitivity, our individual and group bias, and our flight from further theoretical and philosophic questions that Lonergan calls general bias, on the other hand. It is this dialectic of desire that reveals itself in our dreams /6/. The dialectic of desire as affectively experienced is aesthetic subjectivity.

While the dialectic of desire attends and is pertinent to every level of intentional consciousness, its specific importance reveals itself only when we come to consider the fourth level, existential subjectivity, where the issue is value, and where what is at stake is character. In fact, it may be said that the dialectic of desire attends the pursuit of meaning and truth precisely because meaning and truth are themselves values and because their realization calls for a decision on the part of the existential subject for self-transcendence in one's cognitive being. It is for existential subjectivity that values as

such are the issue, and, as we have seen, the base of the value experience lies in an affectivity structured in terms of and certified by symbolic consciousness. This aesthetic subjectivity, the dialectic of desire, is the base of our moral and religious being (see Doran: 1977d, 1977e). Thus the access to the dialectic of desire provided by psychic conversion will enable us to appropriate our subjectivity at this fourth level of its intentional consciousness.

If psychic conversion is the key to moral and religious self-appropriation, then the sublation of intellectual conversion by moral conversion and of intellectual and moral conversion by religious conversion is greatly aided and facilitated by psychic conversion. As we have seen, intellectual conversion is attendant upon intellectual self-appropriation, whereas moral and religious conversion are independent of and prior to moral and religious self-appropriation. In fact, there would seem to be a dynamic moving the subject from intellectual self-appropriation to moral and religious self-appropriation, if indeed Lonergan is correct about the relations of sublation that obtain among the three conversions that for him constitute foundational reality. For self-appropriation at the level of one's cognitive being, it would seem, can be securely sublated into existential (moral and religious) consciousness only to the extent that such consciousness has been subjected to as rigorous a maieutic as intelligent and reasonable consciousness. If I am correct in emphasizing the aesthetic base of existential consciousness, then the key to this maieutic is psychic conversion. Thus, while psychic conversion, in its occurrence, is at least in principle independent of any of the three conversions specified by Lonergan, being simply the release of the capacity for the internal communication of symbolic consciousness, its role in foundational reality is specified by the aid it provides in the task of sublating intellectual conversion into one's

commitment to all value and both of these commitments into the surrender of cognitive and affective being into the hands of God.

2. The Three Orders of Elemental Symbols

There are three different kinds of dream symbols: personal, archetypal, and anagogic. The differences and relations among these three orders of symbols are best approached from a discussion of the unconscious.

The unconscious is one of the most ambiguously employed notions in the human sciences. I believe that the key to the precise and legitimate employment of the terminology of the unconscious lies in a careful discrimination of the notion of energy.

As Lonergan has indicated, frequently the expression, the unconscious, is used to refer to what is or has been, in fact, conscious but not objectified /7/. This aspect of subjectivity, I believe, would better be called "the undifferentiated." But what is truly unconscious is all energy in the universe that is not present to itself, the energy that emerges into new forms and laws in accord with emergent probability but not in accord with potentially intelligent emergent probability (see Lonergan, 1957:123-128, 209-211). Proximately to consciousness, this energy takes the form of neural-physiological process in the body. More remotely, it is universal energy, the entire non-conscious cosmos.

Now energy begins to become conscious when it becomes psychic energy, and psychic energy emerges in the dream. With Jung, we may distinguish between the ego of the conscious subject and the totality of subjectivity, conscious and unconscious, that Jung calls the self (see *inter alia* Jung, 1972:123-241). But in terms of our discussion of energy, when neural-physiological energy enters into consciousness through the dream, a portion or aspect of the unconscious dimension of the self has become conscious. On our analysis, these dream symbols are personal. They

come from the personal unconscious, which includes all that is forgotten and repressed by consciousness as well as elements that have never before been conscious in either a differentiated or undifferentiated fashion. But other dreams reflect more universal and generalizable motifs of development and decline. These dreams, as well as those that are either synchronistic with or prophetic of outer events, are the products of the emergence into consciousness of energy that is not only ego-transcendent but self-transcendent. Their images imitate nature in their reflection of generic motifs of life, death, and rebirth. They are archetypal images, and the energy that is their ground corresponds to what Jung calls the collective or impersonal unconscious or, less happily, the objective psyche. Finally, there are certain dreams, recorded in the annals of all the great world religions, that can be said to originate with an experienced directness from the realm, not of ego-transcendent energy nor even of self-transcendent energy, but of absolute transcendence, from the absolute limit of the process of going beyond that is God. Such dreams are hermeneutic of the divine call. In them, the energy that is the cosmic and then the personal unconscious, is the transparent medium of creative and redemptive power. The symbols of such dreams are properly called anagogic, in that they are not so much mimetically expressive of nature or even of history as the whole meaning of nature and history is contained or summed up within them and offered in a revelatory fashion to the consciousness of the dreaming subject as his or her ultimate dramatic context of existence. These dreams are no longer a commentary on life or an imitation of nature, but the context or system of relationships that constitutes the ineffable mystery that is the final meaning of existence, the context within which all of life is contained and which now offers itself to the subject in the form of a concrete call. There is a totality about such symbols that reflects the final limit of the dialectic of human desire, the

dialectic of unconditional love and cosmic hate that is at once the final and basic option of every human subject. Thus Joseph Flanagan correctly remarks that "in the anagogic phase of meaning, a single symbol can become so concentrated in meaning as to contain within itself an unlimited feeling of desire or dread. The classical example of this in the Western literary universe are the symbols of Christ and Satan" (1977:78) /8/. If we may still speak of anagogic symbols as the emergence of the unconscious into consciousness, we do so only improperly, i.e., with reference to the psychoid medium of these dreams and to our own absolutely spiritual unconscious, and not with reference to the first and quite personal agent of such dreams /9/.

II. Jung and Method

A. The Way of Individuation: Jung

Individuation, the process of becoming one's own self (see Jung, 1972:173), can be set within the context set by the incorporation of psychic conversion into the foundational reality proposed by Lonergan. It then becomes *the psychic and aesthetic correlative of the self-appropriation of intentionality*.

In 1946 Jung wrote an essay that has since come to be regarded as programmatic for the future developments of archetypal psychology. This essay is entitled, "On the Nature of the Psyche" (1969a:159-234). A recent survey of the development of the notion of the archetypes since Jung's own work spotlights this essay as the springboard of the later refinements (see Goldenberg, 1975:199-220) /10/. In the present section I propose to employ this essay to demonstrate in a very initial fashion how Jungian psychology can be reconstructed from the horizon established by generalized empirical method.

Jung presents the process of individuation as a progressive and cumulative reconciliation of opposites. The opposites are named spirit and matter or instinct. The

operator of their ongoing integration is the psyche. The integration or reconciliation of the opposites is portrayed in the dramatic form of psychic images and symbols.

"On the Nature of the Psyche" begins by refuting the contention of some turn-of-the-century psychobiologists that only what is conscious is the proper concern of the psychologist. For example, Wilhelm Wundt objected to the hypothesis of the unconscious on the grounds that the notion of unconscious representations without a subject is an anomaly. For Jung this objection is easily met by speaking, not of representations, but of *complexes* or contents. These are to be thought of, not as inborn ideas but as patterns of behavior, not as perceptions but as forms of behavior, as "sketches, plans, or images which, though not actually 'presented' to the ego, are yet just as real as Kant's hundred thalers." Jung calls them archetypes (1969a:165f.; and Frey-Rohn, 1974:34f.) /11/. They are "fundamentally analogous forms of perception that are to be found everywhere" (Jung, 1969a:165).

These impersonal complexes constitute at least for the moment the hypothesis of the unconscious psychic which forms a matrix or background to (ego-)consciousness. This background Jung characteristically refers to as "a pre-consciousness" (168) /12/. In this context he introduces the notion of threshold. A threshold divides ego-consciousness from the entire psychic background. "The indispensable raw material of all knowledge--namely psychic reactions--and perhaps even unconscious 'thoughts' and 'insights' lie close beside, above, or below consciousness, separated from us by the merest 'threshold' and yet apparently unattainable." This psychic system "may possibly have everything that consciousness has, including perception, apperception, memory, imagination, will, affectivity, feeling, reflection, judgment, etc., all in subliminal form" (Jung, 1969a:172) /13/. In this sense, "the possibility of an unconscious subject becomes a serious question" (165).

A less reified and inchoatively more differentiated hypothesis would speak, however, not of an unconscious subject, but of the dissociation or dissociability of the psyche into complexes. Dissociation can result from one of two quite different occasions: the repression of originally conscious contents because of their incompatibility with ego-consciousness, and (more often for Jung) the functioning of processes that never entered into ego-consciousness at all because the ego could not assimilate them. In either case, the complexes may possess the energy to cross the threshold, and if so they *do* affect ego-consciousness and are reflected in the symptoms known to psychopathology (175).

The notion of the threshold is a metaphor originally used in physiological studies of sensation. When introduced into psychology it raises the possibility that "there is a lower as well as an upper threshold for psychic events, and that consciousness, the perceptual system par excellence, may therefore be compared with the perceptible scale of sound or light, having like them a lower and upper limit" (176). Moreover, it may be that we can extend this notion of threshold to the outer limits, not of ego-consciousness alone but of the psyche in general, so that there are "'psychoid' processes at both ends of the psychic state" (176).

The hypothesis of the unconscious can be verified only if there are unconscious contents that can be integrated into consciousness by an interpretative method. The dream has been one of the principal mediators of this integration, but whereas for Freud dream contents are exclusively linked with the instinctual sphere, for Jung their specifically psychic component has lost the compulsive character of instinct and can be applied in different ways by "the will." It can even function, under the direction of "the will," in ways "contrary to the original instinct" (181) /14/. The psychic, then, is "an emancipation of function from its instinctual form and so from the

compulsiveness which, as a sole determinant of the function, causes it to harden into a mechanism. The psychic condition or quality begins where the function loses its outer and inner determinism and becomes capable of more extensive and freer application, that is, where it begins to show itself accessible to a will motivated from other sources" (181f.).

So much for the lower limits of the psyche. What about the upper limit of these psychic phenomena emancipated from physiological compulsion? Jung is reticent on the issue. "With increasing freedom from sheer instinct," Jung says, "the *partie supérieure* (the psychic) will ultimately reach a point at which the intrinsic energy of the function ceases altogether to be oriented by instinct in the original sense, and attains a so-called 'spiritual' form" (182). This would seem to be due to the fact that the instinct in question is *human* instinct, which "may easily mask a sense of direction other than biological, which only becomes apparent in the course of development" (182).

The psychic, then, for Jung is a sphere of disposable energy, intermediate between physiological determinism and spirit. The psychic is intrinsically linked with both of these extra-psychic spheres, reaches ever further into each of them, and links them with one another under the guidance of "the will," which is familiar with other goals besides the instinctual.

Is the unconscious for Jung, then, psychic at all, or is it psychoid? Is not the psyche even for Jung coextensive with consciousness? Does not the term, the unconscious, refer to those physiological processes which have not entered, and in some cases cannot and will not enter, into the sphere of disposable energy where energy becomes at once psychic and conscious? Jung is forced to deal with this question, but in doing so he sets up a model which includes in the unconscious the personalistic fringes of consciousness, the Freudian findings and the psychoid functions.

The first two sets of "contents" of the unconscious, so conceived, are psychic, but in a manner quite different from the contents of ego-consciousness. They include undifferentiated and unintegrated feeling-toned complexes which can recede ever further from ego-consciousness. As they do so, they assume an ever more archaic, mythological, and even at times numinous character. With increasing dissociation, they seem "to sink back to a more primitive (archaic-mythological) level, to approximate in character to the underlying instinctual pattern, and to assume the qualities which are the hallmark of instinct: automatism, nonsusceptibility to influence, all-or-none reaction, and so forth" (187). Yet they are not psychoid but psychic. They are little luminosities endowed with an "approximative consciousness" (189f.). They correspond, in fact, to "tiny conscious phenomena" (199). Thus the psyche is after all consciousness, but its contents are, says Jung, partly conscious and partly unconscious. The psyche is a "conscious-unconscious whole" whose lower reaches begin with emancipation from instinct.

But now further clarifications are in order, for Jung distinguishes between the personal and the collective unconscious. The collective unconscious consists of vestiges of biological evolution and heredity closely connected with instinct. There is an image with fixed qualities that corresponds to every instinct. Insofar as the human animal functions instinctively, he or she is equipped with such instinct-types or instinctually related imaginal patterns. But, says Jung, these types or archetypes "are not just relics or vestiges of earlier modes of functioning; they are the ever-present and biologically necessary regulators of the instinctual sphere" and represent "the meaning of the instincts" (201). Jung claims to have found at least an indirect access to these instinctual patterns in human activity through the gradual discovery of certain well-defined themes in the dreams and fantasies of his patients. These themes manifest and

render capable of conscious recovery the process which Jung named individuation. Among the most salient characteristics of these images are the following: "chaotic multiplicity and order; duality; the opposition of the light and dark, upper and lower, right and left; the union of opposites in a third; the quaternity (square, cross); rotation (circle, sphere); and finally the centring process and a radial arrangement that usually followed some quaternary system....The centring process is, in my experience, the never-to-be surpassed climax of the whole development, and is characterized as such by the fact that it brings with it the greatest possible therapeutic effect" (203). These fantasies and dreams guided by unconscious regulators "coincide with the records of man's mental activity as known to us from tradition and ethnography" (203). Furthermore, the whole centering process seems ruled by "a dim foreknowledge not only of the pattern but of its meaning" (204). On the basis of such experience, Jung postulated that "there are certain collective unconscious conditions which act as regulators and stimulators of creative fantasy-activity and call forth corresponding formations by availing themselves of the existing conscious material" (204). The regulators are the archetypes which, Jung says, may be in the end identical with the human instinctual patterns (205) /15/. Yet when they appear in imaginal form, they are endowed with an element of spirit, in that their character is numinous or spiritual or mystical. They can mobilize religious convictions and draw the subject under a spell from which he cannot and would not break free, so deep and full is the experience of meaningfulness he enjoys (205).

Nonetheless one is not to draw the conclusion that the effects of archetypal experience are always positive. Such experience can be healing or destructive, since spirit, as represented in the archetypal image, has *as such* no moral significance. Spirit and instinct "belong together as correspondences,...subsist side by side as reflections

in our own minds of the opposition that underlies all psychic energy" (206), but "*instinct is not in itself bad any more than spirit is good. Both can be both*" (206).

B. Individuation and Generalized Empirical Method

It seems to me necessary to introduce here the distinctions we have already established in our methodological comments, so as to make clear the relation of Jung's presentation to our own formulations. What Jung encourages us to suggest is, first, that there is an upper and a lower threshold dividing ego-consciousness from the undifferentiated, and a further upper and lower threshold dividing the whole of consciousness (understood in terms of self-presence and including both ego-consciousness and the whole realm of the undifferentiated) from processes that, to use Jung's terms, are psychoid, that is, non-psychic but understood by analogy with the psyche. The upper threshold divides psyche from spirit, the lower psyche from matter. Our terminology would alter Jung's formulation to the following: perhaps beyond the structure of consciousness, at both ends of the spectrum that stretches from the dream to the highest reaches of existential consciousness in agapic love and in the mystic's cloud of unknowing, there are processes that, at the lower end, are literally and entirely unconscious and, at the upper end, are purely spiritual. Our "spectrum of the structure of consciousness" is Jung's "psyche in general," our "unconscious" is Jung's lower psychoid aspect, while his higher psychoid aspect would refer to what I would call spiritual processes that originate independently of the conscious subject they may affect. These spiritual processes are the domain referred to by what Christian spirituality has come to call the discernment of spirits. The "psyche in general" for Jung means what we, following Lonergan, would call the subject.

Thus when Jung speaks of the unconscious he means sometimes what we also mean by the unconscious, sometimes

what we have chosen to call the undifferentiated, and sometimes the upper psychoid realm that is spirit. In failing to distinguish these realms as sharply as they should be discriminated, Jung posits a notion of the totality of subjectivity or the self that is inflationary, that extends beyond what our stricter terminology would allow: so much so that in one place Jung refers to the self as "a borderline concept, expressing a reality to which no limits can be set" (1968c:355). Such a description may hold for the self's reachings into the upper and lower psychoid spheres, but should not, strictly speaking, be used of the self, which is "just this" /16/. For Jung, moreover, the hypothesis of the unconscious seems to refer in part to an aspect of the psyche, whereas for us the psyche is the beginning of consciousness, and the unconscious is both extrapsychic and, except for the personal unconscious, even extra-subjective. For Jung's psychic unconscious, I substitute the term, the undifferentiated, or what Loneragan calls the "twilight of what is conscious but not objectified" (1972a:34), and I reserve the term, the unconscious, for what is altogether beyond the lower reaches of the disposable psychic energy at any point in time, i.e., for what Jung calls the psychoid in its lower or physico-chemical dimensions. The introduction of the directing power of will, moreover, approaches our notion of the dialectic of desire. Psyche then becomes "essentially conflict between blind instinct and will (freedom of choice)" (Jung, 1969a:183). The dialectic of desire is more complicated than this, but this conflict would represent at least one of its dimensions.

As we can see, Jung understands the process of individuation as a progressive and cumulative reconciliation of the opposites of spirit and matter or instinct. The operator of their reconciliation is psychic energy. Spirit and matter are, as such, both psychoid. The archetype is an intrinsic constituent of spirit, but it is at the same time the meaning of the instinctual counterpole. It

displays this meaning through the archetypal images released in the psyche of the dreaming subject. These images will display the process of the reconciliation in the form of a story or narrative whose intelligent recapitulation constitutes the recovery of individuation through meaning. The images seem to reflect a foreknowledge of the goal or of certain steps along the way to the goal. And yet the coincidence of spirit and matter can be destructive as well as therapeutic, even morally evil as well as good. Clearly we are opened upon intellectual difficulties of great proportions which cannot be resolved within the framework of scientific psychology alone. We seem to be led by the very process of discovery to a standpoint that is beyond psychology, beyond the scientific disengagement of a purely immanent process of subjective psychological development. The context seems to be set by this analysis for integrating psychology not only with intentionality analysis but also with spirituality, and especially with the tradition of the discernment of spirits.

But can we be more precise on the notions of the collective unconscious and the archetypes? I believe we can again draw upon the methodological considerations of the first portions of this paper for a more satisfactory formulation of the discoveries of Jung than Jung himself was able to provide for them.

The collective unconscious, then, like the personal unconscious, should be considered as psychoid, not as psychic. Whereas the personal unconscious is all energy in the neural-physiological bodily process of the subject that is not present to itself, the collective unconscious is all energy beyond these neural-physiological processes that is not present to itself. The collective or, better, impersonal or cosmic unconscious is at bottom all energy in the universe that is neither psychic energy and thus at least inchoatively conscious, nor non-conscious energy in the bodies of conscious subjects. Impersonal energy, as

well as that which constitutes the personal unconscious, can come into consciousness by becoming psychic energy, i.e., by emerging into the dream. In the dream's images there are revealed not only the repressed and forgotten meanings and evaluations that often show themselves in the displaced-fashion highlighted by Freud and accounted for by the processes of neural interaction, but also at times variations on a ground theme of the emergence of the authentic subject. These variations are transpersonal and thematic in their impact and meaning and, since the ground theme is a cross-cultural one, the variations on the theme and even at times the symbols through which the variations will be narrated are found cross-culturally and are discovered to have been operative in other ages and perhaps even at times in quite archaic cultures.

Furthermore, Jung's work shows us that the emergence of the authentic subject is a matter of the concrete reconciliation and integration of the opposites of spirit and matter. Spirit in the subject is intelligent, reasonable, and responsible consciousness, the single transcendental intention of intelligibility, truth and value, the unrestricted desire to know and the capacity for a universal willingness. Matter is limitation. Spirit in the subject is a participant, I suggest, in purely spiritual processes that transcend the subject's individuality but that, through this participation, affect the subject's emergence or failure of emergence into authenticity. The images released in the psyche through the reconciliation, not of spirit in the subject and matter in the subject, but of spirit and matter that both transcend the subject and involve the subject as a participant in their interaction, are Jung's archetypal images. On our account, though, it would be more accurate to speak of some of these images as archetypal and of others as anagogic. Archetypal images are the recurrent and often cyclical symbols taken from nature that enable the communication of the human drama to take place; they are the associative

clusters that refer to and evoke human action as a whole and especially as it displays the story of a conflict between desire and reality. Anagogic symbols are no longer parts of a whole, however associative, as are archetypal images, but the containers of the whole of human action, symbols that seem to be or reflect or negate the Logos, the shaping word of the universe and of history (see Frye: 95-128) /17/. Again, as Joseph Flanagan has indicated, Christ and Satan function symbolically in an anagogic rather than archetypal fashion for the Christian psyche and even for the secular psyche of Western people /18/.

C. Individuation and the Problem of Evil

Jung does not treat the symbolic significance of Christ and of Satan in Christian tradition as anagogic symbols, but makes of them archetypal symbols on the same plane as, e.g., the royal king and queen of alchemical lore who symbolize for Jung the androgynous nature of the psyche (see 1969b), or the golden flower of Taoist literature which Jung interprets as symbolizing the wholeness of individuated life (see 1967:1-56, esp. 22-25). Such symbols are taken from nature and imitate nature, albeit in a generic and highly associative manner, which allows them to reflect a wholeness in nature. If Christ and Satan are considered as archetypal rather than anagogic, however, they are necessarily incomplete, for one is light and the other darkness. Neither reflects a wholeness in nature such as is symbolized in the nuptial *coniunctio* or even in the golden flower. On the archetypal level, only a conjunction of Christ and Satan would seem to reflect the wholeness of nature that the associative clusters that are archetypes symbolize. And this is precisely how Jung treats these two symbols, as needing one another if they are adequately to represent the self, the wholeness, that is the goal of individuation. Christ for Jung is necessarily inadequate as a symbol of the self, for he is without sin and darkness. Only the reconciliation of God's

two sons, of the hostile divine brothers, will provide for Jung the symbolization of individuated totality that will satisfy his postulate of a progressive reconciliation of opposites cumulatively heading toward the realization of the self (see 1968b).

Implicit in this conceptual scheme, of course, is the arrangement of good and evil among the opposites to be reconciled by the imaginal processes of the psyche. In a sense, then, it may be said that Jung is not faithful to the insight expressed in "On the Nature of the Psyche," where spirit and matter, both in the subject and beyond the subject but involving the subject as a participant in their interaction, were seen best to represent or summarize the understanding of the opposites reconciled by psychic energy /19/, and where it is clearly stated that neither of the opposites so conceived is in itself good or bad. "Both can be both" (1969a:206). More precisely, we can make several further criticisms. First, and somewhat *ad hominem*, the postulate of the reconciliation of spirit and matter necessarily moves Jung into specifically metaphysical and theological territory where he is not at home. Secondly, there is a quite definite distinction between "good and bad" on the one hand, and "good and evil" on the other. And thirdly, the adequate treatment of the problem of evil calls for several distinctions which never seem to have been recognized by Jung. I have in mind the sort of distinctions Lonergan draws among moral impotence (1957: 627-630), basic sin and moral evil (666-668). At the root of all these criticisms, though, is the need for clarification of the notion of the self, and I limit myself to this task in the present context.

D. What is the Self?

Jung has much to say about symbols of the self, but tells us not enough about what it is that these symbols symbolize. What, from the standpoint of generalized empirical method, is the self? Is it not the subject? Do

not the symbols of wholeness which for Jung symbolize the self reflect the totality of subjectivity in its concern for receptive attentiveness to the data of sense and of consciousness, for meaning, for truth, for value and for the absolutely transcendent origin and goal of nature and of history? This will be my option, that the self, under the aspect of totality, is the subject as the latter has been disengaged by Lonergan, and as Lonergan's analysis is complemented by the additional sublation effected by psychic conversion. And the most notable thing about this self or subject is that it can be authentic or inauthentic; that its authenticity consists in self-transcendence in knowing, in doing, and in religion; and that it truly knows itself only when it reflectively recognizes that it is authentically itself solely in the self-transcending intention of intelligibility, truth, and value /20/. This total self or subject transcends the limits of differentiated consciousness or ego and reveals its ego-transcendence in dreams that originate from the personal unconscious. But beyond the personal unconscious and thus *beyond the self*, there extends the vast, indeed cosmic, reach of the collective or objective unconscious which is not only ego-transcendent but self-transcendent. The self, then, finds its lower limit at the threshold that divides the personal from the collective unconscious. The upper limit of the self is constituted by another and quite different threshold, one which marks the boundary between the highest intention of agapic love on the part of existential subjectivity and the spiritual processes that can be divined only by religious discernment. Nonetheless, despite the thresholds which limit the self or subject to being "just this," its lower and upper self-transcendent reachings make of it a tension of limitation and transcendence, and its genuineness consists in negotiating this tension (see Lonergan, 1957:469-479).

Generalized empirical method, then, allows us to substitute the intentionality categories of limitation and

transcendence for Jung's characterization of the intra-subjective opposites as matter and spirit. Let us keep matter and spirit as our formulation for the self-transcendent opposites in whose interaction the self is an intrinsic participant, in fact, an instrumental operator of integration or of disintegration, but let us speak of limitation and transcendence as articulating the way matter and spirit become the opposites in the intentional subject or self.

Psyche, then, becomes one dimension of this totality of subjectivity, a dimension which is manifest at each level of intentional consciousness in the dramatic and affective component of all empirical or inattentive, intelligent or stupid, reasonable or silly, responsible and constructive or irresponsible and sociopathic consciousness. But what qualifies the subject as subject is intentionality, the orientation to self-transcendence at each level, and the successive sublations of lower levels by higher ones in the pursuit of authenticity. And what qualifies the psychic component of this intentional striving as authentic or inauthentic is the manner in which it participates in the negotiation of the tension of limitation and transcendence, and the extent to which it shares in the detachment and disinterestedness, the universality and cosmic context, of the single transcendental intending of the intelligible, the real and true, and the good. The self, the totality of subjectivity, is both genuine and authentic to the extent to which the organic, psychic and intentional systems are operating, first, in harmony with one another; second, in the interests of cognitive, real and religious self-transcendence; and third, for the promotion of the religiously discerned integration of spirit and matter as this integration is issued into being by world- and self-constituting projects on the part of the developing, self-transcending subject.

This transposition of the Jungian notion of the self into the categories of an intentionality analysis

complemented by the maieutic of the psyche which such an analysis renders possible, highlights the most important fact about the self: that it can be self-transcending cognitively, existentially, and religiously, or that it can flee understanding and shun truth in the name of any one or some or all of the counter-philosophies which deny its capacity for meaning and objectivity; that it can allow its action in the world to be governed by dramatic, egoistic, group or general bias; and that it can hide from and eventually come to hate the call to holiness which alone reveals its ulterior finality. This dialectic of the self-transcendence and the self-containment of the self is not properly emphasized by Jung; nor does he pay sufficient attention to the fact that symbols which open up upon the authentic self are visited upon subjects whose intentional orientation is away from meaning, truth and value, only for the sake of calling them to radical conversion. This latter fact may not completely escape Jung, but it is not brought to the center and core of his articulation of the process of rendering conscious the individuation that is the psychic meaning of total human development. By bringing this fact to its proper place in a theory of individuation, we provide the only adequate context for discussing the problem of evil. This discussion would show us clearly, I believe, that good and evil cannot be among the opposites generally qualified as transcendence and limitation, the opposites whose progressive reconciliation constitutes the process of individuation. To place them among the opposites involves a category mistake on the part of Jung, and, insofar as understanding is central to human development and misunderstanding an obstacle to such development, Jung's category mistake is also an obstruction to the individuation process which he labored so diligently to understand, formulate and promote, and which he correctly judged to be, not only a psychological but indeed a moral and religious imperative of our time.

III. Conclusion

Lonergan's intentionality analysis and Jung's psychology take on an explicitly dialectical relation to one another when the subject must negotiate the evil he avows of himself. But the underlying dynamics which come to the fore in the area of moral and religious authenticity are present in either case from the very beginning, so that the entire relation of these two conceptions of human development and transformation may be considered dialectical. Lonergan describes and explains throughout his work the exigencies of what in his later writings is called self-transcendence. These exigencies, which constitute the law of the subject as intentional, are less consistently glimpsed and even less heartily affirmed by Jung, despite the access he provides the subject to trustworthy ciphers in their regard. There is, I submit, operative in Jung's thought a less than adequate notion of what makes for wholeness, despite his correct insistence on the centrality of the issue.

The further and mysterious outposts of Jungian thought constellate a number of problems for the theologian: the problem of method; the question of the relation between psychology and religion; the proper way to speak about good and evil; the relation of symbols of the self to images of God; the nature of wholeness; and the contribution of psychic deliverances to a theological doctrine of God. The theologian is not helped by the fact that Jung's forays into explicitly theological territory most evidence the need for a dialectical critique of Jung's entire *corpus*. I have no desire to deny or undermine the extraordinary significance of Jung for theology, and I share, though perhaps for other reasons, the frequent complaints of Jungians that theology has yet to appreciate this significance (see von Franz: 188ff.). I share, too, the assessment of David Burrell, already cited, that "Jung's work promises to prove as reliable a handmaid for doing theology today as more metaphysical schemes proved

in the past" (232). But, Burrell adds, "Every such interpretative scheme must be carefully monitored and critically employed, yet that defines the theologian's task" (232). The beginning of this critical monitoring must focus on the religious significance of the process of individuation which is simultaneously lived and discovered under the auspices of a Jungian analysis. For, as Burrell says, in this journey one will not fail to meet God (221). But one will also meet much that is not God and that even is against God. The crux of the matter is the negotiation of evil, and so the ultimate monitoring of the theologian is existential and religious before and even while it is speculative or intellectual. In terms of the tradition that is my own, the Roman Catholic and Ignatian tradition, it is best conceived as discernment of spirits.

One further statement of Burrell's deserves mention and approval: "Rather than Jung's explicit statements about God, it is his language conveying the pursuit of individuation which offers the most fruitful model for discovering a religious way of speaking" (184). The resources of this model need to be carefully disengaged by the religious thinker equipped with sharper tools of philosophical analysis than those enjoyed by Jung. Easy adaptation of religion to analytical psychology--a temptation encouraged by Jung's religious suggestiveness--is to be disparaged on both religious and psychological grounds, to say nothing of method. It is here, again, that the theologian's monitoring of Jung's work and praxis both begins and ends: what is the relation between the process of individuation as articulated in analytical psychology and that of religious development and transformation as objectified in that portion of theological foundations dealing with religious and moral conversion? The relation is intimate, yet it is clearly not one of identity. That genuine religious conversion, as this is understood by Christian theology, can and I dare say does sometimes occur within the course of a Jungian analysis, I do not wish

to deny. But my focus in this paper has been on the respective formulations of an analytical psychology of individuation and a foundational-theological objectification of conversion. The languages depart over the issue of evil, and, before this, over the notion of the self. For Christian faith, Jung's articulation of the problem of evil--and so his formulations of the self and of wholeness--are unacceptable. This, I find, is an inescapable conclusion, one I have wanted to avoid but have not been able to while still remaining faithful to my understanding of what Christianity, as a religion proclaiming *redemption from evil*, means. For analytical psychology this conviction probably remains hopelessly tied to the "Old King" of a declining age, to the splitting of opposites symbolized by the astrological sign of Pisces, and to that portion of Christianity which must be relinquished as we move toward a new and more universal religion (von Franz: chap. 9). But I find that to relinquish this portion of Christianity in favor of Jung's apocatastasis model of the *integration of evil and good* is not only to relinquish Christianity *in toto* but to regress, to pursue avenues previously traveled in the history of religions, avenues which from our present vantage point can only be termed blind alleys in the evolution of religious consciousness. So many of Jung's insights into the psychological aberrations of some Christian spirituality are unfortunately attended by a recommended alternative that is no less an aberration, and that perhaps even exceeds in illusion the mistake it was intended to replace. The ultimate relation of the Christian religion to Jung's myth is irretrievably dialectical. One cannot entertain both in their respective totalities without internal self-contradiction. No final resolution is possible except through dialectic.

There are, nonetheless, definite parallels between individuation and the self-appropriation to which Lonergan's work invites us. The principal similarity is of course that both are processes of self-knowledge and

self-transformation. Jung's writings no more than Lonergan's can be understood without a change being effected in the subject studying them. "The only test available for Jung's science is that to which we put a road map: does it succeed in getting us there? A working meaning for the term *individuation* is reserved for those who allow themselves to submit to its demands" (Burrell: 185). But despite the relative lack of attention paid to the positive significance of symbolic consciousness in Lonergan's formulations, he is working from and promoting a more accurate understanding of the totality that is the self than is Jung. What Jung provides to a subjectivity tutored by Lonergan is access to the symbolic ciphers of the psyche regarding the economy of the subject's pursuit of the authenticity of self-transcendence. Lonergan offers the theologian essentially what he offers anyone who reads him: an avenue to the intentionality that, among other things, founds theology. Jung presents to such a subject a complementary access to symbolic ciphers of personal development and transformation. The contribution is not only not negligible but serves to offset the one bias that Lonergan may not purge us of, the intellectualist bias that would regard the intellectual pattern of experience as somehow a privileged domain of self-transcending activity /21/.

The relationship is further complicated, however, by the fact that Jung's model of wholeness, one of *ego-transcendence*, is not also one of *self-transcendence* but ultimately one of self-enclosure. Jung fails to appreciate how significant it is to the process of becoming, or living our way into the self, that the self is an intentional self, intent on and capable of affirming true meanings and making good decisions--where "true" and "good" denote self-transcendence as the criterion of one's genuineness as a knower and as a moral agent. Philosophically, Jung is a Kantian, and an amateur one at that. Furthermore, his remarkably thorough knowledge of the

human psyche is not matched by a sufficiently penetrating knowledge of the spirit which psyche mediates with the body in the movement toward wholeness. Thus the self-transcending dynamism of the psyche is only inconsistently glimpsed and affirmed by Jung. This dynamism is an orientation toward intentionality, a potential readiness for conscription into the *eros* of the pure question intent on meaning, truth and value. But an explicit conscription cannot take place without psychic conversion, and this conversion is neither identical with nor unrelated to the intellectual, moral and religious conversions which condition authenticity. The lines between psyche and spirit are not clearly drawn by Jung, nor does his articulation of their dialectic completely escape a romanticist resolution in the capitulation of intentionality to nature's rhythms. Such romanticism, however, is not conversion and consequently falls short of authenticity.

The relation of psyche and spirit or transcendence can be put very succinctly: psyche is the whole realm of the imaginal, while spirit or transcendence is the domain of operations intent on intelligibility, truth and value. Ultimately only the intentionality of spirit is responsible for authenticity or inauthenticity, for it is this intentionality which qualifies a person as good or evil. Again we find the focus for the most important bit of monitoring that must be done by the theologian if Jung's work is to realize its theological fruitfulness. I am inauthentic when I am not what the very constitution of my intentionality prompts me to be: contemplatively attentive, intelligent in my inquiry for meaning, reasonable in my exigence for truth and responsibly self-transcending in my decisions. Psyche's images are the most accurate ciphers of my relative self-transcendence or self-enclosure. They are, as such, utterly trustworthy, humbling, demanding and evocative. But to pursue them for their own sake is to lose one's very self. A romanticist conception of individuation is a hopeless *cul-de-sac*. It dooms one to

the endless treadmill of self-analysis that is psychology (see Progoff: 258). Psychology is not life--a fact recognized in all depth psychological analyses of the transference phenomenon, yet missed in the theoretical or meta-psychological constructions of all the leading depth psychologists save Otto Rank /22/. Ultimately it must be said that Jung does not provide a road map for getting us there, if "there" is individuated *life*, and the reason lies in the problems constellated at those furthest outposts of his thought that he has pointed us to in his paper, "On the Nature of the Psyche."

NOTES

/1/ In a book I am writing on the foundations of Christian theology, I will attempt to indicate more precisely the role of foundations in the work of interpretation, history, and dialectic. For our present purposes, it is sufficient that we work with Lonergan's notion of an indirect influence of foundations on interpretation, history, and dialectic, and a direct influence on doctrines, systematics, and communications (see Lonergan, 1972a:268).

/2/ Strictly speaking, Lonergan leaves it to the theologian to determine the explanatory status of his categories (1972a:285). It is obvious, however, that Lonergan judges that the theologian whose subjectivity has been tutored through the cognitional and existential analysis of *Insight* and *Method in Theology* will be in possession of more than a model with exceptional foundational validity.

/3/ The argument that such is Lonergan's conception of an ideal for systematic theology is bolstered by his recent and persuasive suggestion that such a philosophy of God as that proposed in chap. 19 of *Insight* be included within systematics (see 1973).

/4/ "Terminalis denique ratio non solum omnem transcendit imaginem sed etiam quodammodo omnem intelligibilitatem in imagine perspectam. Sicut enim equationes campi electromagnetici a Maxwell inventae ita ex imaginibus ortae sunt ut tamen nulla sit imago quae iis correspondeat, ita etiam regula ab Athanasio posita nisi conceptus et iudicia non respicit. Eadem enim de Filio quae de Patre dicuntur, excepto Patris nomine. Quod non solum ab imaginibus praescindit sed etiam in nullo imaginabili vel perspicui vel intelligi potest" (Lonergan, 1964:86).

/5/ "I should urge that religious conversion, moral conversion, and intellectual conversion are three quite different things. In an order of exposition I would prefer to explain first intellectual, then moral, then religious conversion. In the order of occurrence I would expect religious commonly but not necessarily to precede moral and both religious and moral to precede intellectual. Intellectual conversion, I think, is very rare" (Lonergan, 1972b:233f.).

/6/ Paul Ricoeur distinguishes three levels of creativity of symbols and relegates dreams to the lowest, that of "sedimented symbolism: here we find various stereotyped and fragmented remains of symbols, symbols so commonplace and worn with use that they have nothing but a past. This is the level of dream-symbolism, and also of fairy tales and legends; here the work of symbolization is no longer operative. At a second level we come upon the symbols

that function in everyday life; these are the symbols that are useful and are actually utilized, that have a past and a present, and that in the clockwork of a given society serve as a token for the nexus of social pacts; structural anthropology operates at this level. At a higher level come the prospective symbols; these are creations of meaning that take up the traditional symbols with their multiple significations and serve as the vehicles of new meanings. This creation of meaning reflects the living substrate of symbolism, a substrate that is not the result of social sedimentation.... This creation of meaning is at the same time a recapture of archaic fantasies and a living interpretation of this fantasy substrate. Dreams provide a key only for the symbolism of the first level; the 'typical' dreams Freud appeals to in developing his theory of symbolism do not reveal the canonical form of symbols but merely their vestiges on the plane of sedimented expressions. The true task, therefore, is to grasp symbols in their creative moment, and not when they arrive at the end of their course and are revived in dreams, like stenographic grammalogues with their 'permanently fixed meaning'" (504-506). Ricoeur here undervalues the symbolization of the dream, which, when attended to and cultivated, more often responds as a critic of Ricoeur's second level symbols and as an agent of his third level symbols than as a dumping ground for his first level symbols. Dreams both tell and promote a story, and the story they tell and promote is the story of the dramatic component of the life of the intentional subject. Had Ricoeur turned to Jung rather than to Hegel for the teleological counterpart to the Freudian archeology of the subject, he would have discovered this to be the case. It is Jung's lasting significance to have discovered and at least begun to precise a teleology of the subject working from the data of dreaming consciousness (see Adler: 1961).

/7/ "It is much better to take full cognizance of one's feelings, however deplorable they may be, than to brush them aside, overrule them, ignore them. To take cognizance of them makes it possible for one to know oneself, to uncover the inattention, obtuseness, silliness, irresponsibility that gave rise to the feeling one does not want, and to correct the aberrant attitude. On the other hand, not to take cognizance of them is to leave them in the twilight of what is conscious but not objectified. In the long run there results a conflict between the self as conscious and, on the other hand, the self as objectified" (Lonergan, 1972a:32f.). Lonergan adds: "This twilight of what is conscious but not objectified seems to be the meaning of what some psychiatrists call the unconscious" (34, footnote). He then gives references to books by or about Jung, Karen Horney and Wilhelm Stekel. The implications in regard to Jung are, we shall see, partly correct but incomplete. For Jung, consciousness is not self-presence in intentional operations, but the ego, i.e., a complex characterized by relative differentiation and the

capacity for objectification and control. The unconscious includes what Lonergan would call what is conscious but not objectified, but it includes much else besides.

/8/ I am indebted to Fr. Flanagan for introducing me to Northrop Frye's distinction of archetypal and anagogic meaning, which I have transposed into the context of my own concerns in this paper (see Frye, especially the second essay, "Ethical Criticism: Theory of Symbols," pp. 95-128).

/9/ On the spiritual unconscious and its relation to the collective and personal unconscious, see Woolger (256-272). Woolger's concern is not with anagogic images, but with the condition beyond all imagery, the condition of the mystic's cloud of unknowing. For the transition from imaginal negotiation to the *via negativa*, there is demanded the stretching of the psyche to harmony with a cosmic or universal willingness. I hope to show in a future work that the final imaginal cluster to be negotiated before this transition concerns the figure of the father, an image that is not developed with any sophistication in Jungian psychology.

/10/ Ms. Goldenberg says of the new generation of Jungians: "Their psychology stems mainly from the direction Jung took in 'On the Nature of the Psyche,' in which the relations among psyche, spirit and matter are explored" (212).

/11/ In the 1946 essay, Jung's concern is almost exclusively with the impersonal complexes or the collective unconscious.

/12/ Jung consistently rejects the exclusive use of the term "subconscious" or "subconsciousness" (see, e.g., Jung, 1968a:239).

/13/ Obviously the unconscious is being considered here as one system, with as yet no differentiation having been introduced among what we have named the undifferentiated and the personal and collective unconscious in the strict sense in which we have distinguished these three aspects of the background.

/14/ In a footnote Jung tells us that his reference to the will "is purely psychological and has nothing to do with the philosophical problem of indeterminism" (1969a: 181, footnote 44). Here we see Jung a victim of the strictures of the second stage of meaning, where theory is the supreme differentiation of cognitional consciousness. In the stage marked by interiorly differentiated consciousness, the Aristotelian division of the sciences presupposed by this remark of Jung's no longer obtains. Now philosophy has given way to method; and method's task is the ongoing

unification of the sciences. Philosophy become method "is neither a theory in the manner of science nor a somewhat technical form of common sense, nor even a reversal to Presocratic wisdom. Philosophy finds its proper data in intentional consciousness. Its primary function is to promote the self-appropriation that cuts to the root of philosophic differences and incomprehensions. It has further, secondary functions in distinguishing, relating, grounding the several realms of meaning and, no less, in grounding the methods of the sciences and so promoting their unification" (Lonergan, 1972a:95). On such a supposition, Jung's statement may be reformulated as follows: The psychic, as opposed to the physiological or purely instinctual, marks the entrance of previously compulsive drives into the sphere of conscious intentionality, where what has so become conscious can be understood intelligently, affirmed reasonably and negotiated freely and responsibly. This relationship to intentionality characterizes the psychic as opposed to the physiological or organic.

/15/ It is obvious that Jung has a quite non-reductionistic notion of instinct, in contrast with, e.g., Freud. James Hillman has capitalized on this notion of instinct in his development of the notion of soul-making. For Jung there are five basic instinctual groups: hunger, sexuality, the drive to activity, reflection and creativity. "The first four are comparable to Konrad Lorenz' major groups: feeding, reproduction, aggression, and flight....Lorenz does not mention the fifth instinct, creativity; but then he speaks from observations of animal behavior, while Jung speaks from the study of people.

"If we accept the hypothesis of a creative instinct, then this instinct, too, must be subject to psychization. Like other drives, it can be modified by the psyche and be subject to interrelation and contamination with sexuality, say, or activity. (But neither one's sexual drive, nor productive activity in the world, nor reflective consciousness, nor contentious ambition is the ground or manifestation of one's creativity.) Moreover, as an instinct, the creative is able to produce images of its goal and to orient behavior toward its satiation. As an instinct, the creative is a necessity of life, and the satisfaction of its needs a requirement for life. In the human being, creativity, like the other instinct, requires fulfillment. According to Jung's view of man, activity and reflection are not enough; there is a fifth component, as basic in man as hunger and sexuality, the *quintessentia* of creativity....(Jung's) major concern in both his therapy and his writing was with the manifestations and vicissitudes of the creative instinct and with disentangling it from the other four" (Hillman, 1972:33f.). That the creative instinct is coextensive with the process that leads to individuation is obvious from Hillman's list of the conceptions Jung uses to deal with it: "the urge to wholeness, the urge toward individuation or personality

development, the spiritual drive, the symbol-making transcendent function, the natural religious function, or, in short, the drive of the self to be realized" (34). To employ the word, instinct, in this regard is to highlight the physiological and biological dimensions of an incarnate spirit.

/16/ One is reminded here of Paul Ricoeur's complaint about the impreciseness of Jung's language: "Psychoanalysis is limited by what justifies it, namely, its decision to recognize in the phenomena of culture only what falls under an economics of desire and resistances. I must admit that this firmness and rigor makes me prefer Freud to Jung. With Freud I know where I am and where I am going; with Jung everything risks being confused: the psychism, the soul, the archetypes, the sacred" (1970:176).

/17/ I am suggesting that some such distinction as Frye's between archetypal and anagogic symbols is crucial for understanding the domain of reality upon which we are opened by Jung's discoveries.

/18/ See /8/ above. The pertinence of the distinction of anagogic and archetypal symbols for our present discussion appears precisely here. I have discussed the implications of the distinction in 1977c.

/19/ "Opposites are extreme qualities in any state, by virtue of which that state is perceived to be real, for they form a potential. The psyche is made up of processes whose energy springs from the equilibration of all kinds of opposites. The spirit/instinct antithesis is only one of the commonest formulations, but it has the advantage of reducing the greatest number of the most important and most complex psychic processes to a common denominator" (1969a:207). In treating the opposites, the logical distinction of contraries and contradictories escapes Jung. Spirit and matter are contraries, good and evil contradictories.

/20/ Besides the aspect of totality, Jung includes under the notion of the self also the aspect of the center. The self is simultaneously the wholeness of subjectivity and the center of subjectivity. This latter aspect is, I believe, most profoundly treated in Jung (1967). Our transposition of the notion of the self into the context of generalized empirical method does not neglect this second aspect. I have called attention to Lonergan's contribution to the shift to this center by speaking of the therapeutic function of intellectual conversion in Doran (1977a). In a similar vein, my colleague Vernon Gregson speaks of Lonergan's work as intentionality therapy (see 1975). Intellectual conversion joined with and complemented and sublated by psychic conversion will orient the subject toward this center.

/21/ Lonergan's recent emphasis on healing as a development from above downwards, foreshadowed in the relationship between loving and knowing discussed in *Method in Theology*, represents a clear breakthrough on his part beyond this possible bias (see Lonergan, 1975:55-68).

/22/ "Man is born beyond psychology and he dies beyond it but he can *live* beyond it only through vital experience of his own--in religious terms, through revelation, conversion or re-birth" (Rank, 1958:16).

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