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## INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this paper is to examine certain works of the later Heidegger with a special view to what he says in these works concerning the relation of Being to the essence of man. We can consider this paper as an effort to determine and clarify the meaning of the following three statements which occur in the important work, An Introduction to Metaphysics:

1. The determination of the essence of man is never an answer but essentially a question.
2. The asking of this question and the decision in this question are historical, and not merely in a general sense; not this question is the very essence of history. 2
3. The question of what man is must always be taken in its essential bond with the question of how it stands with Being. The question of man is not an anthropological question but a historically meta-physical question. The question cannot be adequately asked in the domain of traditional metaphysics which remains essentially 'physics.' 1

The works which we shall examine in detail are On the Essence of Truth, An Introduction to Metaphysics, and the "Letter on Humanism." Our effort will be directed solely to understanding what Heidegger is saying and in no way to passing judgment, particularly negative judgment, on what he says. In perhaps un-Heideggerian fashion, our concern will be to present and attempt to give thought to, not the un-said, but the said. The two points which we trust will be clearest are: 1. that the "Letter on Humanism" gives a precision to the meaning of the second statement and thus of the historical character of the question before us-- a precision not found in the two earlier works; and, 2. that there is a shift in mood within the later Heidegger away from self-

assertive violence to the idea of man as "shepherd of Being," and even to gratitude for Being's favor (in Was heisst Denken?, a work which we shall not examine here).

CHAPTER ONE: AN INTRODUCTION  
TO METAPHYSICS AND ON THE  
ESSENCE OF TRUTH

The relation of Being to the essence of man has, as Richardson notes,<sup>2</sup> been a problem occupying Heidegger's attention ever since Being and Time (SZ). It might perhaps be best for us to begin by examining certain indications presented in An Introduction to Metaphysics (EI), one of the earliest written works of the later Heidegger. The largest single section of this work discusses the theme "Being and Thinking" and is thus concerned with the relationship between Being and man's essence. Unlike becoming and appearance, which are situated, with Being, in the realm of beings, thinking "sets itself off against Being in such a way that Being is placed before . . . it and consequently stands opposed to it as an object."<sup>3</sup> Heidegger tells us that he is seeking to return to the origins of this distinction, which has proved to be of mammoth significance not only in Western philosophy but in all of Western history.

The characteristics of thinking, as the latter is usually understood, are summarized as follows:

1. Representation 'of our own accord'--considered as a uniquely free act.<sup>4</sup>
2. Representation as analytical synthesis.
3. Grasp of the universal through re-presentation.<sup>5</sup>

Heidegger's principal effort in the pages that follow is to show that thinking, in its relation to Being, cannot simply be placed alongside our other "faculties," such as willing, feeling, etc., on the grounds that all involve a relation to beings. Rather, "the differentiation springs from an initial inner union between thinking and Being itself. The formula 'Being and thinking' designates a differentiation that is demanded as it were by Being itself."<sup>6</sup>

The substantiation of this thesis is initiated by a discussion of the meaning of logos, of both its original meaning and its later derived meanings, which are connected with the ordinary connotation of "logic." While "logic" is taken to be the philosophical doctrine of thinking, the term itself is an abbreviation of epistēmē logike, the science of the logos. Logos is here taken to mean, not "thinking," but "statement." What is the connection between statement and thinking? How did the science of statement come to be regarded as the doctrine of thinking?

Thinking was not originally studied by the science of statement. The origin of the separation of Being and thinking cannot be understood from a study of logic, for the latter arose only after this separation had taken place. We can understand this separation only in terms of an unfolding of the question of Being itself.<sup>7</sup>

The key to understanding the initial unity between Being and thinking, between physis and logos, lies in freeing ourselves from the idea that the original meaning of logos and legein was "thought, understanding, and reason."<sup>8</sup> In addition, logos did not originally signify speech, statement. Rather, "Lego, legein, Latin lerere, is the same as the German word 'lesen' (to gather, collect, read)."<sup>9</sup> Even after the word logos came to mean speech, discourse, and statement, "it retained its original meaning in the sense of 'relation of the one to the other.'"<sup>10</sup>

Physis, Being, originally meant "the power that emerges . . . , permanent presence . . . , appearing, manifest presence."<sup>11</sup> Heraclitus and Parmenides, in whom Heidegger finds a similarity not often acknowledged by other interpreters,<sup>12</sup> both indicate an original connection between Being so understood and logos. Heidegger first cites Fragments One and Two of Heraclitus. We shall quote both of them in full, in order to facilitate the understanding of Heidegger's ensuing discussion.

Fragment 1: But while the logos remains always this, men remain uncomprehending (axynetoi), both before they have heard and just after they have heard. For everything becomes a being in accordance with this logos, kata ton logon tonde; but they (men) resemble those who have never in their experience ventured anything, although they try their hand at words and works, such as I perform, separating all things kata physin, according to Being and explaining how they behave. As to the other men (the other men as they all are, hoi polloi), from them what they actually do when awake is hidden, just as what they have done in sleep is hidden from them afterward.

Fragment 2: Therefore it is necessary to follow it, i.e. to adhere to togetherness in the Being; but though the logos is this togetherness in the being, the many live as though each had his own understanding (opinion).<sup>13</sup>

Heidegger concludes: " . . . 1) permanence and endurance are characteristic of the logos; 2) it is togetherness in beings, the togetherness of all beings, that which gathers; 3) everything that happens, i.e. that comes into Being, stands there in accordance with this permanent togetherness; this is the dominant power."<sup>14</sup>

How do we know that logos, thus understood as "permanent gathering," is to be identified with physis, Being? We are told that men are axynetoi, "those who do not bring together" the collectedness; they indeed hear words but without heeding the logos. There are thus two kinds of hearing: "Here hearing scatters and diffuses itself in what is commonly believed and said, in hearsay, in doxa, appearance. True hearing has nothing to do with ear and mouth, but means: to follow the logos and what it is, namely the collectedness of the being itself."<sup>15</sup>

Fragment 72 of Heraclitus gives Heidegger the clinching proof of the original identification of logos with physis: "For what they associate with most closely, the logos, to it they turn their back; and what they encounter every day seems strange to them." Now, that which men have always to do with and yet are always alien from, is precisely Being. "Men have always to do with Being in that they are always dealing with beings; it is alien to them in that they turn away from Being, because they do not grasp it but suppose that beings are only beings and

nothing more."<sup>16</sup> Thrashing about in beings, each man holds obstinately to his own opinion and is thus prevented from "reaching out to what is gathered together in itself."<sup>17</sup>

Hearing and speaking are, of course, closely related. Thus Heidegger can say, after a discussion of true hearing and of mere vorbiage (open): "There can be true speaking and hearing only if they are directed in advance toward Being, the logos. Only where the logos discloses itself does the phonetic sound become a word. Only where the Being of beings is heard does a mere casual listening become a hearing."<sup>18</sup> Those who cannot bring Dasein to stand in the Being of beings can neither hear nor speak. They cannot master the word. Thus we see, in 1935, a foreshadowing of the later insistence on language as a key element in the relation between Being and the essence of man.

But what does it mean to bring Dasein to stand in Being? Heidegger offers us a clue while still discussing Heraclitus. Being, aletheia, logos, is only for the strong,<sup>19</sup> for those who engage, as we shall see, with violence in the struggle with Being. We see more clearly what this means when he discusses Parmenides' axiom, "To gar auto noein estin te kai einai," which Heidegger translates, "There is a reciprocal bond between apprehension and Being."<sup>20</sup> Eintai, Being, is of course understood in the sense of physis, emerging (from concealment), abiding (in the light) presence. Noein is translated into German as verhehmen,



i.e., "to apprehend," and is given two complementary meanings, one of which stresses "passivity," the other a more "active" stance. "To apprehend means to accept, to let something (namely that which shows itself, which appears) come to one. Vernehmen means also to hear a witness, to question him and so determine the facts, to establish how a matter stands." Noein is a "receptive bringing-to-stand."<sup>21</sup> To auto speaks of a unity, not in the sense of equivalence, but in that of "the belonging-together of antagonisms."<sup>22</sup> Being and apprehending are one in a contending sense.

But what does this mean? The oneness is due to the fact that "apprehension occurs for the sake of Being" and shapes in Being's power; the connotation of contention is due to the fact that apprehension must not only let Being be, i.e., let it enter into unconcealment; it must also bring Being to stand, just as, "when troops prepare to receive the enemy, it is in the hope of stopping him at the very least, of bringing him to stand."<sup>23</sup> Apprehension belongs to Being, occurs for the sake of Being, but only if it brings Being to stand. "Being dominates, but because and insofar as it dominates and appears, appearing and with it apprehension must also occur."<sup>24</sup>

The question which we asked a moment ago, however, had to do with bringing Dasein to stand in Being. How does the foregoing discussion relate to this question? What does the discussion of noein tell us about being-human? Certainly, a

proposition of Parmenides, "The same is apprehension and that for the sake of which apprehension occurs," which tells us that apprehension belongs to Being, suggests that man too, if he is to share in this apprehension, must belong to Being, in fact that the essence of being-human is determined by the particular manner in which man belongs to Being. Apprehension, says Heidegger, is precisely what determines the essence of being-human: apprehension, i.e., the receptive bringing-to-stand of Being. Being and apprehension, i.e., man, belong together. More precisely, " . . . apprehension is . . . a process in which man first enters into history as a being . . . i.e., (in the literal sense) comes into Being. Apprehension is not a function that man has as an attribute, but rather the other way around: apprehension is the happening that has man."<sup>25</sup> Parmenides' maxim expresses "a definition of the essence of man from out of the essence of Being itself."<sup>26</sup>

But we still have not discovered what it means to "being Dasein to stand in Being." Being is set apart, differentiated, in conflict, in polemos. We learn who man is "when man contends with beings, striving to bring them into their Being, i.e., into limit and form, that is to say when he projects something new (not yet present), when he creates original poetry, when he builds poetically."<sup>27</sup> By commenting on the first chorus of Sophocles' Antigone, Heidegger tells us something of this confrontation.

Man, Sophocles claims, is the strangest (to deinotaton) of all that is strange. The Greek word deinon has two meanings; in

the present context, the first of those meanings refers to the totality of beings, the second to man. First, deinon means both the overpowering power that compels panic fear and "the collected, silent awe that vibrates with its own rhythm." That is, " . . . where the overpowering irrupts, it can hold its overpowering power in check"--which makes it still more terrible and remote. Secondly, deinon means "one who uses power, who not only disposes of power (Gewalt), but is violent (gewalt-tätig), insofar as the use of power is the basic trait not only of his action but also of his Dasein (There-being)."<sup>28</sup>

Why is man deinon in this second sense? First, because he belongs to Being and thus "remains exposed within this overpowering power"; second, because "he gathers the power of the overpowering, and brings it to manifestness."<sup>29</sup> He is the most powerful, deinotaton, because he is "violent in the midst of the overpowering."<sup>30</sup>

Heidegger translates deinon as "strange," in the sense of "uncanny" (unheimliche) because it is the uncanny which drives us out of the "homely," into the unhomely, the unfamiliar (unheimliche). In addition, however, to living amid the strange, man "departs from his customary, familiar limits, because he is the violent one, who, tending toward the strange in the sense of the over-powering, surpasses the limit of the familiar."<sup>31</sup>

The designation of man as deinon is not merely a particular characterization of man, but expresses "the basic trait of the human essence, within which all other traits must find their place."<sup>32</sup> To understand this, we must experience "the power of appearance and the struggle with it as an essential part of Dasein."<sup>33</sup> We shall thus also come to appreciate better what it means to bring Dasein to stand in Being and perhaps we shall come closer to an awareness of why the question of the essence of man, as part of the inquiry about Being, is "the very essence of history."<sup>34</sup>

The mention of the struggle with appearance brings us to an earlier section in EM. We have now seen the immediate context in which the three statements which are the subject of this paper are expressed. We shall return to this section on "Being and thinking," but now must look at the section on "Being and appearance," in order to determine the meaning of Dasein's struggle with appearance.

The German word for appearance, Schein, actually has three meanings: "1) Schein as radiance and glow; 2) Schein and Scheinen as appearing, as coming to light; 3) Schein as mere appearance or semblance (Anschein)."<sup>35</sup> The second meaning is the condition of the possibility of the first and third meanings.

There is an inner connection between Being and appearance, in that physis, the realm of emerging and abiding, is also a "shining appearing." Phyein is phainesthai. Appearing, standing-there, standing-in-the-light, is "the very essence of Being."<sup>37</sup>

Truth, alētheia, unconcealment is also thus one with the essence (Wesen, the coming-to-pass) of Being, since whatever is, by definition emerges and becomes manifest. "In showing itself, the unconcealed as such comes to stand. Truth as un-concealment is not an appendage to Being."<sup>38</sup>

A consequence of the fact that appearing is part of the essence of Being is that Being, in appearing, takes on an aspect, doxa.

Doxa is the regard<sup>AN</sup> which a man stands, in a broader sense the regard (Ansehen, looking-at, esteem) which every being conceals and discloses in its appearance (Aussehen) (eidos, idea). . . . The aspect which a being has in itself, and which it can offer only for this reason, may in every case be perceived from this or that point of view. According to the diversity of viewpoint, the aspect that offers itself changes. Hence the aspect is always one that we take and make for ourselves. In experiencing and dealing with beings, we are always forming views of their appearance. Often we do so without looking closely at the thing itself. In various ways and for various reasons we form a view of the thing. We form an opinion about it. Sometimes the view that we advocate has no support in the thing itself. Then it is only a view, an assumption. We assume a thing to be thus or thus. Then all we have is an opinion.<sup>39</sup>

This is why we have the meaning of Schein in the sense of Anschein, semblance. Being, physis, "stands essentially and hence necessarily and permanently, in the possibility of an appearance which precisely covers over and conceals what the being in truth, i.e. in unconcealment, is."<sup>40</sup>

Appearance, then, belongs to beings. The story of the Greeks, until the rise of the Sophists, is a story of an enduring

struggle to "wrest Being from appearance and preserve it against appearance," i.e. in unconcealment.<sup>41</sup> This demands a truly great effort, having "one eye too many," as Hölderlin says of Oedipus, for " . . . appearance not only makes beings as such appear as what they actually are not; it not only distorts the beings whose appearance it is; no, it even cloaks itself as appearance insofar as it shows itself as Being. Because appearance thus essentially distorts itself in its cloaking and dissembling, we rightly say that appearance deceives."<sup>42</sup> Being, unconcealment, appearance--these three open up an area which Heidegger calls errance.

Two successive differentiations were demanded at the beginning of Greek philosophy: Being from appearance, and Being from non-Being.

. . . the man who holds to Being as it opens round him and whose adherence to beings is determined by his adherence to Being, must take three paths. If he is to take over Dasein in the radiance of Being, he must bring Being to stand, he must endure it in appearance and against appearance, and he must wrest both appearance and Being from the abyss of non-Being.<sup>43</sup>

Not only differentiation, but decision is called for. "Even the decision concerning the gods resided in (the) decision" made at the beginning of philosophy.<sup>44</sup>

Parmenides opened these three paths. Logos and noein characterize the first path, the way of Being. This way is called by Parmenides "noedful." We shall return to this later. The second path, the way of non-Being, cannot be traveled, for it has no "is" but it must be considered. The third path, that of

appearance, is taken by those who take disorientation as their guide, "the brotherhood of those who do not differentiate."

It appears to be the path of Being, and thus countless men travel it--and lose themselves entirely.

Parmenides does not believe in "primal innocents," in the manner of Being and truth. It is necessary to experience this third path, to know it as such, if Being is to disclose itself against it. The superiority of knowledge is given only to the man who experiences everything, who undertakes "the venture of Being, non-Being, and appearance, all at once," who brings Dasein to stand in Being through de-cision.

What is the ground of the close bond between Being and seeming? This is revealed in Heraclitus' saying, "Physis kryphesthai philei," i.e., Being (emerging appearing) inclines intrinsically to self-concealment," Heidegger interprets:

Since Being means emerging appearing, to issue forth from concealment--concealment, its origin in concealment, belongs to it essentially. This origin lies in the essence of Being, of the manifest as such. Being inclines back toward it, both in great silence and mystery and in banal disroption and occultation.<sup>45</sup>

Richardson's comments at this point are very helpful.

He asks why Heidegger does not consider the possibility of some being without concealment of any kind, "transparent self-disclosure as such," and suggests that such a being would not come within the sphere of the problem which Heidegger is here concerned with. For Heidegger is concerned only with finite beings and finitude is precisely what comports obscurity, concealment.

For a being is that which comes to stand on its own in abiding fashion by revealing itself in the light of truth. To take up a stand thus is to define the limits (therefore comports the finitude) of that being. Now this "finit-izing" of a being is not a constricti~~on~~ from without. Still less is it a deficiency in the being by reason of some detrimental defect. On the contrary, it is the being's restricting of itself to its own confines, its self-containment, hence the Being of the being by which it is what it is in distinction from what is not a being. For a being to come to stand on its own, then, means for it to establish a frontier for itself. It is the sense of "frontier" that the Greeks gave to the word "end" (telos), so that this "end" meant not simply the point at which the being ceases to be, but the ending (Endung) of the being in the sense of coming-to-perfection (Vollendung). So it is that the limit and end are not that point at which a being ceases but where it begins to be. . . .

. . . Being is that by which beings stand on their own in the light of truth; to take a stand is to be self-contained within one's limits, so, to be limited. All emergence into non-concealment, therefore, is finite, sc. limited by continual concealment, and this in virtue of Being itself, by reason of which emergence takes place. The fundamental reason why physis necessarily conceals itself in revealing itself, and therefore why Being is inextricably intertwined with seeming-to-be, is that the Being in question is finite.<sup>46</sup>

In order to see more clearly what it means that Being inclines to concealment both in mystery and in banal distortion, as well as for a fuller elucidation of all that is mentioned in the above paragraph from EM, we must look back to the lecture of 1930, Vom Wesen der Wahrheit (WV). Only a close look at this lecture will enable us to see with much clarity what the Heidegger of EM might have meant by "bifing Dasein to stand in Being;" WV helps us to "experience the power of appearance and the struggle with it as an essential part of Dasein."<sup>47</sup>



As is obvious from the title of the lecture, the question to be raised about truth is an essential question. As such, it must fix its attention on "the one thing that is the mark of 'truth' of every kind."<sup>48</sup> The conventional doctrine of truth finds this essential mark in a twofold correspondence: "firstly the correspondence of a thing with the idea of it as conceived in advance, and secondly the correspondence of that which is intended by the statement with the thing itself."<sup>49</sup> Truth is thus conceived as rightness (Richtigkeit), as adaequatio rei ad intellectum. In medieval Christian theology, adaequatio rei (creandae) ad intellectum divinum guarantees veritas as adaequatio intellectus(humani) ad rem(creatum). In modern philosophy, the object or thing conforms to reason's idea of it, and reason is a law unto itself, not requiring any basis in conformity to the divine idea of it: the workings of earthly reasoning have a self-evident universal validity. Untruth is either the non-conformity of the thing with its essence or the non-conformity of statement with thing. Untruth is excluded from the nature of truth and thus "can be left out of account when it is a matter of coming to grips with the pure essence of truth."<sup>50</sup>

Of this conventional notion of truth Heidegger says:

The impression is given--wrongly--that this definition of the essence of truth is independent of the explanation of the essential nature of all that 'is,' of its very Being--which explanation always involves a corresponding explanation of the essential nature of man as the vehicle and perfecter of the intellectus.<sup>51</sup>

In other words, it leaves out of account the relation between Being and the essence of man, i.e. truth as unconcealment. He is not claiming that agreement is impossible or that this conception is without value, but that agreement is not the essence of truth. By essence he means "the basis of the inner possibility,"<sup>52</sup> i.e. the condition of possibility.

In the second chapter of the lecture Heidegger considers this question of the "inner possibility of agreement," i.e. of the agreement of a proposition or representative statement to the thing represented. Here he is interested simply in detailing what this possibility implies; in the next chapter he discusses its condition or basis. The agreement of a representative statement with the thing represented--: that is to say, "The representative statement has its say about the thing represented, stating it to be such as it is."<sup>53</sup> Representation is defined as "letting something take up a position opposite to us, as an object."<sup>54</sup> The "original seat" of this agreement does not lie in the representative statement nor even in the representation, but in that Heidegger refers to as "the openness of comportment."<sup>55</sup> Representation, as here defined, depends on there being an open domain across which the thing or object must come; it must approach us while standing fast in itself and manifesting itself. The openness of the open domain is not created by representation but entered into by open comportment, which always relates to something open as such, to something which is manifest, present, to das Seiende.<sup>56</sup>

The open domain is "what SZ called the World, the matrix of relationships (Total Meaningfulness) which constitutes the horizon of There-being's potentialities--itself not a being but that within which There-being and other beings meet when one of these potential relations comes-to-pass as an encounter."<sup>57</sup> By coming across this open domain toward us, beings become capable of expression by taking up their stand before open comportment as and how they are what they are. The openness of comportment issues in submission on the part of the statement to a directive enjoining agreement to beings as they are. Because of open comportment, beings can become a criterion for the adequacy of the statement; thus open comportment is in itself a kind of criterion.

But what is the basis of the possibility of open comportment itself and of its functioning as a criterion? Comportment, to be a criterion, must be somehow pre-established, pre-given; not only that: it must somehow have freed itself (sich freigesprochen hat) so that it can become open to a manifestation which comes across the domain of openness to it. It is free precisely in order to submit to itself as a binding openness and thus to reveal what approaches. Comportment must be free to enter into the openness of the open domain and relate to what is manifest in such a way that it reveals it as it is. If open comportment is the basis of the possibility of rightness, freedom is the basis of the possibility of open comportment. Thus freedom is the ground, the ultimate essence of truth.<sup>58</sup>

But what is freedom? It is precisely the letting-be of what is, das Seiende. And "to let a being be what it is means participating in something open and its openness."<sup>59</sup> The openness of what is open is the original meaning of ta alēthēa, the Unconcealed. The word which we usually translate as "truth," alētheia, would be better translated as "unconcealment" or "revelment"; such a translation would lead us beyond our notion of truth as propositional rightness to "that still uncomprehended quality: the revealedness and revelation of beings."<sup>60</sup>

But what of letting-be? Letting-be is seen in the retirement before beings, so that they may reveal themselves as what and how they are, into which the participation in the openness of what is open develops. Open comportment, as letting-be, is ~~what~~ <sup>what</sup> ~~is~~ <sup>is</sup> ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> ~~unconcealment~~ <sup>unconcealment</sup> of beings.<sup>61</sup>

It is at this point in the works we shall study here that the relation of our question about Being and the essence of men (ek-sistence) to history first emerges, and indeed in a cryptic fashion. History begins with ek-sistence, with the first experience of the question, Was ist das Seiende, ti to on, what are beings? The totality of beings-as-such is here given the name physis, nature, in the sense of an "unfolding presence."<sup>62</sup> The preservation of the unconcealment of this unfolding presence in the quest for beings as such marks the beginning of history.

"The initial revelation of beings-in-totality, the quest for beings as such, and the beginning of the history of the West are one and the same thing."<sup>63</sup>

Freedom in the sense of letting-be is not a property which man possesses; rather freedom as ek-sistent, revelatory There-being, possesses man, conferring on him the relationship to beings-in-totality which grounds history. Truth as unconcealment and history thus are related at least in this, that they are grounded in freedom, conceived as letting-be. Freedom is not only the basis of the possibility of the approximation of representation to beings; in addition, because man-ek-sists, he "has his history and all its possibilities guaranteed him in the revelation of beings-in-totality. The manner in which the original nature of truth comes-to-pass gives rise to the rare and simply decisions of history."<sup>64</sup> Only ek-sistent Dasein which lets-be can be confronted with a freedom in the sense of a "choice between actual possibilities." Two senses of freedom, it would seem, are brought out here: the freedom which ek-sistence itself is and the consequent freedom of choice between or among possibilities, among which would be the possibilities of affirming or denying ek-sistence as letting-be. This latter point must be further qualified.

Both the essence of truth and the consequent relation to history are complicated by the fact that truth, precisely as

freedom, prevents historical man from really letting beings be what they are and as they are. "Beings are then covered up and distorted. Illusion comes into its own. The essential negation of truth, its 'dis-essence,' makes its appearance."<sup>65</sup> This dis-essence of truth is not, however, due to man's negligence, since ek-sistent freedom is not a property of man. "Untruth must derive from the essence of truth" itself.<sup>66</sup> The non-essence of truth is part of its essence and not simply to be equated with the wrongness of an opinion.

It is the "in-totality" aspect of "beings-in-totality" that is at the root of the problem for Heidegger in WW. This "in-totality", in the perspective of everyday activities, remains indeterminate, since it cannot be understood in terms of what is "ready-to-hand" and most easily thought of. Beings-in-totality remain concealed, despite the fact that letting-be lets each thing be as it is only because comportment is attuned to beings-in-totality. Letting-be is a concealment, a dissimulation of beings-in-totality.

This concealment is prior to all revelation of this or that being and to the letting-be of beings. But letting-be can, by revealing, conceal not only beings-in-totality but this very concealment itself. This Heidegger refers to as "the dissimulation of the dissimulated," "mystery."<sup>67</sup> The dissimulation of the dissimulated of beings-in-totality, mystery, "pervades the whole of man's There-being."<sup>68</sup>

Mystery is thus the non-essence of truth. Yet it remains essential to the essence of truth and not, as we would ordinarily suppose, indifferent to this essence. When man remains fixed in the region of the controllable and practicable, he displays "an unwillingness to let the dissimulation of the dissimulated have full dominion."<sup>69</sup> Mystery, the very dissimulation of dissimulation, itself becomes lost in oblivion! It is in this forgetfulness of mystery that man is abandoned to his own resources, clinging to the "certainties of selfhood" and operating from only the most immediate of needs and intentions. Ek-sistent man thus in-sists, "Ilel, obstinately holds fast to that which beings, as though open of and in themselves, offer him."<sup>70</sup> He is still ek-sistent, since he takes beings as a measure and guide, but as turned away from the mystery he simultaneously in-sists.

The forgetfulness of the dissimulation of dissimulation is called by Heidegger die Irre, "errance." Errance is part of the constitution or structure of There-being. It is "the essential counter-essence of the original essence of truth (since) it opens out as the manifest theatre for all counterplay to essential truth."<sup>71</sup>

The wrongness or inadequacy of a judgment is seen by Heidegger to be the most superficial way of erring. "The errance in which historical man must always walk, which makes his road erratic, is essentially one with the manifest character of beings. Errance dominates man through and through by leading him astray."<sup>72</sup>

On the other hand, by reason of the very aberration (Beirrunn) of errance, man is given the possibility, which he can always "extract from his essence," of not allowing errance to lead him to overlook mystery.<sup>73</sup> Richardson interprets:

(Errance) 'oppresses' man and by this oppression attains a certain domination over the mystery, insofar as it keeps the mystery a victim of forgottenness. Thus There-being must submit to what seems to be a double alterity: the oppression by errance and at the same time the domination of the mystery. The result is a tension in There-being in the form of a distress out of the constraint imposed upon it from this double ~~essence~~ errance on the one hand, mystery on the other. There-being oscillates endlessly between the two. The non-truth which we call 'errance' and the non-truth which we call 'mystery' combine, and both together, forming as they do the complete non-essence of truth, help to constitute the full essence of truth itself, so, that essence which includes within itself its own most proper non-essence, therefore negativity. . . . (But) when There-being comprehends errance as such, it recognizes it to be but the reverse side of its own forgetfulness of the mystery, and this is ipso facto to re-collect the mystery. By this re-collection, There-being is already under way towards a surrender to domination by the mystery through authentic resolve in its regard.<sup>74</sup>

There-being becomes open to mystery by letting-be the total onsemble of beings as such. This is a more profound and original asking of the question of the essential essence of truth than is accomplished even by locating the condition of propositional rightness in freedom, for this latter recognition, important as it is, has not yet opened up the essential character of resolve in its orientation to mystery, in its gazing out of errance into mystery. The question that is asked in authentic resolve is the question of the Being of beings itself.



The question of the Being of beings captures in words the essential freedom of ek-sistence. Heidegger maintains that those who have ears for this question determine man's place in history. The initial raising of this question is also the beginning both of philosophy and of its counterpart, sound common sense become Sophism, through the brushing<sup>aside</sup> of questioning. The meditations of philosophy have a gentleness in their facing of mystery, in their refusal to deny the dissimulation of what-is in totality; their open resolve is also marked by a hardness which forces the essence of dissimulation into the open. By doing so, philosophy brings the question of the essence of truth into essential coincidence with the question of the truth of essence, i.e. of Being itself, for the essential core of the ek-sistent freedom of letting-be which is the basis of the possibility of propositional rightness is to be found in dissimulation and errance, in the "self-dissimulation of the unveiling of the 'meaning' of what we call 'Being,'" i.e. coming-to-presence. The original essence of truth lies in the unveiling of presencing (Being), which conceals itself as it reveals itself, and which, in its relation to ek-sistent freedom (the essence of man) grounds the possibility of open resolve toward the mystery of dissimulation and of errance, abandonment to forgottenness of the mystery.

Richardson explains more fully the proposition, "The essence of truth is the truth of essence":

In this categorical form, the proposition does not appear in the original text, but is first formulated in the note to the second edition (1949). Yet even in the original it is suggested more reticently. . . .

. . . . The author does not say explicitly until 1949 that (Essence, Wesen) is to be taken as a verb, but there is no difficulty in seeing that this was what was intended also in 1930. He does say in the original, however, that in the concept of "Essence" . . . philosophy thinks Being, " . . . which we have been accustomed for a long time to consider only as beings-(as-such)-in-their-totality." Now to the concept of beings-as-such-in-their-totality corresponds what the early Greeks meant by physis, sc. not any particular sphere of beings but the whole ensemble, " . . . and, indeed, in the sense of the process of emerging-into-presence. . . . " Being in the sense of Essence, then, means coming-to-presence, and a being, sc. that-which-is, or that-which-is-open, is that-which-comes-to-a-presence. . . . Being . . . holds sway; it is an emerging-into-presence that is an "origin," that takes the initiative with which philosophy in the West began.<sup>75</sup>

The finitude of truth is due to the fact that Being itself is essentially negated, and not simply to the finitude of There-being.

. . . Errance is so inscribed in Being as a modality of its intrinsic negativity that, although interior to Being, it opens up as itself a type of open domain which is Being's anti-essence, where every possible fashion of contaminating truth has free play.<sup>76</sup>

Heidegger does not as yet link this negativity of Being closely with history. Indeed his discussion of the relation of what he has said concerning freedom, mystery, errance, and truth to the problem of "the rare and simple decisions of history" is problematic, to say the least. Certainly it is not at all clear from WW why the question concerning the essence of man in its relation to Being is the very essence of history, although this much seems to be said, in other words, even in WW.

Finally, as is again noted by Richardson, thought is conceived in a two-fold manner in NW: as proceeding from There-being in resolve and as proceeding from Being itself in the "utterance" or "artificialiveness" of the ontological difference between Being and beings. The sense of the latter meaning and the connection between the two meanings is still obscure.

We return now to EM. Our discussion of NW was prompted by Heidegger's interpretation of Parmenides' three ways and in particular by Parmenides' saying, "Physis kryptesthai philai," i.e. "Being (emerging appearing) inclines intrinsically to self-concealment." We can see more clearly now why Heidegger interprets Parmenides to say that concealment belongs essentially to Being. We have now a clearer picture of the theme of struggle with the power of appearance which will mark the rest of our discussion of EM.

The effort to interpret Parmenides' statement, "To gar auto noein estin te kai einai," ("There is a reciprocal bond between apprehension and Being") had taken Heidegger into an exposition and analysis of Sophocles' first chorus in Antigone, where, as we have seen, man is depicted as the strangest of all that is strange, because he both remains exposed within the overpowering power of beings-in-totality and because he gathers its power and brings it to manifestness. Man is violent against the overpowering, cast out of relation to the familiar and destined to ruin and catastrophe.

The violent men are the creators who, "pre-eminent in the historical place (polis), . . . become at the same time apolis, without city and place, lonely, strange, and alien, without issue amid beings-in-totality, at the same time without statute and limit, without structure and order, because they themselves as creators must first create all this."<sup>77</sup> At least in this sense, then, we can see some relation between the Being-man correlation and history. Those men who use power to create, who are violent against the overpowering, are the creators of the polis in the sense of the site of history. History is not a matter of development or evolution; rather its beginning is the strangest and mightiest.

That comes afterward is not development but the flattening that results from mere spreading out; it is inability to retain the beginning. . . . That strangest of all beings is what he is because he harbors such a beginning in which everything all at once burst from superabundance into the overpowering and strove to master it.<sup>78</sup>

The overpowering is spoken of by Sophocles in terms, on the one hand, of the sea, the earth, the animal, and, on the other hand, of language, understanding, feeling, passion, building. The latter group reigns within man but as a power that he must take upon himself.<sup>79</sup> These are not powers which man uses; rather they alone enable him to be a man. Man finds his way to them and thus finds himself as the violent one, the wielder of power. These powers, no less than those of earth, sea, and animal, must be mastered in violence. If man masters these powers, then "beings

open up as such when man moves into them<sup>80</sup> One of the major questions which we will have to raise is: in the "Letter on Humanism" and later writings, does man still find himself precisely as the violent one, the wielder of power, when he finds his way to language, understanding, and building?

One way in which the violence of man moves with reference to the power of the overpowering is through technē, knowledge as "the insistent looking out beyond what is given at any time."<sup>81</sup> Such looking out is what brings Being to stand in the work, stabilizes it in something present. Violence as technē comes up against the overpowering as dikē, "the governing structure which compels adaptation and compliance."<sup>82</sup> Man violently carries Being into the overpowering but he can never fully master it. The conflict creates the possibility--no, the necessity--of man's disaster. "Violence against the preponderant power of Being must shatter against Being, if Being rules in its essence, as physis, as emerging power."<sup>83</sup> Richardson interprets:

Being is emergent Power; but emergence as such implies concealment out of which, or within which, it takes place, so that this concealment (non-emergence, negativity, finitude) is intrinsic to the process, not only in its inception but in its duration; when the emergence comes-to-pass in a 'place' of disclosure, therefore takes-'place' in a There, this, too, must be permeated by negativity (finitude) and therefore comes to an end which permeates it at every moment from the very beginning; this always immanent ending may be characterized as death (when There is considered in a more anthropological context) or as being dashed to pieces (if the context remain 'ontological,' where Being is considered as dynamic power), and language ~~must~~ accordingly. Briefly: the There is potentiality-unto-death (unto violent disintegration) because Being's emergence unto truth, which takes place in it and through it, is ineluctably finite.<sup>84</sup>

In line with the general movement of the later Heidegger, Being takes explicit primacy over There-being in the conception of death.

. . . what characterizes the finitude of There . . . is grounded in the inevitably finite character of the emergence of Being into truth. It is subject, then, to the same law which dictates that Being necessarily conceal itself in revealing itself, sc. that Being be inextricably intertwined with seeming-to-be: all emergence is finite.<sup>85</sup>

Man has been thrown into the disaster-bound affliction of There-being because the overpowering, Being,

. . . in order to appear in its power, requires a place, a scene of disclosure. The essence of being-human opens up to us only when understood through this need completed by Being itself. The There-being of historical man means: to be posited as the breach into which the preponderant power of Being bursts in its appearing,<sup>86</sup> in order that this breach itself should shatter against Being.

Being accomplishes itself as history in the There-being of historical man. Human There-being is "an incident, the incident in which suddenly the unbound powers of Being come forth and are accomplished as history" through the violence of the one who finds his way to language, knowledge, and building and to mastering the environment.

The reciprocal relationship between technē and dikē is is the same relationship as that between noein and einaí in Parmenides' maxim, to gar auto noein estin to kai einaí. Apprehension in its bond with Being demands violence; violence is a need endured in struggle; and apprehension is expressly related to the logos, which is the ground of being-human. Thus apprehension is to Being as technē to dikē; there is a need for

violence in the struggle with dike; and techné is the violence of knowledge, the deinon which is man.

Thus Heidegger proceeds to show three things:

1. Apprehension is no mere process, but a de-cision.
2. Apprehension stands in an essential kinship with the logos. The logos is a need.
3. The logos is the essential foundation of language. As such it is a struggle and the ground on which man's historical There-being is build in the midst of the essent as a whole.<sup>87</sup>

In defense of the first statement, Heidegger relies on his previous characterization of mooin as a receptive attitude toward the appearing of beings. It can be so only if it cuts between the three paths of Being,<sup>88</sup> non-Being,<sup>89</sup> and appearance,<sup>90</sup> and thus is itself a de-cision (Entscheidung) for Being, against nothing, and a struggle with appearance. It must use violence to achieve perseverance against everydayness. "The violence of this decisive departure along the path to the Being of beings wrests man out of his home in what happens to be nearest and most familiar to him."<sup>91</sup>

As Richardson notes,<sup>92</sup> this decision for Being, combined with the recognition that There-being cannot overpower the Overpowering and the acceptance of this recognition, is equivalent to the "resolve" of S7.

To resolve is to will; it is to choose authenticity; it is for There-being to let itself be its self; it is to become free for the exigencies of what it is; it is to will its own congenital freedom by which it is There and to will it as finite; it is There-beings willingness to open-unto-Being to the very limit of its power.<sup>93</sup>

There-being goes about this willing of its own finite openness to Being by willing to know, to stand within the Being of beings as manifest, and therefore to question. In particular it is to ask the question which is the key question in EM, "Why are there beings rather than nothing?" and, even more ultimately, "How does it stand with Being?" It is in this sense that the first and third statements of Heidegger with which we began this paper are, it seems, to be understood: the determination of the essence of man is never an answer but essentially a question; and, the question of what man is must always be taken in its essential bond with the question of how it stands with Being.

The second statement leads Heidegger into a discussion of the statement which will prove so important in Was heisst denken?: Chre to legein te noein t'eon emmenai: "Needful is the gathered setting-forth as well as the apprehension: beings, Being." Noein and legein are mentioned together and called needful. Logos is equated by Heidegger with apprehension and signifies the human act of violence by which Being is gathered in its togetherness. A reciprocal gathering (logos) is involved here: a collection of oneself amid dispersion and a gathering of beings into the togetherness of emergent, abiding presence (Being). The first logos, as ingathering, "first brings being-human into its essence, so thrusting it into homelessness."<sup>94</sup> Only from this legein can noein take its essence as gathering apprehension. Both together, as the need of apprehension and collection, constitute the essence



of being-human, which itself is "a being-driven into the freedom of undertaking technē." This, says Heidegger, is the very "character of history."<sup>95</sup>

In this connection the second statement of Heidegger with which we began this paper can be further clarified. After stating that the determination of the essence of man is always essentially a question, Heidegger notes that "the asking of this question and the decision in this question are historical, and not merely in a general sense; no, this question is the very essence of history." The question is that of how it stands with Being; the decision in its regard is the opening up of There-being to Being, thus the legein and noein of Parmenides. By this opening-up of There-being through this question history comes-to-pass. "This will be evident when we recall (from 22) that history, as time itself (of which it is but an exploitation), is the coming of Being, (future) to a self that already-as-having-been (past), thus rendering present (present) as beings the beings with which it deals. Now the posing of the Being-question is this very process."<sup>96</sup>

Now the gathering of Being into its original togetherness is equivalently the opening or making manifest of Being. Thus legein is associated with the process of alētheia, unconcealment. Logein achieves this relationship to making manifest on the basis of the relation of logos to physis. The very essence of man is logos,, "the happening of that strangest being of all, in whom through violence, through acts of power, the overpowering is made

manifest and made to stand."<sup>97</sup> But when man departs, stands out, into Being, he finds himself in language. Hence the connection of logos with discourse. The reason that the origin of language remains in essence mysterious is that "language can only have arisen from the overpowering, the strange and terrible, through man's departure into Being,"<sup>98</sup> through the disclosure of beings.

The word, the name, restores the emerging being from the immediate, overpowering surge to its Being and maintains it in this openness, delimitation, and permanence. Naming does not come afterward, providing an already manifest being with a designation and a hallmark known as a word; it is the other way around: originally an act of violence that discloses Being, the word sinks from this height to become a mere sign, and this sign proceeds to thrust itself before the being. Pristine speech opens up the Being of beings in the structure of its collectedness. And this opening is collected in a second sense: the word preserves that was originally collected and so administers the overpowering power. Standing and active in logos, which is ingathering, man is the gatherer. He undertakes to govern and succeeds in governing the power of the overpowering.<sup>99</sup>

But language can be also idle talk, concealment, rather than a gathering into structure and order. Thus the legein is a need. Language comes to its truth only when directed toward logos, collectedness, and directed away from hearsay, mouthing, and glibness. Thus the third statement aims at asserting the logos as a struggle: the struggle against appearance and into the legein and noein of the Being of beings. Separating (Scheiden) and de-cision (Entscheiden) between the paths are part of finding oneself to the collectedness of Being. Judgment, selection,

measuring are demanded; they are what ground being-human. "To be a man means to take gathering upon oneself, to undertake a gathering apprehension of the Being of beings, the sapient incorporation of appearing in the work, and so to administer (verwalten) unconcealment, to preserve it against cloaking and concealment."<sup>100</sup>

In this way, "the question of Being necessarily embraces the foundations of There-being,"<sup>101</sup> There-being as legen and noein occurs for the sake of Being.

This disclosure by the early Greeks of the essence of being-human degenerated into the definition of man as the rational animal, zōon logon echon; this is quite a shift from the characterization of physis as logos anthropon echon: i.e., being, overpowering appearance, necessitating the gathering which pervades and grounds being-human.<sup>102</sup> According to the later definition, the logos is "externalized into a faculty of understanding and reason."<sup>103</sup>

In contrast to the domination of Being, the initial separation between logos and physis led to the domination of logos as reason over Being. This separation is also the separation of Being and thinking, a separation which has characterized the whole of Western thinking from Plato to the present day. This development is not immediately germane to the topic of this paper; we will consider it sufficient to say that it is this "development" which is responsible for truth as unconcealment

being transformed into truth as the correctness of apprehension-- as representation which Heidegger characterized in W1 as the conventional conception of truth,<sup>104</sup> and that logos as statement has become the abode of truth in the sense of correctness.<sup>105</sup>

" . . . The original disclosure of the Being of beings ceased, and henceforth the true, now interpreted as the correct, merely spread by way of discussion, teaching, and rules, becoming steadily broader and flatter. For the benefit of this process the logos (as statement) had to be fashioned into a tool. Logic was about to be born."<sup>106</sup> Finally, perhaps the following statement casts some further light on the kinds of historical occurrence which lead Heidegger to characterize the question of Being and the decision in its regard as the very essence of history: "'Idea' and 'category' become the two terms that dominate Western thought, action, and evaluation, indeed all Western There-being."<sup>107</sup>

The breakdown of truth-as-unconcealment is not due to a deficiency on the part of man. Rather, because it was the beginning, it had to break down in the sense of leaving itself behind. Here we find an extremely important statement for the understanding of Heidegger's philosophy, indeed of his entire procedure as a thinker: "A beginning can never directly preserve its full momentum; the only possible way to preserve its force is to repeat, to draw once again more deeply than ever from its source. And it is only by thoughtful retrieving that we can deal appropriately with the beginning and the breakdown of its truth."<sup>108</sup>

No merely historical investigation will reveal to us the need of Being for its There which we find laid before us in Heraclitus and Parmenides.

Richardson relates the process of retrieval to the assuming of self in authenticity as a historically significant decision taken in regard to the question of Being.

. . . in this process of assuming the self, the return of There-being to its own origin plays a central role. This is exactly what is meant by the process of retrieve. "To ask: how about Being?, this means nothing less than to re-trieve the origin of our historical-spiritual There-being in order to transform it into another origin. . . ." This is, indeed, possible, not insofar as we simply re-iterate what we know already about Being, but " . . . insofar as the origin originates all over again more originally (than before), and, indeed, with all the bewilderment, obscurity and insecurity that genuine origination comports. . . . "109

Thus,

. . . every interpretation, whether of a philosopher, a poet, or even of a word, must do violence to the original. It must throw light on what is 'no longer present in words' and yet somehow or other uttered. This is simply to repeat in different context what was said about There-being itself: it does violence to the Overpowering and forces it into open-ness, so that what was unexpressed, or even un-thought, in the initial text (and therefore did not appear) is brought to light by retrieve. 110

## CHAPTER TWO

### "LETTER ON HUMANISM"

The "Letter on Humanism" (HB)<sup>111</sup> considers explicitly and in detail the relation between Being and the essence of man; the relation is considered primarily in terms of thought, secondarily (in a sense) in terms of language. HB was written in response to three questions directed to Heidegger by Jean Beaufret: Comment redonner un sens au mot 'humanisme'? Comment préciser le rapport de l'ontologie avec une éthique possible? and Comment sauver l'élément d'aventure que comporte toute recherche sans faire de la philosophie une simple aventure? Heidegger responds in detail only to the first question, but this response throws some light on what he would say concerning the other two.

Before even mentioning Beaufret's first question, Heidegger indicates the general direction which his response will take. The first paragraph of HB begins with a discussion of action (Handeln), because he wants to take up thought as an action. Action is not essentially the bringing about of an effect, but rather the unfolding of something into the fullness of its essence, ushering it forward into fullness, bringing to fulfillment.<sup>112</sup> Thought is an action which brings to fulfillment the relationship between Being and the essence of man. Heidegger is insistent that thought does not make or produce this relationship but rather offers it to Being as that which has been delivered to itself by Being.<sup>113</sup>

The relationship between Being and the essence of man has first of all been opened up for the essence of man, for thought, by Being and is now returned by thought to Being.

The return is made in an offering which consists in the taking up of Being into language. Thought takes Being up in language. Language, then, is the way in which thought brings to fulfillment the relation between Being and the essence of man.<sup>114</sup> "Language," Heidegger says, "is the house of Being. In its home man dwells. Whoever thinks or creates in words is a guardian of this dwelling. As guardian he brings to fulfillment the unhiddenness of Being insofar as, by his speaking, he takes up this unhiddenness in language and preserves it in language."<sup>115</sup> Implicitly it seems to be affirmed that the unhiddenness of Being is the relation of Being to the essence of man. Being is related to the essence of man precisely as aletheia, as unconcealment, as unhiddenness, and it is this which language takes up and preserves. By this assumption of the unhiddenness of Being in language, this unhiddenness is brought to fulfillment, this relation of Being to the essence of man is ushered into its fullness.<sup>116</sup>

Thought, Heidegger says, "lets itself be called into service by Being in order to speak the truth of Being. It is thought which accomplishes this letting-be. Thought is l'engagement par l'Etre pour l'Etre."<sup>117</sup> Thought is not merely l'engagement dans l'action for and by beings in the sense of the actual and present situation; thought is rather l'engagement by and for the

truth of Being.<sup>118</sup>

The history of thought is never a past thing. Rather it is always imminent, because the history of Being sustains and determines every human condition and situation.<sup>119</sup> Thus Heidegger immediately brings in this increasingly important notion of the history of Being. Thought has a history because Being has a history. The history of thought seems to be correlative with the history of Being. Thought is engaged in this history of Being, engaged by Being, engaged for the sake of Being. Being is referred to as the element of thought, which has been abandoned in the technical interpretation of thought, attributed to philosophy beginning with Plato and Aristotle. Thought is valued by such an interpretation only as technē, "reflection in the service of doing and making,"<sup>120</sup> i.e., reflection as l'engagement dans l'action for and by beings. Now he wants to bring thought back to its element, back to Being.

Heidegger questions the necessity, implied in Beaufret's first question, of retaining the word "humanism," not because it is suspect in itself, but because it is historically connected with the same withdrawal of thought from the Being-process as such terms as "logic," "ethics," and "physics." For thinking to withdraw from its element is for thinking to cease, for "the element is that by means of which thinking can be thinking."<sup>121</sup> The relation between Being and thought is specified at this point



in a very exact manner. Being is the potency (Vermögen) for thought in that Being is concerned with thought and brings thought into its essence, so that thought is precisely thought of Being.<sup>122</sup> That is to say, thought is "e-vented" (ereignet) by Being and is thus of Being in the sense of belonging (gehört) to Being; and thought is of Being because it listens to and heeds (hört) Being. To say that thought is, is to say that Being is concerned about its own essence.

Being is said to be so concerned geschicklich, which the translators render: "In the manner of destiny."<sup>123</sup> Now Geschick was first used in a precise and significant sense by Heidegger in the essay "Nietzsches Wort 'Gott ist tot.'"<sup>124</sup> Richardson translates it as "mittence." As interpreted by Richardson, Heidegger's new use of this word adds an important precision with regard to the primacy of Being. For our purposes, its greatest significance would seem to lie in the precision given to the sense of the second statement of Heidegger with which we began this paper, i.e. the sense in which the question of the essence of man in relation to Being is essentially an historical question, in fact that the decision taken in regard to this question is the very essence of history. For Richardson, "mittence" is taken to mean the event (Ereignis) "in which Being is disclosed, when this event is conceived as proceeding from the initiative of Being."<sup>125</sup> The character of this event is such that Being bestows itself, discloses itself, and simultaneously always conceals itself; its unconcealment

is always "negated," finite, by reason of the very way in which it bestows itself. The negativity of the disclosure of Being-in-mittence, along with the concealment of this negativity, constitutes what WW referred to as "mystery." Metaphysics itself, of which Nietzsche's nihilism is the culmination, proceeds from the event of Being-as-mittence. In metaphysics the Being-question is not posed, precisely because metaphysics is the withheld mystery of Being. In metaphysics, "Being emits itself to man in such a way that man tries to comprehend beings as beings."<sup>126</sup>

The word Geschick is etymologically associated with schicken ("to send"), Geschichte ("history") and geschehen ("to come-to-pass," "to happen.") Being-as-history consists of the collectivity of mittences (Ge-schick-o, Geschichte).<sup>127</sup> The thinking of Being involves, in fact is, the thinking of Being-as-history, of Being-as-mittence. Heidegger's notion of hermeneutics is profoundly affected by this precision. Other thinkers are meditated after the manner of re-trieve, which attempts to think through what the original author did not and could not say because of the finite mittence of Being to him. In its approach to beings, thought "will try to receive the earth as a blessing bestowed upon it and make itself at home on earth according to the exigencies of this acceptance, sc. in such a way that it stands guard over the mystery of Being."<sup>128</sup> Richardson sees in this all the

essentials of the formula of HB which we will see shortly: "Man as shepherd of Being." We might add that we have here also a prelude of the "thought-as-thanking" of WD.

The event of Being-as-mittance is nothing other than the issuing forth of the ontological difference of Being and beings. Man's comportment with beings is grounded in this difference, in man's relatedness to Being.<sup>129</sup> Being always comes-to-presence in beings in a finite way. This means that Being itself is always self-concealing, precisely because it does not lose itself in beings but, in order to <sup>remain</sup> remin itself, withdraws from them as it gives rise to them. The finitude of man's comprehension of Being is rooted in the finitude of the Being-process itself.

This brief aside permits us to see that the phrase that Being is concerned about its own essence geschicklich cannot simply be rendered, "Being has always, in the manner of destiny, concerned itself about its essence." The word geschicklich brings to our attention the discussion, now a regular feature in Heidegger's writings, of Being-as-mittance, Being-as-history. The further sense of this, in the context of HB, will be seen shortly. For the moment, we can simply indicate that to say that thought is, is to say that Being gives itself as Being-as-mittance and that Being somehow stands in need of thought in order to do so. This seems to be the meaning of the German sentence: "Das Denken ist-- dies sagt: das Sein hat sich je geschicklich seines Wesens angenommen."<sup>130</sup>

This concern is a "liking" (mögen). Potency (Vermögen) "not only can perform this or that, but . . . can let something be what it is as it stems from its true origin."<sup>131</sup> It is <sup>in</sup> this sense of "concernful potency" that Being is the potency for, gives rise to, thought. Thus, " . . . Being is capable of thought."<sup>132</sup> As such capability, Being "commands thought and thus also the essence of man, which means in turn his relationship to Being," i.e., Being sustains thought in its element and thus preserves it in its essence.<sup>133</sup> Only such a command keeps thought from being technique and language from falling under the public "establishment and authorization of the overtness of the existent in the absolute objectivization of everything."<sup>134</sup> Language is not a tool for arranging lines of communication nor an instrument of domination over beings but "the house of the truth of Being" whose task it is to take up Being and thus complete (fulfill) the relation of Being to the essence of man by restoring the nearness of Being to man.

The concern (Sorge) for restoring to man the dwelling of the truth of Being and thus of restoring man to his essence is nothing other than the concern for rendering man human. The question of the humanitas of man, of whence and how the essence of man is determined, has been problematic in the course of history. The Roman, Marxist, Sartrean, and Christian versions of humanism all "coincide in that the humanitas of the homo humanus is determined from the view of an already-established interpretation of nature, of history, of world, of the basis of the world. . . . , i.e. of beings in their totality."<sup>135</sup> That is to say, " . . . every

humanism is either founded in a metaphysics or is converted into the basis for a metaphysics."<sup>136</sup> As metaphysical, these determinations of man's essence presuppose an interpretation of beings but do not raise the question of the truth of Being. Humanism has nothing in common with the question of the relation of Being to the essence of man.

The metaphysical character of humanisms is shown in that they all presuppose as self-evident the character of the essence of man revealed in the phrase animal rationale. Such a definition of the essence of man, as metaphysical, does not raise the question of how the essence of man belongs to the truth of Being. Every interpretation of reason and life rests on a prior interpretation, which always remains unquestioned, of beings in their Being.

Finally, Heidegger objects to characterizing the essence of man in terms of animalitas. " . . . By this the essence of man is too lightly considered and is not thought of in the light of its source, that essential source which always remains for historical humanity the essential future. Metaphysics thinks of man as arising from animalitas and does not think of him as pointing toward humanitas."<sup>137</sup>

The essential origin, out of which man comes-to-pass in his essence, is Being itself, by which man is claimed. When he heeds this claim he has found the dwelling-place of his essence and "has" language as the home in which he dwells in the truth of

Being. He heeds this claim by "standing in the clearing of Being" through Ek-sistenz, which is "that, wherein the essence of man preserves the source that determines him," i.e., Being itself.<sup>138</sup>

Of all beings, only man has been admitted into the mittence (Geschick) of Ek-sistenz, which thus uniquely characterizes the essence of man, in such a way that " . . . all that we attribute to man as animalitas in comparing him to the 'animal' is grounded in the essence of Ek-sistenz."<sup>139</sup> The mittence of Ek-sistenz is a mittence to think the essence of his Being.<sup>140</sup>

For Heidegger the essence of man lies precisely in Ek-sistenz.<sup>141</sup> The question is clearly not one of determining the relationship of existentia as actuality to essentia as potentiality or possibility. That Heidegger rather means by this statement and what he meant by the SZ statement, "Das 'Wesen' des Daseins liegt in seiner Existenz," is that " . . . man is essentially such that he is the 'There', that is the lighting-up of Being."<sup>142</sup> Ek-sistent Dasein stands outside itself within the truth of Being. It is because this is so that man "has" language, not vice versa: man "has" language because he "has" a world. Language is "the lighting-and-concealing advent of Being itself."<sup>143</sup>

Heidegger further distinguishes his phrase, "The 'essence' of Dasein lies in its Ek-sistenz" in the statement, "The phrase, 'man ek-sists,' does not answer the question of whether there are actually men or not; it answers the question of the 'essence' of man."<sup>144</sup> The question of the essence of man should not be posed in terms of who or what man is. For both the personal and the

objective miss and obstruct "all that is essentially Ek-sistenz in its historical Being."<sup>145</sup> Seinsgeschichtlich Eksistenz: to specify the meaning of this phrase would give us essentially the determination, in terms of HB, of the three statements of EM with which we began this paper. It is reasonable to assume that the meaning of this phrase is contained in the following sentences: "As ek-sistenz man endures (steht . . . aus) Da-sein, in that he takes the There as the lighting-up of Being into 'care.' But Da-sein itself is as the 'thrown' (geworfen). It comes-to-pass in the cast (Wurf) of Being-as-the-emitting-mittance (des Seins als des schickend Geschicklichen)."<sup>146</sup> The casting of Dasein is the self-emitting of Being. Man is cast by Being into the truth (unconcealment) of Being. As ek-sistent, he is to guard the truth of Being, and in the light of Being allow beings to appear as what they are.<sup>147</sup> That beings appear and how they appear are determined, not by man, but by the mittence of Being.<sup>148</sup> Man is to find the "com-mitment" (Schickliche) which corresponds to this mittence (Geschick), the com-mitment of shepherding the truth of Being. "Man is the shepherd of Being."<sup>149</sup>

Metaphysical thought for Heidegger is not concerned with the truth of Being, but, even in its critical representatives (e.g., Descartes and Kant) it "thinks from beings to beings with a glance in passing at Being."<sup>150</sup> The lighting-up (Lichtung) of Being is not known in terms of the truth of Being itself. The truth of Being is the lighting-up, the lighting-process; the lighting-process

is Being.<sup>151</sup> In this sense, then, the casting of Da-sein is equivalently the self-emitting of Being itself, which in metaphysics remains concealed.

That the casting of Da-sein is the self-emitting of Being is seen in Heidegger's further and "more straightforward" claim that Being itself is the relationship between Being and ek-sistent Da-sein. Being and Da-sein are not two things which require a bond between them. Rather, Being is the bond, insofar as Being "holds fast Ek-sistenz in itself and gathers it together unto itself in its existential, i.e. ek-static essence as the place of the truth of Being amid beings."<sup>152</sup> Being e-mits itself (sich selbst schickt) as this relationship; man as ek-sisting comes to stand in this relationship, ecstatically endures (aussteht) this relationship, by taking it up (übernimmt) in concern; but precisely insofar as he does this he fails at first to recognize what is closest (Being) and holds himself fast to the next closest (beings), taking these as the closest. The relationship of the essence of man to the truth of Being cannot derive from Ek-sistenz since the coming-to-pass of Ek-sistenz itself derives from the coming-to-pass of the truth of Being.<sup>153</sup>

The priority of Being is thus precised explicitly in a way which remained at best only hinted at in EW and EM. This priority is referred to as an "unobtrusive holding-away."<sup>154</sup> And, somewhat surprisingly, the mysterious closeness of Being is



identified with language. "This closeness comes-to-pass as language itself."<sup>155</sup> Of course, language here is not the metaphysical-animal interpretation of language as "the unity of sound-form (script), melody and rhythm and meaning,"<sup>156</sup> but language as seen from the point of view of its coming-to-pass within Being-as-history,<sup>157</sup> according to which language is the house of Being, the very correspondence of man's essence to Being.<sup>158</sup>

In SZ Heidegger states, "intentionally and cautiously," "Being is given," Es gibt das Sein." In HB, the Es gibt is said to be Being itself and the essence of Being to lie in the giving, in the imparting of its truth. "The giving-itself into the Open with this self is Being itself."<sup>159</sup> Heidegger uses "Es gibt" in order to avoid saying "Being is," "das Sein ist." for he does not want to confuse Being with beings. It is true, however, that Parmenides had said, "Being is," estin gar einai, and "in this utterance the original mystery of all thought is concealed."<sup>160</sup> Parmenides' utterance remains unthought in the history of philosophy. Heidegger attempts to give it thought by saying Es gibt, an expression intended to convey the mittent character (Geschick) of Being.<sup>161</sup> The history (Geschichte) of Being always comes to expression in the words of the essential thinkers; in their words the self-giving, the self-emitting of Being is expressed. The essential thinkers are those who, by enduring ek-sistent There-being, stand guard over the self-emitting truth of Being. A thinker like Heidegger, therefore, who wants to think the truth of Being must think historically (geschichtlich).

Heidegger is not talking here of a history (Historie) of past opinions as illustrative of a systematic of dialectical thought, but rather of the history (Geschichte) of Being itself, of which thought is the remembrance (Andenken) brought-to-pass (ereignet) by Being itself.<sup>162</sup> "The occurrence (Geschehen) of history (Geschichte) comes-to-pass as the mittance (Geschiek) of the truth of Being and out of this mittance."<sup>163</sup> Being comes to mittance insofar as it gives itself.

As mittance, Being both gives itself and refuses or withholds (versagt) itself at the same time. The various examples of Being's coming-to-expression, e.g., Hegel's absolute metaphysics, Marx's dialectical materialism, and Nietzsche's final expression of metaphysics, belong to the mittences, to the history (Geschichte) of the truth of Being. They are not to be refuted but rather appraised and reintegrated into Being itself. In the recent lecture "Zeit und Sein" (where, however, significant modifications are introduced regarding the meaning of the Es gibt Sein), the simultaneous withdrawal (epoche) of the Es das gibt is responsible for the epochs which have occurred and will occur in the transformations of Being.

If man is to think the truth of Being, he must think it from Ek-sistenz, for it is as ek-sisting that man stands in the mittance of Being. Man's Ek-sistenz, as Ek-sistenz, is historical

(geschichtlich).<sup>164</sup> Thought of the truth of Being demands thought of the Ek-sistenz of Da-sein and thus of its historicity (Geschichtlichkeit).<sup>165</sup> When it is said in SZ that "only as long as Dasein is, is there Being," this does not mean that Dasein creates Being, but rather that only insofar as Being lights itself up for man in the ecstatic projection of Ek-sistent Da-sein does Being come-to-pass for man. The projection is a being-cast by Being itself, which emits man into the Ek-sistenz of Da-sein as his essence.<sup>166</sup> This mittance is the lighting-up of Being and grants to man the nearness of Being, in which the ek-sistent There dwells, the nearness which is the There (Da) of There-being (Da-sein).

This closeness of Being in the There of There-being is man's homeland. The history of Being reveals an oblivion of Being in which the homelessness of modern man is rooted. Homelessness is a sign of the same forgetfulness of Being which is evidenced also in the fact that man considers only beings. "Being as the mittance which e-mits istah, remains concealed."<sup>167</sup> Homelessness, as a world "fate" (Schicksal), is emittance (Geschick) which must be understood from the history of Being (seinsgeschichtlich). The alienation which Marx has discovered is an essential dimension of this history of Being. Only a thought which recognizes the essentially historical character of Being can profitably discuss with Marxism, for Marx's alienation reaches back into the homelessness of modern man, which itself results from the forgetfulness of Being.

Marx's materialism, in which "every being appears as the material of labor"<sup>168</sup> contains concealed within itself the essence of technicity, which is "a mittance, in the history of Being, of the truth of Being reposing in forgetfulness."<sup>169</sup> In communism an elementary experience of what is world-historical (weltgeschichtlich) has been uncovered. Metaphysics cannot overtake (ein-holen) this mittance and gather together what now is.<sup>170</sup> The future mittance of man shows itself to the thought which thinks the history of Being in terms of man's setting out on the way toward the discovery of the truth of Being. This will not be accomplished by any nationalism or internationalism, nor by any individualism or collectivism. Collectivism is the absolute self-assertion of man's subjectivity, of man as animal rationale, thrust out from the truth of Being and running around in a circle. Man's essence lies in his being more than animal rationale, i.e., "more original and, therefore, in essence more essential."<sup>171</sup> Man is in thrown-ness, as the "ek-sisting counter-throw of Being;"<sup>172</sup> he is not the master, but the shepherd of Being. The dignity of man "rests in the fact that he was called by Being into the truiness of its truth."<sup>173</sup> The casting of Da-sein, which is the self-emittance of Being, is also the "call" of Being to Da-sein, in which call the relation between Being and the essence (coming-to-presence) of man resides. The call is the throw.<sup>174</sup> In short, "man is in his coming-to-presence in the history of Being that being whose Being as Ek-sistenz consists

in this, that he dwells in the nearness of Being. Man is the neighbor of Being."<sup>175</sup> The essence of man is in its own way a mittence, the mittence of Ek-sistenz, which "derives from Being itself, insofar as Being brings man to pass as the ek-sisting one for the guardianship of the truth of Being."<sup>176</sup>

Man's homelessness will be overcome only when man finds his abode in the truth of Being. Being shelters man in his ek-sisting essence in such a way that it lodges Ek-sistenz in language.<sup>177</sup> Language houses both Being and man. The thought of Being issues in language as the dwelling-place of ek-sistent There-being. Being lights-up itself in Ek-sistenz and thus comes to language.<sup>178</sup> As Being arrives in language, it brings ek-sisting thought to language. And, since language itself is historical, Ek-sistenz in thought guards the truth of Being by re-collecting (Andenken) the arrival of Being at language in the speaking of thinkers.

## CONCLUSION

There are unquestionably many points of importance in these three works of Heidegger which we have not touched upon here. And there are many questions raised by what we have seen which must be left unanswered at the present moment. We took as our point of departure and organization three statements from EM, and attempted to analyze their meaning, first within the context of EM and EW and then from the standpoint of the further development which can be witnessed in HB. In our "Introduction," we expressed the hope that two points would clearly emerge from our discussion: first, that HB specifies with far more precision than the earlier works the sense in which the question concerning the relation of man's essence to Being is historical; secondly, that there is a change in the mood conveyed by Heidegger's development of this relation from the earlier works to HB.

The first point seems quite obvious. The association of Geschichte with Geschick and related words definitely helps Heidegger to precise more clearly the sense in which history is bound up with ek-sistent Dasein's standing-out into the truth of Being. Some of the questions which we have not dealt with here are: in what sense does this development affect what Heidegger would say concerning the freedom of man? Is there any sense at all in which the Heidegger of HB can be called fatalistic? Is such a notion of history and truth

relativistic? What is the relation between such a presentation of history and what Heidegger says elsewhere concerning time?

The second point undoubtedly deserves more elaboration. James L. Robinson, who has presented a fine outline of much of the recent German discussion concerning the possible assistance which theological thinking may receive from Heidegger, makes a great deal of the shift in mood in Heidegger's thought. In his presentation of Walter Schulz's analysis of the later Heidegger,<sup>179</sup> he finds Schulz emphasizing the concurrence of Heidegger's renunciation of any attempt to ground Dasein outside himself with a gradually emerging shift toward a more positive mood. Schulz discovers that " . . . the nothing that emerged when metaphysics sought to ground Dasein outside itself ceases to emerge as nothing and instead Being dawns. . . . The arrival at nothing, by ending the engrossment with beings, corresponds to the unveiling of Being."<sup>180</sup> Whether this is a correct analysis of the turn in Heidegger's thought is not our concern; what is of importance is that there is a basic change in mood. It may be that this change is more closely connected with and dependent on the precision regarding Geschichte than on any repudiation of a nihilism which may never have been Heidegger's philosophy in the first place. The answer to this question awaits further study. Schulz (and Robinson?) find the change in mood to be expressed as follows:

Rather than calling man "the one who stands in nothing's place," Heidegger now speaks of him as the "shepherd of being." Instead of anxiety, there emerges gratitude for being's "favor." Once *the*

Promethean direction of metaphysics is renounced, the positive emerges.<sup>181</sup>

Within the context of our own study, the change in mood is toward the characterization of man as shepherd and away from the characterization of man as the violent one destined to destruction at the hands of the prevailing Over-powering. Man and the Being-process are still ineluctably finite, but the manner of bringing Dasein to stand in Being is now characterized in a more positive manner. At the present we are not capable to suggest the reason why or at least to demonstrate the adequacy of any hypothesis, and least of all to disprove the correlation which Schulz discovers between this shift in mood and a move away from nihilism. Hopefully we are correct in noting that such a shift does take place; only further exploration can open up <sup>the</sup> precise way of thinking which led Heidegger to this change.



## FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup>"1. Die Bestimmung des Wesens des Menschen ist nie Antwort, sondern wesentlich Frage.

"2. Das Fragen dieser Frage und ihre Entscheidung ist geschichtlich, nicht nur überhaupt, sondern das Wesen der Geschichte.

"3. Die Frage, wer der Mensch sei, muss immer im Wesenszusammenhang mit der Frage gestellt werden, wie es mit dem Sein steht. Die Frage nach dem Menschen ist keine anthropologische, sondern eine geschichtlich meta-physische. (Die Frage lässt sich im Bereich der überlieferten Metaphysik, die wesentlich 'Physik' bleibt, nicht zureichend fragen.)" EM, p. 107. (Eng., p. 118). English translations will be used. However, the wording will be changed when this is necessary for providing a uniform translation of certain of Heidegger's key words. For example, the English translation of EM translates Sein as 'being'; we have changed this to "Being." We shall attempt to follow the translation of key Heideggerian words suggested by William J. Richardson, S.J., Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff (Phenomenologica, 15), second edition, 1967.

EM was published in 1953, but its essential material was presented in a lecture course of 1935.

<sup>2</sup>See Bibliography for Richardson, p. 531.

<sup>3</sup>EM, Eng., p. 98. Gr: "Das Denken setzt sich dem Sein dergestalt gegenüber, dass dieses ihm vor-gestellt wird und demzufolge wie ein Gegen-stand entgegensieht." Gr., p. 89.

<sup>4</sup>By "free act," Heidegger seems here to mean one which always starts from ourselves.

<sup>5</sup>EM, Eng., p. 100. Gr: "... 1. das 'von uns aus' Vorstellen als ein eigentümlich freies Verhalten.

2. das Vor-stellen in der Weise des zergliedernden Verbundens.

3. das vorstellende Fassen des Allgemeinen." EM, p. 91.

<sup>6</sup>EM, Eng., p. 101. Gr: "Die Unterscheidung entspringt aus einer anfänglichen inneren Zugehörigkeit des Unterschiedenen und Geschiedenen zum Sein selbst. Der Titel 'Sein und Denken' nennt eine Unterscheidung, die vom Sein selbst gleichsam verlangt wird." EM, P. 96.

<sup>7</sup>See EM, Eng., p. 103; Gr., p. 93.

<sup>8</sup>EM, Eng., p. 104; Gr: "... Denken, Verstand, und Vernunft." EM, p. 94.

<sup>9</sup> EM, Eng., p. 105; Gr: "Logos, legein, lateinisch legere, ist dasselbe Wort wie unser 'lesen.'" EM, p. 95.

<sup>10</sup> EM, Eng., p. 105; Gr: "Wir erinnern hier nur daran, dass der Name logos auch dann noch, als er längst Rede und Aussage bedeutete, seine ursprüngliche Bedeutung behalten hat, indem er das 'Verhältnis des einen zum anderen' bedeutet." EM, Gr., p. 95.

<sup>11</sup> EM, Eng., p. 106. Gr: "Sein ist als physis das aufgehende Warten. In der Gegenstellung zum Werden zeigt es sich als die Ständigkeit, die ständige Anwesenheit. Diese bekundet sich in der Gegenstellung zum Schein als das Erscheinen, als die offenbare Anwesenheit." EM, p. 96.

<sup>12</sup> "Parmenides teilt mit Heraklit denselben Standort. Wo sollen diese beiden griechischen Denker, die Stifter alles Denkertums, auch andere stehen als im Sein des Seienden." EM, p. 104.

<sup>13</sup> EM, Engl. pp. 107 f.

<sup>14</sup> EM, Eng. p. 108. Gr: "Vom Logos wird gesagt: 1. Ihm eignet die Ständigkeit, das Bleiben; 2. er west als das Zusammen in Seienden, das Zusammen des Seiend, das Sammelnde; 3. alles was geschieht, d.h. in das Sein kommt, steht da gemäß diesem ständigen Zusammen; dieses ist das Haltende." EM, p. 98.

<sup>15</sup> EM, Eng., p. 109. Gr: "Das blosse Hören verstreut und zerstreut sich in dem, was man gemeinhin meint und sagt, in Hörensagen, in der doxa, im Schein. Dass echte Hörigsein hat aber nichts mit Ohr und Handwerk zu tun, sondern besagt: Folge leisten gegenüber dem, was der logos ist: die Gesamtheit des Seienden selbst." EM, p. 99.

<sup>16</sup> EM, p. 110. Gr: "Fortgesetzt haben die Menschen es mit dem Sein zu tun und doch ist es ihnen fremd. Mit dem Sein haben sie zu tun, indem sie sich ständig zu Seiendem verhalten, fremd ist es ihnen, indem sie sich vom Sein abkehren, weil sie es gar nicht fassen, sondern meinen, Seiendes sei nur Seiendes und nichts weiter." EM, p. 100.

<sup>17</sup> EM, p. 110. Gr: " . . . am rechten Vorausgrieffen auf das in sich Gesammelte. . . . " EM, p. 100.

<sup>18</sup> EM, Eng., p. 110. Gr: " . . . am rechten Vorausgreifen auf das in sich Gesammelte. . . . " EM, p. 100.

<sup>18</sup> EM, Eng., p. 111. Gr: "Das Sagen und Hören ist nur ein rechtes, wenn es in sich zuvor schon auf das Sein, den Logos gerichtet ist. Nur wo dieser sich eröffnet, wird der Wortlaut zum Wort. Nur wo das sich eröffnende Sein des Seienden vernommen ist, wird das blosse Herumhorchen zum Hören." EM, p. 101.

<sup>19</sup>EM, Eng., p. 112. Gr: "Das Wahre ist nicht für jedermann, sondern nur für die Starken." EM, p. 102.

<sup>20</sup>EM, Eng., p. 122. Gr: "Zusammengehörig sind Vernehmung wechselweise und Sein." EM, p. 111.

<sup>21</sup>EM, Eng., p. 116. Gr: "Vernehmen meint einmal: hin-nehmen, auf einen zukommen lassen, nämlich das, was sich zeigt, erscheint. Vernehmen meint sodann: einen Zeugen vernehmen, ihn vornehmen und dabei den Tatbestand aufnehmen, fest-stellen, wie es mit der Sache bestellt ist und wie es mit ihr steht." EM, p. 105. " . . . aufnehmende Zum-stehen-bringen . . . " EM, p. 105.

<sup>22</sup>EM, Eng., p. 117. Gr: " . . . Zusammengehörigkeit des Gegenstrebigen." EM, p. 106.

<sup>23</sup>EM, Eng., p. 116. Gr: "Wenn Truppen eine Aufnahmestellung beziehen, dann wollen sie den auf sie zukommenden Gegner empfangen und zwar so empfangen, dass sie ihn wenigstens zum Stehen bringen." EM, p. 105. Nowin here, then means to draw up a position of resistance to the Over-powering in such a way that a being<sup>which</sup>-appears is brought to a standstill. Richardson, p. 269.

<sup>24</sup>EM, Eng., p. 117. Gr: "Sein waltet, aber weil es waltet und sofern es waltet und erscheint, geschieht notwendig mit Erscheinung auch Vernehmung." EM, p. 106.

<sup>25</sup>EM, Eng., p. 119. Gr: " . . . Vernehmung ist ein Geschehen, worin geschehend der Mensch erst als der Seiende in die Geschichte tritt, erscheint, d.h. (im wörtlichen Sinne) selbst zum Sein kommt.

"Vernehmung ist nicht eine Verhaltensweise, die der Mensch als eigenschaft hat, sondern umgekehrt: Vernehmung ist jenes Geschehnis, das den Menschen hat." EM, p. 108.

<sup>26</sup>EM, Eng., p. 121. Gr: " . . . eine Bestimmung des Wesens des Menschen aus dem Wesen des Seins selbst." EM, p. 110.

<sup>27</sup>EM, Eng., p. 121. Gr: " . . . Wer der Mensch sei, das bekommen wir nicht durch eine gelehrte Definition zu wissen, sondern nur so, dass der Mensch in die Auseinandersetzung mit dem Seienden tritt, indem er es in sein Sein zu bringen versucht, d.h. in Grenze und Gestalt stellt, d.h. ein Neues (noch nicht Anwesendes) entwirft, d.h. ursprünglich dichtet, dichterisch gründet." EM, p. 110.

" . . . the conception of polemos, sc. some elemental conflict out of which beings emerge-into-presence (appear), permeates (Heidegger's) thinking at this time. . . . In the lecture 'The Origin of a Work of Art,' delivered in November of the same year (1935), the author explicates by saying that the primordial struggle is the contention between positivity (revelment) and negativity (concealment) in the coming-to-pass of non-concealment (alētheia). At any rate most of the terminology in EM is derived from this dominant image. For example, Being itself must be overcome, subdued--subdued, indeed, by There-being, whose task is to do violence to the Over-powering. By reason

of this struggle is made manifest the previously concealed Being of what appears as a being, a struggle that involves at the same time a battle against the power of mere seeming-to-be." Richardson, p. 268.

<sup>28</sup> EM, Eng., p. 126. Gr: "Das deinon ist das Furchtbare im Sinne des überwältigenden Waltens, das in gleicher Weise den panischen Schrecken, die wahre Angst erzwingt wie die gesammelte, in sich schwingende, verschwiegene Scheu. . . . Wo dieses hereinbricht, kann es seine überwältigende Macht an sich halten. Aber dadurch wird es nicht harmloser, sondern nur noch furchtbarer und ferner." EM, p. 114 f.

<sup>28</sup> EM, Eng., p. 126. Gr: "Zum anderen aber bedeutet deinon das Gewaltige im Sinne dessen, der die Gewalt braucht, nicht nur über Gewalt verfügt, sondern gewalt-tätig ist, insofern ihm das Gewaltbrauchen der Grundzug seines Tuns nicht nur, sondern seines Daseins ist." EM, p. 115.

<sup>29</sup> EM, Eng., p. 126. Gr: "Der Mensch aber ist deinon einmal, sofern er in dieses Überwältigende ausgesetzt bleibt, weil er nämlich wesenhaft in das Sein gehört. Der Mensch ist aber zugleich deinan, weil er der Gewalt-tätige in dem gekennzeichneten Sinne ist. (Er versammelt das Waltende und lässt es in eine Offenbarkeit ein.)" EM, p. 115.

<sup>30</sup> EM, Eng., p. 126. Gr: " . . . gewalt-tätig inmitten des Überwältigenden." EM, p. 115.

<sup>31</sup> EM, Eng., p. 127. Gr: "Der Mensch aber ist das Unheimlichste, weil er nicht nur inmitten des so verstandenen Unheimlichen sein Wesen verbringt, sondern weil er aus seinen zunächst und zumeist gewohnten, heimischen Grenzen heraustritt, austrückt, weil er als der Gewalt-tätige die Grenze des Heimischen überschreitet und zwar gerade in der Richtung auf das Unheimliche im Sinne des Überwältigenden" EM, p. 116.

<sup>32</sup> EM, Eng., p. 127. Gr: " . . . der Grundzug des Menschenwesens, in den je und immer alle anderen Züge eingezeichnet werden müssen." EM, p. 116.

<sup>33</sup> EM, Eng., p. 127. Gr: " . . . die Macht des Scheins und den Kampf mit ihm in seiner Wesenszugehörigkeit zum Dasein . . . " EM, p. 116.

<sup>34</sup> See footnote 1.

<sup>35</sup> EM, Eng., p. 85. Gr: " . . . 1. den Schein als Glanz und Leuchten; 2. den Schein und das Scheinende als Erscheinen, den Vor-schein, zu dem etwas kommt; 3. den Schein als blossen Schein, den Anschein. . . " EM, p. 76.

<sup>37</sup> EM, Eng., p. 86. Gr: "Sein west als Erscheinen." P. 77.

<sup>38</sup> EM, Eng., p. 87. Gr: "Das Unverborgene als solches kommt im Sich-zeigen zum Stehen. Die Wahrheit ist als Un-verborgenheit nicht eine Zugabe zum Sein." EM, p. 78.

<sup>39</sup> EM, Eng., p. 88. Gr: "Doxa ist das Ansehen, darin einer steht, im weiteren Sinne das Ansehen, das jegliches Seiende in seinem Aussehen (eidos, idea) birgt und entbirgt. Eine Stadt bietet einen grossartigen Anblick. Die Ansicht, die ein Seiendes an ihm selbst hat und erst deshalb von sich aus bieten kann, lässt sich dann je und je von diesem oder jenem Augenpunkt aus aufnehmen. Entsprechend der Verschiedenheit des Gesichtspunktes wird die sich bietende Ansicht eine andere. Diese Ansicht ist somit immer zugleich eine solche, die wir uns dabei nehmen und machen. Im Erfahren und Betreiben des Seienden bilden wir uns von seinem Aussehen ständig Ansichten. Oft geschieht es, ohne dass wir uns die Sache selbst genau ansehen. Wir kommen auf irgendwelchen Wegen und aus irgendwelchen Gründen zu einer Ansicht über die Sache. Wir bilden uns eine Meinung darüber. Dabei kann es geschehen, dass die Ansicht, die wir vertreten, in der Sache keinen Halt hat. Sie ist dann eine blosser Ansicht, eine Annahme. Wir nehmen etwas so oder so an. Wir meinen dann nur." EM, p. 79.

<sup>40</sup> EM, Eng., p. 88; Gr: " . . . steht es wesensmässig und somit notwendig und ständig in der Möglichkeit eines Aussehens, das jenes, was das Seiende in Wahrheit ist, d.h. in der Unverborgenheit, gerade verdeckt und verbirgt." EM, p. 79.

<sup>41</sup> EM, Eng., p. 89; Gr: "Sie mussten je und je das Sein erst dem Schein entreissen und es gegen diesen bewahren." EM, p. 80.

<sup>42</sup> EM, Eng., p. 92; Gr: " . . . der Schein lässt nicht nur Seiendes als solches erscheinen, als welches es eigentlich nicht ist, der Schein verstellt nicht nur das Seiende, dessen Schein er ist, sondern er verdeckt sich dabei selbst als Schein, insofern er sich als Sein zeigt. Weil so der Schein sich selbst wesenhaft im Verdecken und Verstellen vorstellt, deshalb sagen wir mit Recht: der Schein trügt." EM, p. 83.

<sup>43</sup> EM, Eng., p. 93; Gr: " . . . sind für den Menschen, der sich inmitten des sich eröffnenden Seins hält und immer aus solcher Haltung heraus sich so und so zum Seienden verhält, drei Wege notwendig. Der Mensch muss, soll er sein Dasein in der Helle des Seins übernehmen, diesen zum Stand bringen, muss es im Schein und gegen den Schein erhalten, muss Schein und Sein zugleich dem Abgrund des Nichtseins entreissen." EM, p. 84.

<sup>44</sup> EM, p. 93 (Eng.). Heidegger explains that by "decision," he means not judgment and choice, but "a separation in the above-mentioned togetherness of Being, unconcealment, appearance, and non-Being." IBID.

<sup>45</sup> EM, Eng., p. 96. Gr: "Weil Sein heisst: aufgehendes Erscheinen, aus der Verborgenheit heraustreten, deshalb gehört zu ihm wesenhaft die Verborgenheit, die Herkunft aus ihr. Solche Herkunft liegt im Wesen des Seins, des Erscheinenden als solchen. In sie bleibt das Sein zurückgeneigt, sei es in der grossen Verhüllung und Verschweigung, sei es in der flachsten Verstellung und Verdeckung." EM, p. 87.

<sup>46</sup> Richardson, p. 265.

<sup>47</sup> EM, Eng., p. 127; Gr: " . . . Zu dem Geschehnis der Unheimlichkeit dringen wir erst ganz vor, wenn wir zugleich die Macht des Sehns und den Kampf mit ihm in seiner Wesenszugehörigkeit zum Dasein erfahren." EM, p. 116.

<sup>48</sup> WW, Eng., p. 292.

<sup>49</sup> Ibid., p. 293.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid., p. 297.

<sup>51</sup> Ibid.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid., p. 303.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid., p. 300.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid.

<sup>55</sup> Ibid., p. 302.

<sup>56</sup> Ibid., pp. 300 f.

<sup>57</sup> Richardson, p. 231.

<sup>58</sup> WW, Eng., p. 303.

<sup>59</sup> Ibid., p. 306.

<sup>60</sup> Ibid.

<sup>61</sup> Ibid., p. 307.

<sup>62</sup> Ibid., p. 308.

<sup>63</sup> Ibid.

<sup>64</sup> Ibid., p. 309.

<sup>65</sup> Ibid., pp. 309 f.

<sup>66</sup> Ibid., p. 310.

<sup>67</sup> Ibid., p. 313.

<sup>68</sup> Ibid.

<sup>69</sup> Ibid., p. 315.

<sup>70</sup> Ibid., p. 316.

<sup>71</sup> Ibid., p. 317.

<sup>72</sup> Ibid., p. 318.

<sup>73</sup> Ibid.

<sup>74</sup> Richardson, pp. 225 f.

<sup>75</sup> Ibid., p. 239.

<sup>76</sup> Ibid., p. 240.

77 EM, Eng., p. 128. Gr: "Hochragend in der Geschichtstätte, werden sie zugleich apolis, ohne Stadt und Stätte, Ein-sems, Un-heimliche, ohne Ausweg inmitten des Seienden im Ganzen, zugleich ohne Satzung und Grenze, ohne Bau und Fug, weil sie als Schaffende dies alles je erst gründen müssen." EM, p. 117.

78 EM, Eng., p. 130. Gr: "Was nachkommt, ist nicht Entwicklung, sondern Vorflachung als blosse Verbreiterung, ist Nichtinnehmenkönnen des Anfangs, ist Verharmlosung und Übertreibung des Anfangs zur Missgestalt des Grossen im Sinne der rein zahlen- und mengenhaften Grösse und Ausdehnung. Das Unheimlichste ist, was es ist, weil es einen solchen Anfang birgt, in den alles zumal aus einem Übermass in das Überwältigende, Zubeiwältigende ausbricht." EM, p. 119.

79 EM, Eng., p. 130; Gr., p. 119.

80 EM, Eng., p. 132; Gr.: " . . . das Seiende sich als ein solches erschliesst, indem der Mensch in dieses einrückt." EM, p. 120.

81 EM, Eng., p. 133. Gr: " . . . Das . . . ständige Hinausschauen über das je gerade Vorhandene." EM, p. 122.

82 EM, Eng., p. 134 f. Gr: " . . . das fügende Gefüge, das Einfügung und Sichfügen erzwingt." EM, p. 123.

83 EM, Eng., p. 136. Gr: "Die Gewalt-tätigkeit gegen die Über-gewalt des Seins muss an dieser zerbrechen, wenn das Sein als das waltet, als was es west, als physis, aufgehendes Warten." EM, p. 124.

84 Richardson, p. 277.

85 Ibid., p. 278.

86 EM, Eng., p. 137. Gr: " . . . das Überwältigende als ein solches, um waltend zu erscheinen, die Stätte der Offenheit für es braucht. Von dieser durch das Sein selbst ernötigten Not her verstanden, eröffnet sich uns erst das Wesen des Menschseins. Da-sein des geschichtlichen Menschen heisst: Gesetz~~t~~-sein als die Bresche, in die die Über-gewalt des Seins erscheinend hereinbricht, damit diese Bresche selbst am Sein zerbricht." EM, p. 124.

87 EM, Eng., p. 140 f. Gr: "1. Die Vernehmung ist kein blosser Vorgang, sondern Ent-scheidung.  
"2. Die Vernehmung steht in einer inneren Wesensgemeinschaft mit dem Logos. Dieser ist eine Not.

3. Der Logos begründet das Wesen der Sprache. Er ist als solcher ein Kampf und der gründende Grund des geschichtlichen Daseins des Menschen inmitten des Seienden im Ganzen." EM, p. 128.

88 "Heidegger does not explain this beyond saying: that it is the way unto non-concealment; that it cannot be by-passed. We interpret this to mean that this path represents the radical relation to

Being that constitutes the There, sc. makes the process of There-being to be what it is, the coming-to-pass of truth. It is unavoidable, simply because it is the ground of man's essence, and even if it be forgotten, nevertheless it is this alone that enables man to enter into comportment with beings as beings in the first place." Richardson, p. 284.

<sup>89</sup>"This path, as Heidegger reads Parmenides, is inaccessible but must be recognized as inaccessible, and, indeed, precisely because it does lead to Non-being. We interpret this to mean: Non-being is inaccessible to the ordinary processes of thought as they function in science, for these are always concerned with beings, sc. with precisely what Non-being is not; Non-being can be discerned, however, by There-being and meditated in itself as inaccessible to logical thought because it is Non-being; the true thinker, therefore, must make the poignant experience of Non-being." Richardson, p. 284.

<sup>90</sup>"This path is, indeed, accessible to man, so much so that he may lose himself on it completely; his task is to recognize it for what it is, sc. to realize that seeming-to-be is a correlative of Being. We interpret this to mean: Being, as the process of emerging into non-concealment in its There, is insuperably finite, therefore negatived, therefore a non-emerging, or concealment, at the same time that it is a revelation; this law of concealment affects different beings differently--the beings with which There-being deals (so that they are hidden as much as they are manifested and therefore seem-to-be what they are not) and There-being itself (whose special prerogative is first of all and for the most part hidden from itself in its everydayness, so that There-being seems to be what it is not, a being so different from the rest)--but it is the same law of concealment, sc. of finitude, that pervades both; it is this law of finitude that accounts for seeming-to-be, and it is because Being as emergent Power is finite that seeming-to-be is a necessary correlative of Being; to experience seeming-to-be as such is to recognize this correlation of Being and seeming-to-be as necessary and inevitable, sc. to comprehend Being as finite; the true man of thought must achieve this comprehension, ' . . . in order that amid seeming-to-be and despite (it), Being may be revealed'; the thinker, then, is he who ' . . . has assumed the way of seeming-to-be as an abiding necessity (of Being).'" Richardson, p. 285.

<sup>91</sup>EL, Eng., p. 141. Gr: "Die Gewalt-tat des so ent-schiedenen Ausrückens auf den Weg zum Sein des Seienden rückt den Menschen aus dem Heimischen des gerade Nächsten und Üblichen heraus." EL, p. 128.

<sup>92</sup>Richardson, p. 287.

<sup>93</sup>Ibid.

<sup>94</sup>EL, Eng., p. 142. Gr: "Der Logos als Sammlung, als das Sich-sammeln des Menschen auf den Fug, versetzt das Menschsein allererst in sein Wesen und stellt es so in das Un-heimische, sofern das Ein-



heimische vom Schein des Gewöhnlichen, Üblichen, und Platten beherrscht ist." EM, p. 129.

<sup>95</sup>EM, Eng., p. 142; Gr: "Das Menschsein ist als Not der Vernehmung und Sammlung die Nötigung in die Freiheit der Übernahme der techné, des wissenden Ins-Werk-setzens des Seins. So ist Geschichte." EM, p. 130.

<sup>96</sup>Richardson, p. 289.

<sup>97</sup>EM, Eng., p. 143; Gr: " . . . das Geschehnis jenes Unheimlichsten, in dem durch die Gewalt-tätigkeit das Überwältigende zur Erscheinung kommt und zum Stand gebracht wird." EM, p. 131.

<sup>98</sup>EM, p. 144; Gr: "Die Sprache kann nur aus dem Überwältigenden und Unheimlichen angefangen haben, im Aufbruch des Menschen in das Sein." EM, p. 131.

<sup>99</sup>EM, Eng., p. p. 144. Gr: "Das Wort, das Nennen stellt das sich eröffnende Seiende aus dem unmittelbaren überwältigenden Andrang in sein Sein zurück und bewahrt es in dieser Offenheit, Umgrenzung und Ständigkeit. Das Nennen versieht nicht nachträglich ein sonst schon offenes Seiendes mit einer Bezeichnung und einem Markzeichen, genannt Wort, sondern umgekehrt: das Wort sinkt aus der Höhe seiner ursprünglichen Gewalt-tat als Eröffnung des Seins zum blossen Zeichen herab, so zwar, dass dieses selbst sich dann vor das Seiende schiebt. Im ursprünglichen Sagen wird das Sein des Seienden im Gefüge seiner Gesammeltheit eröffnet. Diese Eröffnung wird gesammelt in dem zweiten Sinne, wonach das Wort das ursprünglich Gesammelte bewahrt und so das Haltende, die physis, verwaltet. Der Mensch ist als deus im Logos, in der Sammlung, Stehende und Tätige: der Sammler. Er übernimmt und vollbringt die Verwaltung des Haltens des Überwältigenden." EM, pp. 131 f.

<sup>100</sup>EM, Eng., p. 146; Gr: "Menschsein heisst: die Sammlung, das sammelnde Vernehmen des Seins des Seienden, das wissende Ins-Werk-setzen des Erscheinens übernehmen und so die Unverborgenheit verwalten, sie gegen Verborgenheit und Verdeckung bewahren." EM, p. 133.

<sup>101</sup>EM, Eng., p. 146; Gr: " . . . die Frage nach dem Sein notwendig die Gründung des Daseins einschliesst." EM, p. 133.

<sup>102</sup>EM, Eng., p. 146, Gr., p. 134.

<sup>103</sup>EM, Eng., p. 147; Gr: " . . . der Logos ist längst in ein Vermögen des Verstandes und der Vernunft veräusserlicht." EM, p. 134.

<sup>104</sup>See also EM, Eng., pp. 154 f.

<sup>105</sup>Ibid., p. 155.

106 EM, Eng., p. 157; Gr: " . . . die ursprüngliche Eröffnung des Seins des Seienden ausgesetzt hat und das Wahre als das Richtige auf dem Wege der Diskussion, der Lehre und der Vorschriften nur noch vorbereitet und verbreitert und so immer ebener wird. Hierfür muss der Logos als Werkzeug zubereitet werden. Die Geburtsstunde der Logik ist gekommen." EM, p. 143.

107 EM, Eng., p. 158; Gr: "'Idee' und 'Kategorie' sind künftig die beiden Titel, unter denen das abendländische Denken und Tun und Schätzen, das ganze Dasein steht." EM, p. 144.

108 EM, Eng., p. 160; Gr: "Der Anfang kann nicht und kann nie ebenso unmittelbar, wie er anfängt, dieses Anfangen auch so bewahren, wie es allein bewahrt werden kann, nämlich dadurch, dass es in seiner Ursprünglichkeit ursprünglicher wiederholt wird. Deshalb ist auch nur in einer denkenden Wiederholung und allein durch diese angemessen vom Anfang und dem Einsturz der Wahrheit zu handeln." EM, p. 146.

109 Richardson, p. 290.

110 IBID., pp. 290 f.

111 See bibliography.

112 HB, Eng., p. 270.

113 Ibid., p. 271.

114 Ibid., p. 271.

115 HB, Eng., p. 271. Gr: "Die Sprache ist das Haus des Seins. In ihrer Behausung wohnt der Mensch. Die Denkenden und Dichtenden sind die Wächter dieser Behausung. Ihr Wachen ist das Vollbringen der Offenbarkeit des Seins, insofern die diese durch ihr Sagen zur Sprache bringen und in der Sprache aufbewahren." HB, p. 53.

116 This interpretation of the relation of Being to the essence of man will be confirmed by the statement which we shall see shortly according to which Being itself is the relationship. The main thrust of HB can be considered as an explicitation of this understanding of the relation.

117 HB, Eng., p. 271. Gr: "Das Denken dagegen lässt sich vom Sein in den Anspruch nehmen, um die Wahrheit des Seins zu sagen. Das Denken vollbringt dieses Bessere. Denken ist l'engagement par l'Etre pour l'Etre." HB, p. 54.

118 HB, Eng., p. 271.

119 Ibid.

120 IBID.

<sup>121</sup>HB, Eng., p. 272; Gr: "Das Element ist das, aus dem her das Denken vermag, ein Denken zu sein." HBQ p. 56.

<sup>122</sup>!Es (Sein) nimmt sich des Denkens an und bringt es so in dessen Wesen. Das Denken, schlich gesagt, ist das Denken des Seins." HB, pp. 56 f.

<sup>123</sup>HB, Eng., p. 272.

<sup>124</sup>Holzwege, pp. 193-247.

<sup>125</sup>Richardson, p. 435.

<sup>126</sup>Ibid., p. 436.

<sup>127</sup>See ibid., p. 435, footnote 4.

<sup>128</sup>Ibid., p. 439.

<sup>129</sup>Ibid., p. 436.

<sup>130</sup>HB, p. 57.

<sup>131</sup>HB, Eng., p. 273; Gr: " . . . Solches Mögen ist das eigentlich Wesen des Vermögens, das nicht nur dieses oder jenes leisten, sondern etwas in seiner Herkunft 'wesen,' das Heisst sein lassen kann." HB, p. 57.

<sup>132</sup>HB, Eng., p. 273; Gr: " . . . vermag das Sein das Denken." HB, p. 57.

<sup>133</sup>Eng., p. 273. Gr: " . . . das Sein selbst, das mögend über das Denken und so über das Wesen des Menschen und das heisst über dessen Bezug zum Sein vermag." HB, p. 58.

<sup>134</sup>HB, Eng., p. 274; Gr: " . . . die . . . Einrichtung und Ermächtigung der Offenheit des Seienden in die unbedingte Vergegenständlichung von allem." HB, p. 58.

<sup>135</sup>HB, Eng., p. 276; Gr: "So verschieden diese Arten des Humanismus nach Ziel und Grund, nach der Art und den Mitteln der jeweiligen Verwirklichung, nach der Form seiner Lehre sein mögen, sie kommen doch darin überein, dass die humanitas des homo humanus aus dem Hinblick auf eine schon feststehende Auslegung der Natur, der Geschichte, der Welt, des Weltgrundes, das heisst des Seienden im Ganzen bestimmt wird." HB, p. 63.

<sup>136</sup> HB, Eng., p. 276; Gr: "Jeder Humanismus gründet entweder in einer Metaphysik, oder er macht sich selbst zum Grund einer solchen." HB, pp. 63 f.

<sup>137</sup> HB, Eng., p. 277; Gr: "Aber dadurch das Wesen des Menschen zu gering geachtet und nicht in seiner Herkunft gedacht, welche Wesensherkunft für das geschichtliche Menschentum stets die Wesenszukunft bleibt. Die Metaphysik denkt den Menschen von der animalitas her und denkt nicht zu seiner humanitas hin." HB, p. 66.

<sup>138</sup> HB, Eng., p. 277; Gr: "Das Stehen in der Lichtung des Seins nenne ich die Ek-sistenz des Menschen. Nur dem Menschen eignet diese Art zu sein. Die so verstandene Ek-sistenz ist nicht nur der Grund der Möglichkeit der Vernunft, ratio, sondern die Ek-sistenz ist das, worin das Wesen des Menschen die Herkunft seiner Bestimmung wahr." HB, pp. 66 f.

<sup>139</sup> HB, Eng., p. 277; Gr: "So gründet auch das, was wir aus dem Vergleich mit dem 'Tiere' dem Menschen als animalitas zusprechen, selbst im Wesen der Ek-sistenz." HB, p. 67.

<sup>140</sup> " . . . es dem Menschen geschickt ist, das Wesen seines Seins zu denken . . . " HB, p. 67.

<sup>141</sup> "Das, was der Mensch ist, das heisst in der überlieferten Sprache der Metaphysik das 'Wesen' des Menschen, beruht in seiner Ek-sistenz." HB, p. 68.

<sup>142</sup> " . . . der Mensch west (comes-to-pass) so, dass er das 'Da,' das heisst die Lichtung des Seins, ist." HB, p. 69.

<sup>143</sup> HB, Eng., p. 279; Gr: "Sprache ist lichtend-verbergende Ankunft des Seins selbst." HB, p. 70.

<sup>144</sup> HB, Eng., p. 279; Gr: "Der Satz: 'Der Mensch ek-sistiert' antwortet nicht auf die Frage, ob der Mensch wirklich sei oder nicht, sondern antwortet auf die Frage nach dem 'Wesen' des Menschen." HB, pp. 70 f.

<sup>145</sup> HB, Eng., p. 279; Gr: "Allein das Personhafte verfehlt und verbaut zugleich das Wesende der seinsgeschichtlichen Eksistenz nicht weniger als das Gegenständliche." HB, p. 71.

<sup>146</sup> HB, Gr., p. 71.

<sup>147</sup> HB, Eng., p. 281; Gr: "Der Mensch ist vielmehr vom Sein selbst in die Wahrheit des Seins 'geworfen', dass er, dergestalt Ek-sistierend, die Wahrheit des Seins hütet, damit im Lichte des Seins das Seiende als das Seiende, das es ist, erscheine." HB, p. 75.

148 "Die Ankunft des Seienden beruht im Geschick des Seins." HB, p. 75.

149 "Der Mensch ist der Hirt des Seins." HB, p. 75.

150 HB, Eng., p. 282; Gr: "Sie denkt vom Seienden aus auf dieses zu, im Durchgang durch einen Hinblick auf das Sein." HB, p. 76.

151 "Die Lichtung selber aber ist das Sein." HB, p. 77.

152 "Das Sein selber ist das Verhältnis, insofern Es die Ek-sistenz in ihrem existenzialen, das heisst ekstatischen Wesen an sich hält und zu sich versammelt als die Ortschaft der Wahrheit des Seins inmitten des Seienden." HB, p. 77.

153 "Aber dieser Bezug ist so, wie er ist, nicht auf Grund der Ek-sistenz, sondern das Wesen der Ek-sistenz ist existential-ekstatisch aus dem Wesen ~~der Wesen~~ der Wahrheit des Seins." HB, p. 78.

154 " . . . die schlichte Nähe eines unaufdringlichen Kaltens." HB, p. 78.

155 "Diese Nähe weist als die Sprache selbst." HB, p. 78.

156 " . . . die Einheit von Lauggestalt (Schriftbild), Melodie und Rhythmus und Bedeutung (Sinn) . . . " HB, p. 78.

157 " . . . deren seinsgeschichtlichen Wesen." HB, p. 79.

158 "Daher gilt es, das Wesen der Sprache aus der Entsprechung zum Sein und zwar als diese Entsprechung, das ist als Behausung des Menschenseins zu denken." HB, p. 79.

159 "Das Sichgeben ins Offene mit diesem selber ist das Sein selber." HB, p. 80.

160 HB, Eng., p. 284; Gr: "In diesem Wort verbirgt sich das anfängliche Geheimnis für alles Denken." HB, p. 80.

161 "Dieses 'es gibt' waltet als das Geschick des Seins." HB, p. 81.

162 "Es gibt nicht ein 'systematisches' Denken und daneben zur Illustration eine Historie der vergangenen Meinungen. Es gibt aber auch nicht nur, wie Hegel meint, eine Systematik, die das Gesetz ihres Denkens zum Gesetz der Geschichte machen und diese zugleich in das System aufheben könnte. Es gibt, anfänglicher gedacht, die Geschichte des Seins, in die das Denken als Andenken dieser Geschichte, von ihr selbst ereignet, gehört." HB, p. 81.

163 "Des Geschehen der Geschichte west als das Geschick der Wahrheit des Seins aus diesem." HB, p. 81.

164 "Die Ek-sistenz des Menschen ist als Ek-sistenz geschichtlich." HB, p. 82.

165 "Weil es gilt, die Ek-sistenz des Da-seins zu denken, deshalb liegt dem Denken in 'Sein und Zeit' so wesentlich daran, dass die Geschichtlichkeit des Daseins erfahren wird." HB, p. 82.

166 "Das Werfende im Entwerfen ist nicht der Mensch, sondern das Sein selbst, das den Menschen in die Ek-sistenz des Da-seins als sein Wesen schickt." HB, p. 84.

167 HB, Eng., p. 287; Gr: "Das Sein als das Geschick, das Wahrheit schickt, bleibt verborgen." HB, p. 86.

168 " . . . der gemäss alles Seiende als das Material der Arbeit erscheint . . . " HB, p. 87.

169 " . . . ein seinsgeschichtliches Geschick der in der Vergessenheit ruhenden Wahrheit des Seins." HB, p. 88.

170 "Keine Metaphysik . . . kann . . . das G<sup>4</sup>schick noch ein-holen, dies meint: denkend erreichen und versammeln, was in einem erfüllten Sinn von Sein jetzt ist." HB, p. 89.

171 HB, Eng., p. 288; Gr: " . . . ursprünglicher und darum im Wesen wesentlicher." HB, p. 90.

172 " . . . der ek-sistierende Gegenwurf des Seins . . . "

173 " . . . dessen Würde darin beruht, vom Sein selbst in die Wahrnis seiner Wahrheit gefufen zu sein." HB, p. 90.

174 "Dieser Ruf kommt als der Wurf, dem die Geworfenheit des Da-seins entstammt." HB, p. 90.

175 "Der Mensch ist in seinem seinsgeschichtlichen Wesen das Seiende, dessen Sein als Ek-sistenz darin besteht, dass er in der Nähe des Seins wohnt. Der Mensch ist der Nachbar des Seins." HB, p. 90.

176 HB, Eng., p. 290; Gr: "Das Wesen des Menschen beruht in der Ek-sistenz. Auf diese kommt es wesentlich, das Heisst vom Sein selbst her, an, insofern das Sein den Menschen als den ek-sistierenden zur Wächterschaft für die Wahrheit des Seins in diese selbst ereignet." HB, p. 94.

177 "Das Sein ist das Hut, die den Menschen in seinem ek-sistentem Wesen dergestalt zu ihrer Wahrheit behütet, dass sie die Ek-sistenz in der Sprache behaust." HB, p. 115.

178 178 " . . . kommt . . . zur Sprache." HB, p. 116.

179 James M. Robinson and John B. Cobb, Jr., Ed., The Later Heidegger and Theology, New Frontiers in Theology, vol. 1, pp. 13 ff.

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