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DOOSO

DORAN--DISSERTATION: PSYCHIC CONVERSION AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF THEOLOGY

INTRODUCTION: STATEMENT OF PROBLEM; DESCRIPTION OF COURSE OF RESEARCH

- I. Paul Ricoeur: The Hermeneutical Conflict and the Problem of a New Immediacy
- II. Martin Heidegger: Imagination as Primordial Time
- III. Bernard Lonergan and the Problem of Immediacy
- IV. A Revised Philosophical Anthropology: Heidegger and Lonergan
- V. Functions of the Imagination and Psychic Conversion
A. ^{Transcendental} Structure of the Imagination and its aberrations. B. Dreams and Constitutive
- VI. "The Therapeutic and the Foundations of Theology" Meaning
C. Psychic Conversion and a New Immediacy

Weekend: read Ricoeur, my original Ricoeur paper.
Read 2nd volume of Lonergan papers.

III. Verstehen

IV. Heidegger's First Retrieval of Kant

Any complete attempt to investigate the significance of Heidegger for theology ought to contain at least the following elements: an exposition of the early Heidegger's fundamental ontology; an examination of the later developments in his thought; an analysis of his critique of the history of Western philosophy and, through this analysis, a presentation of problems connected with theological categories; and an exposition and evaluation of the employment of Heideggerian categories as well as of criticisms which theologians, beginning with Bultmann,^{EN 2} have offered of Heidegger's philosophy.

The first of these elements will provide us, among other things, Heidegger's portrayal of Dasein as Verstehen, and the shift, in the history of the concept of Verstehen, to the universality of hermeneutic structure. In this study, however, we shall limit our investigation to the early (1929) book on Kant. In addition to being a helpful introduction to Being and Time, this study is of importance as marking a major early attempt to recall the historical destiny of the Western philosophical tradition.² However, our primary

interest in it here is as a point of departure into the earlier Heidegger and into the central theological problematic to which this study has given rise.

Heidegger studies Kant in order, through an interpretation

of the Critique of Pure Reason, to explicate what he himself means by a "fundamental ontology,"³ or an analytic of Dasein as the foundation of ontological knowledge.⁴ Metaphysics in this context is not to be considered an actual edifice already constructed. Rather it is a natural disposition in all men, and the task of laying its foundation consists in the ^{projective formation} [Entwerfen] of its blueprint, the architectural delimiting and distinguishing ^{concrete} of its inner possibility, the determination of its coming-to-be or essence [Weens].⁵ This can only be done by laying bare its ground in Dasein.

Heidegger projects four points to his interpretation of ^{Kantian} ^{uncovered by Kant for} Kant: an examination of the starting-point [Ansatz], of the laying of the foundations of metaphysics; an inquiry into the carrying out of the laying of the foundation of metaphysics; an attempt to uncover the basic originality or, perhaps better, ab-originality of the laying of the foundation of metaphysics; and, finally, a

Heideggerian repetition - through transformation of the laying of the foundation of metaphysics. This final section of the book is an excellent introduction to Being and Time. However, our main concern here is with the controversy-inspiring third section, "Die Grundlegung der Metaphysik in ihrer Ursprünglichkeit." ~~However,~~ Obviously, though, the first two sections must first be discussed.

A. The Starting - Point.

Heidegger rejects outright the interpretation of the first Critique as a matter of epistemology or theory of knowledge. Rather, Kant has provided metaphysics with a foundation, for the first time has revealed it for what it is.⁶ At this point, Heidegger is thinking of the division of metaphysics inherited by Kant into metaphysica generalis, having to do with beings as beings and with the highest sphere of beings, and metaphysica specialis, with its traditional division into cosmology, psychology, and theology. Kant is concerned with both of these: with metaphysica generalis in the transcendental analytic and with metaphysica specialis in the transcendental dialectic. Kant inherited this division as well as the insistence that metaphysical knowledge be rigorous and binding, which, for him, meant that it correspond to the ideal of mathematical knowledge (free from the contingencies of experience, rational, *a priori*). Kant recognized that, to his own time, this science had been a mere groping among concepts and desired to forestall all further attempts to proceed in the traditional direction until the limitations of

this kind of knowledge had been established.

The question of the knowledge of supersensible beings (metaphysica speciales) cannot be answered until a more general and more fundamental question has been faced. How is it possible for beings to manifest themselves as such? "The laying of the foundation is an elucidation of the coming-to-pass of a [Idee eines Verhaltens] comportment to beings, in which the latter show themselves in themselves, so that all statements concerning them are thereby rendered warranted."⁷

As a result of the scientific breakthroughs of the late seventeenth century and the Enlightenment reflections on the generalization of the scientific method, a clue as to the possibility of such a comportment was available to Kant. For it was clear to him that reason has an insight only into what it has brought forward in accordance with its own designs.⁸ For Heidegger, this means that there is an "already projected plan" of nature-in-general which holds out in advance the Being-constitution of beings to which all investigative questions must be able to be related. Thus an anticipatory understanding [vorgängige Verstehen]

of the Being - constitution of beings, or ontological knowledge, makes possible any relation to beings or ontic knowledge.⁹

In Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, as well as in Being and Time, it is this anticipatory understanding which is Heidegger's central concern. The question of the essence or coming-to-pass of this understanding is the question of the very possibility of metaphysica generalis. Obviously Heidegger has already transposed Kantian discourse into his own problematic.

The problem left unsolved, in fact even forgotten, by the Western tradition is the Being-question, the character of the passing-beyond [Überschritt] involved in the comprehension of the Being-structure of beings. For the first time since Plato and Aristotle, clarity was demanded by Kant with respect to this question. Kant reveals, by his way of questioning, that not all knowledge is ontic and that ontic knowledge itself is possible only through ontological knowledge. This is Heidegger's interpretation of the meaning of Kant's "Copernican Revolution," in which something is determined about objects prior to their being given. "Ontic knowledge can be adequate to beings ("objects") only if these beings are already

manifest beforehand as beings, that is, in their Being-structure."¹¹ And without ontological knowledge in this sense, ontic knowledge has no referent, no possible Wanach."

Kant raised the question of the intrinsic possibility of such ontological metaphysics, which at its root asks about, ontological knowledge, under the form, "How are synthetic judgments a priori possible?", and thus as a critique of pure reason. That is to say, he views ontological knowledge as judgment according to principles which arise without recourse to experience and yet which bring forth or reveal the being as what it is. On Heidegger's interpretation, this means that no grounding-instance of the legitimacy of these judgments which deal with the matter of the Being of beings can be found in experience, which itself depends upon and is guided by this ontological understanding.¹² Kant terms such an investigation "transcendental," because, says Heidegger, "... it concerns the passing beyond (transcendence) of pure reason to beings so that experience can render itself adequate to the latter as its possible object."¹³ Kant's intention is seen by Heidegger to be one of delimiting and

determining the plan and internal organization of ontological knowledge, i.e., of specifying its internal possibility and range.

B. The Kantian laying of the foundations

1. The Dimension of the Task

The first question to be confronted in such an investigation is the essence of knowledge in general, the nature of its field of origin. The fundamental Kantian thesis, assumed by Kant but elaborated to a great extent by Heidegger, is the following: "The ground source for the laying of the foundation of metaphysics is human pure reason, such indeed, that at the heart of this problematic of the laying of the foundation the humanness of reason, that is, its finiteness becomes essential. It is helpful therefore, in characterizing the field of origin [Ursprungsfelder], to concentrate on clarifying the essence of the finiteness of human knowledge."¹⁴ This finiteness lies in ~~it does not~~ the very essence of human knowledge.¹⁵

Heidegger accepts as key to Kant's characterization of the essence of human knowledge the following statement, with which the Transcendental Aesthetic opens: "In whatever manner and by whatever means a mode of knowledge

IV - 8.

may relate to objects, intuition is that through which it is in immediate relation to them, and to which all thought as a means is directed."¹⁶ It is of the utmost importance to Heidegger's interpretation of Kant that knowledge is essentially intuition.¹⁷ Thinking (and judgment) are in the service of intuition; the relativity of thinking to intuition is possible because both are a form of "representation," through which something is presented or announced in "objective perception."¹⁸

Intuition relates immediately to an object and is single; concepts relate meditately to objects and contain a feature which several things may have in common. Neither alone is knowledge.

Knowledge is a "thinking intuition" [ein denkendes Anschauen].

But the "center of gravity" of knowledge is to be found in intuition.²⁰ The fact that divine or infinite knowledge is also intuition, but a creative, originary intuition, without need of concepts, makes thought the seal of finiteness in human knowledge; but thought is necessary only because of the finiteness of human intuition.²¹ This consists in the fact that human intuition depends on its object, which exists in its own

IV - 9.

right and must be "grown up" to knowledge. Human intuition is finite in the sense that it is receptive of what ~~an~~ announces itself or solicits intuition.²² It needs organs capable of being affected.

But the priority here is important:

Human intuition is not "sensible" because its affection takes place through "sense" organs. Rather, the converse is true. Because our Daselie is finite -- existing in the midst of beings which already are and at their mercy [an dieer ausgeliefert] -- it must necessarily receive these beings which already are, that is, offer them the possibility of announcing themselves. Organs are necessary for the announcement to get through. The essence of sensibility lies in the finiteness of intuition. The organs which serve affection are sense organs because they belong to finite intuition, that is, to sensibility. Kant thus was the first to secure an ontological, now-sensuous concept of sensibility.²³

In this now-sensuous, now-empirical notion of sensibility lies the possibility of a non-empirical intuition of space and time, i.e., in terms of our previous analysis, of a content-dialectic a priori at the level of intuition.

The added determinations given by thought render that which is intuited accessible and communicable to others. In thought what is represented by intuition is further represented with reference to what it is "in general," but so as to serve the orientation of the particular thing. Thought is "the

representation (concept) of a representation (intuition)."²⁴ It is also a matter of predication or judgment, whose faculty is the understanding [Verstand]. Judging makes intuition capable of being understood.²⁵

Thinking thus serves intuition. It refers meditately to the object, which "in the unity of a thinking intuition becomes manifest (true)."²⁶ The synthesis of thought and intuition is a "true-(manifest-)making, veritative synthesis," in that it brings forth the "content determination" [sachliche Bestimmtheit] of the being.²⁷ Obviously, we have here the Kantian equivalent to (roots of?) Heidegger's notion of truth as a Letheia, unveiling, making manifest, letting-be.

Thinking or understanding is even more finite than intuition in that it lacks the latter's immediacy. Its discursiveness is the clearest index of its finitude, and yet it is in a certain sense productive, in contrast to finite intuition, in that it "permits the content of the object to be put at our disposal" [Beistellen].²⁸

Now, to get at the real basis of the finitude of human

knowledge, we must adopt another perspective, examining the problem with reference to what is knowable in such knowledge.

First, then, the knowable in finite knowledge must show itself by itself, must appear. Beings as the object of finite knowledge are "appearances." They are precisely Gegen-stand, beings-as-op-posed. And they are this only for finite knowledge. For infinite knowledge, they are rather Ent-stand, beings-as-taking-their-origin, since for such knowledge they "are" by coming-into-Being. They are beings as beings, not as objects. These beings become objects only for finite knowledge, and they do so as phenomena or appearances, in conformity with the receptive-determinative power of finite knowledge.²⁹

Thus appearances are not illusions but the beings themselves, which on their side are things-in-themselves, but which are manifest without being known in themselves³⁰ as Entstand.

Thus finite knowledge conceals the thing in itself, which is not accessible to it at all, not because "appearance" designates a diminishment of the reality of the object, but because infinite knowledge beings cannot be known in a manner appropriate to

infinite knowledge.³¹

For Heidegger this characterization of the finiteness of human knowledge gives what is essential to the dimension within which the laying of the foundation of metaphysics takes place. However the ground-source for the possibility of finite knowledge cannot be disclosed until we take account of the fact that knowledge can arise only through a union of these two sources or springs, through their "original synthesis" of the "two fundamental sources of our mind [disposition, Gemüts (!)]."³² Kant in fact speaks of a [Wurzel] of these two stems common root, but declares it to be "unknown." In order to pursue this further, Heidegger raises the question of how a finite being must be constituted in its own ontological structure if, without the aid of experience, it is able to bring forth the ontological structure of another being. How can it effect, not a veritative or ontic synthesis, but an ontological synthesis?³³

The answer to this question will proceed by way of elucidating the primordial unity of ^{pure} intuition and ^{pure} thought, the "pure veritative synthesis." Now, a pure veritative synthesis

is one which determines a priori the element of pure intuition. Hence its concepts, even in their content, must precede all experience. Even further back, the original ground of the intrinsic possibility of a pure veritative synthesis must be elucidated. Only such elucidation will adequately fix the essence of ontological knowledge, and show how it is an essential condition for ontic knowledge, ³⁴ and delimit the entire essence of ontological truth,³⁵ which would be essentially bound up with Verstehen as Dasein.

Now, then, is the field of origin to be elucidated? At this stage any answer to this question must remain indeterminate. However, the region of the elucidation of the origin must be the human mind [Gemüte: mens sive animus].³⁵ Neither "Traditional" logic and psychology are up to such a task. The method to be employed is characterized as, first, an "analytic," or, in Kant's terms, "a study of our inner nature," whose task is the ~~surveillance~~ revelation of the essence of human Dasein.³⁶ An analytic is not a reduction into elements, ^{but} a laying bare of the seeds of ontological knowledge and thus of the entire essence of finite pure reason or of the transcendence of the precursive under-

understanding of Being. What is the synthesis constitutive of such transcendence? "Now ~~He~~ must be the finite being which we call man; he is in his innermost essence, so that in general he can be open to beings which he himself is not, which thus ^{must be able to} reveal themselves from out of themselves?"³⁹ Heidegger, by his own admission, will go behind the Kantian formulation of an answer to this question "in order to be able, from a more fundamental understanding of the inner movement and outline [Zuges] of the laying of the foundation, to judge the adequacy, validity and limits of the outer architectonic of the Critique of Pure Reason."⁴⁰

B. The Stages of the Task

IV - 14

1. The Essential Elements of Pure Knowledge

The first stage, then, of the regression to the laying of the foundation of metaphysics is the elucidation of "pure knowledge" in its elements, "pure intuition" and "pure thought." The elucidation of "pure intuition" would involve the uncovering of an unmediated, experience-free "letting occur" of something singular.³⁹ This reception of something singular, however, cannot be of an already-on-hand being, since we are dealing here with the knowledge of Being, not of beings. Thus, in a sense, a pure intuition would have to be "creative."

On the other hand, what is represented in pure intuition is not absolutely nothing. For Kant, space and time are pure intuitions. They are "that which is necessarily represented in advance in finite human cognitive knowledge."⁴⁰ First, space: it is not a being on hand, but that within which anything can be encountered; further, it is not a concept for its unity is that of something which in itself is one and unique; as one and unique, it is wholly itself in all of its parts. "The representation of space is thus an unmediated representation of one unique singular, that is, an intuition, if the essence of intuition

is to be determined as representatio angularis. And indeed...
 space is what is intuited in a pure intuition."⁴¹ The pure intuition of space and time is originary in that it lets the totality intuited by it spring forth.⁴² Thus "something" is intuited in pure intuition, not thematically nor as a being already on hand, but unobjectively and unthematically in a "fore-sight" [Vorblick], as an entire totality which makes possible the ordering in terms of "next to," "under," "over," and "behind."

In addition to the relations of the "givens" of external sense, we find those of inner sense, which present no spatial patterns or relations but rather appear as a succession of the states of our "mind" [unsere Gemüter], such as representations, drives, and moods. Here pure succession [Nacheinander] is unobjectively and unthematically "sighted." Time, then, is the form of our intuition of ourselves and of our inner state. And, for Kant, time is "the formal condition a priori of all appearances," the predominant essential element of pure knowledge or of what Heidegger calls the knowledge of the

Being of beings.⁴³ As Heidegger proceeds through the stages of the laying of the ground of metaphysics, time will more and more occupy center stage.⁴⁴

If knowledge is intuition through concepts, pure or ontological knowledge will be pure intuition through pure concepts.⁴⁵ But what is a pure concept? The basic act of concept-formation is what Kant calls "reflexion." It consists in "~~an~~" anticipative keeping-in-view a "precurory anticipation" [vorgängige Heraussehen] of the One in which the Many can come together into one.⁴⁶ Reflection involves both comparison and abstraction. A pure concept would be one whose content is obtainable a priori. Kant calls these "notions." Their origin lies in the act of reflection itself, which is a ~~not~~ representation of a precurory unity. "There belongs to the essential structure of the fundamental act of the understanding a representation of unity."⁴⁷ The understanding is, by its essence, "an originary conceiving [Begreifen], in whose action there lie ready prepared representations of a guiding unity. These represented unities are the content of the pure concepts. They render possible all

judgmental unification.⁴⁸ Pure concepts are thus not reflected but reflecting,⁴⁹ constitutive of any reflection under which actual representations can be subsumed.

If judgments as possible modes of unification form the complete nature of the understanding, then the pure concepts are organized into a systematic whole, whose totality is "the system of those predicates, which function in pure knowledge, i. e. assert about the Being of beings." They are ontological predicates or categories, derived from, ^{or, better, discovered by means of} the Table of judgments.⁵⁰ They are essentially at the service of pure intuition and can be determined as "ontological predicates" only when understood in the light of the essential unity of finite pure knowledge.⁵¹

Before moving to the second stage of the laying of the foundation of the knowledge of the Being of beings, it would be well to relate what we have seen so far to our central thesis. This we can do very simply by indicating that a dialectical comparison of Heidegger and Kierkegaard through the relation of their thought to that of Kant will reveal that, in a sense, far too

(to use awkward quantitative language)

IV - 18

much is granted by Heidegger (and Kant) both to unmediated

empirical presentation and to the a priori or ontological roots
in Dasein

of such presentation; too much, because of the role ascribed to
"pure"

the understanding, concepts, and judgment at this level. On

the other hand, too little is allowed by Lonergan, for immediacy
is always structured in terms of dispositional, affective, symbolic
and imaginative elements; these elements are rooted in what Heidegger

will call "pure imagination" and will identify with primordial time.

Our central thesis is that the imagination as primordial time, of "the unconscious,"
The therapeutic effects a healing or conversion which removes what "conscious"
This healing

Heidegger will call "the Being of beings" from the forgetfulness to
metaphysics also which not only Western philosophy but to the emergence of the autonomous,
conscious ego, of which such philosophy is a paramount manifestation,
has consigned it. Such healing is as the source of a fourth
psychic conversion foundational for theology -- affective conversion.

2. The Essential Unity of Pure Knowledge

The Second stage in the laying of the foundations of
ontological knowledge consists in elucidating the unity which
obtains between time as universal pure intuition and the
notions of pure thought. This unity is not "later" than the
elements themselves but must be established "earlier," as their

foundations. The section in the Critique of Pure Reason which Heidegger finds particularly pertinent is that on The Pure Concepts of the Understanding or Categories (A 76-80, B 102-105).

"Because the notions, as belonging to the finiteness of knowledge, are essentially related to pure intuition, and because this relationship of pure intuition and pure thought makes up the essential unity of pure knowledge, the essential delimiting of the categories in general is at the same time the elucidation of the inner possibility of the essential unity of ontological knowledge."⁵²

The unity of these elements "is not the result of a their developing together [Zusammengezahnt], but that which in an originate way unites them [das ursprüngliche Einigende]."⁵³ Thus it is called a synthesis. More precisely, it is a pure veritative synthesis or an ontological synthesis of, on the one hand, the unifying character or "synopsis" of time as pure universal intuition and, on the other hand, of pure thought as the reflecting representation of pure unity. This synthesis unites elements which themselves have a synthetic character and forms them in bringing them to unity.⁵⁴

We may designate the nature of the unity of the ontological synthesis by showing how the structure of each element requires the other. First, then, our pure thought is always placed before the time which "concerns" it [die es angehende Zeit]. And the manifold ~~to be~~ of pure intuition must be freed from dispersion, run through, and collected by pure concepts.⁵⁵ The reciprocal adaptation is called "synthesis." It mediates the two elements of intuition and thought, sharing their fundamental character of an act of representation. It is the result of the power of the imagination, which is described by Kant as "a blind but indispensable function of the soul, without which we would have no knowledge whatever, but of which we are scarcely ever conscious" (A 78, B 103).⁵⁶

The unity of the complete essence of pure knowledge is threefold: the manifold of pure intuition, the synthesis of this manifold by the imagination, and the unity given to this synthesis by the pure concepts of the understanding (Verstand).⁵⁷ The structural central position is held by the pure synthesis of the imagination, in which the two elements fit in with one another. This essential

unity of pure knowledge, revealed as a multiform action, is the place to begin the laying of the foundation of this knowledge: this synthesis must be revealed in its "springing forth." As Kant says, we are now at a point "where die Sache selbst is deeply veiled" (A 88, B 121).

Only from this essential unity of ontological knowledge can we move to a determination of the essence of the categories. A category is ^{not only} not only a mode of assertion but also of being. Thus in it there lies "the known Being of beings."⁵⁸ But the knowledge of Being is a unity of pure intuition and pure thought. Thus the notions themselves must have an element of pure intuitivity. At this point, it seems that Heidegger takes an independent line from Kant. Kant treats the categories and the unity of pure knowledge under transcendental logic, thus giving a priority to logic over aesthetic and providing a basis for interpreting the Critique as a logic of pure knowledge, removing the priority of intuition. For Kant the element of thought remained the point of departure for the question of the essential unity of pure knowledge. This orientation on logos and ratio conforms to the

~~meaning significance of these terms in Western metaphysics.~~ The remainder of Heidegger's interpretation of the further and decisive stages of the laying of the foundation of ontology "must penetrate through and beyond the ^{I Kantian]} architectonic of the external succession and coinage of problems and lay bare the # inner dynamic of the problematic, which allowed Kant to come to this kind of presentation in the first place."⁵⁹

3. The Intrinsic Possibility of the Essential Unity of the Ontological Synthesis
 How can the pure synthesis unify time and the motion? What must it be to effect this unification *a priori*? This question introduces the third stage of the laying of the foundation of ontological knowledge. Heidegger approaches the problem by attempting to lay bare the original character and development of the transcendental deduction of the categories, limiting himself to the first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, which emphasizes much more sharply the transcendental imagination.⁶⁰ The reason for the shift away from imagination will be seen later, as Heidegger moves progressively beyond the external Kantian argument to the inner dynamic of this central question. For the present, we must be satisfied with stating that the unity of the pure synthesis is judged by Heidegger

to be the meaning and purpose of the transcendental deduction of the categories. The latter therefore is not really a quaestio juris, all appearances to the contrary notwithstanding.⁶¹ It is concerned rather with the elucidation of the transcendence of finite reason through the uncovering of the structure of the pure synthesis.

What then is the relation between the pure synthesis and transcendence? Finite knowing is a matter of being related to a being which it is not and which it has not created. Thus this already-on-hand being must be able to come forward of its own and be met. But this in turn demands that it be "known" in advance as a being, with respect to its Being-structure. Thus ontological knowledge is the condition of the possibility that a being can "take up a position over against" a finite essence, which itself must be this ground-possibility of a "turning-towards-which-allows-a-taking-up-a-position-over-against" [ein entgegenstehend aufrütteln].⁶² Transcendence is thus the "holding-onself-in-advance into a free-space [Spielraum] and forming of this free-space from its origins" on the part of a finite knowing being. The pure synthesis is thus what fits together and carries [fügt und ^{festigt}] the

trigt] the inner essential structure of transcendence. Transcendence as the essence of the finiteness of reason is to be clarified by elucidating the ~~the~~ structure of the pure synthesis. This is the meaning of the transcendental deduction.⁶³

Finite knowledge, as receptive intuition, ~~requires~~ determinative thinking. The question of the task or service to which pure thought is called will thus lead to the core of the problem of the essential unity of ontological knowledge. Since our knowledge is receptive, the act of conceptual representation will not be ontically creative of the beings to which it relates itself. But what necessarily belongs to the possibility of this not very self-evident receptivity?

Obviously that beings can show themselves as standing-over-against, that they # have this possibility in advance and at all times. From ourselves, we do not let any being stand-over-against. But if this is so, then we must allow a Nothing [ein Nichts] to stand-over-against. "Only if the letting-stand-over-against is a holding-onceff into nothing [Sichhinnehmen in das Nichts] can representation without this let something a not-nothing, i.e., a being, be met in place of this

nothing and within it."⁶⁴ The Spielraum into which ~~the~~^{IV} finite knowing holds itself in letting something stand over against it is Nothing. Transcendence is a self-holding into nothing so that something may appear. This nothing, however, is not to be thought of metaphysically as nihil absolutum. It is nothing in that it is not something, some being or other.

That finite knowing is a letting-something-stand-over-against prevents it from being arbitrary; this absence of arbitrariness is an a priori characteristic of finite knowing. That is, the ^{non-arbitrariness} ~~oppositional character~~ of finite knowing is not due to beings, but to the prior oppositional character [vorgängige Widerständigkeit] of Being, through which all that is encountered is from the beginning constrained into a unity or accord [Einstimmigkeit]; this constraint is due to ~~to~~ a self-propounding of unity [ein Sichvorhalten von Einheit], a representation of a representing, unifying unity, a concept [Begriff].⁶⁵ Letting-something-stand-over-against is a "primordial concept" [Urbegriff], the primordial activity of the under-

standing, which, however, involves several modes of ~~intuition~~.

Pure reason is thus the capacity for "letting something stand over -

against" [das Vermögen der Gegenstehens ~~wur~~...],⁶⁶

giving in advance what is opposed to the haphazard and arbitrary.⁶⁷

Thus a pure concept would be any concept whose content would be such normative unity. The understanding is the faculty of rules, since it regulates all that the intuition brings forth. This is not to render the understanding supreme, master, infinite, says Heidegger (but see our footnote 67). Rather, in the ruler of unity it reveals its deepest finiteness, for only through these rules it lets something stand over against it, thus betraying the most original neediness.

If the totality composed of pure intuition and pure understanding constitutes in advance the Spielraum within which all beings can stand over - against, i.e., the totality of transcendence, then the next step is to show how these two elements are dependent on one another a priori. Kant does this in two ways, "from above" (how understanding is dependent on time) and "from below" (how intuition is dependent

independent on understanding).

But what is it which enables them to be so connected? It is this which Heidegger labors to bring to light. Both ways of showing the a priori mutual dependence reveal the originary function of pure imagination. Here we shall follow very carefully Heidegger's arguments and indicate in the footnotes where we shall later depart from his account of the universality of hermeneutic structure.

The point of the first way, as elucidated by Heidegger, is to show that ^⑩ pure understanding, by its very structure, is dependent upon a pure synthesis and thus upon pure intuition.⁶⁸ The totality of finite transcendence must therefore be kept continually in view.

To begin with, then, the character of "over against" [Dawider] reveals itself, in an advance grasp of unity. This presentation of unity is manifest to itself as bound to unity and as a self-same identity enduring throughout the action of the pure representation of unity. As an act of pure thought, presenting this presentation of unity has the character of an "I think." The pure concept as the consciousness of unity in general is thus necessarily

a pure self-consciousness. The pure consciousness of unity must be always possible or experience itself would not be possible.

It is essentially an "I can" ["ich vermag"]. It is this pure, original, and unchangeable consciousness which Kant names transcendental apperception. It grounds the presentation of unity which ~~allows something~~^{lets} to stand over against . . . , "for only as the constant, free 'I can' is the 'I think' able to allow the ~~to~~ 'over against' of unity to stand over against."⁶⁹ This unity has the essential tendency to unify what is not yet unified. Thus it has the character of a synthesis. Kant himself indicates that transcendental apperception "presupposes" a synthesis (A 118).

Now, Heidegger had shown in the second stage of the laying of the foundation that every synthesis is the product of the imagination. Thus transcendental apperception must have an essential relation to the ^{pure} imagination, which, as pure, does not represent anything already empirically given; it is formative *a priori*, purely productive rather than re-productive. It is called by Kant "transcendental imagination," and in Heidegger quotes Kant:

IV - 29

"Thus the principle of the necessary unity of ^{the} pure (productive) synthesis of the imagination before apperception is the ground of the possibility of all knowledge, especially of experience."⁷⁰ The word "before" [vor], means not only that the pure synthesis precedes transcendental apperception in the order grounding the possibility of pure knowledge, but also in has a structural sense which includes this first meaning: "before" in the sense of the Latin cōram. This sense, says Heidegger, brings to light the structural unity of transcendental apperception and pure imagination.

to summarize,

Thus, the unity presented in pre-experiential knowledge waits for an encounter with some being-to-be-known. It presupposes, then, a synthesis of pure intuition and pure thought. This synthesis is the work of the transcendental imagination, which, "before the eyes of" apperception provides the ground for the functioning of transcendental apperception.⁷¹ To move on, Because' the pure synthesis unifies a priori, what it unifies is given to it a priori: time as a priori, receptive-yet-productive intuition, and transcendental apperception. Pure imagination, then, has some essential relation to time, and mediates between transcendental

appereception and time. Apperception, in its unity, and in relation
to the ^{pure} synthesis of imagination, ^{pure} ⁷² is understanding.

The point of the second way of the transcendental deduction is to show that intuition is dependent on understanding. Kant does this by showing that sensibility, while receptive, has nothing in itself which corresponds to a connection between phenomena. Connection in general must therefore be given in advance through the notion of relation in general. But the power of forming relations is the pure ^(Worin) imagination,⁷³ and the "medium" of such forming is time as the universal pure intuition. "The letting-be-encountered of beings, which can show themselves in their standing-over-against connectedness, must be essentially grounded in the essentially time-bound pure ~~as~~ intuition. In the pure formation of determinate relations, the latter proposes ^a normative justification, but such as is opposed in advance to the arbitrary reception of what is encountered."⁷⁴

Entailed in every act of connection is a preliminary ^{a priori} presentation of unity, namely, the ^{"I"} of transcendental apperception. The latter is the constant and abiding "self" which accompanies all representations of unity.⁷⁵

The point of both ways of the transcendental deduction is summarized by Heidegger in a quotation from Kant: "we have, therefore, a pure imagination, as a grounding-power of the human soul, which lies at the base of all knowledge a priori. By its means we bring the manifold of intuition into connection, on the one hand, and, on the other, we bring this connected manifold into union with the condition of the most necessary unity of pure apperception."⁷⁶ The imagination unifies pure intuition in itself and the latter with pure apperception.

Richardson summarizes: "Whether we start the analysis with the categories as unified in apperception or with sense manifold offered by pure intuition, we pass inevitably through a center where categories and intuition meet and are constituted as one. This center, prior to all experience (because transcendental), is what constitutes the horizon of objectiveness, or domain of encounter, wherein other beings can arrive at an encounter with the finite knower. It is this horizon that we call transcendence."⁷⁷ The priority thus belongs, not to understanding, but to the pure synthesis of the time-bound imagination, through which

the categories are ~~not~~ rendered essentially relative to time and through this relation constitute transcendence as determinations of beings encountered by a finite knowing.

4. The Ground of the Intrinsic Possibility of Ontological Knowledge

The laying of the foundation of ontological knowledge demands an even further grounding, however. Kant is the first to admit the strange obscurity of the territory into which the transcendental deduction has led us. The problem that has been raised concerns the totality of ontological knowledge in its unity, precisely because of the emphasis that the logical or rational approach to metaphysics leads us to place upon the relationship of the understanding to the pure imagination. Not only this relation but also that of pure imagination to intuition -- for knowledge is primarily intuition, and finite knowledge primarily receptive intuition -- must be further examined. This fourth stage in laying the ground of metaphysics will display the transcendental imagination in its unifying function and the self-formation of transcendence and of its horizon.⁷⁸ Kant undertakes this task in the section on the schematism of the pure concepts of the understanding. This Heidegger refers to as the Leart [Kernstück] of the Critique of Pure

Reason.⁷⁹ The question which guides his interpretation is that of the transcendence of a finite being. ~~form~~

The reception of beings in finite knowledge demands an act of orientation which opens up a horizon which has an "offering character," within which a being can offer itself.⁸⁰ This offering-character of the horizon of letting-stand-over-against must be capable of being received by intuition. ~~intuition~~ This must be perceptible. Thus it must present itself in advance and constantly as pure "view" or "aspect" [Anblick]. The letting-stand-over-against of finite understanding must offer objectiveness [Gegenständlichkeit] as such in an intuitive manner; thus pure understanding must be grounded in a pure intuition that guides and sustains it.⁸¹ The finite knowing being must itself make the horizon of its advance orientation capable of being intuited. But since pure intuition stands in essential relation to the pure synthesis, it is the pure imagination which performs the act of forming the horizon as ~~perceptible~~^{receivable}. It also provides the possibility for any kind of "image" [Bild] and this is formative [bildend] in yet a second sense.⁸²

The formation of the horizon and of anything like a view presents us with the ground of the possibility of transcendence and helps us understand the necessary "aspect character" of its ~~advances~~^{to be} essence, which lets-stand-over-against-in-advance-with-the-character-of-an-offer [ihres vorgängig gegenstehenden und anbietenden Wesens].⁸³

Transcendence is finiteness itself. Now, since finite intuition is sensibility, the offering of a view or aspect sens-ates the horizon.

"The horizon of transcendence can be formed only in a sens-ating [Eversinnlichung]."⁸⁴

Now, if we consider the acting of letting-stand-over-against from the standpoint of the pure understanding, it is a presenting of regulative units or pure concepts. From this point of view, then, transcendence is a sens-ating of pure concepts. This takes place as a pure "schematism." Pure ^{sens-ating} ~~sensation~~ is not the reception of a being, however, but of ~~something~~^{an aspect or view} which is formed or instituted in the very act of reception. What is the character of what is intuited in pure sensibility? How is the sens-ating of the concept possible? In general, it takes place through an act of the imagination such that, e.g., "... necessarily contained... in the

perception of something-on-hand, e.g., this house, is the schematizing pre-view [Vorblieke] of such a thing as a house in general. From this presentation [Vorstellung] alone can what is encountered reveal itself as a house, present the aspect of a "given house."⁸⁴ Thus schematism takes place necessarily because our knowledge is fundamentally finite. Thus Kant must say: 'This schematism... is an art hidden in the depths of the human soul.' But if schematism belongs to the essence of finite knowledge and if finiteness is centred in transcendence, then the appearance of transcendence in its inmost depths must be a schematism."⁸⁵

Thus the ~~desire~~ arises for discussing a transcendental schematism: the pure concepts must be grounded in pure schema which procure an appropriate pure schema-image for them. How does a transcendental schematism take place?

The pure concepts are rules; they regulate a "pure view," one formed prior to experience. Such a view, then, would have to be one offered by pure intuition. The pure view is thus time. The transcendental schematas unite the categories with time and in

this way sens-ate the categories. The schemata of the pure concepts are time-determinations produced by the pure imagination. It is in this way that transcendence is formed a priori.

The schemata must thus "mediate the unicity of time and plurality of the categories."⁸⁶

It is by this mediation that transcendence, ontological knowledge, is instituted a priori. The transcendental schematism is thus the ground of the inner possibility of ontological knowledge. It constitutes the object in a pure letting-stand-over-against, and in such a way that what is represented in a pure thought [e.g., a category such as "substance"] presents itself necessarily in an intuitive form in the pure image of time. Time is thus that which, as giving a priori, bestows in advance on the horizon of transcendence the character of a receivable effect. But this is not all. As the sole pure universal image time gives to the horizon of transcendence an advance inclusiveness. This unique and pure ontological horizon is the condition of the possibility that a being within it can have this or that particular overt and, indeed, ontic horizon. But time gives transcendence not only an advance unified cohesion, but as the

pure giving of itself it offers a kind of check. It makes perceptible to finite being the "over against" of objectiveness, which belongs to the finiteness of its transcending orientation.⁸⁷

Transcendental schemata thus "render possible" bring-to-pass the pre-experiential orientation of the finite knower towards beings-to-be-known that renders it possible for these beings--not simply one, nor a few, nor a class, but 'any being whatsoever'--to reveal themselves as objects offering a view of themselves to be known." They constitute ontological knowledge, the comprehension of the being-structure of beings.⁸⁸

The knowledge is pure because it concerns the generality, not of empirical concepts (e.g., house) but of pure concepts (e.g., causality), i.e., of the concepts of metaphysica generalis. "The doctrine of the schematism of the pure concepts of the understanding is the decisive stage in the laying of the foundation of metaphysica generalis."⁸⁹

5. The Complete Determination of the Essence of Ontological Knowledge

Traditional metaphysics, for Kant, had assumed that pure thought, through concepts alone, was itself knowledge. In Kant's laying of the foundations of metaphysics, however,

pure thought becomes merely a necessary element in finite knowledge. The latter is a relation of accord with ~~some~~⁹⁰ beings, which Kant calls "synthesis" -- the veritative synthesis which takes place by an "immersion" [Darinnsein] in a 'medium' within which the 'totally different', which the knowing being is not and over which it is not master, can be encountered.

This "going-beyond" is instituted by the transcendental imagination, which mediates the unity of: 1) time; 2) the synthesis of representations; and 3) the unity of apperception. By so doing, the imagination renders contingently real experience -- "the finite, receptive, intuitive knowledge of beings" -- possible.⁹¹

To delimit transcendence in its full essence is to determine the conditions of the possibility of experience,⁹² which is defined as "an act of receptive intuition which must allow beings to be given."⁹³ This condition is the act of orientation toward what can be given which Kant revealed in the transcendental deduction and in the transcendental schematism.

In addition, if knowledge is to be true (i.e., if it is to be knowledge at all), it must agree with its object. For this

to be possible, the horizon of ~~that~~ objectness must itself be able to be intuited and overt so that the object can take up a position opposite "over against." Thus, Kant's single proposition delimiting the complete essence of transcendence is: "the conditions of the possibility of experience in general are at the same time conditions of the possibility of the objects of experience" (A 158, B 197).⁹³

For Heidegger "at the same time" [zugleich] is the decisive expression, for "it brings to expression the essential unity of the complete structure of transcendence. The latter lies in in this: that the self-orientating letting-stand-over-against as such institutes the horizon of objectness in general. The going-beyond, which, in finite knowledge, is necessary in advance and always, is thus a constant standing-out, to ... (Ebstasis). But this essential standing-out to ..., precisely in its standing institutes and pro-poses to itself a horizon.

Transcendence is in itself ecstatic-horizonal."⁹⁴

As schema-forming,

Transcendence is creative of the pure view, but not in the sense that it creates the being; in fact, it does not even

relate itself directly and thematically to beings. It relates itself, says Heidegger, to a Nothing, which Kant calls "the non-empirical, that is, transcendental object = X." For Heidegger, this X is the "horizontal" terminus [Woraufzu] of the \wp advance orientation. This Nothing is a "something" because, as pure horizon, it is the correlate of the unity of pure apperception. This X, not an object but a Nothing, is what is "known" in ontological knowledge. "If by 'object' we mean a being thematically apprehended, this horizon is surely not an object but a Nothing.^{and}" If by 'knowledge' we see mean the apprehension of being, ontological knowledge is not knowledge."⁹⁵ It is, however, "original truth," provided that "truth" means "the holding open of the horizon within which the Being of beings is perceptible in advance."⁹⁶ This Kantian transformation of metaphysica generalia into "the explicit disclosure of the systematic whole of pure knowledge insofar as the latter institutes transcendence"⁹⁷, Kant shook the foundations of traditional metaphysics and caused the edifice of metaphysica specialis to totter.

C. The Ab-Originality of Ontological Knowledge

There is no way of denying that, with the third section of the Kant-study, we move beyond anything that could justly be called a commentary on Kant (if, indeed, we have not already done so!). In fact, Ernst Cassirer has complained that in this section, Heidegger "no longer speaks as a commentator but as a usurper."⁹⁸ Heidegger himself claims he is attempting to bring out what Kant intended to say and thus to perform a Sachkritik. "In order to wrest from what the words say that which they intend to say, every interpretation must necessarily employ violence. But such violence cannot be a wandering caprice. The power of an illuminating idea must impel and guide the interpretation. Only in the power of this idea can an interpretation risk what is always & daring, namely, the entrusting itself to the hidden inner passion [Leidenschaft] of a work, in order to through the latter to penetrate to what is unsaid and force it to expression. This is a way in which the guiding idea itself in its power of illumination comes to the light of day."⁹⁹

The directive idea which Kant was trying to express is the following, according to Heidegger: "Kant's laying of the foundation of metaphysics leads to the transcendental imagination. This is the root of both items, sensibility and understanding. As such it makes possible the original unity of the ontological synthesis. This root, however, is planted in original time. The original ground which is made manifest in the laying of the foundation is time."¹⁰⁰ This directive idea is expressed in the title of the main work of the early Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, and even more in the projected (but probably never written as originally intended) Zeit und Sein.
in thirteen steps

We shall list the progress of Heidegger's attempt, in dialogue with Kant, to find the ground of the knowledge of the Being of beings ~~farther~~^{a more fundamental} than Kant allows himself could reach.

5. 1. The transcendental imagination is depicted in the Critique of Pure Reason as a simultaneously receptive and productive (spontaneous, formative) faculty or 'function' of the soul." Its essence is disclosed in this simultaneity, which places it between sensibility and understanding. Moreover,

as Kant's Anthropologie indicates, form its aspect, IV - 43
It can intuitively represent the object, without the latter being present: either by re-collection or by original invention (the latter, however, drawing upon ~~the~~ previous experience). And, it forms in advance, prior to all experience, the aspect of the horizon of objectness in general, in the pure form of time, and, in the same pure form, transcendental schemata for the organization of the manifold of experience. Thus it first renders experience possible. (Despite all the modifications we shall want to make later, this is what must be salvaged from Heidegger's Kant-study: the imagination as primordial time, rendering possible all human experience).¹⁰¹

2. The transcendental imagination is the third transcendental faculty, i.e., the third faculty rendering transcendence possible. But, even more, it is a fundamental faculty in a special way, since it makes possible the original unity of intuition and understanding, the unity of transcendence as a whole. However Kant has rendered it homeless, since the transcendental aesthetic deals with sensibility, and the transcendental logic with understanding. For Heidegger, it is the "unknown common root of both these stems, the root concerning which, says

Kant, we are scarcely ever ~~conscious~~¹⁰² conscious.

3. This means that it lets these stems spring forth from itself and lends them support and stability. In this way, however, pure intuition and pure thought are to be attributed to the transcendental imagination. This is not to reduce all knowledge to the imaginary,¹⁰³ but rather suggests that the imagination only operates in conjunction with the two stems which it "lets spring forth." In such conjunction, it constitutes the horizon of objectness, the comprehension of the Being [Seinsverständnis] of beings. (At this point, Heidegger ^{question of the} raises and immediately postpones the necessary untruth due to the finiteness of transcendence). Even the name, "imagination," here becomes inadequate!¹⁰⁴

4. The "act" of pure intuition is an "act" which receives what it itself has instituted (the aspect of space and time as multiple totalities). But pure intuition can be originary in this way only because it is essentially pure imagination, which in forming aspects spontaneously gives them to itself. Space and time "institute in advance the pure aspect which serves as the horizon of empirical intuition" "At the ground of its

essence, pure imagination intuition is pure imagination.¹⁰⁵ Space and time as ens imaginarium (Kant A 291, B 347) belong to the possible forms of the "Nothing" which is the horizon.) objectness and they are intuited, not as "objects" (i.e., beings) but in the manner of an "originally instituting giving" [einer ursprünglicher bildender Gebeng].¹⁰⁶

5. The derivation of the theoretical reason from the transcendental imagination is not a question of deriving a higher faculty of the soul from a lower. It is the laying of the foundations of ontological knowledge that is in question here, not the faculties of the soul.¹⁰⁷ Finite imagination is sensible in that it is receptive, but this does not render it inferior, for it is the condition of the possibility of all transcendence.

Moreover, the Being-as-understanding [Verstandsein] of the understanding is a dependence on intuition. And this "Being" is how it is and what it is in the pure synthesis of pure imagination. Does this mean it is pure imagination? Yes, says Kant Heidegger. For the understanding is fundamen-

tally "pure apperception," an abiding unity ^{as} which as "I"; the "I" of the "self" renders possible the identity of the complex of the rules of unity (the categories) and thus the character of objectness. This ego, ^{as "I think substance," "I think causality," etc.,} puts the categories in a position where they can be regulatory of unity. This regulation of unity occurs in the two schemata; but these in turn are grounded in the imagination, which therefore constitutes Being-as-understanding.

Original "thinking" is pure imagining [Einbilden].¹⁰⁸

But is the imagination not above all a faculty of receptivity? And is thought or understanding not pure spontaneity? Heidegger answers: "If Kant identifies understanding with spontaneity, this no more excludes a receptivity on its part than the identification of sensibility -- finite intuition -- with receptivity ruled out as spontaneity as belonging to it."¹⁰⁹ "Anything like a regulating rule is only there in a receptive 'letting-one-self-be ruled.'"¹¹⁰ Pure thought is a structurally unifying receptive spontaneity which must spring forth from the transcendental imagination. It pro-poses the horizon within which the knowing self acts, by projecting all our knowledge

as possibly systematic."¹¹

6. How can freedom belong, then, to pure theoretical reason, since it seems to lie under the necessity of the "standing = ~~being~~ stand over-against" of a horizon of objectness? The precise point is that the being which encounters this horizon is "free for it" ~~accept it as such~~. Freedom means "placing oneself under a self-imposed necessity,"¹¹² which then becomes "necessitating" ["Nötigung"]. The freedom of reason is due to the fact that it is a receptive spontaneity, i.e., transcendental imagination,¹¹³ which "more and more discloses itself as structural possibility, that is, in its rendering possible transcendence as the essence of the finite self."¹¹⁴

An elucidation of the "practical self" will reveal that practical reason too arises from, and can be traced back to, the transcendental imagination. The essence of the self lies in "self-consciousness. The authentic self is termed by Kant, "the person," and the personhood of the person is said to consist in "the idea of the moral law with the respect which is inseparable from it." This "respect" is a predisposition for the moral law, rendering us receptive to it

precisely as a moral law. As the essence of the person or the moral self, respect must thus be a mode of self-consciousness.

But Kant also refers to respect as a "feeling," and thus as belonging to sensibility. But, says Heidegger, drawing upon Kant, sensibility "is not necessarily determined by ~~body~~ bodily conditions, so that the possibility remains open of a pure feeling, not determined by the affections, but produced by the subject."¹¹⁵

What then is the essence of feeling? Even bare feelings of pleasure reveal a characteristic basic structure. Feeling is always a "having a feeling for. . . and as such simultaneously a self-feeling on the part of the one feeling. Feeling lets the self be in a way essentially co-determined by the character of that for which the one feeling, in this self-feeling, has a feeling.

According to the Critique of Practical Reason, respect is respect for. . . the moral law, in a way which first constitutes the possibility of an action. In this way, respect is the manner in which the law first becomes accessible to us. It is not a "grounding" of the law so that the law is what it is because of our feeling of respect for it, but rather it determines the way in which the law can encounter us.

Because of the essence of feeling as a feeling-for in which the ~~one~~^{"I"} feeling simultaneously feels ~~himself~~ itself, respect is a manner in which the "I" becomes manifest to itself as an acting self. Reason, as free, gives to itself the referent of respect, the moral law. Thus, "respect for the law is respect for the self as that self which is not determined by self-conceit and self-love."¹⁶ It is, as Kant says, directed to persons, not things.

The feeling for... involved in respect for the law is submission to it and, moreover, to oneself/~~as~~^{as} pure reason. Respect is that "way of Being-as-self of the 'I,' on the basis of which 'the hero in one's soul is not despised.' It is the way of being responsible for the Being of the self, the authentic Being-as-self."¹⁷ Self-commitment to the possibility of authentic existence is the essence of the acting Being-as-self, i.e., of practical reason.

We have here moved beyond an empirical notion of feeling as a faculty of the soul and, through the structure of respect, ~~and~~
^{comes again upon} have ~~discovered~~ the original nature of the transcendental imagination:
"The self-submitting, immediate surrender to... is pure receptivity, but the free self-imposition of the law is pure

spontaneity; both are in themselves originally one. Moreover, only this origin of practical reason from the transcendental imagination ^{neither} allows us to understand why it is that in respect, the law nor the acting self are objectively apprehended, but that they are made manifest in a more original, non-objective and non-theoretical way as "ought" and "action" and form the non-reflected, acting *Bereg-en-ref.*"¹¹⁸

Thus the fundamental essence-constitution of man is rooted in the transcendental imagination. The latter is the "unknown root" pointed to by Kant, but from which, says Heidegger, he drew back in disquiet in the second edition of the first *Po*tique, where it becomes a function of the understanding. "He saw the unknown. He had to draw back from it. Not only did the transcendental imagination alarm him, but in the meantime pure reason as reason had drawn him more strongly under its spell."¹¹⁹ It is not that the first edition is more "psychological" and the second more "logical." Rather, both are "transcendental" in the sense of "being necessarily "objective" as well as "subjective," but the

subjective emphasis is displaced to the understanding.¹²⁰ The question raised by this shift, essential to the completeness of Heidegger's interpretation, is thus: "Is the transcendental imagination as the established ground ~~and~~^{is} sufficiently able to bear the load, to determine the finite essence of the subjectivity of the human subject primordially, i.e. in its unity and totality, or does the problem of a human pure reason constructed as a more comprehensible problem with the elimination of the transcendental imagination and so come nearer to a possible solution?"¹²⁰

8. Human finiteness involves, as we have seen, sensibility conceived as receptive intuition. In this sense, "human pure reason is necessarily a pure sensible reason."¹²¹ In fact, in a transcendental or metaphysical sense, man "has" a body only because finite transcendence is sensible a priori.

However, pure sensibility is time. Time forms a primordial unity with the "I think." The pure ego is temporal, on the basis of the imagination. This is shown

through the following analysis of the relationship of the transcendental imagination to time:¹²²

pure

a. The receptivity ~~of~~^{pure} engaged in transcendence gives to itself, in the receptive act, the pure succession of the now-series in such a way that it looks ahead to its "at once" (the just coming, sein Sogleich) and back to its "just this moment" (the just passing, sein Soeben). In its purity it is not relative to the presence of something but institutes what it is able to receive. Now, the faculty of imagination consists of: the faculty of forming images (of the present), of reproducing images (of the past), and of anticipating images (of the future). The formation of aspects by the imagination is relative to time. Pure imagination constitutes time from the beginning. As that which lets time as the now-sequence spring forth, it is primordial time.

b. More radically, the three modes of synthesis (intuition, imagination, and concept) are three because time appears in them; that is, they express the threefold unity of time as past, present, and future. This does not mean that the

imagination is merely one faculty among others, however. The three syntheses are in the modes of apprehending, reproducing, and recognizing. Each of these modes characterizes synthesis in a specific way, and they enjoy an essential interrelatedness in virtue of their common inherence in the essence of the pure ontological synthesis. Thus :

1) Pure intuition produces the immediate aspect of the now as such, and thus is time-forming. But, as we have seen, intuition is rooted in imagination, which thus has a pure time-temporal character.

2) Pure reproduction, in advance and before all experience, brings back the no-longer-now as such to the present and unites it with the actual now. It forms the past as past. And, just as empirical reproduction is a matter of empirical imagination, so pure reproduction must be a matter of pure imagination. Thus, again, pure imagination is time-forming. It is called "re-production," not because it looks back to a being previously experienced but because it opens up the horizon of possible "going back" [Nachgehen],

the past, and thus "forms" the "past" as such. The imagination is also the origin of the unity of the present and past. "... This process of ③) constituting the pre-experiential synthesis of the 'now'-that-has-been and the 'now'-that-is fuses the horizon of the past with the horizon of the present into a structural unity." ¹²³

3) The notion of "pure synthesis as pure recognition" is very difficult; ~~and I have chosen to relate Richardson's exposition~~ of it:

By recognition here, Kant means that process by means of which the knower discovers that the being which reveals itself in two presentations, or modes of presentation (e.g. reproduction and apprehension), is one and the same. Hence, it is a discovery of identity, an identification. On the empirical level, let us suppose the simultaneous synthesis of reproduction and apprehension. This double process is not haphazard but controlled, sc. regulated by a unity that is seized antecedently and whose function is precisely to control the coming-together of these two syntheses and guarantee that they present one and the same identical being-to-be-known. This antecedent regulating unity is a null, sc. that uniting function which we have called the concept, the presentation of a unity, which in its identity is applicable to many. First to have grasped this regulating unity by anticipation and then to discover the other syntheses as achieving their unison in and through it -- this is to recognize identity: it is a synthesis of recognition.

Such an empirical synthesis supposes as a condition of its possibility a synthesis of identifications that precedes all experience. Preceding all experience of beings, it can only open up the dimension of antecedent seizure as such;

thus it is . . . the original institution of anticipation,
 sc. the future . . . Since it comes-to-pass through the
 regulating function of the concepts as rules, which are the
 schemata, the 'transcendental product' of the pure imagi-
 nation, this institution of the future is the task of the
 transcendental imagination. The transcendental imagination,
 then, instituting future as well as present and past, is
 'original time.' ¹²⁴

This mode enjoys a priority over the other two, for it lies at
 their basis as ~~and~~^{the possibility of} unification in their identity. If this is the
 case, the most primordial essence of time is that it "temporalizes
 itself primarily out of the future." ¹²⁵ This intrinsic structure of
 time is much more pronouncedly delineated in Being and Time, and
 we shall have to examine these descriptions, since they will be essential to
 what we shall mean by "psychic conversion" ~~and~~ and the function of
 "the therapeutic."

and determined by an act of unification of the being with respect to its identity. The synthesis which intends this identity is a synthesis in concepts, which combines the successively intuited and ~~represented~~ reproduced manifold into one representation. Pure recognition then provides the possibility for all identification by prospecting the horizon of what must be pro-posed in advance as identical. This prospecting is the fore formation of that which makes all projection possible, namely, the future. The act of forming this prospective horizon is an act of pure imagination, again as time-forming. Thus even concepts are essentially determined by time. In fact this mode of synthesis, as the basis of the possibility of the other two, reveals the most primordial essence of time: time temporalizes itself primarily out of the future.

Thus transcendental imagination is primordial time.

11. While it may be difficult to prove that the self is temporal, we may ~~surely~~ say that time as such has the character of selfhood.

(24)

Before proceeding to Heidegger's "retrieval" of the Kantian problematic in Section Four of the Kant study (which itself will serve as our introduction to Being and Time), I wish to examine another interpretation of Kant, this time from a Lonerganian perspective. The interpretation is by Giovanni Sala and deals with "The A Priori in Human Knowledge according to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason and Lonergan's Insight."¹⁵⁷

Ch. IV -- Footnotes

1. Find Malet's presentation of Bultmann's criticism of Heidegger.
2. Heidegger, in his 1950 preface to the second edition, concedes to his critics that he has gone astray in points of interpretation. However, he is attempting, not a philological study, but a dialogue between himself and Kant. The laws of such a dialogue, he says, "are more easily violated; the possibility of going astray [in a dialogue] is more threatening, the shortcomings more frequent." KPM, p. xxv. Nonetheless, he leaves the second edition unaltered. "Through these shortcomings, thinkers learn to be more persevering." KPM, Eng., p. xxv.
3. "The task of the following investigation is to interpret Kant's Critique of Pure Reason as a laying of the foundation [Grundlegung] of metaphysics, in order to present the problems of metaphysics as that of a fundamental ontology." KPM, Gr., §. 13¹ (translation mine; Except where indicated otherwise, the translation will be my own). The heading prior to Section One reads: "The Unfolding of the Idea of a Fundamental Ontology through the Interpretation of the Critique of Pure Reason as a Laying of the Foundation of Metaphysics." (Ibid., p. 15).
4. Heidegger distinguishes fundamental ontology from philosophical anthropology. The latter asks the question, "What is man?" The former uncovers, through an analytic of Human Dasein, the purpose and manner, the ^{limits} Wesen and the presuppositions of that question. Ibid., §. 13.²
- 5 Ibid., p. 14.
- 6 "The Critique of Pure Reason has nothing to do with theory of knowledge." Ibid., p. 25.
- 7 Ibid., p. 20.
- 8 "... die Vernunft nur das erkennt, was sie selbst nach-

ihrem Entwurfe hervorbringt." Ibid., quoted from Kant,
Critique of Pure Reason B XIII f.

9. "Was demnach das Verhältnis zu Seiendem (ontische Erkenntnis) ermöglicht, ist das vorgängige Verstehen der Seinsverfassung, die ontologische Erkenntnis." Ibid.
10. Ibid., §. 21.
11. Ibid., §. 22.
12. "Die Begründungsgrundlage der Rechtmäßigkeit dieser sachhaltigen Urteile über das Sein des Seienden kann nicht in der Erfahrung liegen; denn Erfahrung von Seiendem ist selbst schon immer geführt vom ontologischen Verständnis des Seienden, das in bestimmter Hinsicht durch die Erfahrung zugänglich werden soll. Ontologische Erkenntnis ist demnach keine Urteilen nachs nicht erfahrungsgemäß beizubringenden Gründen (Prinzipien)." Ibid., §. 23.
13. Ibid., §. 24 f.
14. Ibid., §. 28.
15. "Diese Endlichkeit der Vernunft besteht aber keineswegs nur und in erster Linie darin, dass das menschliche Erkennen vielerlei Mängel der Unbeständigkeit und Ungenauigkeit und des Irrtums zeigt, sondern sie liegt im Wesensbau der Erkenntnis selbst. Die faktische Beschränktheit des ~~Wesens~~ Wesens ist erst eine Folge dieses Wesens." Ibid., §. 28.
16. CPR, A 19, B 33.
17. "Für alles Verständnis der Kritik der reinen Vernunft muss man sich gleichsam einhämern: Erkennen ist primär Ausschauen." KPM, §. 29.

18. Ibid., p. 29. It is precisely on this point that a later study
of Heidegger and Arendt will, of course, have to concentrate.
19. Ibid., p. 30.
20. " . . . die Auseinandersetzung der eigentlichen Wurzeln der Erkenntnis
ausmacht und bei aller Wechselwirkung der Bezüge
zwischen Anschauen und Denken das eigentliche Gewicht
besitzt." Ibid.
21. Ibid., p. 31.
22. Ibid., p. 32.
23. Ibid., pp. 32 f.
24. Ibid., p. 34.
25. Ibid..
26. Ibid..
27. Ibid. There are two other kinds of synthesis which must be
understood and determined if we are to understand, says
Heidegger, the statement that for Kant the essence of knowledge
is synthesis. First, there is the "predicative synthesis" or the
act of uniting proper to a concept itself, by reason of
which it can be a predicate. Secondly, there is "apophantic
synthesis" in which the judgment presents itself as the
connection of subject and predicate. "Thus in the veritative
synthesis, which constitutes the essence of finite knowledge
in general, the predicative and apophantic syntheses are
necessarily joined together in a structural unity of synthesis."
Ibid., pp. 34 f.

28. Ibid., p. 35. The force of this sentence is best brought
out in German: "Im Herstellen der Form des Begriffes
hilft der Verstand den Inhalt des Gegenstandes beizustellen."

In dieser Art des "Stellens" bekundet siele das eigentümliche Vor-stellen des Denkens."

- 29 Ibid., p. 36. The translations "being-as-opposed" and "being-as-taking-its-origin" for Gegenstand and Entstand respectively are suggested by Richardson, op. cit., p. 700. Churchill's translation uses "ob-ject" and the ghartly "e-ject."
- 30 Ibid., p. 37. "Die doppelte Charakteristik des Seienden als 'Ding an sich' und als 'Erscheinung' entspricht der zweifachen Art, gemäss der es zum unendlichen und endlichen Erkennen in Beziehung stehen kann: das Seiende im Entstand und dasselbe Seiende als Gegenstand." Ibid. Heidegger supports this interpretation with a quotation from Kant's Opus postumum: "Der Unterschied der Begriffe von einem Ding an sich und dem in der Erscheinung ist nicht objektiv, sondern bloss subjektiv. Das Ding an sich ist nicht ein anderes Objekt, sondern eine andere Beziehung (respectus) der Vorstellung auf dasselbe Objekt." Ibid. (The emphasis is Heidegger's).
- 31 "... diese für die Kritik fundamentalen Begriffe, Erscheinung und Ding an sich, überhaupt nur bei ausdrücklicher Zugrundelegung der Problematik der Endlichkeit des menschlichen Weisens verständlich und zum weiteren Problem gemacht werden können. Nicht aber sind es zwei hintereinander gelagerte Gegenstandsabsichten innerhalb des völlig indifferent angesetzten Erkenntnis." Ibid., p. 39.
- 32 Ibid., p. 40. The word Gemüth is Kant's.
- 33 "Wie ~~sie~~ muss dieses endliche Weisen seiner eigenen Seinsverfassung nach sein, damit ein solcher erfahrungs-freies Beibringen der Seinsverfassung des Seienden, d. h. eine ontologische Synthesis, möglich ist?" Ibid., p. 42.

34 Ibid., p. 43.

35 "Bei diesem Charakter des liegenden Problems und der Dimension seiner möglichen Bearbeitung ist es nicht verwunderlich, ~~wenn~~ wenn die Art der Ursprungsentzweiung und die Weise des Rückgangs in den Quellgrund zunächst unbestimmt bleiben. Ihre Sicherheit und Bestimmtheit erwachen gleichsam erst während des Vordringens in das bislang verborgene Gebiet und bei der Auseinandersetzung mit dem, was sich da zeigt. Zwar ist das Gebiet der Ursprungsentzweiung nichts anderes als das menschliche 'Gemüt' ('mens rive animus')." Ibid., p. 44.

It is important, I believe, to keep in mind that, with reference to another context in later works, Gemüt should best be taken to mean "heart of man," i.e., "the esenced man," insofar as it is in ec-static relationship to Being, hence man's ek-sistence. Ek-sistence here is considered as that constitutional openness to Being that in SZ [Sein und Zeit] we called an "antecedent" comprehension of Being." Richardson, op. cit., p. 600; cf. p. 700: "Gemüt, heart of man."

36 Ibid., p. 45.

37 Ibid., p. 46.

38 Ibid.

39 "Genukt wird damit ein unmittelbares, obzw. erfahrungs-freies Begegnenlassen eines einzelnen." Ibid., p. 47.

40 Ibid., p. 48.

41 Ibid.

42 "Das Vorstellen eines solchen 'unendlichen' Grossheit als gegeben ist demnach ein gebendes Anschauen. Sofern das einzige Ganze zumal gegeben wird, lässt dieser Vorstellen sein Vorstellbares entspringen und Reist in diesem Sinne

ein ~~der~~ 'ursprüngliches' vorstellen." Ibid., p. 49.

13 Ibid., pp. 50 f.

44 "Die folgende Interpretation zeigt, wie die Zeit durch die einzelnen Stadien der Grundlegung der Metaphysik hindurch mehr und mehr in den Mittelpunkt rückt und erst hierdurch ihr eigenes Wesen ursprünglicher entblößt, als das die vorläufige Kennzeichnung in der transzendentalen Ästhetik ~~vermag~~ vermag." Ibid., p. 51. Heidegger chooses for the time being to leave open the question of ontological function of the pure intuition, space.

45 By way of anticipation, we may say that, once we have completed our dialectical relating of Lonergan to Heidegger, and even after we have salvaged from Heidegger essential elements of the first or presentational level of consciousness, we will seriously qualify him at this point: the disclosure of the ~~what~~ what Heidegger calls the ~~Being~~ ^{finite and time-bound} of beings will be through and ~~to~~ onto a receptive awareness determined not by a priori concepts -- for such there are none -- but by modalities of "a prior" possible human "disposition." It could be argued that this is what Heidegger is getting at, especially in Being and Time. It is certain, I believe, that this is what is overlooked and neglected by Lonergan.

46 Ibid., p. 54.

47 Ibid., p. 55.

48 Judgment [Urteil] is a "determination of something as something" and is an act of Verstand. Surely this is Kant's view and there is no indication in the Kant-study that Heidegger would dispute this. Our dialectical critique will, of course, also have to direct itself to this notion of judgment.

49 "Die reinen Begriffe erwachsen daher nicht erst durch einen Akt der Reflexion, sie sind nicht reflektierte Begriffe, sondern die im Vorhinein zur Wesensstruktur der Reflexion gehörigen, d.h. in, mit und für die Reflexion handelnden

Vorstellungen, d. h. reflektierende Begriffe." Ibid. §

50 Ibid., p. 56. Heidegger chooses to leave open the perennial question of the validity of the derivation of the pure concepts from the table of judgments. He admits that Kant does not derive the multiplicity of functions exercised in judgment from the essence of the understanding, but rather submits an already complete table of judgments organized according to the four principal moments of quantity, quality, relation, and modality. Heidegger does not raise the question yet of the validity of this procedure because, as long as the element of pure thought remains isolated in analysis from intuition, the categories cannot receive any determination. The full essence of the pure concepts as categories can be disclosed only in light of the unity of finite pure knowledge.

51 "Die reinen Begriffe können erst dann als ontologische Prädikate bestimmt werden, wenn sie aus der Wesensheit der endlichen reinen Erkenntnis verstanden werden." Ibid., p. 58.

52 Ibid., pp. 59 f.

53 Ibid., p. 60.

54 "Das Problem der reinen veritativem oder ontologischen Synthesis muss demnach auf die Frage gebracht werden: wie sieht die ursprüngliche (veritative) 'Synthesis' der reinen Synopsis und der reinen reflektierenden (prädiktativen) Synthesis aus? Schon aus der Form dieser Frage lässt sich abschätzen, dass die gesuchte Synthesis einen ganz ausgezeichneten Charakter haben muss, wenn anders sie solches einigen soll, was in sich schon Synthesistruktur zeigt. Die gesuchte Synthesis muss dem zu einigenden Formen der 'Synthesis' und 'Synopsis' im vorhin ein schon gewachsen sein, & sie muss diese selbst im Einigen derselben ursprünglich bilden." Ibid., p. 61.

55 Ibid., p. 62. Here, again by way of anticipation, we introduce our modification: the manifold of the time-bound imagination may or may not be experienced as "freed from

often represented symbolically.
↑

dispersion, run through, and collected," but the "collection" ~~on~~ and experienced time-bound unity of "presentation" immediately is not ~~merely~~ due to concepts, nor even to preconceptual understanding -- for this distinction, see the next chapter -- but to the clarification of affect. This may indeed be brought about by insight, and frequently is (see *Heidegger, Insight*, Ch. 6), but in this case the insight has been therapeutic. Whether effected by insight or not, it is always brought about by "the Therapeutic" (or the conversion or healing of) the magnification.

56 *Ibid.*, pp. 62 f. Emphasis is mine.

57. *Ibid.*, pp. 63 f. Our question will challenge the necessity of this third -- and even the "existence" -- of this third element. The manifold of presentation, synthesized (or disintegrated, as the case may be) through the time-bound magnification will suffice, on our rendition, to allow the self-unveiling and -withdrawing of what Heidegger calls the Being of beings or, to the extent of imaginative disintegration, to relegate this "Being" once again its forgetfulness.

58 "... das erkannte Sein des Seindes...", *ibid.*, p. 65.

59 *Ibid.*, p. 68.

60 cf. *ibid.*, p. 146 ff.

61 *Ibid.*, pp. 68 f.

62 *Ibid.*, p. 70.

63 *Ibid.*. Cf. p. 74: "[The transcendental deduction] is the analytical elucidation of the total structure of the pure synthesis."

64 *Ibid.*, p. 71.

65 Ibid., p. 72.

66 Ibid., p. 73.

67 "Ursprünglich Einheit vorstellend, und zwar als einigende, stellt es sich selbst eine Verbindlichkeit vor, die aller mögliche Zusammen im vorhinein regelt." Ibid. Thus it is in this way that the ^{pure} concept becomes a rule, since its content is a regulating unity. The understanding is thus, in its original nature, a faculty of rules. Ibid.

A gain to anticipate, we will want to say that this exigency for unity at the presentational level has no need of appealing to pure concepts but flows from the nature of the imagination as primordial time! The meaning of this can only be articulated later. For now, we may simply say that the exigence is apprehended in feeling, and that the therapeutic is the instrument for effecting it when, in fact, the presentational level has become arbitrary and haphazard. To judge necessary at this point an appeal to the understanding as regulator for presentation is almost necessarily to follow the direction taken by Kant in the second edition of the first Critique, a direction lamented by Heidegger.

68 "... der reine Verstand als Ausgang des ersten Weges so weit geklärt ist, dass aus seiner Struktur die Angelehntheit auf eine reine Synthese und damit auf eine reine Anschauung sichtbar wird." Ibid., p. 76.

69 "Denn nur als das ständig freie 'ich kann' vermag das 'ich denke' sich das Dauider der Einheit entgegenstehen zu lassen." S Ibid., p. 77. Here, I maintain, Heidegger departs from the previously sustained phenomenological character of his interpretation of the first Critique, and this here is where we will find the root of our departure from Heidegger. We seem to accept Kant's position, which we shall later reject or, better, substantially qualify, that "no fixed and abiding self can present itself in [the] flux of inner appearances." Critique of Pure Reason, A 107, Smith translation, p. 136. A transcendental

unity of consciousness must be appealed to because no such unity can be found in experience and yet such unity is a necessary condition of the experience which we do, in fact, have. (Actually, it might be better to state that the extent of Heidegger's agreement with Kant on this point remains ambiguous. By preserving the sharp distinction between "empirical" and "transcendental" elements, he seems to agree with Kant; yet his rejection of the usual interpretation of the distinction between noumenon and phenomenon makes one wonder). At any rate, the pure understanding, in this original representation-to-itself of unity is transcendental apperception. Cf. ibid., p. 77: "Der reine Verstand handelt in seinem ursprünglichen Sich-vorhalten von Einheit als transzendentale Apperzeption."

70 A 118, quoted in ibid., p. 78.

71 See Richardson, op.cit., pp. 126 f.

72 ibid., pp. KPM, pp. 78 f. It will be our contention later that this entire matter can be substantially simplified by showing the possibility of an experiential unity of consciousness, which, in its initial presentational moments is a matter of being, the operation of the time-bound imagination - period. structured by

73 "... 'der Sinn' zwar hinnimmt, . . . in ihm selbst aber dergleichen wie eine Verbindlichkeit des Begegnenden 'nicht zu halten' ist. Diese muss jedoch ein endliches erkennen erfahren werden können, weil das endliche Wissen das Seiende nie als totum simul hat, sondern, wie Kant hier ausdrücklich sagt, das Begegnende 'zerstreut und einzeln angetroffen' wird. Damit aber das Antizommende als ein in Verbindlichkeit Stehender soll begegnen können, muss im vorkinem dergleichen wie 'Verbindung' verstanden sein. Im vorkinem Verbindung vorstellen, besagt aber: allererst dergleichen wie Verhältnis überhaupt vorstellend bilden. Diese -- Verhältnisse allererst 'bildende' -- ~~die~~ Kraft ist aber die reine Erbildungskraft." ibid., p. 80. Our contention will later be that the temporal relations constitutive of imagination are enough to provide "connectedness," at the level of

IV - FN (6)

immediate experience or presentation. If they are distorted, they give rise to an experienced disconnectedness. The function of the "therapeutic" will be the correction. Healing, or (best) conversion of these temporal relations. (It is, of course, never our intention to minimize that immediate experience is ever free of determination by "concepts," i.e., by pre-understanding. But the latter is the result of previous experience which has been correctly or incorrectly understood.)

74 Ibid., p. 80.

75 Ibid., pp. 80 f.

76 KPR, A 124, quoted in ibid., p. 81.

77 Richardson, op. cit., pp. 127 f.

78 See KPM, p. 85. "Eine solche Aufgabe führt aber dazu, die transzendentale Einbildungskraft in ihrer einigenden Funktion und damit das Sich-Bilden der Transzendenz und ihres Horizontes in seinem innersten Geschehen vorzuführen." Ibid., pp. 85 f.

79 Ibid., p. 86.

80 Ibid. "Die Zuwendung muss in sich ein vorbildendes Sichvorhalten von Angebohaftem überhaupt sein."

81 Ibid., pp. 86 f.

82 Ibid., p. 87. Heidegger says he is using the word Bild here in its most basic sense, according to which we say that landscape presents a beautiful "image" or a group or pitiful "image." Bild is equated with Anblick.

83 Ibid.

84 Ibid. "Sens-ating" in Richardson's translation of Versinnlichung,

see op. cit., p. 130. He admits that the result is "perhaps not very happy."

85 KPM, p. 96. Richardson, op. cit., pp. 130-133 discusses these schemata of empirical concepts as "the presentation of the rule by which a concept performs its function of limitation." Our later interpretation will avoid much of this discussion, as well as the obvious objections which linguistic analysis would raise at this point, by excluding the understanding and thus conceptualization and even naming ~~as we~~ from the constitution of experience as such.

86 Richardson, op. cit., p. 133.

87 KPM, p. 102.

88 Richardson, op. cit., p. 134.

89 KPM, p. 105.

90 Ibid., p. 108.

91 Ibid., p. 109.

92 Ibid., p. 110.

93 Quoted in ibid., p. 111. The emphasis is Kant's.

94 Ibid.

95 Ibid., p. 115. Precisely! It is not knowledge, as the next section will attempt to make manifest. Nonetheless it is extremely important, not only for the reasons Heidegger gives in all his writings, but also because it is the structure of (in Lønergan's terms) the first level of consciousness, of experience -- though we will qualify somewhat the Kantian-Heideggerian depiction of that structure, removing all talk of a Kantian transcendental subject, ~~and~~ Kantian

and pure schemata, IV - FN (7)
categories, Kantian sense understanding, etc., and attempting,
from what is salvaged of Heidegger's interpretation, to construct
empirically the basic structure of the presentational level of
consciousness. From this we shall be able to speak of
"psychic conversion," in itself and as the foundation for
theology, and to delineate the authentic function of "the
therapeutic."

96 Ibid.

97 Ibid.

98 Quoted in Churchill's introductions to English translation
of ibid., p. xix.

99 Ibid., pp. 183.

100 Ibid.

101 For the material in ~~section~~ under no. 1, see ibid., pp.
117-124.

102 For no. 2, see ibid., pp. 124-127.

103 For a fascinating study on the imagination as capax of
more than the "imaginary," see Henry Corbin, "Mundus Imaginis" or "The Imaginary and the Imaginal," Spring: An Annual of Archetypal Psychology and Jungian Thought, (1973), pp. 1-19.

104 For no. 3, see KPM, pp. 127-130.

105 Ibid., p. 132.

106 Ibid., p. 133. "So gibt gerade erst die ursprüngliche
Interpretation der reinen Anschauung als reinster Einbildungskraft
die Möglichkeit, positiv aufzuhellen, was das in der reinen
Anschauung Augeschaute ist. Als vorausgegangenes Bilden eines reinen
untheoretischen und ein Kantschen Sinnes umgegenständlichen

Ausblickes ermöglicht die reine Auseinandersetzung gerade, dass das in ihrem ~~z~~ Horizont sich bewegende empirische Anschauen der räumlich-zeitlichen Dinge nicht erst den Raum und die Zeit anzuschauen braucht im Sinne einer diese Mannigfaltigkeiten erst feststellenden Erfassung." Ibid. For no. 4, see ibid., pp. 180-134.

107 Ibid., pp. 134 f. We raise as a question here whether the emergence of the conscious ego from "the unconscious" as described by Erich Neumann is not quite germane to this problem. See Neumann, The Origins and History of Consciousness (Princeton; Bollingen Series XII, 1971). If we are correct in this hypothesis, then Jungian psychology may give us a perspective for interpreting the "forgetfulness" of Being which Heidegger insists has characterized Western thinking since the Greeks. If this emergence of the conscious ego is "axial" in Gevers' sense, our recovery of the Being-question (Heidegger) or recovery of totality through deconstruction (Neumann) may not only be intrinsically related to one another but may be essential features of the axial character of our age's exigence for "maturity" (Lonergan).

108 ~~See~~ KPM, p. 139. The abandonment of the specifically Kantian "transcendental" framework will, in one sense, lessen the complexity or at least the abstractness of this position and render it more empirical.

109 Ibid., pp. 140 f.

110 Ibid., p. 141. "Wenngleich es wie eine Regelnde Regel nur da ist im hinnehmenden Sich-regeln-fassen, dann kann die 'Idee' als Vorstellung der Regeln nur vorstellen in der Weise eines Hinnahmens."

111 For no. 5, see ibid., pp. 134-142.

112 Ibid., p. 142: "... sich stellen unter eine selbst-gegebene Notwendigkeit."

113 Here we would seem to have the kernel of Heidegger's notion of authenticity. I would maintain that this is also the genuine meaning of the first "transcendental imperative" in Sartrean's notion of authenticity, which, from this perspective, can only be judged to be infelicitously worded, "Be attentive." This "attentiveness," when self-conscious and intended, would mean something along the order of: ~~allow your experience~~ "place yourself under the necessity of experiencing as a time-bound, finite being which lets beings be" (!). It is this that is brought about by "psychic conversion," the genuine effect of "the therapeutic."

114 Ibid. ~~—~~ (Emphasis added).

115 Ibid., p. 144.

116 Ibid., p. 145.

117 Ibid.

118 Ibid., p. 146. For no. 6, see pp. 143-146.

119 Ibid., p. 153.

120 Ibid., pp. 155 f. For no. 7, see pp. 146-156.

121 Ibid., p. 157.

122 What follows is the most important part of this entire section; it is what, I believe, must be retained from the Kant-study as central to the "psychic" structure of human subjectivity and, consequently and among other things, foundational for theology.

123 Richardson, op. cit., p. 144.

124 Ibid., pp. 144 f.

125. Ibid., p. 170.