

Subject, Psyche, and Theology's Foundations
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This paper has a twofold purpose. First, I wish to show that the intentionality analysis of Bernard Lonergan may be employed in the elaboration of categories explanatory of a process of psychic self-appropriation as an aid to the self-knowledge of the existential subject. Second, I wish to suggest the implications of psychic self-appropriation for the theological method proposed by Lonergan. The movement of my argument is thus reciprocal: Lonergan enables the construction of a semantics of depth psychology; this semantics complements Lonergan's attempt to construct a method for theology. The two parts of my argument will be taken up, respectively, in the second and third major sections of the paper. The first section attempts to clarify the notions of the psyche and of the existential subject and to discuss the relation between the referents of these two terms that seems implicit in Lonergan's later work.

The Psyche and Existential Subjectivity

The existential subject is the subject as evaluating, deliberating, deciding, acting, constituting the world, constituting himself or herself.¹ Existential subjectivity emerges on a level of consciousness distinct from and subsuming the three levels constitutive of human knowledge: experience, understanding, and judgment.² Existential subjectivity is consciousness at the fourth and fullest level of its potentiality: consciousness as concerned with the good, with value, with discriminating what is truly worthwhile from what is only apparently good.

The discussion of the existential subject as a notion quite distinct from the cognitional subject is a relatively recent development in Lonergan's thought. It is correlated with the emergence of a notion of the good distinct from the notions of the intelligent and the reasonable. 'In *Insight* the good was the intelligent and reasonable. In *Method* the good is a distinct notion. It is intended in questions for

¹ See, e.g., Bernard Lonergan, *The Subject* (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1968), p. 19; reprinted in *A Second Collection*, ed. William F. J. Ryan, S.J., and Bernard Tyrrell, S.J. (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1974), pp. 69-86, with the relevant section beginning on p. 79.

² See *The Subject*, pp. 20 f. Although the schema of conscious intentionality is in this instance presented in six steps, there are four levels of intentionality for Lonergan. They are referred to as experience, understanding, judgment, and decision or existential subjectivity.

deliberation, Is this worth while? Is it truly or only apparently good? It is aspired to in judgments of value made by a virtuous or authentic person with a good conscience. It is brought about by deciding and living up to one's decisions.'³

The emergence of a distinct notion of the good involves a relocation of the constitutive function of the psyche in the structured process of conscious subjectivity. Psychic development is defined in *Insight* as 'a sequence of increasingly differentiated and integrated sets of capacities for perceptiveness, for aggressive or affective response, for memory, for imaginative projects, and for skillfully and economically executed performance.'⁴ I shall use the term 'psyche' to refer to this set of capacities. They have a basis, Lonergan says, in 'some neural counterpart of association,'⁵ but this unconscious neural basis is 'an upwardly directed dynamism seeking fuller realization, first, on the proximate sensitive level, and secondly, beyond its limitations, on higher artistic, dramatic, philosophic, cultural, and religious levels,' so that 'insight into dream symbols and associated images and affects reveals to the psychologist a grasp of the anticipations and virtualities of higher activities immanent in the underlying unconscious manifold.'⁶

In *Insight*, this set of capacities is integrated by cognitional or intellectual activities: '... the psyche reaches the wealth and fullness of its apprehensions and responses under the higher integration of human intelligence.'⁷ Intellectual development sets the standard and provides the criterion for psychic, affective, and volitional development. Thus Lonergan speaks of reaching a 'universal willingness that matches the unrestricted desire to know.'⁸ But in *Method in Theology*, human intelligence and the psyche, especially in its affective and symbolic capacities, are sublated and unified by the deliberations of the authentic existential subject, for the apprehension of potential values and satisfactions in feelings, along with questions for deliberation, is what mediates between cognitional judgments of fact and existential judgments of value. Thus, 'just as intelligence sublates sense, just as reasonableness sublates intelligence, so deliberation sublates and thereby unifies knowing and feeling.'⁹ The development of existential subjectivity now sets the standard and provides the criterion for

³ Bernard Lonergan, 'Insight Revisited,' in *A Second Collection* 277.

⁴ Lonergan, *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1957), p. 456.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Ibid., p. 457.

⁷ Ibid., p. 726.

⁸ Ibid., p. 624.

⁹ Lonergan, 'Insight Revisited' 277.

intellectual development,¹⁰ and the former development is intrinsically related to the refinement of affective response.

Affectivity and symbols are no less related to one another in *Method in Theology* than in *Insight*. Feelings are said to be symbolically certifiable, and a symbol is defined as ‘an image of a real or imaginary object that evokes a feeling or is evoked by a feeling.’¹¹ One’s affective capacities, dispositions, and habits ‘can be specified by the symbols that awaken determinate affects and, inversely, by the affects that evoke determinate symbols.’¹² Thus ‘affective development, or aberration, involves a transvaluation and transformation of symbols. What before was moving no longer moves; what before did not move now is moving. So the symbols themselves change to express the new affective capacities and dispositions.’¹³ These affective capacities and dispositions affect the existential subject, for feelings ‘are the mass and momentum of his affective capacities, dispositions, habits, the effective orientation of his being.’¹⁴ It is in intentional feeling responses to objects and possible courses of action that values and satisfactions are first apprehended. Feelings thus are crucial in the process of deliberation that comes to term only in the decisions of the existential subject.

The transvaluation and transformation of symbols that goes hand in hand with affective development can be understood only when one realizes that symbols follow other laws than those of rational discourse.

For the logical class the symbol uses a representative figure. For univocity it substitutes a wealth of multiple meanings. It does not prove but it overwhelms with a manifold of images that converge in meaning. It does not bow to the principle of excluded middle but admits the *coincidentia oppositorum*, of love and hate, of courage and fear, and so on. It does not negate but overcomes

¹⁰ ‘As the fourth level is the principle of self-control, it is responsible for proper functioning on the first three levels. It fulfills its responsibility or fails to do so in the measure that we are attentive or inattentive in experiencing, that we are intelligent or unintelligent in our investigations, that we are reasonable or unreasonable in our judgments. Therewith vanish two notions: the notion of pure intellect or pure reason that operates on its own without guidance or control from responsible decision; and the notion of will as an arbitrary power indifferently choosing between good and evil.’ Bernard Lonergan, *Method in Theology* (New York: Herder and Herder, 1972), p. 121.

¹¹ Ibid., p. 64.

¹² Ibid., p. 65.

¹³ Ibid., p. 66.

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 65.

what it rejects by heaping up all that is opposite to it. It does not move on some single track or on some single level, but condenses into a bizarre unity all its present concerns.¹⁵

The function of symbols, moreover, is to meet a need for internal communication that such rational procedures as logic and dialectic cannot satisfy. 'Organic and psychic vitality have to reveal themselves to intentional consciousness and, inversely, intentional consciousness has to secure the collaboration of organism and psyche. Again, our apprehensions of values occur in intentional responses, in feelings; here too it is necessary for feelings to reveal their objects and, inversely, for objects to awaken feelings. It is through symbols that mind and body, mind and heart, heart and body communicate.'¹⁶

The elemental, preobjectified meaning of symbols finds its proper context in this process of internal communication. The interpretation of the symbol thus has to appeal to this context and its associated images and feelings.¹⁷ Because of the existential significance of the symbol, Lonergan evinces a strong sympathy with those schools of dream interpretation which think of the dream 'not as the twilight of life, but as its dawn, the beginning of the transition from impersonal existence to presence in the world, to constitution of one's self in one's world.'¹⁸

The position of the 'later Lonergan' on the psyche, then, is that it reaches the wealth and fullness of its apprehensions and responses, not under the higher integration of human intelligence, but in the free and responsible decisions of the authentic existential subject. This position sets the stage for arguing that Lonergan's intentionality analysis can be complemented by psychic analysis and that the latter is a further refinement of the self-appropriation of the existential subject. Intentionality analysis, moreover, clarifies the finality of psychic analysis.

The argument for complementarity is bolstered by Lonergan's acknowledgment of a twofold mediation of immediacy by meaning. 'Besides the immediate world of the infant and the adult's world mediated by meaning, there is the mediation of immediacy by meaning when one objectifies cognitional process in transcendental method and when one discovers, identifies, accepts one's submerged feelings in psychotherapy.'¹⁹ The second mediation can be understood as aiding the self-appropriation of the existential subject in much the same way as the first aids that of the cognitional subject. Intentionality analysis, as articulated

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 66.

¹⁶ Ibid., pp. 66 f.

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 67.

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 69.

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 77.

in a pattern of judgments concerning cognitional fact, moral living, and religious experience, can be complemented by depth-psychological analysis. If the latter is engaged in within the overall context of the former, it can critically ground moral and religious living²⁰ in an expanding pattern of judgments of value that set one's course as existential subject, and it can facilitate the sublation of an intellectually self-appropriating consciousness by moral and religious subjectivity. The theological pertinence of this psychic complement to Lonergan's work will be foundational. According to the dynamic operative in Lonergan's articulation of theological foundations, the foundational reality of theology is the subjectivity of the theologian. Lonergan has articulated foundational reality in terms of religious, moral, and intellectual conversion. While the conversions generally occur in this order, they also display relations of sublation in the reverse order.²¹ I will posit a fourth conversion, psychic conversion, as an aspect of foundational reality. Psychic conversion is the release of the capacity for the internal communication of symbolic consciousness. By aiding existential self-appropriation, it facilitates the sublation of intellectual conversion by moral conversion, and of both of these by religious conversion.²² The foundations of theology would then lie in the objectification of cognitive, psychic, moral, and religious subjectivity in a patterned set of judgments of cognitional and existential fact cumulatively heading toward the full position on the human subject.

Toward a Semantics of Depth Psychology

My first contention is that Lonergan's intentionality analysis enables the construction of a semantics of depth psychology. To argue this, I will discuss first the finality of both intentionality analysis and depth-psychological analysis under the rubric of second immediacy; second, the role of the depth-psychological uncovering of symbolic consciousness in advancing the subject to second immediacy; third, the manner in which this uncovering can be integrated with Lonergan's intentionality analysis; and fourth, the notion of psychic conversion and its relation to Lonergan's notions of religious, moral, and intellectual

²⁰ [In one of the typescripts (D0213 in my files) I correct this, and I regret that the correction did not find its way into the published text. It would read better as follows: '... can aid moral and religious self-appropriation' – RD]

²¹ Ibid., pp. 241 ff.

²² See Robert Doran, *Subject and Psyche: A Study of the Foundations of Theology* (Ann Arbor, Mich.: University Microfilms, 1975), pp. 240-46 and chap. 6, passim.

conversion. I will conclude this section with a brief statement of the relation of the psychology I am suggesting to the archetypal psychology of C. G. Jung.

Second Immediacy

Method as conceived by Lonergan may be understood as the objectification or mediation of the transcendental infrastructure of human subjectivity. I will call this infrastructure primordial immediacy. The basic structure of primordial immediacy is disengaged in Lonergan's articulation of conscious intentionality. This articulation is method. Method calls for 'a release from all logics, all closed systems or language games, all concepts, all symbolic constructs to allow an abiding at the level of the presence of the subject to himself.'²³ The emergence of a distinct notion of the good and especially its relation to affectivity and symbols allow us to understand psychic self-appropriation as a portion of method. In psychic self-appropriation the existential subject disengages the symbolic ciphers of the affective responses in which values and satisfactions are apprehended. From this disengagement, the subject can gauge the measure of self-transcendence operative in his or her orientation as a world-constituting and self-constituting existential subject. Psychic analysis, then, is a part of self-appropriation at the fourth level of intentional consciousness. But method in its totality is the self-appropriation of the primordial immediacy of the subject to a world itself mediated by meaning.²⁴ This immediacy is both cognitive and existential.

Second immediacy is the result of method's objectification of primordial immediacy, the probably always asymptotic recovery of primordial immediacy through method. Second immediacy is 'the self-possession of the subject-as-subject achieved in the mediation of the transcendental infrastructure of human subjectivity, in the objectification of the single transcendental intending of the intelligible, the true, and the good, in the self-appropriation of the cognitional and existential subject which is the fulfilment of the *anthropologische Wendung* of

²³ Frederick Lawrence, 'Self-knowledge in History in Gadamer and Lonergan,' in *Language, Truth, and Meaning*, ed. Philip McShane (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1972), p. 203.

²⁴ [The phrasing is not quite accurate. Lonergan, *Method in Theology* 28: 'Operations are said to be immediate when their objects are present. So seeing is immediate to what is being seen, hearing to what is being heard, touch to what is being touched. But by imagination, language, symbols, we operate in a compound manner: *immediately with respect to the image, word, symbol; mediately with respect to what is represented or signified*' (emphasis added).]

modern philosophy.’²⁵ From Lonergan’s statement concerning the twofold mediation of immediacy, I infer that primordial immediacy is mediated through intentionality analysis and through psychic analysis. What is mediated by psychic analysis is the affective or dispositional component of all intentional operations, a component frequently and not too accurately referred to as the unconscious.

This affective component may itself be intentional, the apprehension of potential values and satisfactions in feelings. In that case, psychic analysis aids the emergence especially of existential subjectivity by mediating a capacity to disengage the symbolic or imaginal ciphers of the intentional feelings in which values are apprehended. But the dispositional component may also be a matter of one’s mood, of one’s nonintentional feeling states or trends.²⁶ Then it is what we intend when we ask another, How are you? One may find the question quite baffling, and if one adverts to this puzzlement over a period of time, one may be on the way to seeking help. One may become cognizant of being out of touch with something very important, something deceptively simple and in fact very mysterious and profound: the dispositional aspect of one’s intentional operations as a knower and doer. One has acknowledged, however secretly and privately, that the question causes an uncomfortable confusion. One is out of touch. One does not know how one is, who one is. Because one’s intentional affective responses are in part a function of one’s nonintentional dispositions, one does not know where one stands, what one values, how one’s values are related to one another. Finally, while the appropriation of dispositional components in psychotherapy is obviously not dependent on cognitional self-appropriation, it can also figure as a part of method, as a feature of the existential subject’s heeding of the critical-methodical exigence. This exigence is at least in part therapeutic, for it is an exigence for a second immediacy, which is the fruit of the twofold mediation of primordial immediacy in cognitional analysis and in psychic analysis.

Symbolic Consciousness

In reliance on Lonergan’s statement of the relation between feelings and symbols, I suggest that the dispositional component of immediacy is imaginally constructed, symbolically constituted. It is structured by imagination and expresses itself in symbols. The interpretation of these symbols is the deciphering of this component of intentionality. Nonetheless, while this component is immediately accessible to intentional consciousness as the flow of feeling which

²⁵ Doran, p. 118.

²⁶ On intentional and nonintentional feelings, see Lonergan, *Method in Theology*, pp. 30 f.

accompanies all intentional operations, its symbolic constitution can often be retrieved only by specific techniques elaborated by depth-psychological analysis. Principal among these techniques is dream interpretation. Particularly when one is out of touch with how one is, these techniques may be required in order that this dispositional component can be objectified, known, and appropriated. They reveal how it stands between the self as objectified and the self as conscious. They also enable one's self-understanding to approximate one's reality. Through these techniques, one gains the capacity to articulate one's story as it is and to guide it responsibly. One may have to reverse a cumulative misinterpretation of one's experience; this reversal will be painful, but it is escaped only at the cost of a flight from understanding, and indeed from understanding oneself. It is primarily in the existential, evaluative, and dialectical hermeneutic of one's dreams, one's own most radical spontaneity, that one recovers the individual and transpersonal core of elemental imagination which reveals in symbolic ciphers the affective component of one's intentionality.

The cognitive dimensions of method have been expressed in Lonergan's dictum, 'Thoroughly understand what it is to understand, and not only will you understand the broad lines of all there is to be understood, but also you will possess a fixed base, an invariant pattern, opening upon all further developments of understanding.'²⁷ Of the roots of desire and fear in human imagination, we may say something similar: Come to know as existential subject the contingent figures, the structure, the process, and the imaginal spontaneity manifested in your dreams, and you will come into possession of an expanding base and an intelligible pattern illuminating the *vouloir-dire* of human desire as it is brought to expression in the cultural and religious objectifications of human history.²⁸ Furthermore, elemental dream symbols are spontaneous psychic productions. By deciphering them, one gains the potential of conscripting organic and psychic vitality into the higher integration of intentionality as it raises questions of intelligibility, truth, and value. One finds, too, significant clues regarding one's own potential drift toward the loss of existential subjectivity either in triviality or in fanaticism. Dreams do not always resolve the tension they often reveal; this resolution is the task of the intentionality of the existential subject finding out for oneself that it is up to oneself to decide for oneself what one is going to make of oneself. But the symbolic manifestations of dreams can provide access to the materials one has to work with in one's self-constituting operations. Dreams will

²⁷ Lonergan, *Insight*, p. xxviii.

²⁸ Doran, p. 166.

reveal a story of development or decline according as they are dealt with by existential consciousness in the dialogic process of internal communication.

Sublations

Dream interpretation can be understood in terms of Lonergan's notion of successive levels of consciousness, where the lower-level operations are sublated by the higher integrations provided by the operations that occur on subsequent levels. If being is what is to be known by the totality of true judgments,²⁹ then any true judgments about the symbolic ciphers of affectivity concern a sphere of being, which we may call the imaginal.³⁰ The differentiation and appropriation of the dispositional constituents of immediacy, then, are enabled to come to pass by a sublation on the part of conscious intentionality that is additional to the sublations explained by Lonergan. In addition to the sublation of internal and external waking sensory experience by understanding, of experience and understanding by reasonable judgment, and of experience, understanding, and judgment by existential subjectivity, there is a sublation of dreaming consciousness on the part of the whole of attentive, intelligent, reasonable, responsible, cooperative-intersubjective existential consciousness. Thus, in addition to the attentive, intelligent, reasonable, and responsible appropriation of one's rational self-consciousness effected by bringing one's conscious operations as intentional to bear on those same operations as conscious, there is the attentive, intelligent, reasonable, and responsible appropriation and negotiation of one's psychic spontaneity and irrationality. Such a sublation is implicit in Lonergan's reference to the approach of existential psychology, which, as we have seen, regards the dream as the dawn of life, as the beginning of the transition from impersonal existence to personal existence and self-constitution.³¹ We may venture beyond Lonergan at this point and speak of an additional sublation mediating this dawn of consciousness to the existential subject. Through this sublation, the affective component of one's intentional orientation is released from muteness and confusion.

²⁹ Lonergan, *Insight*, p. 350.

³⁰ See Gilbert Durand, 'Exploration of the Imaginal,' *Spring: An Annual of Archetypal Psychology and Jungian Thought* (1971), pp. 84-100; and Henri Corbin, 'Mundus Imaginalis, or the Imaginary and the Imaginal,' *Spring* (1972), pp. 1-19.

³¹ Lonergan, *Method in Theology*, p. 69.

Dreams, then, may be regarded as an intelligible text or story whose meaning can be read by interpretive understanding and reasonable judgment and affirmed or reoriented by evaluative deliberation. The symbols of dreams are operators effecting internal communication, in much the same way as questions are operators promoting successive levels of intentional consciousness.³² The ground theme of the internal communication is the emergence of the authentic existential subject as free and responsible constitutive agent of the human world. This theme is the basic a priori of human consciousness, the intention of intelligibility, truth, and value. It promotes human experience to understanding by means of questions for intelligence, and understanding to truth by means of questions for reflection. So too it promotes truth into action, but in a thetic and constitutive manner, through questions for deliberation. The data for these questions are apprehended in intentional responses to values in feelings; the feelings structure patterns of experience; and the patterns can be understood by disengaging their imaginal ciphers and by insight into the images thus disengaged. Dream images, then, promote neural, sensitive, affective, and imaginative process to a recognizable and intelligible narrative. The narrative is the basic story of the ground theme. It can be understood; the understanding can be affirmed as correct, so that the images function in aid of self-knowledge; and beyond self-knowledge, there is praxis, where the knowledge becomes thetic: What am I going to do about it? The ultimate intentionality of the therapeutic process so conceived is thus coextensive with the total sweep of conscious intentionality. The psyche can be conscripted into the single transcendental dynamism of human consciousness toward the authenticity of self-transcendence. The imaginal spontaneity of dreams belongs to this dynamism, but it can be disengaged only by intelligent, reasonable, and decisive conscription, without which the psyche can fall prey to an inertial counterweight toward the flight from genuine humanity. This conscription must generally take place in a cooperative-intersubjective milieu, with the aid of a professional guide familiar with the vagaries of dreaming consciousness, a guide who is familiar with the dialectic of the psyche, who knows the need of healing if conscription is in some instances to take place, and who can instruct his or her dialogical counterpart on how to accept and befriend the dimensions of affectivity that need to be healed. The language of dreams is frequently so very different from that of waking consciousness that the process of negotiation usually demands that one seek such competent assistance.

³² See Giovanni Sala, *Das Apriori in der menschlichen Erkenntnis: Eine Studie über Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft und Lonergans Insight* (Meisenheim am Glan: Verlag Anton Hain, 1971).

Psychic Conversion

The conscious capacity for the sublation of the imaginal sphere of being is effected by a conversion on the part of the existential subject. This conversion I have called psychic conversion.³³ In this section, I will demonstrate how it meets all of Lonergan's specifications for conversion and how it is integrally related to the religious, moral, and intellectual conversions specified by Lonergan as qualifying authentic human subjectivity.

Lonergan first began to thematize conversion in his search for renewed foundations of theology. In a lecture delivered in 1967, he described the new context of theology in terms of the demise of the classicist mediation of meaning and the struggle of modern culture for a new maieutic, only to conclude that this new context demands that theology be placed on a new foundation, one distinct from the citation of scripture and the enunciation of revealed doctrines characteristic of the foundation of the old dogmatic theology. What was this new foundation to be?

Lonergan drew his first clue from the notion of method, considered as 'a normative pattern that related to one another the cognitional operations that recur in scientific investigations.'³⁴ The stress in this notion of method is on the personal experience of the operations and of their dynamic and normative relations to one another. If a scientist were to locate one's operations and their relations in one's own experience, Lonergan maintained, one would come to know oneself as scientist. And, since the subject as scientist is the foundation of science, one would come into possession of the foundations of one's science.

Of what use is such a clue to one seeking a new foundation for theology? Lonergan says: 'It illustrates by an example what might be meant by a foundation that lies not in sets of verbal propositions named first principles, but in a particular, concrete, dynamic reality generating knowledge of particular, concrete, dynamic realities.'³⁵

Lonergan draws a second clue from the phenomenon of conversion, which is fundamental to religious living. Conversion, he says, 'is not merely a change or even a development; rather, it is a radical transformation on which follows, on all levels of living, an interlocked series of changes and developments. What hitherto

³³ Doran, pp. 240-46. The present subsection is a slightly revised version of these pages.

³⁴ Bernard Lonergan, 'Theology in its New Context,' *Theology of Renewal* (Montreal: Palm, 1968), 1:43.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 44.

had been of no concern becomes a matter of high import.’³⁶ Conversion of course has many degrees of depth of realization. But in any case of genuine conversion, ‘the convert apprehends differently, values differently, relates differently because he has become different. The new apprehension is not so much a new statement or a new set of statements, but rather new meanings that attach to almost any statement. It is not new values so much as a transformation of values.’³⁷ Conversion is also possible as a change that is not only individual and personal but also communal and historical; and when viewed as an ongoing process, at once personal, communal, and historical, it coincides, Lonergan says, with living religion.³⁸

Now, if theology is reflection on religion, and if conversion is fundamental to religious living, then not only will theology also be reflection on conversion, but reflection on conversion will provide theology with its foundations. ‘Just as reflection on the operations of the scientist brings to light the real foundation of the science, so too reflection on the ongoing process of conversion may bring to light the real foundation of a renewed theology.’³⁹ Such is the basic argument establishing what is, in fact, a revolutionary recasting of the foundations of theology.

For the moment, however, my concern is not theology but conversion. The notion is significantly developed in *Method in Theology*, where conversion is differentiated into religious, moral, and intellectual varieties. What I am maintaining is that the emergence of the capacity to disengage the symbolic ciphers of the feelings in which the primordial apprehension of value occurs satisfies Lonergan’s notion of conversion but also that it is something other than the three conversions of which Lonergan speaks. As any other conversion, it has many facets. As any other conversion, it is ever precarious. As any other conversion, it is a radical transformation of subjectivity influencing all the levels of one’s living and transvaluing one’s values. As any other conversion, it is ‘not so much a new statement or a new set of statements, but rather new meanings that attach to almost any statement.’⁴⁰ As any other conversion, it too can become communal, so that there are formed formal and informal communities of men and women encouraging one another in the pursuit of further understanding and practical implementation of what they have experienced. Finally, as any other conversion, it undergoes a personal and arduous history of development, setback,

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Ibid., pp. 44 f.

³⁸ Ibid., p. 45.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 44.

and renewal. Its eventual outcome, most likely only asymptotically approached, is symbolically described by C. G. Jung as the termination of a state of imprisonment through a cumulative reconciliation of opposites,⁴¹ or as the resolution of the contradictoriness of the unconscious and consciousness (read *of psyche and intentionality*) in a nuptial *coniunctio*,⁴² or as the birth of the hero issuing ‘from something humble and forgotten.’⁴³ But, like any other conversion, psychic conversion is not the goal but the beginning. As religious conversion is not the mystic’s cloud of unknowing, as moral conversion is not moral perfection, as intellectual conversion is not methodological craftsmanship, so psychic conversion is not unified affectivity or total integration of consciousness and the unconscious or immediate release from imprisonment in the rhythms and processes of nature and mood. It is, at the beginning, no more than the obscure understanding of the nourishing potential of elemental symbols to maintain and foster the vitality of conscious living by a continuous influx of both data and energy; the hint that one’s affective being can be transformed so as to aid one in the quest for authenticity; the suspicion that coming to terms with one’s dreams will profoundly change what Jung calls one’s ego, that is, the oftentimes too narrow, biased, and self-absorbed focus of one’s conscious intentionality, by ousting this narrowed focus from a central and dominating position in one’s conscious living and by shifting the birthplace of meaning gradually but progressively to a deeper center which is simultaneously a totality, the self.⁴⁴ Slowly one comes to discover the complexity of dreams, and thus of one’s affectivity, and to affirm the arduousness of the task to which one has committed oneself. Slowly one learns that the point is what is interior, temporal, generic, and indeed at times religious, and not what is exterior, spatial, specific, and solely profane.⁴⁵ Slowly a system of internal communication is established between intentionality and one’s organic and psychic vitality. Slowly one learns the habit

⁴¹ C.G. Jung, *Mysterium Coniunctionis*, trans. R.F.C. Hull, vol. 14 in *The Collected Works of C.G. Jung*, Bollingen Series XX (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), p. 65.

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 81.

⁴³ C.G. Jung, ‘Concerning Rebirth,’ in *The Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious*, trans. R.F.C. Hull, vol. 9i in *The Collected Works of C.G. Jung*, Bollingen Series XX (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), p. 141.

⁴⁴ C.G. Jung, ‘On the Nature of the Psyche,’ in *The Structure and Dynamics of the Psyche*, trans. R.F.C. Hull, vol. 8 in *The Collected Works of C.G. Jung*, Bollingen Series XX (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969) 223 f.

⁴⁵ See Lonergan, *Method in Theology*, p. 92.

of disengaging the symbolic significance associated with one's intentional affective responses to situations, people, and objects. Slowly one learns to distinguish symbols which indicate and urge an orientation to truth and value from those which mire one in myth and ego-centered satisfactions. Slowly one notices the changes that take place in the symbolic ciphers of one's affectivity. One becomes attentive in a new and more contemplative way to the data of sense and the data of consciousness. One is aided by this new symbolic consciousness in one's efforts to be intelligent, reasonable, and responsible in one's everyday commonsense living and in one's intellectual pursuit of truth. Some of the concrete areas of one's own inattentiveness, obtuseness, silliness, and irresponsibility are revealed one by one and can be named and quasi-personified. They are complexes with a quasi-personality of their own. When personified, they can be engaged in active imaginative dialogue where one must listen as well as speak. The dialogue relativizes the ego and thus frees the complexes from their counter-rigidity. Some of them, those that indicate where one needs healing, can then even be befriended and transformed. When thus paid attention to, honored, and in a very definite sense compromised with, they prove to be sources of conscious energy one never before knew were at one's disposal. Such is psychic conversion. In itself it is not a matter of falling in love with God or of shifting the criterion of one's choices from satisfactions to values or of reflectively recognizing that knowing is not looking but the affirmation of the virtually unconditioned. It is not religious conversion or moral conversion or intellectual conversion. It *is* conversion, but it is something other than these.

A Note on Jung's Archetypal Psychology

C. G. Jung's notion of individuation as a cumulative process of the reconciliation of opposites under the guidance of responsible consciousness and with the aid of a professional guide obviously bears some similarity to the process of psychic self-appropriation that I have briefly described. Furthermore, his insistence that neither of the basic opposites of instinct or spirit is in itself good or evil,⁴⁶ that moral significance attaches rather to the process of reconciliation, is correct and illuminating. Jung's researches help us to reject a falsely spiritualistic and narrowly egoistic tendency to locate the root of evil in instinct and the body. Moreover, Jung is at home with a notion of elemental symbolism that is nonreductionistic and basically teleological. He would be quite in agreement with Lonergan's description of dreams as indicating 'the anticipation and virtualities of

⁴⁶ Jung, 'On the Nature of the Psyche,' p. 206.

higher activities immanent in the underlying unconscious manifold.’⁴⁷ Thus Jung is the principal psychological contributor to my own position. Nonetheless, because of the intentionality analysis of Lonergan, with which I am seeking to integrate a process of psychic analysis, I wish to suggest that there is one pair of opposites that is not to be reconciled in the manner of the mutual complementarity of such contraries as spirit and matter, but that qualifies for good or for evil any such process of reconciliation. These opposites are authenticity and unauthenticity, where authenticity is understood as self-transcendence. These opposites are contradictories, not contraries. Their conflict is revealed, not in Jung’s archetypal symbols that are taken from and imitate nature’s cyclical processes, but in the symbols that Northrop Frye has called anagogic and that contain and express the orientation of the whole of human action in an irreducibly dialectical fashion. It is my suspicion that the recognition of such a distinction between archetypal and anagogic symbols would necessitate a reconstruction of those further outposts of Jungian thought where the question is one of good and evil, and where the religious import of the question is revealed in one’s notion and image both of the self and of God. The progressive reconciliation of the opposites that Jung calls spirit and matter and that Lonergan calls transcendence and limitation⁴⁸ takes place in what Lonergan calls the realm of interiority. But when the question is one of authenticity and unauthenticity, the resolution demands a movement into another realm of meaning, the realm of transcendence, where discriminated intentionality and cultivated affectivity surrender to the mystery of God’s love and find their basic fulfillment in this surrender.⁴⁹ At this final point in the individuation process, the Christian symbol of the crucified can become quite significant. Here, too, anagogic images are to be negotiated, principally that of the Father, a symbol left relatively unexplored in Jung’s archetypal researches. The exploration of the symbolic dimensions of this negotiation will provide a needed complement, I believe, to Jung’s phenomenology of the psyche.

⁴⁷ Lonergan, *Insight*, p. 457.

⁴⁸ See *ibid.* 472-77. On archetypal and anagogic symbols, see Northrop Frye, *Anatomy of Criticism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), pp. 95-128. For the relevance of Frye’s work to my own concerns, I am indebted to Joseph Flanagan, ‘Transcendental Dialectic of Desire and Fear,’ a paper delivered at the Boston College Lonergan Workshop, June 1976, and subsequently published in *Lonergan Workshop 1*, ed. Fred Lawrence (Missoula, MT: Scholars Press, 1978), pp. 69-91.

⁴⁹ On the realm of transcendence, see Lonergan, *Method in Theology* 83-84

Psyche and Theology's Foundations

In this section, I move to the second portion of my argument. It is to the effect that the semantics of depth psychology suggested by Lonergan's intentionality analysis complements Lonergan's notion of foundations in theology. I will discuss, first, the development of Lonergan's thought on foundational reality or the subject; second, the pertinence of my suggestions regarding depth psychology for Lonergan's later thought on the subject; and third, the effect that this expanded notion of the subject will have on the articulation of the functional specialty 'foundations.'

Lonergan on Foundational Reality

The emergence of a distinct notion of the good in Lonergan's later work effects a very significant change in his notion of the foundational reality of theology. In *Insight*, the basis of any philosophy lies in its cognitional theory. The further expansion of the basis is formulated in the philosophy's pronouncements on metaphysical, ethical, and theological issues. Now, the formulation of the basis necessarily will entail a commitment on three philosophical questions: reality, the subject, and objectivity. Lonergan has advanced his own positions on these issues in the twelfth, eleventh, and thirteenth chapters of *Insight*, respectively. One's commitments on these three issues will be positions open to development if they agree with the positions advanced in these chapters, and counterpositions inviting reversal if they are in conflict with these positions. Thus:

The inevitable philosophic component, immanent in the formulation of cognitional theory, will be either a basic position or else a basic counterposition.

It will be a basic position, (1) if the real is the concrete universe of being and not a subdivision of the 'already out there now;' (2) if the subject becomes known when it affirms itself intelligently and reasonably and so is not known yet in any prior 'existential' state; and (3) if objectivity is conceived as a consequence of intelligent inquiry and critical reflection, and not as a property of vital anticipation, extroversion, and satisfaction.

On the other hand, it will be a basic counterposition if it contradicts one or more of the basic positions.

... any philosophic pronouncement on any epistemological, metaphysical, ethical, or theological issue will be named a position if it is coherent with the basic positions on the real, on knowing, and on objectivity; and it will be

named a counterposition if it is coherent with one or more of the basic counterpositions.⁵⁰

According to the second of these basic positions, the subject becomes known when it affirms itself intelligently and reasonably. But *nothing* is known unless it is intelligently grasped and reasonably affirmed. The self-affirmation intended by Lonergan is the intelligent and reasonable affirmation of one's own intelligence and reasonableness. It is the judgment 'I am a knower,' where knowledge is the compound of experience, understanding, and judgment. Thus the basic position on the subject in *Insight* is the position on the knowing subject. The self-affirmation of the knower, along with positions on the real and objectivity, are what constitute the foundations or basis of metaphysics, ethics, and (at least philosophical) theology.

These three basic positions are reached as a result of what Lonergan later calls intellectual conversion. Intellectual conversion, according to the later Lonergan, generally follows upon and is conditioned by religious and moral conversion. There is a realism implicit in religious and moral self-transcendence which promotes the recognition of the realism of knowing. Moreover, in Lonergan's later work a primacy is assigned to the existential subject, the subject as religious and moral. The basic position on the subject includes but exceeds that on the knowing subject. It reaches to the position on the deciding, deliberating, evaluating subject. Furthermore, if the intellectual conversion which issues in the basic positions is consequent upon religious and moral conversion, then the foundation of one's metaphysics, ethics, and theology would seem to lie in the objectification of all three conversions in a patterned set of judgments concerning both cognitional and existential subjectivity. And such is indeed what happens to foundations in *Method in Theology*. The foundations of theology include but go far beyond *Insight's* basic positions on knowing, the real, and objectivity – not by denying them but by adding that the basic position on knowing is not the full position on the human subject. The foundational reality of theology is the intellectually, morally, and religiously converted theologian. The intentionality of human consciousness, the primordial infrastructure of human subjectivity, is a dynamism for cognitional, existential, and religious self-transcendence. That subject whose conscious performance is self-consciously in accord with this dynamism is foundational reality. The objectification of this dynamism in a patterned set of judgments of cognitional and existential fact constitutes foundations in theology. Lonergan's thought thus becomes not primarily

⁵⁰ Lonergan, *Insight*, pp. 387-88.

cognitional theory, but an elucidation of the drama of the emergence of the authentic subject.

Psyche and Foundational Reality

The basic position on the subject finds expression only when judgments of cognitional fact are joined with judgments of existential and religious fact. Moreover, on the basis of Lonergan's treatment of the existential subject, it is fair to say that the formulation of the position on the subject demands not only the functioning of intelligence and reasonableness grasping and affirming intelligence and reasonableness, but also a satisfactory transcendental analysis of the human good. This analysis includes a set of judgments detailing the authentic development of feelings. This development, in my analysis, is a matter of the dispositional component of primordial immediacy. If the story of the development and aberration of feelings can be told by disengaging the spontaneous symbols produced in dreams, if the habit of such disengagement is mediated to the subject by psychic conversion, if psychic conversion is foundational reality, if the objectification of conversion is the functional specialty 'foundations,' then psychic conversion is an aspect of foundational reality and an objectification of psychic conversion will constitute a portion of foundations.

There are counterpositions on the real, on knowing, and on objectivity that are incoherent with the activities of intelligent grasping and reasonable affirmation. But there are also counterpositions on the subject that are incoherent, not specifically with these activities alone, but with the emergence of the authentic existential subject. Only in this latter incoherence are they suspected of being counterpositions, for they are apprehended as articulations of countervalues in the feelings of the existential subject striving for self-transcendence, and they are judged to be such in the same subject's judgments of value. They are incoherent, not specifically with the self-transcendence intended in the unfolding of the desire to know, but with the self-transcendence toward which the primordial infrastructure of human subjectivity as a whole is headed. The subject who contains implicitly the full position on the subject is not the intelligent and reasonable subject, but the experiencing, intelligent, reasonable, responsible, religious subject. In fact, if one is looking for the full position on the human subject by scrutinizing only one's intelligence and reasonableness, one is heading for the articulation of a counterposition on the subject. One is then the victim of an intellectualist bias perhaps still too easily confirmed by the writings of the early Lonergan in those readers whose personal history has been characterized by a hypertrophy of intellectual development at the expense of the underlying neural and psychic manifolds. The emergence of the notion of the good as distinct from,

though not contradictory to, the intelligent and reasonable in the writings of the post-1965 Lonergan decisively shifts the atmosphere of his work as a whole. Human authenticity is a matter of self-transcendence. Self-transcendence can be in one's knowing, in one's free and responsible constitution of the human world and of oneself, and in one's religious living as a participation in the divine solution to the problem of evil. The struggle between the dynamism for self-transcendence and the flight from authenticity provides the ground theme unifying the various aspects of this achievement.

This ground theme is invested with a distinct symbolic significance. Not only does intentionality in its dynamic thrust for self-transcendence have the potential of conscripting underlying neural and psychic manifolds into its service through the dialectical disengagement of their intention of truth and value; but the psyche insists, as it were, on stamping the entire drama with its own characteristic mark by giving it a symbolic representation, by releasing in dreams the ciphers of the present status of the drama, by indicating to the existential subject how it stands between the totality of consciousness as primordial infrastructure to be fulfilled in self-transcendence and the subject's explicit self-understanding in his or her intention of or flight from truth and value. The articulation of the story of these ciphers, the disengagement of their intelligible pattern in a hermeneutic phenomenology of the psyche, would constitute what we might call, in a sense quite different from Kant's, a transcendental aesthetic. This aesthetic would, I wager, follow Jung's phenomenology of the psyche quite closely, until one comes to the farthest reaches of subjectivity, which also constitute its center. There hermeneutic becomes dialectic, in Lonergan's quite specific sense of this word as indicating an interpretation that deals with the concrete, the dynamic, and the *contradictory*.⁵¹ For the issue becomes that of good and evil, grace and sin, authenticity and unauthenticity. At that point psychology as a path to individuation must bow to an immanent *Anankē* and give way to religion.⁵²

⁵¹ Lonergan, *Method in Theology*, p. 129.

⁵² Thus Jung relates a dream he had prior to writing *Answer to Job*, his most controversial work. In this dream, he is led by his father to the center of a mandala-shaped building and into the 'highest presence.' His father knelt down and touched his forehead to the floor. Jung imitated him, but for some reason 'could not bring my forehead quite down to the floor – there was perhaps a millimeter to spare.' C. G. Jung, *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, trans. Richard and Clara Winston (New York: Vintage, 1961), p. 219. Jung then expected, after such a dream, severe trials, including the death of his wife, to which he was unable to submit completely. 'Something in me was saying, "All very well, but not entirely."' Something in me was defiant and determined not to be a dumb fish:

Intentionality and the psychic manifold it has conscripted into its adventure must at this point surrender to the gift of God's love. One symbol of this surrender, the embodiment of the self at these far reaches of the psyche, is found in the Crucified, where alone there is forgiveness of sin. The transcendental aesthetic issues in kerygma, proclamation, manifestation, in the return to the fullness of language simply heard and understood, in the second naiveté intended in the writings of Paul Ricoeur.⁵³ This return is mediated by the process of self-appropriation in its entirety, by the objectification of the primordial infrastructure of intentional and psychic subjectivity in a twofold mediation of immediacy by meaning.

Psyche and the Functional Specialty 'Foundations'

The functional specialty 'foundations' would seem to have a twofold task: that of articulating the horizon within which theological categories can be understood and employed, and that of deriving the categories which are appropriate to such a horizon. What is the relationship of psychic self-appropriation to this twofold task?

I have spoken of the first task in terms of framing a patterned set of judgments of cognitional and existential fact cumulatively heading toward the full position on the human subject. Psychic self-appropriation is a contribution to this patterned set of judgments and thus to the full position on the subject. Implicit in this statement is the claim that psychic self-appropriation is a needed complement to the self-appropriation of intentionality aided by the work of Lonergan. It is even an intrinsic part of transcendental method, a necessary feature of the objectification of the transcendental infrastructure of human subjectivity. It is demanded by the task set by Lonergan, the task of moving toward a viable control of meaning in terms of human interiority.⁵⁴ The psyche is no accidental feature of the transcendental infrastructure of human subjectivity. It achieves an integration with intentionality, however, only in the free and responsible decisions of the

and if there were not something of the sort in free men, no Book of Job would have been written.' Ibid. 220. Neither, we might add, would an *Answer to Job* have been written if, in this dream, Jung had touched his forehead to the floor, when led into the highest presence, the realm of transcendence.

⁵³ See Paul Ricoeur, *Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation*, trans. Denis Savage (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970).

⁵⁴ See Bernard Lonergan, 'Dimensions of Meaning' in *Collection*, vol. 4 in *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan*, ed. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988).

existential subject who is cognizant of the psychic input into and reading of his or her situation. The integration of psyche and intentionality, to be sure, is not the only task confronting the existential subject. It is a task that for the most part affects one's effective freedom, and there is the more radical question which one must deal with at the level of essential freedom.⁵⁵ What do I want to make of myself? The integration of psyche with intentionality occurs in the framework established by one's answer to that question and may affect and modify this framework. But occur it must, if this more radical answer is to bear fruit in the effective constitution of oneself and of one's world.

Lonergan speaks of placing 'abstractly apprehended cognitional activity within the concrete and sublating context of human feeling and of moral deliberation, evaluation, and decision.'⁵⁶ Until cognitional activity, no matter how correctly apprehended, is so placed, it remains abstract in its apprehension. The move toward greater concreteness on the side of the subject, then, calls for a second mediation of immediacy by meaning. Only such mediation brings transcendental method to its conclusion. This is no easy task. It is at least as complicated as comprehending and affirming cognitional activity. Equally sophisticated techniques are needed for its execution. But without it the movement brought into being by Lonergan is left incomplete and those influenced by this movement are left the potential victims of an intellectualist bias. Students of Lonergan's work have not yet sufficiently attended to the shift of the center of attention from cognitional analysis to intentionality analysis, from the intellectual pattern of experience to self-transcendence in all patterns of experience as the privileged domain of human subjectivity. This shift means that the exigence giving rise to a new epoch in the evolution of human consciousness, an epoch governed by a control of meaning in terms of interiority, only begins to be met in the philosophic conversion aided by Lonergan's cognitional analysis. The radical crisis is not only cognitional but also existential, the crisis of the self as objectified becoming approximate to the self as primordial infrastructure. And the psyche will never cease to have its say and to offer both its potential contribution and its potential threat to the unfolding of the transcendental dynamism toward self-transcendence. Psychic self-appropriation is quite necessary if the concrete sublation of appropriated cognitional activity within the context of human feeling and moral decision is to take place.

Psychic analysis, then, is a necessary contribution to the maieutic that *is* the self-appropriating subject. And an articulation of psychic conversion is a constituent feature of the patterned set of judgments of cognitional and existential

⁵⁵ See Lonergan, *Insight*, pp. 619-22.

⁵⁶ Lonergan, *Method in Theology*, p. 275.

fact cumulatively heading toward the full position on the human subject that constitutes renewed foundations in theology.

Foundations, however, has a second task, that of deriving categories appropriate to the horizon articulated in the objectification of conversion. What is the relation of psychic self-appropriation to *this* foundational task?

All theological categories have a significance that has psychic and affective resonances. The *general* theological categories, those shared by theology with other disciplines, are derived from the transcendental base giving rise to the emergence of the authentic cognitional and existential subject. The narrative of this emergence can be disengaged by the deciphering of dreams. The emergence itself is the ground theme of the dialogue and dialectic between intentionality and psyche. It can be objectified in a transcendental aesthetic. The *special* theological categories, those peculiar to theology as it attempts to mediate between the Christian religion and the role and significance of that religion within a given cultural context, reflect a collaboration between God and human beings in working out the solution to the radical problem of this ground theme, the problem of evil. As the emergence of the existential subject is the drama of human existence, so the Christian religion in its authenticity is for the Christian theologian the fruit of the divinely originated solution to that drama. As the psyche will continue to have its say in the drama even when intentionality has proclaimed a relative autonomy from imagination, as in our day, so at the farthest reaches of the psyche there stands the image of the crucified, the anagogic symbol of universal willingness, whose surrender to the Father reveals the finality of the psyche as a constituent feature of primordial immediacy.

Psychic self-appropriation, then, is a part of the objectification of the transcendental and transcultural base from which both general and special theological categories are derived. It affects the self-understanding in terms of which one mediates the past in interpretation, history, dialectic, and the special research generated by their concerns. And it gives rise to the generation of theological categories appropriate to the mediated phase of theology, the phase which takes its stand on self-appropriation and ventures to say what is so to the men and women of different strata and backgrounds in different cultures of the world of today. It gives rise to the possibility of theological categories, doctrines or positions, and systems which are legitimately symbolic or poetic or aesthetic. It makes it possible that such categories, positions, and systems can be poetic without ceasing to be explanatory, without ceasing to fix terms and relations by one another. A hermeneutic and dialectical phenomenology of the psyche would be the objectification of psychic conversion that is a constituent feature of foundations in theology from which appropriate explanatory categories can be

derived. Ray L. Hart's desire, then, for a systematic symbolics⁵⁷ is an ambition that is methodologically both possible and desirable. But its valid methodological base is found, I believe, only in the mediation of immediacy in which one discovers, identifies, accepts one's affectivity by disengaging its symbolic ciphers.

Second immediacy will never achieve a total mediation of primordial immediacy. Complete self-transparency is impossible short of our ulterior finality in the vision of God. Only in seeing God as God is will we know ourselves as we are. But there is a poetic enjoyment of the truth about us and God that has been achieved in many cultures, at many times, within the framework of many differentiations of consciousness, and related to different combinations of the various realms of meaning. The second mediation of immediacy by meaning can function in aid of a recovery of this poetic enjoyment. Even of the theologian, it may be said with Hölderlin and Heidegger:

Full of merit, and yet poetically, dwells
Man on this earth.⁵⁸

⁵⁷ Ray L. Hart, *Unfinished Man and the Imagination* (New York: Herder & Herder, 1968).

⁵⁸ Quoted by Heidegger in 'Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry,' in *Existence and Being*, trans. Douglas Scott (Chicago: Regnery, 1949), p. 270.