

METHOD

Journal of Lonergan Studies

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METHOD

Journal of Lonergan Studies

Method aims, first, to promote original research into the methodological foundations of the sciences and disciplines; second, to further interpretive, historical, and critical study of the philosophical, theological, and methodological writings of Bernard Lonergan; and, third, to encourage interpretive, historical, and critical study of thinkers, past and present, who address questions, issues, and themes in a manner that brings to light the foundational role of the intentional subject of consciousness.

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WHAT IS A THING FOR LONERGAN?

Paul Kidder
Regis College, Denver

The notion of the thing is one of the many elementary features of Lonergan's thought. One who has not fathomed the distinctions between body and thing, between 'knowledge' in the primitive, animal sense and 'knowledge' in the full human sense, or between the real as verified and the real as "already out there now" cannot claim a basic mastery of Lonergan's philosophy. Yet however elementary the notion of the thing, its full meaning is something that even the most veteran Lonergan scholar may find elusive. Anyone who reads with care Chapter Eight of Insight can identify many objects that would count as things for Lonergan, and many that would count as "coincidental aggregates"; however, it is also possible to produce problematic candidates. For example, is the moon a thing? Is an automobile a thing? Is a cardigan sweater a thing?

I encountered in a dramatic way the complexity of the notion of the thing in working with the community of Lonergan scholars as Boston College. A few years back it came to light that if one presents various examples of what I have called "problematic candidates" to various Lonergan scholars, one will receive equally various interpretations. Indeed, questions surrounding the examples I have mentioned here sparked nearly universal controversy at Boston College. Many of those who could agree on a basic interpretation of Chapter Eight disagreed nevertheless as to which of the items on the list are truly things. Scholars who could agree upon a given candidate would frequently do so for different reasons. The various views that were aired were of course complex, nuanced, and not all of them voiced in my hearing. But perhaps I can convey some sense of the diversity of views which one could take, and which, at that time, various people did take. The case I will offer is that of the cardigan sweater.

A cardigan sweater, one might claim, is obviously a thing, for it satisfies Lonergan's definition of a thing as a "unity, identity, whole" grasped in data [1]. A sweater is clearly unitary (I refer to it in the singular), it is

an identity (the sweater I wear today I can see is the same one I wore last week), and it is a whole (its sleeves, front, back, and buttons are sewn together to make one complete sweater). On the other hand, one might claim that a cardigan is not a thing but a body, its unity being that of a coincidental aggregate perceived at a particular place and time, not the intelligible unity, identity, whole grasped in an insight into "thing". One might elaborate this answer and say that a cardigan is not a thing, but is many things: the aggregate is an aggregate of many chemical things, held together by chemical and physical bonds. But if this is true, we might not want to say that the aggregation is merely coincidental; the relationships among its parts form a scheme of recurrence. Pushing this line of thought further might reverse the argument once again. It is indeed no coincidence at all that the chemical parts of a cardigan have come together; they have come together in order to be a sweater! The sweater is part of the world that is constituted, and not merely mediated, by human acts of meaning. And if the meaning that mediates is the meaning of distinct things, then why should the meaning that constitutes not be constitutive of distinct things?

At the time the debate first raged at Boston College, it did not escape notice that one could, if one wished, put some of the problematic cases to Lonergan himself, who was then in one of his last years of residence there. And so Lonergan was approached, a number of potential things were named, and each received a yes or no answer in the very voice of the master. But however much this might have illuminated matters at the time, it is of no help to us here. Lonergan, weary, perhaps, of the gravity with which so many of his casual comments were taken, gave many of his last interviews, including this one, only on condition that his remarks not be published.

The task before us, then, is to establish what can be clarified in Lonergan's notion of the thing through detailed scrutiny of his texts. My efforts towards this end will largely take the form of a commentary on the most decisive sections of Insight's Chapter Eight. As my remarks will demonstrate, while early statements in the chapter might suggest that Lonergan's understanding of "thing" is compatible with traditional and commonsense usage, the chapter fairly quickly

moves into an explanatory context wherein "thing" takes on a technical meaning that excludes many of our ordinary assumptions.

A first section of my discussion will clarify several basic moments in Lonergan's exposition of the notion in question; a second section will consider the nature and the implications of Lonergan's shift into an explanatory context, and will criticize certain potentially misleading aspects of his earlier exposition; a third section will use the foregoing to address the problem that has been raised about the status of artifacts, broadening the scope of the discussion to include relevant points from Method in Theology. Not all of this, I fear, will thrill. Much of it is detail work. Yet one typically finds in the study of Lonergan that meticulous step-by-step detail work can be the surest route to the kind of vantage point that opens out on the full scope, the thorough consistency, and the great depth of his philosophical vision.

I

Chapter Eight's first subsection announces that the notion of the thing involves a new kind of insight. Whereas the original kind of insight examined in earlier chapters grasps conjugates, correlations, or relations, the new kind of insight grasps a "unity, identity, whole in data." "This unity," says Lonergan, "is grasped, not by considering data from any abstractive viewpoint, but by taking them in their concrete individuality and in the totality of their aspects"[2]. The announcement of a whole new type of insight might lead us to expect a whole new exposition, and a new set of five-finger exercises that might repeat elements of Chapters Two through Five, but with a different emphasis or angle. But no such repetition occurs. The reader does not have much chance to practice adverting to the insight before being directed towards its conceptualization, its use in science, and its connection with the notions of genus and species. One can be thankful that this lack of detailed exploration of the thing-insight itself makes Insight a shorter book than it would otherwise have been. On the other hand, one regrets the relative brevity of the book when seeking to pin down the exact nature and scope of the insight.

The notions of unity, identity, and wholeness that go into Lonergan's description of the thing-insight can be

misinterpreted. Of the three terms, greatest stress must fall upon the third: the thing as a whole, a totality of aspects. This totality is not complete in any one place or at any one moment of time; it is whole only when considered in light of every place it occupies or can occupy, and over the whole temporal range of its existence [3]. One must emphasize this sense of totality in order to avoid reading Aristotelian ideas into Lonergan's description. There is a temptation, I suspect, to focus on the term 'identity', to think of the insight into the thing as a grasp of the substrate that persists through change, that underlies accidental properties. Such a reading misconstrues Lonergan's notion entirely. A thing is not a substance to which accidental properties adhere; the thing is a concrete totality that includes what Aristotle called accidents, so long as these are grasped, not abstractly in their relativity, but concretely in their individuality.

To say that the notion of the thing regards data as individual and concrete is not to say that it regards data as immediate. On the contrary, the very concreteness of a thing is realized only in a totality that transcends any particular immediate experience. The totality stretches across past, present, and future, and always includes parts that are unavailable to immediate perception. The very concreteness of a thing, then, can be grasped only through inquiry and understanding. Such inquiry, moreover, will be impossible without the help of abstractive insights that grasp relations. One cannot grasp a water molecule, for example, as a single thing until one understands enough about laws of heating and cooling to know that liquid water, ice, and steam are different states in which the one thing can exist.

An explicit formulation of this complementarity between concrete and abstractive insights yields a linked pair of concepts: "thing" and "property". The very same data which, taken concretely, yield insight into a thing, may, when considered from various abstractive viewpoints, yield insights into what may be called properties of that thing [4]. The complementarity between these two types of insights implies a dialectical course for all learning about things; that is, better knowledge of any given thing is achieved through better understanding of properties, and superior knowledge of properties requires an ever-improving grasp of the whole or wholes to which they belong. One might ask, could one

learn all of the properties of a given thing, and then, in one overarching insight, grasp them at once in all of their concreteness? Certainly any attempt to understand a thing properly heads towards such an ideal, and approaches it asymptotically, but it is surely more doubtful whether such a comprehensive, overarching insight into a thing ever occurs. The overwhelming richness of data and intelligibility within our experience of things is the very reason why abstraction is necessary in any attempt to understand them.

Closely tied to the notion of property is that of change. Sets of data on a given thing may differ at different times. Because the data differ but pertain to a single thing, that thing is said to change [5]. Lonergan points out that any such change must be partial, otherwise it is not a change at all, but an annihilation and new creation [6]. Here again it is important to note how Lonergan's thinking diverges from that of Aristotle. In saying that any particular change must be partial, he is not saying that changes only occur among the accidental properties of an unchanging substrate. He is not committing himself to saying which sort of features of things change and which do not. Rather, the thing is grasped in the totality of its aspects, which includes its changing aspects.

The differences between Lonergan's and Aristotle's views is made vivid in a case such as that of a caterpillar that becomes a butterfly. To explain such seemingly total transformations the Aristotelian is forced to hunt for some bit of material substrate that never changes throughout the whole transformation. A person taking Lonergan's view, on the other hand, is satisfied to note that the enormous changes in the creature do not occur all at once, but in succession so that each is partial, and each is part of a single instance of development through stages. To this one might object that while each individual change in the development might be partial, the Lonerganian would admit as a thing something which at the end of the process was utterly different in every respect from what it was at the beginning; but such a thing is really two things. The reply would be that the objection conceives a beginning and an end abstractly, whereas in reality things are concrete, and only get from beginning to end by traversing all of the necessary intermediate stages.

Changes are occurrences. This means that while the nature of a particular kind of change may be investigated through classical scientific method, full knowledge of such changes will require statistical method in order to determine how often, under what conditions, and with what regularity the changes occur [7]. Probabilities also attach to the existence of things. "Existence stands to the thing," says Lonergan, "as event or occurrence stands to the conjugate" [8]. Thus it is a matter of probabilities. One may discuss the nature of purple cows, but there are currently low probabilities attached to the existence of such things.

Opposed to the notion of thing, but most often confused with it by philosophers and laypersons alike, is that of "body". The treatment of "body" in Insight is especially familiar to Lonergan scholars because it makes a highly instructive and wide-ranging distinction between animal knowing and fully human knowing. Animals such as dogs and kittens operate according to biological patterns, and these biological patterns have targets [9]. But these targets Lonergan calls bodies, not things. For animal knowing has no insight into the intelligible unity of things. The biological extroversion of the animal lacks the critical powers of fully human intelligence; it knows reality not by insight and judgment, but only insofar as reality satisfies the animal's narrow set of biological exigencies [10]. Critical distinctions such as that between thing and coincidental aggregate are simply irrelevant to animal knowing.

Lonergan's discussion turns from the role of bodies in animal knowing to their conception by modern epistemology. The work of an epistemologist is the work of human intelligence and not mere animal instinct, but the modern history of epistemology has been one of preoccupation with animal knowing. Epistemology seeks to articulate paradigmatic structures of knowing; and it often feels satisfied to find those structures in the simple and obvious operations of animal knowing rather than in the strange and elusive ways of the human mind. For epistemologists of such a bent, the critical distinction between thing and aggregate can have little more interest than it does for a dog or a kitten [11].

Between, as it were, the restricted powers of animal instinct and the intellectual virtuosity of the epistemologist lies the ordinary but human intelligence at work in common

sense, and one might wonder whether the pragmatic operations of common sense normally deal in bodies or things. The question is a tricky one, and is certainly not fully answered in Insight's section on "Bodies." What appears in that section is a distinction between things for us, "differentiated by experiential conjugates and common-sense expectations," and things themselves, "differentiated by explanatory conjugates and scientifically determined probabilities" [12]. In connecting common sense with the notion of "things for us," Lonergan seems to want to put distance between common sense and the notion of "body". Yet at the same time, Lonergan draws particular attention to the fact that all humans, even the very scientific ones, are also animals [13]. Such a claim implies that at least some of our oeprations (and presumably these would be common-sense operations) differ little from those of other animals. The targets of these operations would be bodies.

Further consideration of the relation of common sense to things requires further elaboration of the idea of "things for us" versus "things themselves," or "things as described" versus "things as explained." But such an elaboration raises general questions as to the nature of explanation as such, questions which require separate and prior treatment, and raise new difficulties as well.

II

Insight's Chapter Eight moves quickly from an initial sketch of "thing" as a general notion to the role of this notion in the context of explanatory thought. In this context Lonergan introduces the ancient notions of genera and species of things, now no longer as isolated rungs on a static, immutable ladder of creation, but as fundamental elements in his dynamic worldview of emergent probability [14]. The reinterpretation of these old notions, in turn, provides central premises for an argument against reductionist worldviews, an argument which is among the most important and remarkable discussions in the chapter, and indeed the entire book. As the explanatory context unfolds in Chapter Eight, a careful reader cannot help being impressed with the power, the flexibility, and the nuance in Lonergan's explanatory conception of thinghood. At the same time, certain puzzles suggest themselves which are not fully handled or explained, and the occasion arises to criticize certain of Lonergan's choices in terminology and the use of examples.

A thing is known through its properties, which is to say, through its relations with other things. A thing is known incompletely if only some of these relations are known. But relations divide into two types: descriptive relations whereby things are related to our senses, and explanatory relations whereby things are related to one another. Lonergan suggests that the notion of thing straddles descriptive and explanatory contexts [15]. Much of science begins with a process of categorization based on description by developing systematic ways of classifying things according to observable similarities and differences among them. But such descriptive categorizations are incomplete. They are a kind of preparation for asking the explanatory questions and proposing explanatory theories that reveal why the things described are thus categorizable. We begin with a set of things described and end with a set of things explained. The set is the same set, and throughout the process the notion of thing serves to identify the concrete unity to which both descriptive and explanatory attributes pertain.

There is, however, a difficulty here. The itinerary I have described from description to explanation is straightforward enough when dealing with things such as the plants and animals of Linnaeus's tables, but it encounters complications in the case of objects such as rocks, puddles, or clouds. One can categorize rocks -- by size, weight, shape, coloring, locality, and so forth -- but once the descriptive process moves towards explanation, the rocks that one had believed to be things reveal themselves to be merely coincidental aggregates of chemical things. Thus explanation has the power to break down our common-sense world and to carry us into a whole <u>new</u> world of things themselves.

Moreover, it would seem to follow that it is this new explanatory world of things that contains the <u>true</u> things. Descriptions are verifiable only as relations to us, not as properties independent of our perceptions. As properties independent of our perceptions, only explanations are verifiable [16]. But if this is so, one begins to wonder, how many of the things we think we know are really and truly things? Recent centuries have brought so many breakthroughs in the understanding of explanatory relations that even common sense now questions the ultimate veracity of its own assessments of color, weight, hardness, and other descriptive qualities. The early chapters of <u>Insight</u> introduce us to the

complexity, indeed the strangeness, of the new understanding of the universe offered by explanatory science. Science no longer settles for a Cartesian method of four simple rules, but requires a set of several interrelated canons, such as those of selection, of relevance, and of parsimony. It is only incompletely served by laws of the classical type, but requires complementary statistical laws. Its laws of motion do not pertain to a single framework of absolute space and time, but obtain across inertial transformations [17]. To understand the natural operations performed by, say, a plant, requires knowledge, not only of classical and statistical laws, but of the way in which these come together into a causal cycle, forming a scheme of recurrence [18]. If we are to understand the plant as a whole and in its environment, rather than merely thinking its functions abstractly, we must speak not only of schemes of recurrence, but of conditioned series of schemes [19]. If the evolutionary dimension is to be included, then we must think in terms of successive schedules of probability of conditioned series of schemes [20].

The project of understanding explanatory relations or properties, then, has become extraordinarily complex and is constantly developing. Everyone admits this. But not everyone notices what is implied: if explanatory relations are the true relations, if things are known <u>through</u> relations, and if our knowledge of explanatory relations is in so many ways rudimentary, incomplete, and open to revision, then the question as to which things are true things is as difficult as the question as to which natural laws are the true laws, or which schemes are the true schemes. Furthermore, the answer to the first question is, at least in part, dependent upon the answers to the other two. The tasks are all equally vast.

As Lonergan himself allowed, <u>Insight</u>'s Chapter Eight is incomplete because it does not deal fully with the question of verification, which is left for Chapter Nine to cover [21]. Chapter Eight does not, therefore, explicitly draw out all of the connections I have made between the description and the explanation of things, and between the explanation and the verification of things. But these connections are clearly implied in Chapter Eight's movement into an explanatory context; they are assumed in that chapter's differentiation of explanatory genera and species; and they are made more explicit when, in the metaphysical context of Chapter Fifteen,

Lonergan identifies the notion of thing with that of central potency, form, and act [22].

But if I have correctly interpreted the main purport of Lonergan's exposition of his notion of the thing, then there is reason to complain of certain incidental features of his exposition. For example, in the course of defining the general notion, Lonergan states,

> if the reader will turn his mind to any object he names a thing, he will find that object to be a unity to which belongs every aspect of every datum within the unity. [23]

But this statement is misleading, for ordinary speech confuses things and aggregates. Most readers would ordinarily refer to rocks, for example, as things. But rocks are coincidental aggregates, not things.

Lonergan's use of the moon among his examples is also potentially misleading. The example is used when he explains how Aristotle's syllogism relates things and their attributes.

> In a given totality of data there is a unity named the moon. In the same totality there is grasped a regular series of luminous shapes named the phases of the moon. In the regular series of phases one may grasp that the surface of the moon cannot be flat and must be spherical. Aristotle would name the moon his subject, its phases the middle term, and its sphericity the predicate. [24]

While we can easily see that Aristotle would have considered the moon a thing, in Lonergan's own explanatory context the moon would not be one thing, but an aggregate of many chemical things. But Lonergan does not explicitly distance himself from Aristotle when using the example, so that one can get the impression that Lonergan, too, considers the moon a thing.

Lonergan's exposition has also, I would suggest, a terminological limitation in its very use of the word 'thing'. The limitation results from the way in which Lonergan's use of that term departs from ordinary speech. Now, nothing is more common in philosophy than redifinitions that yield technical terms. But in the case of Lonergan's redefinition of 'thing', there results a significant problem as to how ordinary speech is to accommodate the new meaning. Many, if not most, ordinary uses of 'thing' actually refer to what Lonergan would insist are coincidental aggregates. Lifting a rock, I say, "This is a heavy thing"; gazing at a sunset, I say, "What a magnificent thing." But these are not things by Lonergan's definition.

Perhaps one could read Lonergan's redefinition as a struggle to replace, in ordinary speech, the usual vague and general meanings of 'thing' with his own exact meaning. But if this is so, one may yet oppose his purpose on stylistic grounds. For 'thing' (in the ordinary sense) is, by its very vagueness, endlessly rich in connotation, and has, by its very generality, a marvelous versatility. Perhaps, in time, another word, such as 'body' or 'aggregate', could acquire these same rich overtones. But why introduce such linguistic upheaval if there is an easier way to conduct matters? The easier way, I would suggest, is to give the more technical definition the more technical-sounding term. So, instead of using the word 'thing', when thinking of Lonergan's technical notion, one might use the word 'being' (in the sense of a being). The word 'being' is not frequently used in ordinary speech. When it is, it appears most often with the word 'human', and human beings are indeed things by Lonergan's definition. In making this suggestion I do not think that I am calling for totally un-Lonerganian usage, for Lonergan himself says in Latin what I recommend in English when he writes, in De Constitutione Christi,

> Strictius, ens est id quod est. Ita Deus, angeli, homines, animalia, plantae, mineralia, quia ipsa sunt, entia strictius dicuntur. [25]

The list of objects here is limited to those that Lonergan would call things (though God and angels are not treated in Chapter Eight and would require more explanation than that chapter offers), and he chooses to name them with the word 'entia' rather than 'res', thus selecting a word closer to the English 'beings' than to 'things'.

Having offered these points of criticism, I wish to end my commentary on Chapter Eight with some remarks on the idea of explanatory genera, an idea that perhaps reveals best Lonergan's primary motivation in writing the chapter. The motivation I have in mind is the desire to refute the reductionism of the modern-scientific worldview, but to do so from within an understanding and appreciation of science.

By "reductionism" here I mean the tendency to believe that because it is necessary to explain a whole thing in terms of its parts, the reality of the thing is in the parts rather than in the whole. Reductionism can take many forms. It may reduce the human to the animal, the biological, the chemical, or the physical; it may reduce the animal to the biological,

the chemical, or the physical; it may reduce the biological to the chemical or physical; and so on. In each case, it makes the same logical move. Because physical conjugates must be used to explain chemical things, it finds reality at the physical level rather than the chemical; or because chemical conjugates must be used to explain biological things, it finds reality at the chemical level rather than the biological; and so on up and down the traditional hierarchies of genera.

A first point that Lonergan would direct against such reductionism is that higher order genera do not represent random collections of lower-order conjugates, but have, in fact, a unique immanent intelligibility of their own. Thus the reason why there is a science of chemistry at all is because there exist phenomena that are inexplicable through physical laws alone. The same holds true between chemistry and biology. One could exhaust every chemical law known to science and still have no explanation for why chemicals should come together in such a way as to form a cell. For that, biological laws are necessary. The higher-order sciences, thus, are due to the existence of higher-order kinds of conjugates. But as these conjugates may be considered abstractly as instances of laws, so they may be considered concretely, in their individuality. Through the latter type of consideration, one recognizes the existence of higher-order <u>things</u> as well as higher-order conjugates.

A second point Lonergan would make would reject the philosophical confusion of conjugates and things, a confusion that clearly invites reductionism. Conjugates are known through abstraction, but things are known only as a concrete totality. In examining conjugates of higher genera, one can "abstract from the aspect of the aggregate that cannot be accounted for on the lower viewpoint" [26]. But one cannot abstract from this aspect when referring to things. This is the error of reductionism; it abstracts from the higher-order features of a thing and posits a set of lower-order things corresponding to its lower-order abstraction. But what such a move yields is in fact not things at all, but bodies [27].

A third point, then, is that there are no things within things as there are bodies within bodies. One might be inclined to say that because conjugates of lower-order genera may be found in higher-order genera, therefore lower-order things survive in things of higher genera. But such a view

is again overly abstractive. One is not understanding a thing concretely and in its totality if one is abstracting from the way its functioning is controlled by the larger unity, identity, whole [28].

It is perhaps only when the anti-reductionist program of Lonergan's thinking is brought to the fore that one fully appreciates Lonergan's need to insist upon a strict, technical, explanatory understanding of thinghood. Lonergan is not satisfied merely to oppose the reduction of human being to something less than human; he finds deeper reductionist misunderstandings running throughout all of the sciences. To oppose reductionism in such a global manner requires the utmost consistency, and so the utmost strictness in the use of terms. Any slippage in the use of the explanatory notion of thing would open an opportunity for the reintroduction of a confusion between body and thing, and so the reappearance of reductionist assumptions.

III

Sufficient materials have been marshalled now to clarify some of the problems regarding the status of artifacts, and perhaps to hazard an opinion on some of them. A first claim I would defend is that it is inadequate to consider an artifact a mere coincidental aggregate. The ordering of the parts of an artifact is guided by intelligible human intentions, brought about by intelligible human acts, and ordered toward intelligible human purposes. The tearing apart of a sweater is a fundamentally different kind of act of destruction than the smashing of a rock. The latter yields many smaller rocks; the former, at best, rags.

The intelligibility of an artifact is, moreover, that of a scheme of recurrence. An easy example would be an automobile. The functioning of a gas engine comprises a series of different types of events, one occasioning the next, and all of them ultimately coming around in a cycle, so that the last once again occasions the first. And to each (as every car owner is painfully aware) there attaches not a necessity but a degree of probability.

Certain of Lonergan's statements in Insight, when put together, seem to suggest that once one understands artifacts as distinct schemes, one can go on to regard them as things. Late in Insight's chapter on the thing, Lonergan states:

> Inquiry and insight are not so much a higher system as a perennial source of higher systems, so that human living has its basic task in reflecting on systems and judging them, deliberating on their implementation and choosing between possibilities. [29]

Presumably, at least some artifacts embody the kind of higher systems produced by human intelligence and referred to in this passage. Artifacts would implement the higher systems that one had devised, reflected upon, and judged. But we may recall from earlier in the same chapter that "there cannot be conjugates of a higher order without things of the same order" [30]. If at least some artifacts, then, can be said (when considered from various abstractive viewpoints) to consist of conjugates pertaining to higher-order systems, then those same artifacts (when taken concretely and individually) must be considered genuine and distinct things.

One might regard a passage found in Chapter Eleven, wherein Lonergan explicitly links the term 'thing' with the intelligence and intelligibility constitutive of artifacts, as supportive of this interpretation.

> In their different manners both common sense and positive science view the material world as subject to intelligible patterns and as governed by some law of causality. To confine our attention to what man knows best, namely, his own artifacts, there is discernible in them an intelligible design and their existence has its ground in the labor of production. But before the design is realized in things, it was invented by intelligence; before the sequence of productive operations was undertaken, it was affirmed as worthwhile for some sufficient or apparently sufficient reason. In the thing there is the intelligible design, but in the inventor there was not only the intelligibility on the side of the object but also intelligent consciousness on the side of the subject. [31]

Taken together, the three passages quoted seem to endorse the conclusion that the artifact may be called a thing because one can explain its unity, identity, and wholeness. To be sure, the explanation differs from that of natural objects; it includes an account, not only of the natural schemes by which the object's functioning is ordered, but also of the human intentions, the human purposes, and the human activities that went into producing it. But explanatory accounts of

such intentions, purposes, and activities, however difficult they might be, are nevertheless possible in principle.

Yet even with these arguments and textual evidences in view, the conclusion that artifacts are things is open to serious objections. For one, if Lonergan had meant us to come to this conclusion, one would expect from his customary thoroughness that one would not have to construct the argument from three unjoined statements in the book, as I have done. One would find it set out by the author himself. Secondly, lack of a full, explicit treatment of the matter leaves one confused as to how artifacts would figure into Lonergan's explicit system of explanatory genera and species. Would sweaters find their niche somewhere between chemical and biological things? Would automobiles and computers, because their greater ability and autonomy, be placed closer to the animal genus than would sweaters? Such questions seem strange, if not altogether ridiculous. Thirdly, it has been pointed out to me that my argument rests on a correlation of the terms 'conjugate' and 'system' that might not hold up under close scrutiny. While 'conjugate' clearly has a strictly technical meaning, 'system' may be used by Lonergan in a much looser fashion. Fourthly, this distinction between the strict and loose employment of terminology might also apply to the very term 'thing'. In the passage quoted above, where Lonergan explicitly refers to artifacts as things, he may very well be using the term in its more ordinary sense, or only in the limited sense of "thing for us."

But if one is convinced by such objections that artifacts cannot be things, how then does one interpret the possibility of explaining their intelligibility? One would have to say that explanatory accounts of artifacts do not constitute explanatory accounts of the unity, identity, or wholeness of autonomous things. Thus one colleague has argued that the business of analyzing the human intentions, purposes, and activities associated with the production of artifacts is a necessary part of the explanation of <u>humans</u>, so that the only thing that is thereby explained is not the artifact but the human person.

This position seems quite reasonable, but it too is not utterly free from difficulties. If artifacts are not things themselves, but are parts of the human being, then one has the problem of explaining just exactly what one means by 'part' in this case. For sweaters, toothbrushes, and refrigerators

are not parts of individual persons in the same way that arms, teeth, and hair are. If it is strange to equate artificial things with natural things, is it not similarly strange to equate artificial parts of things with natural parts?

One might hope to find our problem more fully illuminated by Method in Theology. In that book, considerations of human meaning come to center stage and lead the discussion from the very beginning. Intersubjectivity, art, symbol, and history are handled with a thoroughness and a sensitivity unencountered in Insight. In his section entitled "Functions of Meaning," Lonergan describes how human acts of meaning not only mediate the world, but in part constitute it [32]. As examples he mentions cities, roads, industries, religions, art-forms, languages, sciences, philosophies, histories, the family, the state, the law, and the economy. All of these creations contribute to the constitute of a world. One may wish to call this world artificial, but it is no less real for being artificial. The contributions of the human mind establish real patterns for the functioning of the real world.

In these notions one might hope and expect to find a conclusive statement on the status of the individual products of constitutive acts of meaning. But no such statement appears. Lonergan does not take up the question of thinghood as formulated in Insight; in fact, he seems to avoid the very use of the word 'thing'. Nor does Lonergan, in Method, attempt to relate the constitutive role of meaning back to the anti-reductionist program and the explanatory context of Insight's Chapter Eight.

We are faced, then, with sets of texts which, for all of their comprehensiveness and detail, are, when approached with our particular questions about artifacts, found to be incomplete and inconclusive. One can piece together clues, but no definitive answer emerges. One may reinterpret, extrapolate, and supplement, but one is thereby involved in a thorny dialectic. I have adduced arguments on either side of that dialectic in order to give some sense of just how thorny it gets, and thus, too, I provide an excuse for refusing, myself, to bring the debate here to a resolution or synthesis. Nor do I even hope to provide here the definitive doxography on the issue. My hope is rather that my comments might serve to facilitate the discussion, and it is in such a spirit that I would express a conviction which is my own, and which, I believe, amounts to a third kind of stand on the question

of artifacts. That conviction (a reapplication of what I have said earlier) is that the terms in which the problem of artifacts is defined are inadequate. As long as one is employing the term 'thing', one will always sound a little ridiculous refusing to let the word be used for those objects which people everywhere, every day call "things." On the other hand, if one interprets Lonergan's technical term 'thing' as broadly as possible, merely for the sake of preserving the ordinary connotations of the word, one is sure to obscure many of Lonergan's most imnportant explanatory distinctions. Chapter Eight, then, for all of its excellence in treating a particular set of issues, is set out in terms which are inadequate when applied beyond that set of issues, and in particular when applied to the matter of artifacts. In treating this issue, one should not have only the terms 'body', 'coincidental aggregate', 'thing for us', and 'thing itself' to choose from. Human creation imitates divine creation, and so brings products into the world that are like the things of nature; but human creativity never comes to equal its divine counterpart. Our terminology ought to be capable of reflecting the similarity without obscuring the difference.

NOTES

[1] Lonergan, Insight: A Study of Human Understanding, 3rd ed. [NY: Philosophical Library, 1970], p. 246.

[2] Ibid. [3] Ibid. [4] Ibid. [5] Ibid., p. 247. [6] Ibid.

[7] Ibid., p. 248. [8] Ibid. [9] Ibid, p. 251.

[10] Ibid., p. 252. [11] Ibid., pp. 252-53.

[12] Ibid., p. 253. [13] Ibid. [14] Ibid., pp. 254ff.

[15] Ibid., pp. 247, 253.

[16] For example, the Sun appears to us to circle the Earth; but to state in an unqualified way that "the Sun circles the Earth" is to make an unverifiable claim. The qualified claim that "the Sun appears to circle the Earth" can be verified because one can explain why the Sun appears thus.

[17] See Insight, pp. 23, 40. [18] Ibid., pp. 96, 118.

[19] Ibid., pp. 118-20. [20] Ibid., pp. 125-6, 134.

[21] See Lonergan, Understanding and Being, eds. E. A. Morelli and M. D. Morelli [NY & Toronto: Edwin Mellen, 1980], p. 126.

[22] Insight, p. 434. [23] Ibid., p. 246. [24] Ibid., p. 247.

[25] Lonergan, De constitutione Christi ontologica et psychologica, 2nd ed. [Rome: Gregorian U. Press, 1958], p. 12. A fairly literal translation might run, "More strictly, being is that which is. Thus God, angles, men, animals, plants, and minerals are said to be beings in the more strict sense."

[26] Insight, p. 258. [27] Ibid., p. 259. [28] Ibid., pp. 258-9.

[29] Ibid., p. 266. [30] Ibid., p. 259. [31] Ibid., p. 322.

[32] Lonergan, Method in Theology, 2nd ed. [NY: Herder & Herder], pp. 77-8.

HAYES' RADICAL BEHAVIORIST EXPLANATION OF THE COGNITIVE DIMENSION OF CONSCIOUSNESS: A LONERGANIAN CRITIQUE

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The most pressing intellectual issue facing modern culture is the foundation of method in general. For Lonergan the foundation of method in general is the subject qua subject [1]. For the radical behaviorist the foundation of method in general is nature. Human operant behavior is viewed as a "natural" event which has both its topography and probability of emission completely determined by the "natural" processes of operant conditioning. "We must assume," states Skinner, "that behavior is lawful and determined" [2]. Which of these positions is true depends on the nature of consciousness. If the subject qua subject is the foundation of method in general then consciousness must be both cognitive and constitutive. The cognitive dimension of consciousness must take the form of an original, immediate, and non-reflexive experience of the subject and his or her operations of experiencing, understanding, judging, and deciding. The constitutive dimension of consciousness must take the form of the self-determination of: (a) the experience of the subject that occurs in the operations of sensing, understanding, judging, and deciding, (b) the structure and internal relations of these operations, and (c) the intentional orientation of these operations toward data, essence, truth and being, and value respectively [3].

This constitutive dimension of consciousness does not, of course, exclude the role of environmental learning processes in the development of the operations. The constitutive dimension of consciousness simply means that learning depends upon the conscious subject and not vice versa and that the emergence of the structure and relations of the operations is determined by the nature of the subject rather than by learning. The emergence of the operations across ontogenetic time, their specific intentional objects, and the subtlety and bias of their use will be determined by the interaction between the subject and the environmental processes of learning [4]. There is a necessary overlap between the original

or underived property of the cognitive dimension of consciousness and the self-determination of the experience of the subject, because, if the experience of the subject is underived and original then it is inherently self-determined rather than other-determined.

If nature is the foundation of method in general then consciousness must be cognitive and non-constitutive. The cognitive dimension of consciousness will take the form of a derived, non-immediate, and reflexive knowledge of the subject and his or her operations of sensing, understanding, judging, and deciding. The non-constitutive dimension of consciousness must take the form of: (a) the emission of the operations of sensing, understanding, judging, and deciding without the original, immediate, and non-reflexive experience of the subject, (b) the emission of these operations in an other-determined manner, namely by way of operant conditioning processes, and (c) the emission of these operations in an automatic or non-intentional manner [5]. This amounts to the complete rejection of the conscious subject and his or her role in constituting the operations and therefore the reduction of the operations to the operant conditioning processes of learning.

In an earlier essay I demonstrated that Lonergan's formulation of the immediate and non-reflexive properties of the cognitive dimension of consciousness was correct and that the radical behaviorist formulation of B. F. Skinner was incorrect. However, the demonstration uncovered a very interesting fact. Steven Hayes, a radical behaviorist, agrees with Lonergan's formulation of these properties but rejects the original and underived nature of the cognitive dimension of consciousness, as well as the entire constitutive dimension. It will be the purpose of this essay to offer a Lonerganian critique of Hayes' rejection of the thesis that the cognitive dimension of consciousness is original or underived and therefore intrinsic to the operations of the subject.

Since it is Lonergan's thesis that the non-reflexive experience of the subject is self-constituting, rather than other-constituted, then even though this paper deals primarily with the cognitive dimension of consciousness it will also deal with the first property of the constitutive dimension--the self-determined nature of the experience of the subject.

Prior to the critique an account will be given of the explanation of the original/derived nature of the cognitive dimension of consciousness given by Hayes and Lonergan.

1. Hayes on the Nature of the Cognitive Dimension

In an earlier essay I outlined the method used by radical behaviorists for constructing theoretical explanations of behavior. Using the three-term contingency of reinforcement as an interpretive tool, the radical behaviorist will attempt to identify the conditions (the discriminative stimuli symbolized as SD) under which behavior (the response symbolized as R) is emitted and the effects that this behavior has in the external or internal environments (the reinforcer symbolized as Sr+ or punisher symbolized as Sr-). Within this methodology explanatory behavior of the theoretician is scientifically acceptable if it is under the stimulus control of operations and data and has the effect of leading to prediction and control of events. The operations and data can be internal or private as long as they are concrete and experienceable rather than abstract and inferred. Explanatory behavior is not scientifically acceptable if it is only under the stimulus control of social and cultural stimuli and has as its only effect, social and cultural reinforcers or punishers. Thus, for the radical behaviorist a behavior is explained when the contingencies controlling it have been determined [6].

Using this methodology Hayes concludes that human behavior can be classified into three categories. Using the analogy of ocular vision he refers to these as "seeing" (for Lonergan -- direct knowing) where the SD is external, "seeing seeing" (for Lonergan -- reflexive knowing) where the SD is part of one's physiological constitution and/or behavior repertoire, and "seeing seeing from perspective" (for Lonergan -- consciousness) where the SD is the experience of oneself as the constant and unchanging locus or perspective from which all "seeing" and "seeing seeing" behaviors are emitted. As Hayes states, it is not only important to the verbal community to "know that you see and that you see that you see, but [also] that <u>you</u> see that you see" [7]. If you did not report seeing and seeing seeing from a consistent locus the verbal community would break down in chaos, to say nothing of yourself. To avoid this chaos the verbal community establishes contingencies to ensure that you develop seeing from constant perspective behavior [8].

Seeing seeing from perspective is a very unique behavior. "For the person engaging in the behavior, it is not truly possible to see it as an object .... If we were to see our own perspective (i.e., as an object) from what perspective would we see it?" [9] The "you" in seeing that you see from perspective is "some sort of agent independent of all the things about you .... As long as this [seeing seeing from perspective] behavior itself does not change, you are still you. What you see will change radically -- your body will age, your thoughts will change -- but the locus or context of self-knowledge will not and cannot" [10].

If Hayes' description was not phrased in the language based upon the analogy of knowledge to ocular vision, it would be a very close parallel to Lonergan's description of consciousness as the immediate, and non-reflexive experience of the subject and his or her acts. However, whereas consciousness is for Lonergan an original or intrinsic aspect of all the operations of the subject, seeing seeing from perspective is for Hayes not original or intrinsic to behavior. Rather, it is a product of operant conditioning. It is learnt early in childhood.

How does this conditioning come about? Hayes suggests three ways. All of them involve the development of subtle reponses in the child's tacting repertoire -- behavior under the control of data and operations. Seeing seeing from perspective behavior can develop as a by-product of learning to emit the tacts "here" and "there" where the SD for "there" is the relation of distance from the child's point of view and the SD for "here" is the relation of proximity to the child's point of view. Presumably, the child undergoing such conditioning learns to respond to his point of view as an SD. Secondly, children are taught to discriminate between their perspective and the perspective of others. In Piagetian terminology this is a concrete operational achievement that only occurs in our culture around the ages of five to seven. Once again such experiences quite likely make one's own seeing seeing from perspective behavior more salient. Thirdly, children are taught to respond to questions of the type "what did you X?" where the X is a variable that can range over all possible acts of seeing and seeing seeing and the you is constant. "Thus, the one consistency between the word 'you' in such questions and behavior is not seeing or seeing seeing but the behavior of seeing that you see from a particular locus or perspective" [11].

Hayes concludes that the foundation for seeing seeing from perspective is not the subject but the environmental processes of operant conditioning. Since the contingencies involved are verbal contingencies, Hayes concludes that, "Quite literally, it may be that verbal behavior gave humankind a soul" [12]. Thus, seeing seeing from perspective is identified with operant behavior. Even though, for the person emitting it, it is not observable and describable in the same way that other events are, nevertheless it is in the final analysis a "thing -- it is socially established behavior of importance to the verbal community" [13].

Hayes therefore affirms the immediacy and non-reflectiveness of the experience of the subject but rejects its originality. Because the foundation of the experience of the subject lies in the environmental principles of operant conditioning, rather than in the subject itself, this experience is not an intrinsic property of all action. That is, the experience is not self-constituting. Since it is a derived experience the subject qua subject is not required as an explanatory concept. In the end the only explanatory concept required is that of behavior which is always defined by its relation to the other two terms of the three-term contingency of reinforcement.

It is remarkable to find such a degree of convergence between radical behaviorist and critical realist thought. Speaking metaphorically Hayes, through his very creative behavioral analysis, has led radical behaviorists to the doorway of the spiritual life. However, in the final analysis he is not able to lead them into the home of the spirit, because in his attempt to remain faithful to his materialistic metaphysics he reduces the subject qua subject to the subject qua object.

Can Lonergan be of help in this regard? Can he demonstrate that the attempt to reduce the subject to the object is incorrect, without at the same time invalidating the science of operant conditioning and its striking discovery of the principles of operant conditioning?

2. Lonergan on the Nature of the Cognitive Dimension

Lonergan's method for gaining knowledge of the nature of consciousness is that of "intentionality analysis" whereby one heightens attention to the operations that one engages in when one is knowing and doing. As a result of his application

of this method he concluded that the operations that are involved are organized into the four qualitatively different levels of experiencing, understanding, judging, and deciding. Each of the operations is both intrinsically intentional and intrinsically conscious. By consciousness Lonergan refers to the experience of the subject and his or her acts which is part of the nature of these acts. Consciousness is therefore not identified with the subject's objective self-presence, that occurs in reflexive knowing. Rather, consciousness is the "utterly primitive cognitional self-presence that is not reflective in any way. [Consciousness] is originally and immediately given. It is the internal presence of the acts (and underlying them, the actor), the presence to which all external terms -- whether of non-reflective acts or of reflective acts -- become cognitionally present" [14]. I have discussed Lonergan's method and his theory of consciousness more fully in an earlier essay [15].

Given this understanding of consciousness how would Lonergan deal with Hayes' account of the original/derived nature of the experience of seeing seeing from perspective?

Preparatory to this discussion two general points need to be made. First, Lonergan would not agree that there is an analogy between knowing and ocular vision. For him reality is not the already-out-there-now-real that is fully known on the level of experience. Rather, the real is the verified. It is what is known by way of all the operations on the levels of experiencing, understanding, and judging [16]. For example, reality as known through quantum mechanics is simply not knowable on the level of experience. For Lonergan, this example is not atypical. What is not obvious on the level of common sense, but nonetheless true, is that the unity in any given data is not known by experience alone. Insight into the unity, which occurs on the level of intelligence, is also necessary. Further, judgment of the correctness of the insight, which occurs on the level of reason, is also required.

Second, though Lonergan would agree with Hayes that there is a type of self-knowledge which is immediate, non-objective, and non-reflexive, he would disagree with Hayes' formulation of it as merely an experience of perspective. No doubt perspective is an aspect of this experience. The person does experience him or herself as the perspective from which all knowledge takes place. However, in addition to this there is an experience of immediate self-presence.

The person is not merely experienced as locus or perspective. Rather, he or she is also experienced as the one who knows and does -- as the one to whom things become present through the operations of experiencing, understanding, and judging, and so on, precisely because she or he is immediately self-present. When the insight into the self-presence property of this primitive experience is added to the insight of the perspective property, then the understanding that occurs is better formulated with the concept of the subject qua subject. The subject qua subject is indeed the perspective from which all knowing and doing occurs, precisely because the subject qua subject is the one who knows and acts.

Turning now to the issue of whether the experience of the subject/perspective is original or derived, Lonergan would disagree with Hayes' contention that the experience of the subject as knower/doer/perspective is a derived experience. For Lonergan it is an original experience, one which is intrinsic to all the operations at all levels. This experience would first emerge in ontogenetic development when the individual has his or her first sensory experience of either the external or internal environment. This occurs, of course, sometime during prenatal development. Theoretically, this must be so because if I am not immediately present to myself, then nothing can be present to me. As Lonergan states, "If there were no one there to see, there would be nothing present to the seer." What counts in this case is "not the presence of the subject that looks, even when he is looking at himself" [17]. Not only is this immediate self-presence theoretically necessary. It is also empirically given in the primitive experience that we have of ourselves whenever we carry out any operation. For Lonergan, this self-presence is very unique. "It is the presence in, as it were, another dimension, the presence concomitant and correlative and opposite to the presence of the object. Objects are present by being attended to; but subjects are present as subjects, not by being attended to, but by attending" [18]. Therefore, if at any time the subject who attends was not there to attend, no object would be made present through attending. Thus, for Lonergan this experience of self-presence is original. It is intrinsic to every act. It is, in other words, self-constituted rather than other-constituted.

Lonergan would consider Hayes' behavioral analysis of seeing seeing from perspective as a very creative specification of some of the contingencies which cause the child to heighten his or her consciousness of what already exists in consciousness. By way of the contingencies, the responses that are acquired are "here", "there", "my perspective is...", "your perspective is..." and so on. The response that is being acquired is not the experience of perspective. This experience is an intrinsic part of all behavior. Because of the nature of these contingencies, while learning to tact the discriminative stimuli for "here", "there", "my perspective", "your perspective", "my behavior yesterday" and so on, the child adverts to his or her experience of him or herself, as self-present in each of these acts. This heightening of this experience is not a new tact response but is rather an intrinsic dimension of the tacting tacts of "here", "there", and so on. It is impossible to tact a tacting tact. Later through memory and reflexive analysis this experience can be tacted as "self-presence", "perspective", and so on. However, a tact never produces the properties of its SD. That is why it is objective. Therefore, the contingencies specified by Hayes do not produce the experience of seeing seeing from perspective or self-presence. They produce the discriminations between here and there, my perspective, your perspective and so on. In so doing they coincidentally cause the child to heighten his or her own experience of self-presence; to advert to the experience of being the perspective. However, they do not cause the experience.

Lonergan would therefore conclude that though Hayes has very creatively formulated some of the properties of immediate self-presence, an oversight of data, and a mistaken analogy of knowing, have led him to miss the fundamental insight into the subject <u>qua</u> subject and to come to the conclusion that seeing seeing from perspective is not original and self-constituting, but is rather derived and other-constituted by operant conditioning processes. For Lonergan, the subject <u>qua</u> subject is the foundation of consciousness and because of this is also the foundation of the environment <u>qua</u> environment. Rather than it being the case that verbal behavior give humankind a soul, it is the case that humankind has a verbal repertoire because it is conscious and this consciousness organizes itself into operations that are not merely empirical, but also intelligent and rational.

The discussion has thus far occurred on the level of the intellectual operations. What has been provided is an exposition of Hayes' and Lonergan's formulations of their insights into the original or underived quality of the experience that the individual has of him or herself as knower and doer. The question which now arises is, which formulation is correct?

3. The Judgment of Hayes' and Lonergan's Formulations

In order to come to judgment about which of these two formulations is correct we must gain a reflective insight into the conditions that must be met if either of these conditioned formulations is to be transformed into a virtually unconditioned judgment -- a conditioned whose conditions are known and linked to it and are in fact fulfilled [19]. It is necessary, then, to state the two conditioned statements and their necessary conditions. In addition we must determine whether or not their conditions are in fact fulfilled [20].

The conditioned statement in Hayes' case would be that, my experience of myself as the perspective or locus from which all my behavior is emitted is not original or intrinsic to these behaviors, and therefore self-constituted, but rather is derived or extrinsic to these behaviors. This experience is thus other-constituted by operant conditioning processes.

I will mention only two links between this conditioned and its conditions. There are undoubtedly others. The first link can be formulated in the proposition that, prior to the conditioning of seeing from perspective, which occurs during middle childhood, I have been places and experienced things without being present to have experienced them. Stated differently, these behaviors occurred "naturally" and unwittingly, that is, without my being there as perspective or locus.

The second link, which is really just a corollary of the first, is that I am capable of learning when I am in a state that lacks my presence as perspective or locus. That is, it is possible for things to become present to me when I am not present to myself. Thus, since dreamless sleep, comatose, anaesthetized, and somnambulatory states are prototypic of such a condition, I should be capable of learning when in these states.

The fulfillment of these conditions will be given in the data both of one's own experience and of research on learning in the above-mentioned states.

The conditioned statement in Lonergan's case would be that, my experience of myself as the perspective or locus from which all my behavior is emitted, and as subject of these acts, is original or intrinsic to these behaviors. This experience is therefore self-determined or self-constituted.

Once again only two links between this conditioned and its conditions will be mentioned. The first link can be stated in the proposition that I have never been anywhere or experienced anything that I was not there as perspective, locus, and subject to experience. Stated differently, none of my behaviors occur "naturally", "automatically", and "unwittingly", that is, without my self-presence.

The second link, which is again a corollary of the first, is that I am not capable of learning when I am in a state that lacks my presence as subject, perspective, or locus. That is, it is impossible for things to be present to me when I am not present to myself. Thus, in the states of dreamless sleep, coma, anaesthetization, and somnambulation, I am not capable of learning.

When we turn to the data of experience in order to see which of the two first links are fulfilled, it is clear that the condition required by Lonergan's conditioned proposition is the one that is fulfilled. Hayes, very clearly, though inconsistently, recognizes this in his statement that:

> So far as you can directly know, you have never been anywhere you-as-perspective have not been. There is nothing you have ever done or experienced that you know about that wasn't known in the context called you. On experiential (not logical) grounds, so far as you know you have no limits and no end. At least you have never experienced any limits, or boundary, or end that you know about, by definition. If you know about it, you were there to know about it. [21]

This is a very astute phenomenological analysis.

Concerning the two second links, I am not aware of any empirical research on learning in any of the states mentioned. Nonetheless, it seems very unlikely that such learning could occur. However, the second link in the Lonerganian formulation is not subject to empirical invalidation since this link "reflects the very structure presupposed in undertaking any empirical investigation whatsoever" [22].

The judgment that follows from this use of reflective reason is that the individual has an original and self-constituting experience of him or herself as perspective, locus, and subject.

Conclusions and Extensions

This discussion has demonstrated that, contrary to Hayes' radical behaviorist theory, the cognitive dimension of consciousness is an experience of the subject and his or her acts that, in addition to being immediate and non-reflexive, is also original and self-constituting. This demonstration has occurred in a manner that is consistent with both Lonergan's generalized empirical method and B. F. Skinner's radical behaviorist method. An earlier essay demonstrated, by way of the same methodology, that, contrary to Skinner's theory, consciousness, taken as an immediate and non-reflexive experience of the subject and his or her acts, exists. As a result of these demonstrations we can judge that Lonergan's critical realist formulation of the nature of the cognitive dimension of consciousness is correct. Further, the discussion in this essay has also brought us to the judgment that the cognitive dimension of consciousness is self-constituting.

The striking thing about these conclusions is that, at least as far as I can determine, nothing in the method used is incompatible with the method of radical behaviorism for explaining behavior. The findings of this essay thus take us another step towards an integration of critical realist and radical behaviorist methodologies. In this integration the generalized empirical method would be foundational and the behavior analytic method would constitute a specialized empirical method for analyzing the environmental contingencies that interact with the subject in the development of the subject's behavioral repertoire. Such an integration of methods has some very important implications. Because the generalized empirical method includes both the data of consciousness and the data of sense, and because the behavior analytic method, not only provides rigorous principles for the analysis of the sensory data on behavioral development, but is also open to private data, the integration of the two could result in a generalized empirical method that would be capable of a refined interactional analysis of human behavior. Such an articulated generalized-empirical-method is urgently needed if we are to reverse what appears to be the cycle of decline within our culture.

However, before systematic work on this integration can begin it is necessary to complete, in a manner that is not incompatible with behavior analytic methods, the demonstration of the final two properties of the constitutive dimension of consciousness. That is, we must prove that both the structure (and internal relations) and the intentional orientation of the operations of the subject are self-constituting. In so doing, it must be possible to show that the error in the radical behaviorist formulations is due to an oversight of data and not to erroneous methodology.

NOTES

I am deeply grateful to Fr. R. Doran, Dr. M. Vertin and Dr. F. Braio for their generous reading of this essay and their thoughtful comments.

[1] P. Byrne, "Lonergan and the Foundations of the Theories of Relativity," in M. Lamb, ed., Creativity and Method: Essays in Honor of Bernard Lonergan, S.J. [Milwaukee: Marquette U. Press, 1981], p. 488.

[2] B. Skinner, Science and Human Behavior [NY: The Free Press, 1953], p. 26.

[3] M. Vertin, "Dialectically-Opposed Phenomenologies of Knowing: A Pedagogical Elaboration of Basic Ideal-Types," in P. McShane, ed., Searching for Cultural Foundations [London: U. Press of America, 1984], p. 81. B. Lonergan, "Christ as Subject: A Reply," in F. E. Crowe, ed., Collection [NY: Herder & Herder, 1967], pp. 176-80.

[4] The Background for this formulation of the function of learning in the development of the operations lies in Lonergan's acceptance, in his Method in Theology [NY: Seabury Press, 1972], pp. 27-28, of Piaget's account of skill acquisition and in the synthesis that Dunst has created of Piagetian and behaviorally-oriented learning theory. See Carl Dunst, Infant Learning: A Cognitive-Linguistic Intervention Strategy [Hingham, Mass.: Teaching Resources Corp., 1981].

[5] Cf. Vertin, "Dialectically-Opposed Phenomenologies," pp. 81-82.

[6] L. Cooley, "A Lonerganian Critique of B. F. Skinner's Radical Behaviorist Theory of the Cognitive Dimension of Consciousness," Method, Vol. 6, No. 2 [1988]: 107-137; S. Hayes, "Making Sense of Spirituality," Behaviorism 12 [1984]: 100.

[7] Hayes, "Making Sense of Spirituality," p. 102.

[8] Ibid., p. 104. [9] Ibid., p. 103. [10] Ibid., p. 104.

[11] Ibid., p. 103. [12] Ibid., p. 104.]13] Ibid., p. 104.

[14] Vertin, "Dialectically-Opposed Phenomenologies," p. 78.

[15] Cooley, "A Lonerganian Critique."

[16] Lonergan, Insight [NY: Philosophical Library, 1957], p. 252.

[17] Lonergan, Understanding and Being, eds. E. Morelli and M. Morelli [NY: Edwin Mellen, 1980], pp. 17-18.

[18] Lonergan, "Cognitional Structure," in F. E. Crowe, ed., Collection [NY: Herder & Herder, 1967], p. 226.

[19] Lonergan, Insight, p. 280.

[20] On my use of the Lonerganian method for establishing the truth or falsity of theoretical formulations and its relation to the Skinnerian method, see my essay, "A Lonerganian Critique," Note 97.

[21] Hayes, "Making Sense of Spirituality," p. 105.

[22] Vertin, A personal communication, 1987.

THE COGNITIVE FUNCTIONS OF FEELINGS

David Oyler

Like most biological, psychological and cognitive events, feelings occur within the context of complex systems. Discussing feelings without reference to the broader context of systems is both too abstract and too simplistic. The fundamental functions of feelings are overlooked. Considering the neurological, ethnological, anthropological and psychological evidence, behavioral systems form the fundamental context of feelings. These are flexible, open systems, developing through external as well as internal relations. The events which initiate and terminate the key activities of the system are within ranges which permit complex personal, familial, social and cultural variations. As Edward Hall has claimed, these variations extend to the fundamental spatial-temporal relations of cultural activity [1]. However, all take place within some spatial-temporal context. Though the systems are general, as they develop they become more specific. These more specific relations form much of the data for the human sciences.

An excellent account of behavioral systems is found in John Bowlby's Attachment [2]. He shows how a fundamental set of relations arises in the development of attachment behavior between children and adults. Though there may be variations in the specifics of how the relationship works out, occurrences of bonding follow a cross-cultural pattern. In turn, unsuccessful bonding yields a cross-cultural range of mal-adapted behavior.

Turning from psychology to ethnology, there is ample evidence of species specific behavioral systems in all animal species. As one ascends the evolutionary hierarchy, these systems become more flexible, open and complex. The general occurrence of species-wide behavior in other animals, suggests that humans are subject also to such systems [3]. However, the complexity and flexibility of the systems and the complexity of the problems associated with studying them makes this more difficult to discern in humans.

Feeling and imagining are central to the functioning of behavioral systems. The function of the imagination is

shown in other animals by evidence of a range of key perceptions that initiate, sustain and terminate behaviors. That feeling and imagination are somehow related is provided by evidence of behavior in animals, which occurs in conjunction with these perceptions, that we know has some emotional motivation when similar behavior occurs in humans [4]. There seem to be behaviors specific to the initiation, maintenance and termination of particular action chains in both humans and animals.

Further evidence that feeling and imagining are intimately linked in behavior is provided by neurological research into dreaming, memory, and emotional behavior. The limbic system is a neurological system common in many respects to all mammals. It is a key system supporting emotional expression. There is evidence that it is active in dreaming. It is plausible that this dream activity is related to the formation of long-term memory, as well as the refinement of daily behavior [5]. Since memory involves images, this suggests that feelings and images are related as central elements in mnemonic integrations. Memory, in turn, plays a role in behavior by constituting the present in relation to past experience and in the anticipation of future events. Action chains, as linked sets of acts which rely on the conscious involvement of the animal in making higher-level decisions, require mnemonic functions, be they instinctual, learned, or a combination of the two. The role of memory suggests that immanently-generated feelings and images can be key clues in decision-making.

It is probably within the context of behavioral systems that cognitive functions emerged [6]. As they became refined in evolution, the cognitional system became more autonomous until we reach the possibility of pure, detached, non-action-oriented thinking in humans. However, within this system it is probable that feelings maintain functions similar to those they display in acting. If we consider the data of consciousness, we find ample evidence that this is so in the fundamental cognitive functions of feelings.

Though I think that an investigation of the data of consciousness is sufficient to establish the relations I am going to outline, the prior discussion has served to circumscribe the area of inquiry and to orient it in general with current scientific thought. As this inquiry benefits from the conclusions of science, so can science benefit from those of philosophy. If the conscious evidence for the function

of feeling in human cognition and the relations for which it is evidence are outlined, this knowledge can be used by scientists who accept the possibility of empathetic understanding of human and animal behavior to create new theories and lend support to current theories concerning behavioral systems. Science and philosophy exist in a symbiotic relationship where each takes the data and results of the other into account in its development. If there is to be a correct science and a correct philosophy, then they must be compatible. If they are to be compatible in their term, they should also display some compatibility and synergistic interaction in their development [7].

For those philosophers who are concerned with understanding the data of consciousness, the prior discussion indicates that a full understanding of that data requires the understanding of scientific results. The data of consciousness are contingent on non-conscious processes, and the evolution of the personal as considered within the finite material world, is contingent on non-personal events. Also, data of consciousness can be data for disciplines other than philosophy. The self extends beyond consciousness in two directions. It is contingent on preconscious processes, and it finds itself in a network of relations of which it is merely a part. To know and accept the self is to understand and accept these relations. In turn, understanding conscious data is instrumental in understanding these other areas due to the centrality of conscious activity in the relational network. The following discussion of the cognitive function of feelings should illustrate these points.

Behavioral Systems

Like most complex systems, behavioral systems are hierarchically organized open systems. As hierarchical, they are integrations of integrations of cycles of events. Each lower level of integration provides constraints for the operation of the higher level. However, these constraints are also opportunities for ranges of occurrences on the higher level. In turn, the higher level of organization orders the lower-level events, providing the potential for the transformation of the lower level.

In biological systems each level of organization has operators organizing some of that level's events. These operators are limited from two directions. The range of integrations

they effect is conditioned by the elements at their disposal. Also, unless one is at the highest level of integration, they are subject to the integration of their operations into a higher level of integration by higher-level operators. At the highest level the possibility is open for the emergence of higher levels of organization.

This discussion of behavioral systems concerns the neural, psychic, cognitive, action, familial, social and cultural levels of integration, focusing on those elements which delimit the cognitive functions of feelings.

A behavioral system is a patterned set of actions which performs some set of personal, familial, social, or cultural functions. 'Function' is a neutral and a general term. It is general because it applies to events on all levels of organization from the biochemical upward. It is neutral because it can be normative or non-normative. For example, one of the functions of a baby's crying when left alone can be to contribute to the survival rate for the species. But one would not claim that this is what the baby had in mind. On the other hand, the baby's crying when it is hungry is part of a system which fulfills a conscious need. The function is normative in that its initiation, maintenance and termination is delimited by the efficacy of the actions in meeting the need.

Behavioral systems perform more than one function. For example, breast-feeding provides food and the arena for a set of activities instrumental to the development of attachment behavior between mother and child. Developmentally, the emergence of one behavioral system sets the stage for the emergence of the next. In fact, if one reviews the list of hierarchical levels above, behavioral systems can be seen to perform functions on all of these levels simultaneously.

Behavioral systems are open systems. In Piaget's terms, they can assimilate elements to themselves and they can accommodate themselves to elements outside the system by self-modification [8]. The sources of the new elements can be from any level of organization. Thus, the attachment between mother and child is continually transformed to assimilate and accommodate the emergence of new feelings and the associated developmental levels in the child, the shifting familial and social patterns, and the growth of the child into its culture.

Behavioral systems are patterned sets of actions. In a biological being an action is performed by the highest level operator. Actions have a comprehensive quality since they can embody all levels of organization within a being. In a human being we generally associate free rational acts as the highest level of operation. However, in our early development, instinct and associated reflex activity may be the highest-level operator in some behavioral systems. For example, when a newborn baby is hungry, it probably does not choose to cry. It also instinctively moves its head to the side on which its cheek is stroked, making the breast available for feeding. However, as conscious, the person is present, and the instinctual endowment yields the potency for further conscious development.

Actions rely upon the body for their execution. Behavioral systems are contingent on the neural integrations which support the motor and expressive acts instrumental to the system.

In actions subject to conscious control, elements are available to consciousness which serve as guides to initiate, maintain and terminate actions. On the most basic level we have the emergence of a felt need, such as hunger, which initiates an act leading to the unfolding of a set of actions. For example, crying is a clue for other participants in the system to initiate actions, such as feeding the baby. As the baby is satiated, the autonomic nervous system terminates the hunger and provides the emotional correlates of conscious satisfaction. This in turn may initiate smiling and cooing on the part of the baby which in turn leads to the emergence of another set of behaviors on the part of the mother. The initiators for the mother are both emoticnal and cognitive, as are the terminators.

As in the above example, most behavioral systems are intersubjective. Even when we act alone, we usually do so with reference to others. As intersubjective, behavioral systems need the complementary actions of others to meet our needs. All participants are attuned to key elements in the system as guides for initiating, sustaining, and terminating their actions. The nature of these elements determines the levels of control in the system.

In humans, cognition plays a key role in recognizing the elements which control behavioral systems. Much of this knowledge is not explicit; that is, in the form in which it is used, it is not always verbalized nor is it verbalizable.

To note explicitly what is going on is to move into another mode of behavior, the intellectual pattern of experience concerned with theoretical thought, and out of the intersubjective, action-oriented behavior of the behavioral system. In fact, one may never know in a theoretical mode many of the cultural cues on which he or she relies to carry on a normal polite conversation. Nor may we advert to the subtle, highly intelligent, but non-explicit common forms of courtship unique to our culture. The same holds true of family patterns, such as the complementary behaviors of husband and wife, parent and child, and the complexities of the extended family.

Nor should we expect that all this knowledge should be explicit. The goal of behavioral systems is to get things done. Explicit knowledge of what we are doing is only necessary to the extent that it serves the successful operation of the system. Just as we do not need to know the physiological theory of the mechanics for hitting a tennis ball to hit one, we do not need a theory of behavioral systems to have a successfully functioning system. If we needed the explicit knowledge first, we would still be waiting for the first behavioral system. In fact, it is probable that knowing as an activity pursued for its own sake became intelligently differentiated from behavioral systems. As an activity it encompasses cognitive functions which originally emerged in behavioral contexts. Whatever the evolutionary causes of the emergence and survival of these functions were, they have an economy of function which permits them to act rapidly, flexibly and appropriately as required. In addition, though behavioral systems in humans rely on cognition and free will in their successful development, there are biologically-based psychic strategies which override the cognitive function if it is not cooperative or successful in performing the acts required to meet our needs.

Control in Behavioral Systems

Controls initiate, sustain and terminate actions within behavioral systems. At any particular time in human development behavioral systems are hierarchically organized in terms of basic needs, satisfactions and values. The emergence of behavioral systems in human development also exhibits hierarchical organization with successive stages building on prior stages. Successful performance leads to a self-confirmatory progression where each stage terminates by eliciting the

next higher stage which is more complex, flexible, economical, and satisfying. Dysfunctional performance on the lower levels radiates throughout subsequent development as the behavioral unit (person, family, culture) assimilates and accommodates itself to the results of the prior stages in terms of the demands of the current stage. Aristotle's comment that a small mistake in the beginning is a big one in the end takes on additional meaning in the therapeutic world.

The controls are also systematic. The fundamental elements are feelings, images, acts of understanding, judgment and decisions. Acts of understanding and judgment can be oriented to reality only, or they can be oriented within the decision-making process. Thus, I can be concerned with scientific questions concerning a cat's behavior, or I can be concerned with how I am going to react if a cat reacts in a particular kind of way.

The movement of conscious intentionality from feelings to images to acts of understanding to judgments to decisions and action is a movement from the more general to the more specific. It is not a movement from the more general, in an abstract sense, as is that from the universal to the particular. The movement is functional. It is a key to understanding the function of controls in behavioral systems and the concomitant functions of feelings in knowing.

Feeling and imagining are often a functional unit. For example, if one is angry a range of images arises in consciousness different from the ranges of images that accompany hunger, sexual desire, or the aesthetic images associated with listening to a symphony. Imagining, sensing and memory are also linked. It is likely that the development of our auditory imagination via the transformation of our remembered auditory images is instrumental in the development of hearing. The same is probably true of the other senses. In fact, the differentiation of memory and imagination may occur on the higher cognitive level of judgment, though there may be a quality to memories as such which differentiates them from the merely imagined on the level of psychic experience. Undoubtedly, the distinction often becomes blurred in real life. However, the point is that the emergence of feeling is accompanied by the emergence of concomitant images which can be grouped by the feelings which accompany their emergence.

The opposite also occurs. The emergence of an image, or a sensible experience, can elicit feelings, which in turn lead to the emergence of a range of images. Because the images associated with a feeling comprise a range, and because the same images can be associated with different feelings, the emergence of one feeling and its images can lead to the emergence of another feeling. This makes possible the linked emergence of sets of emotional-imaginative-sensitive psychic contents subject to dual levels of control. The emergence of feelings has a variety of endogenous sources, in addition to the sensitive-imaginative elicitors. Sensitive-imaginative conscious contents which can elicit feelings are present in large numbers simultaneously during our waking and much or our sleeping life. The situation seems to approximate the description of experience as a blooming, buzzing confusion.

We can introduce some order by noting that the endogenous sources for the feelings which channel our attentive action are hierarchically organized in terms of a natural scale of importance. For example, the recognition of a life-threatening situation, or a sensitive experience, such as a loud noise, or something whizzing past our ear, will elicit behavior which overrides our current concerns. At any one time, there is a hierarchy of expression of feelings which is transformed as one develops. The development is a hierarchically organized emergence of different frequencies and types of the expressions of feelings.

Another source of order is the imaginative functions. There are processes underlying the emergence and linking of images. Some types are Freud's primary processes of condensation, association, and displacement, the temporalization of the imagination in the timing of the sequential and parallel emergence of images, and the spatialization of the imagination in the juxtaposition of images.

Associated with these are the mnemonic functions. There is the spatial-temporal unity of endogenous psychic and sensitive experience which is maintained via the short- and long-term memory systems. There also are mnemonic functions supporting language, knowing and sensory-motor integration.

Feelings and images are primary elements in a variety of psychic and behaviorial integrations. As activities within dynamic systems, they contribute to successful functioning. However, besides functioning as efficient causes, they have intentional functions. We understand ourselves and the world in terms of them.

Intentionality of Feelings

As intentional, acts constitute the world without creating it, or causing it to be the way it is. Intentionality as it applies to knowing does not mean the same as "doing something intentional." It is also compatible with an objective world transcendent to knowers. In their cognitive function and in the development of skills, feelings can be constitutive of reality as intended. However, the effective range of feeling is broader than that. It not only is constitutive of reality, but it can be an integral part of creating subjective and intersubjective human experience. For example, if we are sad, the sadness is part of our self-experience. Additionally, irrespective of what others think, or of the objective situation, our sadness, by itself, makes our situation a sad one. There is an intentionality in our relatedness to the world via feelings such as sadness, but we would not claim the same level of objectivity for them as for feelings which intimate the heuristic possibilities of a newly discovered mathematical theorem, for example. The intimation of heuristic possibilities does not create these possibilities, while the experience of sadness does create the sad situation. What made us sad in the past may not make us sad now, but we would not say that the sad situation did not exist, because it existed in virtue of our sadness. On the other hand, if the heuristic possibilities of the mathematical theorem do not exist, then our intimations of them would have been mistaken. Our intimations of them were not part of the cause of their existence.

The transition from the causal to the intentional functions of feelings in the constitution of reality is seen in the development of sensory-motor skills. As Michael Polanyi claims, skills display a dual level of control corresponding to the control of focal and subsidiary elements [9]. Though the function of the thinking actor changes within the skillful behavioral complex, this structure remains. He must be focusing on something instrumental to the task at hand. His effort is directed toward the successful achievement of it. In this attending, there is a reliance on the body to perform the other required functions. This reliance takes two forms. There is a reliance on the body to support the focal act and attend to ancilliary acts. For example, if I am watching the ball in tennis I must rely on myself to perform the required footwork without my explicit attention. Since I am watching the ball and not my opponent, I rely on other cues to determine

where he is on the court, including past memories of matches with him, or his performance in this match. There is a set of subsidiary functions which are instrumental, but to which I do not need to attend explicitly. They are within consciousness. I can direct my attention to them if I wish. But I can make the decisions required to play the match based on subsidiary information without explicitly attending to it.

The second form of reliance is seen most clearly in coaching precepts. Most skills are comprised of sets of complex acts. There are key acts within the complex which, if performed, increase the probability that the proper form of the skill will emerge. For example, if you lean forward in running, you are less likely to overstride or to swing your shoulders, and your speed will increase. In general, precepts work because the skill is a set of interrelated acts. Good form in one area makes it more difficult to have bad form in another, just as bad form in one area can lead to an overall deterioration of performances -- a slump. Just as focal attending relies on subsidiary activities, the performance of the subsidiary functions is conditioned by the focal attending.

The interesting point, though, is that in many cases the object is constituted in terms of the subsidiary acts. Polanyi calls this process indwelling. A good example is his of a person using a probe to explore inside a cavity. While using the tool, attention shifts from the impacts felt as such to the contours explored with the probe. However, these contours are experienced in terms of the impacts felt via the probe. We experience this shift in attending in any instance where the use of tools becomes second nature to us. However, we also experience it in developing motor and behavioral skills as we rely on the body to support the activities we focally attend to.

Feelings are subsidiary elements in this process. In Polanyi's terms, we indwell others in our feelings towards them, for example. In these cases, indwelling would play the dual role of intending and creating the world as experienced, as in the example of the intentionality of sadness above [10]. On the other hand, skills are integrated flexible sets of acts relying on timing and control. The kinesthetic feedback we receive helps us determine if we are acting successfully. In addition, our feelings about our activity help us anticipate what is coming next, or elicit what should

come next. By paying attention to these emotional cues, they attain the function of controls for our focal activities. As integrated within the activity they can be causes of the reality as experienced, as in the case of indwelling, or they can be intentionally constitutive of the reality, as in the anticipation of successful performance.

Cognitive Controls

Much of our lives is spent in the development of functions or skills. They are specifications of innate general tendencies which have, as their term, their satisfactory integration within behavioral systems. From this perspective, cognition is spontaneously within action networks which have the dual role of patterning and being part of the pattern of our experience. I use the term 'network' because skills utilized in one action chain can be transposed to another. Thus, sets of skills can be organized differently for different purposes. They are available for the intelligent actor to combine in various integrations.

For knowing to be oriented to reality for its own sake requires the intelligent actor to shift from his or her spontaneous orientation towards action into the intellectual pattern of experience where questions are pursued for their own sake. However, this presupposes a cognitive system that can become detached from the exigencies of action. A key step in the evolution of these systems was the emergence of play. Actions and the knowing involved in developing and executing them were detached from the objects the acts have in the mature animal. In turn, this assumes a flexibility of the emotional and imaginal functions. Cognitively, their intentional range is broader and freer.

In humans this flexibility was taken a step further in the development of abstract thinking which relies on symbols for its development and expression. Language is generally considered to be the key skill which differentiates us from the higher primates. However, the evolution of humans involved the emergence of a larger and more highly developed cortex which supports musical, mathematical, and logical thought as well as language skills. A greater capacity for thinking which does not rely on representative images emerged. The break with representative images allows us to "imagine" aspects of reality which were not or could not be sensibly present. It also permits us to integrate thoughts, or ideas, as such.

If an ideas is non-sensible, but understanding requires images to discover intelligibility, symbols, as non-representative images, can be the carriers of the intelligibility of the ideas they symbolize. Manipulation of the symbols leads to new neural integrations which become fixed via insight. In turn, these neural integrations are open for higher integrations via new insights. With the emergence of symbolic thought, absolute freedom of the cognitive system from the behavioral system is theoretically possible because anything that exists can be "represented" independently of the behavioral system by the use of symbols. Functionally, however, our survival requires the integration of the higher cognitive functions within behavioral systems. Even the pursuit of "pure thought" occurs within an intersubjective community, and the pursuit of truth is channeled and sometimes biased by our existential concerns.

Even though the grasp of the intelligibility within a situation can initiate or terminate action, it occurs within a context created by prior acts and sustained by processes which occur without our direct conscious control. Though the conscious actor has been compared to the rider of a wild horse when it comes to controlling the hierarchically lower functions, such as emotions, it is more often the case that these functions occur seamlessly as subsidiary supports for the attainment of the conscious goals of the existential actor. As one's skills develop, what was learned previously is taken for granted as it becomes the condition for the next level of attainment. In the execution of any skillful behavior the person must make and execute key decisions. What these decisions are depends on the situation and one's level of development. This is also true for the emotional correlates of decision-making. In behavior, then, the decision-maker is both confined and liberated by his previous development. It both limits the scope of current attainment and makes that level of attainment possible. As subsidiary elements, emotions function as controls within this same context for the cognitive correlates of conscious decision-making. This will become clearer as we discuss the symbolic, heuristic and aesthetic functions of feeling in knowing.

The Symblic Function

I noted above that feelings can be causally as well as intentionally constitutive of reality. Feelings such as sadness, fear, love, hate and joy are not only emotional interpretations of the world, but are changes in the experience of the person. When I am happy, the world is a happy place. When I love, there is a lovable object. When I am fearful, the situation is threatening, and so on. On a more refined level, there is Polanyi's notion of indwelling, where any sensitive or psychic experience, including feelings, can become a subsidiary element in focal intending. Then the object is constituted in terms of these subsidiaries. The experience of the world is in terms of integrations of sensitive, psychic and emotional elements.

However, the world for us goes beyond experience of sense data and the data of consciousness. We live in a world mediated by meaning where the tangibility of the objects of knowledge extends from items I can handle in my immediate environment to unimaginable physical particles, mathematical relationships and conscious activities. But just as we can have an emotional relationship towards people we have never known, and can feel a sense of loss when someone we know has died halfway around the globe, we can become emotionally related to unimaginable things and relations. Words can elicit emotional responses similar to the actual experience of what is described. How is it that emotions become transposed in humans from guiding action in the immediacy of the behavioral system or the skillful sensory motor act to guiding us in a world mediated by meaning, expressing primarily through symbols? How do we become attached to what we have not or do not or cannot experience?

If we accept that meanings are discovered through insight into images, yielding a higher level of generality, the intelligible relation or unity, then the general outlines of the transition of the intentionality of feelings from the immediately experienced to the world mediated by meaning are clear.

As commonly understood, images are psychic products derived from the sensible experience. Thus, we speak of visual, olfactory, auditory, and kinesthetic images and also those associated with taste and touch. Functionally defined, however, an image is whatever sensibly-based element an inquirer uses to understand. It includes the above, plus memories and aspects of current experience. A feeling as remembered, or as currently experienced, can fill the functional role of an image. We

will discuss this aspect further when we discuss the heuristic function of feelings. However, the imaginative function includes the casting of images into various configurations in an effort to create the conditions for insight. One cannot do this mentally with elements as currently experienced since, to a certain extent, they are simply given. Thus, though some cognitive elements may serve the same function as an image, we will restrict our notion of image to those psychic contents which can be manipulated by the imaginative functions.

When insight occurs there is a fixing and a consequent refinement of the imaginative configuration which gave rise to the insight. As we noted above, ranges of imaginative configurations correspond to types of feelings. Thus, since the images are emotionally charged, the imagination mediates between emotion and the object of understanding via the image. When the meaning is discovered, it comes with an emotional intention via the relationship between feeling and image. The use of emotionally-charged images to mediate between emotions and intelligibility causing the emotion to intend the object as intelligible is the symbolic function.

A symbol is a non-representative image of an object of inquiry. A feeling is not representative of any object of inquiry. By functionally underpinning the emergence of images in their relations with the imaginative functions, emotions move inquiry, in its inception, beyond the representative to the intended object of feeling. In addition to being linked to intelligibilities, the feelings are linked to the symbolic expressions of them. Thus, the linking of feelings to intelligibility in the course of the insight into images is termed the symbolic function [11]. The symbolic function occurs also on the level of judgment, linking feelings with intelligible realities, and on the level of the discovery of values, linking feelings with values which go beyond fulfillment of our own basic drives, needs and satisfactions. The symbolic function, then, is what grounds the emergence of attachment behavior, and other behavioral systems, into the world mediated by meaning, permitting us to have feelings for things and relations beyond our immediate experience.

The Aesthetic and Heuristic Functions

In skillful behavior feelings provide a regulatory function by generating feedback concerning our performance. Successful performance often coincides with feelings of joy,

pride, and satisfaction with what we have done, along with a release of the tension associated with our effort. In most cases these feelings provide a readiness and willingness to perform the activity again, perhaps at a higher level of accomplishment. In this way, a self-confirmatory progression of skillful development ensues. This ability to emotionally appraise our acts is the source of aesthetic experience.

Our skillful acts are hierarchical integrations of biological and psychic events. They provide higher levels of order. It is partly the appreciation of this ordering that lies at the center of our aesthetic appraisal [12]. Likewise, when we view art or beautiful scenery, there is a harmony we feel. Though this harmony is projected into the object via indwelling, the harmony also exists in us. In appreciating aesthetic order, we are, by default, also appreciating our ordering. Thus, our aesthetic feelings can serve a dual role of helping us interpret ourselves and the world. Some of these feelings probably arise in conjunction with the emergence of particular types of orders. Such a possibility would help explain the universal aesthetic acceptance of the musical scale. Also, we usually have a general sense of well-being when we are physically and psychically healthy.

On the level of intelligence the situation is similar. There is an accumulation of tension as one tries to understand. There can be a series of emotional evaluations of one's efforts as the answer seems to approach and then recede. Successful understanding yields both a release of tension and the emergence of joy, satisfaction, and an aesthetic appreciation of the order we have discovered. This emotional experience is then subsumed into the emotional context which contributed to the initiation of the inquiry.

However, in understanding there also are feelings specific to the activity. We have intellectual passions which reinforce our inquiry through their heuristic function. Just as feelings can be linked to intelligibilities via the symbolic function, we have feelings which anticipate intelligibility as such, and which can appraise intelligibility as discovered. We have an emotional sense of the implications of our discoveries, and these implications can be intelligibilities yet to be discovered [13].

In judgment our search for the evidence for our insights is fueled by the emotional correlates of uncertainty and the desire to satisfy our restlessness. Inconsistency bothers

us, the possibility of further relevant questions may trouble us, and the lack of experiential verification can leave us extremely uneasy. All of these support a reluctance to make a commitment which we oftentimes will sum up in the phrase "It just doesn't feel right".

Just as our feelings can contribute to our hesitation, they also guide our commitment in judgment. We have feelings specific to our drive for consistency and empirical verification. Feeling states are associated also with the emergence of further critical questions. Depending on their context, they can make us so dissatisfied that we pursue the inquiry to its conclusion. However, I do not think that we have natural emotional structures corresponding to reality as such, as we do corresponding to intelligibility as such. Beyond the regard for intelligibility as such, our other metaphysical feelings probably develop via the symbolic function in our metaphysical and religious judgments.

As our knowledge and feelings develop, the heuristic function becomes both broader and more specific. It becomes broader because feelings which have been integrated with intelligibility via the symbolic function can have heuristic value in further inquiry. Because these feelings have become linked to specific intelligibilities, the function also becomes more specific.

As a subset of their heuristic function, they also have imaginative and verificatory functions. That is, they can function similarly to images in the development of understanding since, within their current integration, they can serve as clues for similar integrations. On the level of judgment, the fact that we have a particular emotional interpretation of the situation, especially in intersubjectivity, can be a fulfilling condition for the commitment in judgment.

The Objectivity of Feelings

Minimally, feelings have a three-fold function in experiencing, understanding and judging. On each of these levels they are integrated within behavioral or cognitional systems. The question of their objectivity is settled by determining the objectivity of the acts which integrate them within higher cognitional or behavioral levels. If these acts are more or less realistic, then so are feelings. If these acts can be subjected to a dialectical analysis in terms of their authenticity and objectivity, then so can feelings, and so on.

In their heuristic function, feelings help regulate the pursuit of knowledge. As such, they are objective insofar as they lead to knowledge of reality.

In their aesthetic function they are objective insofar as they are appreciations of real order, real intelligibility.

But it is in their symbolic function that the most fundamental notions of objectivity arise, for feelings are instrumental to the emergence of most of the images we have when we understand, and it is these feelings which are integrated intelligently, as are images, in the occurrence of insight in understanding and judgment. And it is the symbolic function which underpins the development of behavioral systems by initiating the movement from the emergence of feelings with their concomitant images to the occurrence of the relevant insights and judgments which constitute the situation within which our needs are met. Conversely, it is the lack of the relevant feelings at key stages of development that leads to the emergence of some pathological personalities, for example, people whose insights are not subject to the controls inherent in empathetic understanding because they are not cognizant of the feelings we share on that level of development.

But one may still ask "What are the relationships of feelings to reality?". This is a broader question than that of the objectivity of feelings. For example, it is probable that feelings emerged and survived partially due to their efficacy in contributing to the recognition of situations which are key to the functions of behavioral systems. These situations need to be recognized accurately a statistically significant number of times to insure the survival of the species. However, the question of the reality or the accuracy of these interpretations need not arise. There may be a correspondence of emotion to a real object or situation, but the correspondence is not objective in the cognitive sense. A baby may feel one way when he or she is held and another way when a parent leaves the room, but he or she may not have integrated these feelings intelligently such that they know they have these feelings because these situations have arisen. Yet we could say that these feelings are related to a real situation.

This question is clarified further by adverting to the causal versus the constitutive functions of feelings. As causal, the feelings create part of the situation. In a behavioral system these feelings are integrated in action chains which respond to endogenous or external cues, clues, signals, signs,

meaning, and so on. As constitutive, feelings lead to the intelligent and reasonable apprehension of reality and are in turn integrated via insight, judgment, and the apprehension of values. It is in these acts that the emotional context becomes intelligible, real and valued.

Another question which may be confused with that of the objectivity of feelings concerns the objectivity of my understanding of my feelings. In humans feelings arise within an intelligent context where we try to understand them, or their intentional correlates, either within the context of knowing for its own sake, or within the behavioral system. They emerge bearing the precursors of their intelligent integration, the images suggestive of the mode of their adequate expression. Thus, the relation of feelings to reality is mediated partially via the image. Which images arise is not fully within conscious control, nor is the inhibition of images. But we do know that based on past experiences and development, the images which would contribute to a direct and satisfying expression of our feelings and a concomitant range of types of resolution to the behavioral situation may be replaced by images which direct knowing and acting in different directions. How and why this occurs is a question for psychology. For our purposes it is enough to note that for the sake of some expression of the emotional tension, the interpretation of reality may be inaccurate, since the feelings arise without some key images and with the transformation of others. Thus, my anger may be perceived as another's anger towards me. However, in this situation, my anger is neither objective nor non-objective. It is simply there. Its relation to reality is causal, rather than constitutive. The question of objectivity concerns my interpretation of the situation, of which anger is a part. So while the full set of the relations of my anger to reality can be revealed via psychological inquiry, the cognitive functions of anger may play a minor role, if any.

Conclusion

The association of feelings and images is a key relation in the scientific understanding of the limbic system and the psychic functions it supports. In addition, the functional relations of feelings, images, insights and judgments and their intentional correlates can be discovered in the data of consciousness. These relations are philosophically important

for cognitional theory insofar as feelings have normative cognitional functions. By discussing behavioral systems and the roles of feelings in them and in the development of skills, we could see the basic regulatory and causal functions of feelings in cognition. The fundamental thesis was that feelings play regulatory roles in the emergence and development of behavioral systems. Cognition originally evolved within these systems. It is only in the higher mammals that cognition can be pursued for its own sake, most especially in humans. Thus, the roles of feelings in behavioral systems became transformed in the development of knowledge in cognitional systems. As in behavioral systems, feelings play a key role in initiating, sustaining and terminating cognitive activity. The most significant role is the one which permits the emergence of behavioral systems into a world mediated by meaning, the symbolic function. Other key functions are the heuristic and the aesthetic.

The understanding of these functions leads to the conclusion that if knowledge is knowledge of reality, then feelings can be objective in two ways. First, they help regulate knowing. Second, they can be elements of knowledge. They can elicit images for insight and themselves function as clues and images. Also, they can be the fulfilling conditions for judgment. It is possible, then, to trust our feelings in the development of knowledge just as we trust our basic symbolic operations in logic in formulating a theorem. However, this trust should not be uncritical. Insofar as this trust or mistrust of feelings involves an emotional correlate, the fact that it can be critical or uncritical is an instance of the objective role of feelings.

Further evidence is had by adverting to the emotional changes consequent to a key insight or the changing of a fundamental opinion or judgment. In addition, what this model casts in an explanatory form, the cross-cultural common sense of women has maintained for centuries. Indeed, given the causal function of feelings in creating the intersubjective context of human behavior, it should not be surprising to find specialized biologically-based systems supporting empathetic knowledge. This analysis has immediate implications for understanding the foundations for empathy. In turn, empathetic understanding plays a key role in the methods of the human sciences and aesthetics.

Finally, there is an important relation of feelings to knowing which I have not pursued here. That is the relation

of feelings of value to knowing. When knowing and its elements are grasped as values, there is an emotional ccrrelate to that apprehension as there is with other values. Just as knowing can occur within a range of motivational contexts where the pursuit of knowledge is sustained partially by non-cognitive emotions, so the grasp of the value of knowing as such can create positive emotional feedback which can reorient the role of knowing in one's life. What I am touching on here is the role of feeling in what Lonergan terms intellectual conversion. Treatment of this topic deserves an inquiry in itself. I hope that the relations I have discussed here prove helpful in understanding that process.

NOTES

[1] Edward T. Hall, The Dance of Life: The Other Dimension of Time [Garden City: Anchor, 1984], p. 14.

[2] John Bowlby, Attachment [NY: Basic Books, 1969], pp. 63-84.

[3] Edward T. Hall, The Silent Language [Garden City: Anchor, 1973], pp. 37-59. Konrad Z. Lorenz, The Foundations of Ethology [NY: Simon and Schuster, 1982], pp. 344-346.

[4] Jane Goodall, The Chimpanzes of Gombe: Patterns of Behavior [Cambridge: Harvard U. Press, 1986], pp. 314-315. She categorizes behaviors that release agressive behavior in other chimpanzees. On a less complex level, Lorenz discusses the role of innate releasing mechanisms in eliciting fixed motor patterns. See Konrad Z. Lorenz, Behind the Mirror: A Search for a Natural History of Human Knowledge [NY: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1977], p. 53-62.

[5] Jonathan Winson, Brain and Psyche: The Biology of the Unconscious [NY: Vintage, 1986], pp. 29-34.

[6] This is a fundamental thesis for both Lorenz and Piaget. See Lorenz, Behind the Mirror; Jean Piaget, Biology and Knowledge: An Essay on the Relations between Organic Regulations and Cognitive Processes [Chicago: U. of Chicago, 1971].

[7] Lonergan, Insight [London: Longmans, Green, 1957], p. 498.

[8] Piaget, Biology and Knowledge, pp. 172-82.

[9] Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy [NY: Harper & Row, 1964], pp. 55-57.

[10] Ibid., pp. 377-78.

[11] Anthony Storr, The Dynamics of Creation [NY: Atheneum, 1985], pp. 175-187. Storr describes instances where non-representative objects, signs and symbols become invested with feeling. Particularly interesting is his discussion of the transitional object. However, he does not explain how intelligibility becomes linked with emotion.

[12] Ibid., pp. 151-53.

[13] Polanyi, Personal Knowledge, pp. 320-321. Polanyi focuses on intellectual beauty. However, his analysis is easily transposed to intelligibility as such.

THE STRUCTURES OF INTERPERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS

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The topic of the interpersonal other has become a central question of twentieth-century philosophy. It has been discussed under one aspect or another by phenomenologists such as Husserl, Scheler, Reinbach, and von Hildebrand [1], by dialogical personalists such as Buber, Ebner, Rosenzweig, and Cohen [2], by German existentialists such as Heidegger, Löwith, Binswanger, and Jaspers [3], by French existentialists such as Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, and Marcel [4], by philosophers of spirit such as Mounier, Nédoncelle, and Le Senne [5], by related thinkers such as LaCroix, DeleSalle, and Madinier [6], and above all by Brunner [7], as well as others [8].

When one reads through the writings of such thinkers, one is struck by the wealth of analyses of particular interpersonal phenomena. But one is at the same time troubled by the lack of an adequate integrating structure. My purpose in writing the present essay is therefore to attempt to present the basic structures of interpersonal relationships and thereby to provide a systematic framework for many of the individual analyses of the thinkers referred to above. In doing so, I shall rely heavily on the foundational work of B. Lonergan [9]. Although I intend to offer a desription of interpersonal relationships that will apply to all such relationships, attention will be primarily focussed on those that attain the greatest depth and intimacy. In the following, I shall take my point of departure from the dialogical situation and investigate it in terms of a self-revelation and response.

I. In a typical dialogical situation, we can discern three moments: (1) I say something (2) about something (3) to you. We can therefore speak with J. MacQuarrie of three functions fulfilled by language in the dialogical situation: the expressive function, the referential function, and the communicative function [10]. We shall devote more attention to the first of these. Let us begin, however, with the second.

A. Whenever I speak, I speak about something and in doing so <u>refer</u> to that about which I speak. Furthermore, I am able

to speak about, and thus refer to, anything that lies within my field of consciousness. According to B. Lonergan, my field of consciousness comprises a hierarchy of intentional operations and intended objects on four levels of consciousness [11]. On the level of empirical consciousness, I am aware of acts and objects of sense perception, imagination, and feeling. On the basis of such experience, I am aware, on the level of intellectual consciousness, of asking questions for intelligence (what? why? etc.), having insights, and formulating the content of insights in concepts, definitions, theories, and systems. With regard to these formulations of insight, I am aware, on the level of rational consciousness, of asking questions for reflection (is it so?), weighing and marshalling the evidence, and making judgments about matters of fact. And with respect to possible courses of action within the factual situation, I am aware, on the level of existential consciousness, of deliberating, making judgments of value, and deciding on such courses of action. These intentional operations can be performed in many different contexts and expressed in different languages by different cultural, social, and professional groups. This diversity gives rise to different realms of meaning which Lonergan lists as the realms of common sense, theory, art, scholarship, interiority, and transcendence [12]. Thus, in speaking, I am able to refer to any of my intentional operations and their objects in any of these realms of meaning.

B. Whenever I speak to you about the operations and objects of my consciousness, I express myself. Verbal expression does not, of course, exhaust the possibilities of self-expression. There are also bodily, artistic, and symbolic forms of expression. Yet, linguistic expression would seem to occupy a privileged position both in its own right and as an interpretation of other forms of self-expression.

All self-expression is self-revelation. In self-revelation I make myself known or knowable to others. It may be the case that I reveal my inner self unknowingly, as when I reveal my tiredness through the dragging of my feet. Or I may even reveal myself against my will, as when I reveal my fear through the quavering of my voice. But I obviously make the fullest self-revelation when I willingly reveal myself both verbally and non-verbally. In doing so, I open to you a realm of my inner life that would otherwise remain

inaccessible. Through observation you are able to know me only as an object of empirical investigation, but through self-revelation you are able to know me as a subject of personal existence [13].

Insofar as I make a self-revelation voluntarily, it is free and therefore has the character of a gift [14]. Under normal circumstances I am not under any psychological constraint or moral obligation to reveal myself, nor do you have any compelling claim to such a self-revelation. I make my self-revelation freely and in doing so make a free gift of myself. In receiving my self-revelation you receive not only the objective content of the self-revelation, you also receive me as the revealer.

Yet, paradoxically, in order for me to give you the free gift of self-revelation, you have to give me the chance to do so [15]. Were you not to acknowledge my presence, were you to show no interest in me, or were you to refuse to listen to me, I should have no occasion to reveal myself. Were you to interrogate me solely as a source of factual information, replaceable in principle by a standard reference work, my opportunity to reveal myself as a personal subject would be reduced to a minimum. You must first issue an at least implicit invitation to me to reveal myself, thereby expressing your desire to know me [16].

My self-revelation may assume either a direct or an indirect character. If in the realms of common sense, theory, art, or scholarship, I reveal to you my experiences, insights, judgments, or decisions with reference to some object, then I refer you not so much to myself as to the object in question. I thereby make an only indirect self-revelation insofar as the experiences, insights, judgments, or decisions revealed are mine [17]. But I can reveal myself more directly in at least three ways. First, if in the realm of common sense I reveal to you my experiences, insights, judgments, and decisions with regard to myself, then I refer you to me and make a direct self-revelation. Second, if from the realm of interiority I reveal the contents of my inner life, not in their neutral facticity, but in their subjective importance for me as mirrored in my feelings, I again direct your attention to me and my self-revelation again assumes a directly personal character [18]. Third, if I reveal my experiences, insights, judgments, decisions, or feelings concerning you, myself in

relation to you, or our relationship to one another, then I direct your attention to that meeting point between us, and my self-revelation once more takes a directly personal form.

There are, however, limits to the physical, psychological, and moral possibility of self-revelation [19]. Because I am not immediately transparent, but have to avail myself of a physical means of expression, I often find that I am unable to express myself as accurately or as completely as I wish on any given occasion or series of occasions. Because I possess only insufficient self-knowledge, I myself do not fully know whom or what I have to reveal. And because I am morally responsible for my free self-revelation, the requirements of charity may demand that I not reveal something that would be harmful to you, whereas those of justice may require that I not reveal something that would injure the reputation of a third party.

Self-revelation is further threatened by the possibility of certain distortions. Precisely because my verbal and nonveral expressions reveal an inner life not immediately given, they can also be used to conceal it. This occurs not only in the crasser case of lying when, with the intent to deceive another, one deliberately presents one's experiences, insights, judgments, decisions, and feelings as other than they actually are. It also happens in the more subtle attempt to impress another and win his favor when one consciously or unconsciously suppresses certain items that would cast one in a negative light or exaggerates the importance of those that would place one in a positive light [20].

Self-revelation is also hindered by the possibility of certain impediments [21]. One case is that of the person so absorbed in the world of objects that he scarcely takes notice of his own subjectivity. His utterances are never directly self-revelations, but at best only indirectly so [22]. Another case is that of a person who so fears being ridiculed and rejected that he cannot muster the courage to make any significant revelation of himself whatsoever. Although he perhaps desperately desires an interpersonal relationship, he remains imprisoned behind the walls of his own fears [23]. A further case is that of the person who from stubborn pride refuses to admit his need for others and insists on his own self-sufficiency. He interprets the

revelation of his inner life, particularly of his feelings, as a sign of weakness and as a threat to his domination and control.

C. Whenever I reveal myself to you, I do so in order to communicate with you. This communication bears the character of what A. Reinach calls a "social act." According to his analyses, social acts are those which, in addition to being intentional, spontaneous, and directed towards another, require being perceived [24]. Precisely because my self-revelation is a revelation to you, it is a senseless act if you are not present and a frustrated act if you do not perceive it.

As Lonergan shows, the expression aiming at communication is governed by a practical insight that depends upon a principal insight to be communicated and upon an estimation of the recipient's prior understanding and the deficiences thereof that must be overcome if communication is to be successful [25]. But the communication at which my self-revelation aims does not only involve a transference of information from one mind to another. Rather, communication constitutes the possibility of interpersonal communion. This happens in two ways. First, by revealing the contents of my inner life, I not only communicate my experiences, insights, judgments, decisions, and feelings, but also effectively constitute myself as a person willing to exit the confines of my isolation and enter into interpersonal communion [26]. Second, my self-revelation constitutes the possibility of your sharing in my inner life and thus of building a relationship rooted in common experiences and insights, common judgments of fact and value, common decisions and actions, and common affections and commitments.

A special case of the social act of communication is had in the act of my revealing feelings of love and affection for you or a personal commitment to you. D. von Hildebrand has analyzed the progress such a revelation makes over other social acts such as inquiring, informing, requesting, commanding, and the like [27]. Such a revelation of love and commitment constitutes the possibility of their being accepted and reciprocated. It is this mutual revelation of love and commitment that gives birth to a relationship as something more than a fleeting encounter. And it is fidelity to the revealed love and commitment that maintains and deepens the relationship through time [28].

As communication, every self-revelation aims at an understanding reception and an appropriate response [29]. The recipient of a self-revelation may be intended to respond

on the experiential level by sharing in feelings or entertaining images, or on the intellectual level by attaining insights and grasping ideas, or on the rational level by assessing evidence and forming judgments, or on the existential level by deliberating about proposals, deciding, and acting [30]. It is to an analysis of this response that we now turn.

II. The operations and objects of the four levels of consciousness provided the contents of self-revelation. We shall now find a complex response to that self-revelation to unfold on each of these four levels.

A. On the level of empirical consciousness I must create in myself the necessary presuppositions for understanding your self-revelation [31]. In order for such understanding to take place, I must first be available to listen to you in your self-revelation. According to G. Marcel, this availability (disponibilité) decreases to the degree that I am preoccupied with myself and increases to the extent that I free myself from egocentric concerns [32].

It is this availability that allows me to be present to you. Above and beyond mere physical presence in time and space, a more disciplined mental presence is demanded. It restrains my thoughts from mulling over things in the past or anticipating those of the future. It draws them back from other persons, places, and situations to you in the here and now [33].

This mental presence frees me from other concerns to be attentive to you. If I do not listen attentively to the disclosure of your experiences, insights, judgments, decisions and feelings, I shall not understand what you are saying. If I do not pay observant attention to your non-verbal modes of communication also, I may well understand what you are saying, but fail to understand the person saying it [34].

In order that my listening may bear fruit, I must listen open-mindedly. This open-mindedness comprises two elements. The first of these is what E. Betti calls a "self-denial" (abnegazione di sè). It involves that humility of soul in which one prescinds from the preconceptions and prejudgments that might impede understanding. The second is what he calls "mental openness" (apertura mentale). It entails a readiness to expand my present horizon of understanding [35].

As H.-G. Gadamer explains, however, this open-mindedness does not require that I invalidate all my experiences, reject all my insights, suspend all my judgments, or revoke all

my decisions [36]. It does necessitate, however, that I disavow myself of those prejudices that impede my understanding of you. But since those prejudices that obstruct comprehension cannot be distinguished beforehand from that preunderstanding that aids comprehension, this open-mindedness demands of me the willingness to place my insights, judgments, and decisions into question when they are challenged by yours and to examine whether they have proceeded from a full cognitive and moral self-transcendence [37].

B. If I am available to listen and sufficiently present, attentive, and open-minded, then I shall be able to understand you on the level of intellectual consciousness. In this connection we shall successively examine what it means to understand (1) the object of the discourse, (2) the words of the discourse, (3) the speaker of the discourse, and (4) oneself as the hearer of the discourse. I shall term these objective understanding, linguistic understanding, personal understanding, and self-understanding respectively [38].

1. To understand the object of your discourse would seem to pose two requirements. First, I must understand the referent of your discourse, i.e., the object to which you are referring. If I refer your statements to an object other than the one to which you refer them, misunderstanding will certainly ensue. Second, I must understand the realm of meaning or universe of discourse in which you are speaking, i.e., the tacitly presupposed context in which your statements are made. If I interpret a phenomenological statement as a metaphysical statement, for example, or an aesthetic judgment as a moral value judgment, misunderstanding will again result.

2. Understanding the object of your discourse and understanding the words of your discourse mutually condition and mediate one another. I can only understand the object of your discourse insofar as I understand the words you use to refer to the object; I can only understand the words of the discourse insofar as I understand the object to which they refer. Understanding the words of your discourse would seem to contain three elements. First, I must understand the individual words of the vocabulary employed. Second, I must understand the syntactical relations of the individual words to one another and the ensuing grammatical constructions from which the sentence is formed. And third, I must understand

the semantic meaning, i.e., the identification of the referent and the predication made of it, which results from the meaning of the individual words in the present grammatical construction.

Both objective and linguistic understanding normally occur spontaneously without requiring any additional explanation of the words of the discourse. But if I am initially confronted with a lack of understanding, or if an undetected misunderstanding generates subsequent contradictions, then I must advert explicitly to the words of the discourse in order to ascertain their precise meaning and to pave the way for a correct understanding.

The root of misunderstanding or of a lack of understanding can lie, according to E. Betti, in either a verbal or a metalinguistic ambiguity [39]. The speaker may contribute to a verbal ambiguity insofar as she inadequately or incorrectly expresses her meaning. Verbal ambiguity may arise on the part of the listener insofar as she does not know the ordinary or technical meaning of a particular term, does not understand the grammatical construction in which the terms occur, or does not share the implicit assumptions and presuppositions of the given universe of discourse. Metalinguistic ambiguity may result, on the side of the speaker, from the incomplete disclosure, the distortion, or the misrepresentation of the meaning intended and, on the side of the listener, from preconceptions and prejudgments as well as from a too limited preunderstanding.

The attempt to overcome both misunderstanding and the lack of understanding assumes, as H.-G. Gadamer says, the structure of question and answer [40]. Through the sustained process of questioning and answering, verbal ambiguity may be eliminated as clarity is gained on the usage of words and their referents and as the implicit assumptions and presuppositions of the universe of discourse are made explicit. Metalinguistic ambiguity may also be dispelled insofar as in the course of time either the speaker will have to speak veraciously and the listener listen open-mindedly or the dialogue will have to be broken off.

3. Objective and linguistic understanding normally suffice to understand what the speaker is saying. But in order more fully to understand the <u>speaker himself</u>, an additional element of personal understanding is necessary. Here I should like to distinguish a proximate and a remote moment.

In addition to understanding the content of your statements, personal understanding requires in its proximate moment that I understand the subjective importance that the objects to which your statements refer have for you. I must thus understand the feeling out of which your statements are made. This proximate moment further requires that I understand not only your ideas, but also the insights underlying those ideas; not only your judgments, but also the reasons grounding those judgments; and not only your decisions and actions, but also the motives inspiring them.

In its remote moment, personal understanding requires that I understand the more general interests that give rise to your questions, the viewpoints from which your questions are answered in insights, judgments, and decisions, and the concerns that are mirrored in your intentional feeling responses. I must come to some appreciation of your world as it has come to be articulated in the temporal unfolding of your conscious experience, the matrix of your personal and social relations, your historical situation, your native language, and your religious and philosophical worldview [41].

4. It may seem that the process of understanding is complete with objective, linguistic, and personal understanding. Yet, paradoxically, understanding you requires that I also understand myself in at least two senses.

First, if my present horizon of understanding does not permit me to understand the object of your discourse, the words of your discourse, or you yourself as the speaker of the discourse, then I must understand my need to expand my present horizon. Second, I must understand not only what you have revealed of yourself and the self who has revealed it; I must also understand how your self-revelation invites me, indeed calls me, to respond to you. I must understand what your needs, your desires, and your expectations are and how I am able to meet them through what I say or do or simply through who I am [42].

C. If I have understood your self-revelation, then I shall be in a position to take a stance with regard to it on the level of rational consciousness in the form either of belief or disbelief. After a few brief remarks on belief in general, we shall discuss three elements of belief which I shall term (1) propositional faith, (2) personal faith, and (3) fiducial faith [43].

My immediate experience spans no more than a minute segment of space and time. For knowledge of places and times other than my own I must believe others who report their experience. My original insights depend not only on my own experience, but for the most part on the believed experience of others. Original insights, however, are few; often I must first believe the insights of others and then labor to repeat them in myself. My judgments often rest on evidence for the veracity of which I myself am not personally able to vouch. I must accept such evidence on faith from others before I am able to judge.

Since my immanently generated knowledge is limited, what I know emerges as a composite of such immanently generated knowledge and the believed experiences, insights, and judgments of my contemporaries and predecessors in all the realms of meaning. Were I to refuse to believe as a matter of principle, I should deprive myself of the greater part of my knowledge in the realms of common sense, theory, art, scholarship, and transcendence and completely debar myself from all knowledge of another's inner life.

There clearly seems, then, to be a greater value in believing than in not believing as a matter of general principle. The question now becomes whether or not there is a value in my believing a given communication. There will be such value if you have understood correctly and communicated your understanding truthfully.

1. Belief makes its first appearance in propositional faith where I believe that what you say is true [44]. If on the basis of my personal knowledge of your ability and of the testimony of others I know you to be attentive, intelligent, reasonable, and responsible; and if what you say is inherently probable, internally consistent, and compatible with or corroborated by all I know from other sources, then I have reason to believe that you have understood correctly.

In many realms of meaning I may be able directly or indirectly to verify whether what you say is correct or incorrect. In these case I could in principle come to know the matter at hand apart from your communication. But in the realm of interiority, no such possibility exists. My only acces to your inner life is through faith in your self-revelation.

2. A mere belief in the truth of your statement resulting from a calculation of probabilities is the most superficial

form of faith. Belief reaches a greater depth in personal faith where I believe you to be speaking not only correctly, but also truthfully [45]. If on the basis of my personal knowledge of your character and of the testimony of others I know that you have been honest in the past and I discover no motives for deceit in the present, then I have reason to believe that you are speaking sincerely.

In propositional faith, I believe in virtue of the inherent probability of the statements made and the competence of the person making them, and I am reluctant to believe the unlikely or the unqualified. In personal faith, I believe in virtue of the veracity of the person himself, and I am willing to believe from him what I would not believe from another. Nevertheless, even if I have reason to believe that your statement is objectively mistaken, I can still believe that you are mistaken in good faith and, admitting that the mistake may lie with me, continue our dialogue in the search for the truth.

3. Belief attains its greatest depth in fiducial faith where I believe in you [46]. Here I believe not only that what you say is true, not only that you are speaking truthfully, but also that you will be true to your word, and I am willing to take something on it. If on the basis of my personal knowledge of your character and of the testimony of others I know that you have kept your promises and fulfilled your commitments in the past; and if I see that you make your promise or commitment, not lightly, but with due consideration in the present, then I have reason to believe in you and to trust you.

The judgment that the conditions for responsible propositional, personal, and fiducial belief have been fulfilled rests on what J. H. Newman termed a "convergence of probabilities" [47]. Such a convergence, of course, does not yield an infallible certainty. Belief remains beset by risk. Yet it does offer motives of credibility sufficient to make the act of faith a responsible risk. The rightness of my leap of faith can find its confirmation only in the act itself of believing you.

Through belief and trust in you I not only expand my factual knowledge of the world by profiting from the accumulation of your experiences, insights, judgments, and decisions, I also gain privileged access to your inner life. E. Coreth has characterized this personal knowledge rendered possible

by my belief in your self-revelation as the deepest, the richest, and the fullest mode of knowing [48]. It is the deepest, for thus we penetrate beyond the surface immediately accessible to us to the depths of personal life. It is the richest, for it discloses to us the inner richness of personal being, a wealth of experiences, insights, judgments, decisions and feelings not present on lower levels of being. And it is the fullest, for in it both sensible and intellectual knowledge of an objective nature are taken up into the higher unity of personal knowledge.

D. We have suggested that attentive and open-minded presence on the first level of consciousness is a necessary condition for understanding on the second level and that understanding is in turn a necessary condition for faith and trust on the third level.

1. If now on the fourth level of existential consciousness we turn to the subject of love, this must not be misunderstood to mean that only after I have been present to you, understood you, and believed and trusted you can I first begin to love you. Rather, it is out of love that I listen attentively and open-mindedly to you, strive to understand what you are saying and who you are, and dare to believe you and trust you.

In many discussions of love there is a tendency to identify eros with a natural, egoistic love and agape with a supernatural, altruistic love. This opposition, however, has two severe consequences. First, the denial of a natural altruistic love means that nature cannot be elevated and perfected, but only eliminated and replaced by grace. Second, if agape is merely other-directed love, it loses its specifically theological motivation. It is no longer love of the other for God's sake [49].

J. B. Lotz overcomes this deficiency by distinguishing between (1) eros as a sensitive-instinctual love, (2) philia as a spiritual-personal love, and (3) agape as a divine-gracious love [50]. We shall follow him closely in our exposition.

(a) As sensitive, eros is released and guided by the perception of sensuous beauty; as instinctual, it reacts spontaneously, prior to rational deliberation and free choice. It evinces two distinct accentuations [51]. In the first place, it strives for appropriation of the externally attractive. When open to the higher realm of spirit, it leads to the desire for personal union. When closed to this realm,

it degenerates into treating the other as an instrument of gratification or, when the attraction has waned, as an obstacle to finding satisfaction elsewhere. In the second place, it contemplates the beautiful. When receptive to the spiritual, it opens its eyes to the splendor not only of beauty, but also of goodness, and becomes a gaze of love. When non-receptive, it degrades the other into an object of distanced observation and becomes a stare [52]. Eros is therefore an ambiguous phenomenon. It is not to be repressed, but integrated into philia.

(b) As spiritual, philia directs itself to those depths inaccessible to sense perception. As personal, it proceeds from the core of personal being and reaches out to the other in her unique personhood.

Philia does not exclude, but rather includes as its first moment, a legitimate self-love. This legitimate self-love has nothing in common with self-seeking egocentricity. It is rather that natural love of the good that constitutes one's own fulfillment and perfection, which one, in full accord with right reason, can legitimately affirm [53]. According to J. Pieper, legitimate self-love involves an affirmation of oneself as a person and thus as an absolute value that always remains an end in itself and can never be legitimately reduced to a mere means. Second, it wills that which is truly and not just apparently good and does so for one's own sake. Third, it wills this good for oneself as one is right now, without demanding that one first become more deserving or more worthy. And fourth, it delights in dwelling with oneself, taking joy in one's own existence, gladly remembering the goods of the past, and looking forward to those of the future [54].

As such, this legitimate self-love is both the origin and model for our spiritual-personal love of others [55]. For I will the other for myself only insofar as the other is truly a good. And the affirmation of the value of the other is already a spiritual-personal love. At this point, however, I love the other only for my sake and not necessarily for his sake. Lotz equates this with the amor concupiscentiae of the scholastic tradition and interprets it as my desire for union with you. This desire for union manifests itself first in the desire to be in your physical presence. Thence it deepens itself into the desire for a community of life that also involves a unity of heart, mind, and will expressing

itself in common experiences and insights, common judgments of fact and value, common decisions and actions, and common affections and commitments [56].

This love of you for my sake aiming at union, however, in no way excludes, but rather of itself calls for completion by the love of you for your sake. Lotz pairs this with the medieval amor benevolentiae and renders it as my self-giving to you in response to your value [57]. In the first place, my greatest perfection lies in my selfless love of another, and insofar as I desire this perfection, I necessarily desire this selfless love. In the second place, the desire for union leads to the formation of a common "we" out of a previously separate "you" and "I", in which I already consider you another self and will the good for you for your sake just as I will the good for me for my sake [58]. My love of you for your sake has already manifested itself in my trusting self-revelation to you, in my attentiveness and open-mindedness towards you, in my efforts to understand you, and in my belief and trust in you. It now shows itself in the loving affirmation of you, in my fervent willing of the good for you, in my free self-giving to you, and in my willingness to sacrifice for you [59].

(c) As divine-gracious love, agape does not abrogate eros and philia as natural human love, but elevates and perfects them as grace does nature. As divine, it is first of all God's love for us and then our love of our fellows for God's sake. As gracious, it is a free, unmerited gift empowering us to love beyond our natural capacity. Whereas eros directs itself to the beautiful and philia to the good, agape, according to Lotz, is love of the holy which radiates with goodness and beauty. It is love of both the holy God and the men and women called to holiness in God. It loves the other as a child of the Father, a brother of Christ, and a temple of the Holy Spirit. As love of you for God's sake, it is in no way opposed to love of you for your sake. It in no way overlooks your unique value as a person but acknowledges the ultimate foundation of this value in the creative gift of God.

2. It might seem that with the love that animates and perfects presence, understanding and faith, my response to your self-revelation would be complete. But the temporal character of human relationships and the difficulties besetting them require that love be sustained on the fourth level of consciousness by hope [60].

(a) The object of hope is first of all a good. There are in the natural order many goods for which one can legitimately hope: bodily health and well-being, economic growth and prosperity, social harmony and order, education and culture, professional opportunity and success. Interpersonal relationships consisting in common experiences and insights, common judgments of fact and value, common decisions and actions, and common affections and commitments are certainly among such goods. In fact, such relationships are such a good that in their absence many other goods seem to lose their meaning and purpose [61]. Each of us intuitively grasps the profound truth that it is not good for human beings to be alone.

(b) The object of hope is more specifically a future good. Although we have actualized our relationship to some extent through mutual self-revelation and a mutual response of presence, understanding, faith, and love, our relationship is a dynamic reality in movement towards ever greater self-revelation, ever more attentive and open-minded presence, ever more profound understanding, ever more daring faith, and ever more selfless love. It is intrinsically ordered towards a future consummation that is only dimly foreshadowed in the present.

(c) The future good of hope is, however, a difficult good [62]. Self-revelation has always to contend with the limitations of expression, to resist the temptation to distortion, and to overcome both fear and pride. One must uproot the egocentric desires that prevent one from being available for the other, restrain one's many concerns in order to be present, focus one's interest in order to be attentive, and let go of prejudice in order to be open-minded. One must learn to appreciate a different perspective and to understand the other in his unique and many-faceted world. One must take the risk of believing and trusting without any guarantee that one's faith and trust will not be disappointed. One must rise from attraction to external qualities to love of the spiritual person, subordinate love of self to love of the other, and order love of the other for one's own sake to love of her for her sake.

(d) Although difficult, the good of hope is nevertheless possible. Yet it is not immediately within my power. If I am willing to reveal myself, I cannot do so until you give me the chance. If I am willing to respond with attentive and

open-minded presence, understanding, faith, and love, I cannot do so until you have revealed yourself. I am therefore dependent on you, as you are dependent on me. In the words of G. Marcel, I must "hope in you for you" [63].

With that we have disengaged the basic structures of interpersonal relationships. In doing so, we have discovered a natural self-revelation and, once it has been received and understood, a natural response of faith, hope, and love. This natural analogue gives us the key to understand God's divine self-revelation and man's response through the theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity. But that must remain the subject of another essay.

NOTES

[1] See E. Husserl, Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vorträge, ed. S. Strasser, Husserliana I, The Hague, 1950; M. Scheler, Wesen und Formen der Sympathie, 3rd ed., Bonn, 1926; A. Reinach, Zur Phänomenologie des Rechts, Munich, 1953; and D. von Hildebrand, Metaphysik der Gemeinschaft, 2nd ed., Regensburg, 1955; Das Wesen der Liebe, Regensburg, 1971.

[2] See M. Buber, Die Schriften uber das dialogische Prinzip, Heidelberg, 1954; F. Ebner, Das Wort und die geistigen Realitäten, Regensburg, 1921; F. Rosenzweig, Der Stern der Erlösung, 3rd ed., Heidelberg, 1954; H. Cohen, Religion der Vernunft aus den Quellen des Judentums, 2nd ed., Frankfurt am Main, 1929.

[3] See M. Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, Halle, 1929, pp. 117-125; K. Löwith, Das Individuum in der Rolle des Mitmenschen, Munich, 1928; L. Binswanger, Grundformen und Erkenntnis menschlichen Daseins, Zurich, 1942; K. Jaspers, Existenzerhellung, Vol. II of Philosophie, Berlin, 1956.

[4] See J.-P. Sartre, "L'autrui," in Etre et le néant, Paris, 1943, pp. 265-353; M. Merleau-Ponty, "Autrui et le monde humain," in Phénoménologie de la perception, Paris, 1945, pp. 398-419; G. Marcel, Etre et Avoir, Paris, 1935; Homo Viator, Paris, 1945; Le Mystère de l'être, Paris, 1951. On Marcel, see R. Troisfontaines, De l'existence à l'être, 2 vols., Namur, 1953.

[5] See E. Mounier, Revolution personnaliste et communautaire, Paris, 1931; Manifeste au service du personnalisme, Paris, 1936; Traité du charactère, Paris, 1946; Introduction aux existentialismes, Paris, 1947; Qu'est-ce que le personnalisme?, Paris, 1947; Le personnalisme, Paris, 1950; M. Neconcelle, La réciprocité des consciences, Paris, 1942; La personne humaine et la nature, Paris, 1943; Vers une philosophie de l'amour et de la personne, Paris, 1957; Intersubjectivité et ontologie, Paris, 1974; R. Le Senne, Ch. 9 of Introduction à la philosophie, Paris, 1939.

[6] See J. LaCroix, Le sens du dialogue, Neuchâtel, 1944; J. deleSalle, Essai sur le dialogue, Paris, 1953; G. Madinier, Conscience et amour, Paris, 1962.

[7] See A. Brunner, Erkenntnistheorie, Cologne, 1948; Stufenbau der Welt, Munich, 1950; Glaube und Erkenntnis, Munich, 1951; Person und Begegnung, Munich, 1982.

[8] Some important surveys of this train of thought are J. Cullberg, Das Du und die Wirklichkeit, Uppsala, 1933; B. Casper, Das dialogische Denken, 1967; J. Böckenhoff, Die Begegnungsphilosophie, 1970; M. Theunissen, Der Andere, 2nd ed., Berlin, 1977; and P. Laín Entralgo, Teoría y realidad del otro, Madrid, 1981.

[9] See especially Insight, New York, 1977. According to the note on p. 731, Lonergan believes that "personal relations can be studied adequately only in this larger and more concrete context" provided by his cognitional and volitional theory. The present article is a first contribution to that study.

[10] See J. Macquarrie, God-Talk, New York, 1979, pp. 55-78. A more complete description of linguistic functions can be found in R. Jakobsen, "Linguistics and Poetics," in T. A. Sebeck, ed., Style and Language, Cambridge, Mass., 1960, pp. 350-77.

[11] What follows in the text is an oversimplified schematization of Lonergan's thought.

[12] Idem., Method in Theology, New York, 1972, pp. 81-85, 271-276.

[13] Cf. Brunner, "Das Subjekt muß sich offenbaren, soll es als Subjekt erkannt werden," Glaube und Erkenntnis, p. 20. Hereafter GE.

[14] Cf. Brunner, "Je persönlicher die Mitteilung ist, je mehr sie den Charakter einer freien Offenbarung zeigt, um so reineres Schenken ist sie," GE, p. 76. For good analyses of the gift-character of self-revelation, see Brunner, GE, pp. 71-81; Marcel, Le Mystère de 'l'être, pp. 118-23 [Hereafter ME]; Troisfontaines, De l'existence à l'être, II: 56-59 [Hereafter EE].

[15] See Troisfontaines, EE, II:16-21, 20-30, where Marcel's important notions of réponse-communion and invocation are discussed.

[16] Cf. Marcel: "Si paradoxale que cela puisse paraitre, attendre, c'est en quelque facon donner; mais l'inverse n'est past moins vrai: ne plus attendre, c'est frapper de stérilité l'être dont on n'attend plus rien." See Homo Viator, p. 63 [hereafter HV].

[17] Cf. Brunner, "Jedes Gespräch, auch über Sachen, ist wesentlich zugleich Selbsteröffnung, ist Offenbarung." In Person und Begegnung, p. 14 [hereafter PB].

[18] One would have to distinguish more in detail here between the expression and the report of feelings. See D. D. Evans, The Logic of Self-Involvement, New York, 1969, pp. 80-115.

[19] See Brunner, GE, pp. 27-32; Nédoncelle, La réciprocité des consciences, pp. 186-88 [hereafter RC].

[20] See Buber, Die Schriften..., pp. 263-67 [hereafter SdP], for an excellent analysis of this. See also LaCroix, Le sens du dialogue, p. 26-40 [hereafter SD].

[21] See Jaspers, Existenzerhellung, p. 91 [hereafter E].

[22] This syndrome has perhaps found its classical expression in Heidegger, "Das alltagliche Selbstsein und das Man," in Sein und Zeit, pp. 126-30 [hereafter SZ].

[23] Jaspers profoundly points out the contradiction inherent in such an attitude: "In der Angst vor der Kommunikation vollziehe ich eine widerspruchsvolle Bewegung: ich wünsche so zu bleiben, wie ich da bin, während ich eigentlich furchte so zu sein, wie ich da bin" [E, p. 82].

[24] Reinach terms these requirements Intentionalität, Spontaneität, Fremdpersonalität, and Vernehmungsbedürftigkeit. See Zur Phanomenologie..., pp. 37-64 [hereafter PR].

[25] See Lonergan, Insight, p. 562.

[26] See Ebner, Das Wort..., p. 151 [hereafter WgR]: "Indem das Ich sich aber ausspricht und zum Wort wird, bewegt es sich aus dieser Einsamkeit heraus zum Du hin und wird in einem tieferen Sinne wirklich."

[27] See von Hildebrand, Metaphysik..., pp. 22-32 [hereafter MG], on the distinction between intentionäre Berührung, reale Berührung, and verlautbarte Stellungnahme.

[28] See Marcel's highly nuanced analysis of fidelity in Etre et Avoir, pp. 58-80 [hereafter EA], and Troisfontaines, EE, II:32-36, on the correlates engagement and fidelité.

[29] Cf. Lowith, Das Individuum..., p. 110 [hereafter IRM]: Im Ansprechen eines andern liegt bereits der Anspruch auf Entsprechung."

[30] See Lonergan, Insight, p. 569.

[31] I here retain Lonergan's terminology for whom "empirical" does not necessarily mean the sense-perceptible, but anything preceding and forming the presupposition for the level of intellectual consciousness. The operations on this level are "empirical" in the sense that they provide me with an experience of you that furnishes the basis for understanding you.

[32] See Marcel, EA, pp. 100-106; HV, pp. 27-30; Troisfontaines, EE, II:31-32. Buber expresses a not unrelated idea when he writes: "Die dialogische Grundbewegung ist die Hinwendung" [SdP, p. 156]

[33] See Buber's related understanding of personale Vergegenwärtigung, SdP, pp. 268-73.

[34] See Buber's distinction between Beobachten, Betrachten, and Innewerden, SdP, pp. 136-39. It is the third of these that is in question here.

[35] See E. Betti, Teoria generale della interpretazione, Milan, 1955, I:272-73.

[36] See H.-G. Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode, Tübingen, 1965, p. 253.

[37] Ibid., p. 283.

[38] See Lonergan, Method in Theology, pp. 153-62; E. Coreth, Grundfragen der Hermeneutik, Freiburg, 1969, pp. 55-118.

[39] Op. cit., p. 71.

[40] Op. cit., p. 345. Cf. Brunner: "Durch Rede und Gegenrede läßt sich jedoch der Unterschied zwischen den beiderseitigen Auffassungen erkennen und durch den Blick auf die gemeinte Sache oft auch beheben" [PB, p. 42].

[41] See Coreth, pp. 52-82.

[42] See Gadamer: "Verstehen ist ... immer schon Anwenden" [p. 292].

[43] This present section draws its main inspiration rom Lonergan, Insight, pp. 703-718, and Method in Theology, pp. 41-47. Of less influence has been C. Cirne-Lima, Der personale Glaube, Innsbruck, 1959. It also bears some affinities with the distinctions expressed in the formula Credere Deum, Deo, in Deum found in Augustine, In Johannis Evangelium Tractatus 22, 6; Enarrationes in Psalmos 77, 8; and taken up by Thomas Aquinas in Summa Theologiae [ST] II-II, q. 2, a. 3.

[44] Propositional faith can, of course, only be had with respect to those statements that purport to describe a state of affairs and therefore make a claim to truth.

[45] Statements such as promises, which do not describe a state of affairs, are not, strictly speaking, true are false, though they may still be truthful or untruthful.

[46] Marcel defines it thus: "Croire en quelqu'un, mettre en lui sa confiance, c'est dire: <<Je suis sûr que tu ne trahiras pas mon attente, que tu y répondras, que tu la combleras>>" [ME, II:80]. See his entire discussion here, pp. 78-84.

[47] See J. H. Newman, Ch. 9 of A Grammar of Assent, New York, 1955; see also Brunner, ET, pp. 77-87.

[48] See Coreth, Metaphysik, 3rd ed., Innsbruck, 1980, pp. 461-62.

[49] See H. Scholz, Eros und Caritas. Die plantonische Liebe und Liebe im Sinne des Christentums, Halle, 1929; L. Grunhut, Eros und Agape. Eine metaphysisch-religionsphilosophische Untersuchung, Leipzig, 1931; A. Nygren, Eros und Agape. Gestaltung der christlichen Liebe, 2 vols., Gütersloh, 1930-37; and M. C. D'Arcy, The Mind and the Heart of Love. Lion and Unicorn, A Study in Eros and Agape, New York, 1947. Nygren is the most guilty of this tendency, D'Arcy the least.

[50] See J. B. Lotz, Die Drei-Einheit der Liebe, Frankfurt am Main, 1979.

[51] Although Lotz's understanding of eros is narrower than Plato's, much that the latter says in Symposium 210a-212a and Phaedrus 227a-257b is relevant to the present section.

[52] This has been admirably described by Sartre in the section entitled "Le regard," in Etre et Neant, pp. 298-353, who unfortunately takes it as a model of all interpersonal relationships. For critique and other possibilities, see Mounier, Introduction..., pp. 93-107 [IE]; DeleSalle, Essai..., pp. 51-55 [ED]; Buber, SdP, pp. 136-139.

[53. The locus classicus on self-love is, of course, Aristotle's discussion of philautía in Nicomachean Ethics [NE] 9, 8. Binswanger, Grundformen... [GED], pp. 387-424, traces some of its further history.

[54] See J. Pieper, Über die Liebe, Munich, 1972, pp. 126-130. See also Aristotle, NE 9, 4.

[55] Thomas Aquinas, ST II-II, q. 45, a. 4, says, "Amor quo quis diligit seipsum est forma et radix amicitiae."

[56] Of this union born of reciprocal love, Nédoncelle says: "L'amant désavouerait la valeur de son amour s'il ne voulait pas que l'aimé le partageât et fût aimant à son tour" [PA, p. 34].

[57] See Hildebrand, Das Wesen... [WL], pp. 169-98, on the intentio unionis mentioned above and pp. 199-240 on the intentio benevolentiae. R. Johann, The Meaning of Love, Glen Rock, NJ, 1966, pp. 19-68, understands both the intentio unionis and the intentio benevolentiae as belonging to the amor benevolentiae.

[58] This dialogical consciousness of the We is different from the communal consciousness of the We. The latter has been analyzed by E. Mounier, RPC, pp. 79-88, 94-105; MSP, pp. 81-86; M. Nédoncelle, RC, pp. 78-81; PHN, pp. 9-11; IO, p. 49.

[59] M. Nédoncelle sums this up when he says: "L'amour est une volonté de promotion" [PA, p. 11]. If one makes allowances for his emotional value-intuitionism, Scheler, WFS, pp. 150-164, does a good job of showing what this does and does not involve, as does Buber, SdP, pp. 273-278.

[60] Cf. Troisfontaines" "Il n'y a pas d'amour sans espérance" [EE, II: 199]. See his entire discussion, pp. 173-204.

[61] Cf. Aristotle, EN 8, 1: "aneu gar philôn oudeis eloit' an zên exon ta loipa agatha panta." See also EN 9, 9.

[62] See Nédoncelle, RC, pp. 178-188, the sections entitled "Faillite d'autrui" and "Faillite de soi-meme."

[63] See Marcel, HV, pp. 77-79.

DOCTRINES, PRAXIS AND CRITICAL THEOLOGY: AN INTERPRETATION AND CRITIQUE OF CHARLES DAVIS'S OPTION

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Introduction

The recent work of Charles Davis has revealed what many have come to call "the political turn", a consciousness in theological reflection of the psychological, social, economic, and political implications of religious belief and practice. A continuing theme of Davis's work, moreover, is his critique of the authoritative doctrinal tradition that marks many Christian communions. What results from the convergence of these two trajectories in Davis's work is an advocacy for a "pragmatic" Christianity which, freed of an authoritarian dogmatism, maintains the religion's identity and truth by means of its liberating praxis.

In his Theology and Political Society [1], published in 1980, Davis has worked out much of the critical (social and political) foundations for what he later names "pragmatic" Christianity. In his most recent work, What is Living and What is Dead in Christianity Today?: Breaking the Liberal-Conservative Deadlock [2], Davis has undertaken a prolegomenon to a critical theology which will seek to incorporate the praxis-based concerns of political and liberation theologies while avoiding what Davis perceives as their uncritical stance toward the received doctrinal tradition [3].

I believe that much of what Davis says about theology and politics is important and true: theologians must face up to the political and liberation theologians' insistence that there is no such thing as a non-political theological stance, and they must also take seriously the challenge such a politically aware theology presents for our understanding of ecclesial structures. But there is a difficulty in Davis's insistence that, on the one hand, the intentionality of faith can and must be preserved by the praxis of Christian living rather than by doctrines, and on the other hand, the concomitant requirement that the content of what faith intends be in some way stable enough to generate a political polity that heads toward personal and social transformation. In other words,

while I find much of value in Davis's theological integration of the political and the religious, I do not believe that his marginalization of the role of doctrines will allow Davis's political theology to affirm and maintain, as he wishes it to do, "the identity and truth of the Christian faith" [4].

I will argue this thesis in three sections: the first is an outline of Davis's argument for the superiority of a "pragmatic" Christianity. The second section is a critical analysis of his interpretation of the role of doctrines which he holds to be implied by an option for pragmatic Christianity. The final section argues that a more adequate interpretation and evaluation of Bernard Lonergan on the questions of meaning, historicity, and doctrine would call into question Davis's claims that Lonergan "remains an incurable dogmatist" [5] and that Christianity must choose between doctrines and transformative praxis as sources of its "identity and truth".

The Superiority of a "pragmatic" Christianity

Davis takes his basic orientation from what he calls the pragmatic model of Christianity [6], and this stance is formulated in the principle of primacy of praxis over theory, "accompanied by a modest reserve about the degree of truth possessed by any theoretical formulations" [7]. Although he admits a need for a rational critique of practice, the stress is on the continuing critical conversation of the community, which lives out in praxis the meanings and values of the faith [8].

Insights from the other models of Christianity must be incorporated into the pragmatic model in a way that resists the distortions of individualism and rationalism which liberal religion has often spawned [9]. Davis therefore accepts and seeks to retain what the humanists lost, "the conservative acknowledgement of the transcendent dimension of Christian practice and the consequent indispensable function of tradition and community" [10]. But Davis insists that a critical, practical theology must exclude "orthodoxy".

> Truth and values for human beings do not exist prior to practice....Permanence and universality in the realm of truth and value are desired achievements; they cannot be prior claims. Continuity in truth, which is the meaning of orthodoxy, is a hoped-for attainment; it cannot serve as a prior norm.... [11]

Davis takes this position based not only on his political turn, but also on his conviction, with Wilfrid Cantwell Smith, that the present and future convergence of religions signals "the end of orthodoxy in the sense of a religious identity mediated through the fixed, objectified contents of a particular religious tradition" [12]. The primacy of praxis over theory, therefore, receives its impetus and urgency both from the renewed attention to the liberating value of religion and from the challenges raised by religious pluralism for Christian theology. In the following section I ask whether Davis's marginalization of doctrines will adequately meet the questions raised by these contemporary theological exigencies.

The role of doctrine in Davis's theological option

A dominant them in Davis's recent writings is that political theology signals the end of doctrinal orthodoxy. If faith is mediated through praxis, which is not an application of already known truths, then the normative status of past doctrinal decisions must be rejected. Modernity is characterized by a reliance on the present whereas the dogmatism of mythical Christianity makes the past normative [13]. But a reliance on the past provides no resources for a transformative or critical principle with which to confront the unchristian ethos of contemporary society or the problems stemming from the Christian encounter with other religions [14].

In the shift from myth to theory, motivated by Christianity's encounter with Hellenistic philosophy, there developed ontotheology, "the attempt to translate the content of the Christian myth into the theoretical concepts and statements of metaphysical philosophy" [15]. In Davis's view, ontotheology is deficient in three ways: (1) it is too intellectual for religious living, making knowledge rather than love foundational; (2) it assumes that abstract statement can replace myth and symbol; (3) ontotheology "killed the myth" by attempting to replace it with discursive thought, even at the popular level. The demise of metaphysics thus entailed the demise of the myth [16].

Because so much of the doctrinal tradition is dependent on this shift from myth and symbol to metaphysics, Davis insists that the critique of ontotheology [17] issues in a rather clear distinction between faith and beliefs, and the relativization of the latter. "Faith, while possessing

the assurance of a lived relationship, does not intellectually give absolute certitude. The certitude of propositional beliefs remains a limited, human certitude..." [18].

By "doctrines" Davis seems to mean propositional beliefs held, in some cases at least, as permanent or certain truths. In his critique of metaphysics, for example, Davis says that "the doctrinalization of the Christian myth...[is] the transition of the myth into propositional beliefs, imposed as dogmas..." [19]. Propositional beliefs or doctrines are further removed than are symbols from the experience of faith's thrust toward transcendence, and therefore cannot be given the absoluteness of faith. Not only metaphysical theology, but doctrines as well, are the product of a mistaken attempt to translate myth and symbol into theory [20].

To remedy this state of affairs, Davis recommends a return to the myth by way of praxis.

> [K]nowledge is not a reality apart from praxis; it is not a realm or world of its own, proceeding purely by its own laws as an independent totality; it is an element within praxis itself, so that modes of knowledge, scientific or metaphysical, are to be understood in the context of the other elements and relationships that constitute praxis as a totality. By praxis here I mean the embodied activities of socially related men and women, whereby they struggle with nature as a reality independent of consciousness and with the sedimented, objectified products of past human action, in order to shape their world and themselves in their world. [21]

Such a shift to praxis, and away from the notion that knowledge is foundational, can lead to a "rebirth of images to express on the basis of Christian practice a Christian perception of our present situation" [22]. Theory tends to suffer from the illusion that it is an independent source and reference for the myth, whereas in fact it is deeply influenced by its historical and social context. Meanings that constitute beliefs are "subject to change" in spite of the fact that Davis recognizes that there is some continuity within the Christian tradition [23]. The critical issue, then, is praxis, which always occurs within a context which is never merely intellectual.

The relativization of doctrine, however, does not lead Davis to neglect the importance of tradition and community.

Tradition is "the ground of values, not as an external authority, but as their real presence in history." Memory, which unites reason and history "is not a dogmatic imposition, but an encounter with the reality of an historically embodied value" [24]. And the identity of the tradition is mediated through and within a community; in spite of a certain amount of variation in the degree of shared meaning, "the Christian tradition is still living as long as a group of people, calling themselves Christians, share a common understanding and a common set of judgments with some claim to continuity with the Christian past" [25]. But although Davis affirms the preservation of tradition and community exemplified in the conservative versions of Christianity (which is a rejection of the rationalism and individualism of an uncritical liberalism), he also affirms the overall superiority of the liberal version because it "refuses both the dogmatic claim to an immutable body of revealed doctrines and the ecclesiastical claim to a divinely appointed hierarchy" [26].

To summarize, Davis places doctrine in a clearly subordinate role in Christian life for at least three reasons. First, as propositional beliefs within a metaphysical system, doctrines tend to dessicate the mythic or symbolic manifestation of Christian praxis, and the symbolic is closer to the experience and praxis of faith than is any product of "ontotheology". Second, doctrines have been wrongly declared to be certain and "absolute", and this claim contradicts the historicity of all doctrines as well as the open-ended nature of inquiry. Third, the ascription of certitude and absoluteness to doctrines is frequently the by-product of an extrinsicist authoritarianism which imposes doctrines, an imposition motivated by a desire to control rather than by a pure desire to defend the truth. Christian communities therefore must take their stand on the meanings and values embodied primarily in praxis, and only secondarily in doctrines, which are always threatening to reify or obfuscate faith as a lived reality.

No theologian today who has made the anthropological and political turns would deny the truth and timeliness of many of Davis's arguments concerning doctrine, community, and tradition. The turn to human experience has revealed the fundamental importance of symbolism for human affectivity and the inappropriateness of any attempt to overcome or suppress this realm of meaning in the shift to theory [27]. Historical consciousness has revealed that the hermeneutics of doctrinal

statements requires a critical attention to the milieu of any doctrine's formulation. The renewed interest in praxis has forced the theologian to reinterpret the ways in which theoretical statements function in the Christian life; they can no longer be taken as starting-points or sources for praxis. Rather, as Davis argues, theory is an element in the overall praxis of the Christian community. And there are ecclesiological implications of this historical-critical consciousness, such as a renewed interest in the beliefs and practices of the local church as embodiments of the church's faith, and the new ways in which authority must be understood.

Some of Davis's arguments and conclusions, however, present a number of difficulties. The first difficulty has to do with what I perceive to be an ambivalence in Davis's understanding of what doctrines are and what role they have to play in religious experience. The word "doctrine" has multiple meanings and connotations in Davis's recent work. At times, he seems not to distinguish a doctrinal tradition from "dogmatism", a closed attitude toward the possibility or necessity of change. At other times, he seems to mean by doctrine an abstract or literal propositional paraphrase of myth and symbol which, it is falsely assumed, exhausts the meaning of what is given in myth and symbol. Still a third meaning has to do with those theoretical formulations which serve as the normative, permanent starting-point in an uncritical theological procedure.

A second difficulty has to do with Davis's ambivalence regarding the possibility of permanence in religious traditions. On the one hand, Davis rejects the possibility that a doctrine can be certain or permanent. On the other hand, when he argues for the need to develop a "distinctively Christian contribution to politics" [28] Davis speaks of a Christian political theory arising from shared judgments of fact and value. Within the context of religion and politics Davis exhibits a much more sanguine estimate of the possibility of identifying a determinate content of Christian faith [29]. If Christians can "share a common understanding and a common set of judgments with some claim to continuity with the Christian past" [30], then how relatively common does the understanding have to be (it obviously cannot be identical for all Christians)? And how can the claim to continuity, however it is specified, be understood and verified?

If "transcendent reality is reached only in and through the life of the community and the common meanings constitutive of that life" [31] then it must be possible to name, however inadequately, these common meanings, and to judge them to be constitutive of the community and its tradition. In his discussion of the referential function of language Davis seems to provide for the possibility of specifying common meanings and affirming their truth. First, Davis notes that faith has an intentionality rooted in the nature of feeling: feelings intend reality, and are not purely subjective experiences. And because faith depends upon felt meaning, the language of faith is always symbolic, analogical, imaginative [32]. Davis also recognizes the role of beliefs, which he defines as "propositions expressing judgments of fact and judgments of value, made under the influence of the experience of faith" [33]. Doctrines, along with many other kinds of expression such as images, symbols, or narratives, serve to expand on the practical implications of the foundational experience of faith, but they are not foundational in the sense that they are not starting-points [34].

Davis thus recognizes a role for doctrines, but he is not consistent on the question whether this role includes the possibility of determining the truth status of certain commonly held meanings. He frequently argues that a community's common meanings and values cannot be determined by the community and expressed as doctrines which continue to be true. Praxis, not doctrines, reveals Christianity's "identity and truth" [35].

The practical reason for this position is a serious one, and deserves to be taken seriously by theologians. For Davis, traditional notions of religion as orthodoxy are rendered untenable because, as Marx insisted, there exists a unity of theory and praxis. The notion that doctrines have permanent self-identity allows religion to go "unscathed by social and practical changes...for Marx knowledge is essentially a social product and is actively developed or changed in relation with practice..." [36]. How accurately, then, can we describe Christianity as possessing an identity that is continuous throughout history? Davis continues,

> We possess the degree of truth belonging to the present stage in the development of human society. To suppose some unchanging religious truth...is to deny

> concrete history with its persisting alienations and to escape into abstraction...[and] thus nullify the imperative to change the world. [37]

The self-justifying, ideological uses of religious beliefs often result when beliefs are divorced from praxis. Such doctrines, which deny or impede an ongoing reformation of ecclesial life and structures, is unfortunately all too familiar.

Davis is right to argue against a tendency toward an unwarranted promotion of the elements of religious consciousness to the status of truth. Most of what constitutes our religious world is not truth but a complex conglomerate of our experiences [38]. The unnecessary promotion to the status of truth of that which is not yet determined or in some way verified truncates the process of learning by minimizing the arduous task of understanding, and makes the correction of mistakes, false judgments, and inadequate ideas difficult and unlikely [39]. In this sense, personal and communal praxis--including what Davis has termed the "reflective appropriation of our own subjectivity" [40]--would necessitate a more reserved and tentative attitude toward the process of judgment.

But abuse of the very limited role of doctrines, especially the role of those which are given the authoritative status of dogma, does not thereby argue for an a priori impermanence and relativity. In fact, in order for Davis to maintain the necessity of a distinctively Christian political theology or social policy, he must accept the permanence of certain truths about the human person. Davis's position seems to assume that there are truths, continuous through history, concerning human beings and their relationship to God. As examples we may note certain elements of his theological anthropology, such as the symbolic nature of human communication, or the tension between the private self (which must be overcome) and the interior self in its relation to the Absolute (which must be preserved) [41]. Furthermore, Davis defends, against Habermas, the monotheistic/Christian emphasis on the individual self and its unconditional worth. Are these not permanent doctrines in Davis's theology? [42] Put another way, would it be possible to imagine the morally urgent praxis implied in Davis's "political turn" if one were not convinced that the transcendent value of the individual is indeed a value not only today and in this culture, but always, and in every culture? In places, Davis seems to admit this [43], but at other times he holds that permanence and universality in the

realm of truth and value are desired achievements but not prior norms [44]. Permanent or certain knowledge requires prior praxis, and there is praxis yet to be performed. Only a future world order will reveal what is variant and invariant [45]. Therefore, permanence is always and only in the future.

But acceptance of a doctrinal tradition which contains a small number of quite limited and largely heuristic dogmas is not necessarily a rejection of the kind of openness to present and future praxis. For example, an understanding of the eschatological dimension of certain Christian doctrines is a belief about the need for a permanent openness required of Christian faith [46]. Such an openness requires a critical stance insofar as a community must be alive to the possibility that some doctrines may embody disvalues which future praxis will sift out. But the criteria for making such an evaluation will be shaped in part by what Davis calls "an objective content that permanently excludes" its opposite [47].

There is, then, an ambivalence in Davis's attitude toward the possible permanence of any doctrine: although he usually denies doctrines this quality, he also seems to need it for his construction of a political theology. In the final section I hope to show that there are resources in Lonergan's thought which can suggest a way of understanding doctrines which preserves many of Davis's concerns while at the same time resolving the ambivalence in his position.

Lonergan on the permanence, historicity, and transformative value of doctrines

Davis suspects that Lonergan's claims concerning an invariant cognitional theory are the product of a search for stability and a prior commitment to the doctrines of the church. The assumption here is that religious belief as a prior commitment somehow spoils the objectivity of one's inquiries. Thus, Lonergan's account of emergent probability underlies all of his ideas and is in fact a Christian worldview [48]. What Lonergan calls a critical realism he also names "Christian Realism" because such a cognitional theory (with its implicit epistemology and metaphysics) is a necessary implication of Christian truth claims. Not only does Davis challenge the critical quality of Lonergan's program, but he also doubts whether such a Christian worldview, couched in an intellectualism that does not retain the experiential power of symbol

and myth, can meet contemporary cultural needs [49]. Lonergan, in other words, is a dogmatist because he does not sufficientlt reckon with the ambiguities and contradictions of experience [50].

Aspects of Lonergan's work, however, are essential for a project like the one Davis is attempting to carry out. In the following remarks, I will indicate that, as Lonergan understands them, doctrines (1) participate in a critical evaluation of tradition, (2) are the result of a largely positive judgment about the value of believing what is proposed by a religious tradition, and (3) can be transformative, so that it is a mistake to insist on a choice between doctrines and praxis.

Lonergan insists on the need for theoretic control of symbolic meaning: symbolic meaning often issues in logical contradictions and thus questions about meaning arise. A systematic exigence shifts the context of the questions from common sense (things as they are related to us) to theory (things as they are related to one another)[51]. The move to theory is a necessary one if there is a cognitive content to religious faith, even though that faith is normally communicated in symbols [52]. The move to theory can also be a critical tool for determining the truth status of what symbols mean: when meaning is not controlled, symbols are in danger of becoming oppressive, ideological obfuscations of the transformative values latent in them, and so the question of the truth of a symbol's meaning must be raised. But such a question cannot in an explicit way be settled on the level of symbolic consciousness [53].

There is a fundamental difference, then, between Davis and Lonergan: can questions which emerge from symbolic communication be handled on the symbolic level, as Davis sometimes seems to assume, or must answers be sought on the level of theory? For Davis, theory, which issues in ontological claims, "forgets the limitations of human thought and language." By this, Davis does not want to claim that there is no objectivity to symbolic knowing, but he does deny that the object of symbolic intending can be transposed into anything other than images and symbols, and the "attempt to turn their imaginative content into ontological statements is as misguided as the turning of the religious account of creation into a statement of geological fact" [54].

In his analysis of the corrective genres in the New Testament David Tracy has pointed out that the genre of doctrine or "early catholicism"

> serves as the corrective of any temptation to shirk the ordinary, including the ordinary and necessary human need to find some clarity and explicitness for certain central shared beliefs as doctrines to allow for the human need to find order in thought and some structure in community. The doctrines remind us that every act of proclamation involves a content that can be explicated to mediate the event, that every fides qua does involve a fides quae. The confessions and doctrines remind us as well that sheer intensity without any principles of ordering can lead eventually to a destructive chaos, that all immediacy must eventually find some mediation, that the witness of symbol does give rise to the clarifying thought of the doctrines....[55]

Tracy does not dispute the fact that as a New Testament genre doctrines are less relatively adequate to the communication of the meaning of Jesus; doctrine is not one of the central genres. But any adequate understanding of the other genres must include a place for doctrines.

Unlike Tracy, Davis has failed to integrate into his critique of theoretical discourse how one is to deal with the ordinary questioning and search for clarity that arises from imaginative discourse; he has merely claimed that theory is a mistaken translation of symbol. But his own critique of the four models or "symbol systems" that have characterized Christianity through the ages dos not square with the very limited role Davis gives to theory in his interpretation of religious thought. There is no doubt that Davis, at least implicitly, admits a place for theory; the very structure of Davis's book What is Living, What is Dead in Christianity Today? reveals a great deal of sophisticated and insightful theoretical analysis and critique of symbolic language. To say as he does in his analysis of "Visionary Christianity" that "[t]he concept of a final, lasting ideal order within history is incoherent" or that "apocalyptic imagery is allegorical" [56] is to shift from symbolic to theoretic discourse. It therefore seems to me quite legitimate to allow this same theoretic exigence for developments within the ongoing self-understanding of Christianity. Davis does not make clear, however, that there is such a role.

But the objection is not merely to the shift from symbol to theory; a related but distinct objection is to the possibility of any permanence to be discovered in doctrines. According to Davis, Lonergan's defense of ontological talk about Jesus "has to fall back upon a mythical conception of divine revelation in which God is thought of as presenting the mind with a series of already formulated propositional truths" [57] which must be accepted as absolute because of their divine source. For Davis, such a position is contrary to reason [58].

Davis's concern for the praxis-based and thus ever-changing context of our understanding and appropriation of symbols and doctrines -- in other words, for the socially and historically conditioned nature of belief -- is certainly a necessary element of contemporary theology's method. But the ahistorical emphasis of an older theology on universal truths -- what Lonergan calls "classicist" theology -- has issued in a philosophical reaction which finds it difficult to make truth claims. Lonergan clearly recognizes the importance of the historicity of meaning, and the contextual understanding of doctrines, but he also sees a danger in any tendency to leap from historical consciousness to historicism or relativism. Because there exists the possibility of knowing the context in which a particular doctrine is cast, it is also possible to know the doctrine's meaning, and thus to ask whether that meaning is permanent. Rather than assume that the relativity of its original expression renders its meaning relative, one should rather raise the further question for reflection [59]. To account for the historicity of doctrines one need not accede to historicism.

Davis's critique fails to address not only the way in which Lonergan distinguishes between permanent meaning and contextual expression, but the way in which he grounds his understanding of the role of belief on an analysis of the historicity and socialization of human selfhood. Knowledge born of belief constitutes the vast majority of what is known [60]. The fact of the self's historicity warrants the judgment that believing is a value, in spite of a healthy amount of suspicion, which is always necessary [61]. Religious doctrines are believed upon the foundation of a prior judgment of value born of religious love, i.e., "the value of believing the truths taught by the religious tradition..." [62]. A doctrine is not immanently generated knowledge, but rather knowledge

as proposed for acceptance by a tradition [63]. And because of the social and historical nature of human living, it is impossible to start with absolute doubt about what one's tradition has proposed as true. The person who judges that believing is a value "is fully aware of the fallibilityof believing..." [64] but realizes that there is more harm done, and in the long run less knowledge to be shared or generated,by the Cartesian starting-point [65].

Belief, however, does not necessarily entail a blind, naive, or uncritical stance. Lonergan has frequently pointed out that human authenticity requires the raising of questions about what one has inherited. Speaking of scientific method and scholarship, he reminds us that although prior knowledge gained by belief is a necessity, still

> believing can be too helpful. It can help one see what is not there.... The investigator needs a well-stocked mind, else he will see but not perceive; but the mind needs to be well-stocked more with questions than with answers, else it will be closed and unable to learn. [66]

The question, then, has to do with what is a truly "critical" theological method. Does it require the a priori rejection of assent to any permanence ascribed to any doctrine? for the purpose of remaining open to further, possibly contrary arguments or information? Davis's preference for a pragmatic Christianity requires a notion of critical rationality which does not neglect questions of personal and social responsibility when determining one's theological starting-point. Such a requirement is certainly an ethical necessity for contemporary theology. But to insist that "every attempted delineation of the essence or permanent structure of Christian faith becomes dated, because it is itself only an instance of changing human action as shaped by the underlying, not directly accessible prototype" [67] is to call into doubt the permanence of all doctrines independent of the particular context at hand. In my view, however, critical theology may still be critical whenever it raises questions about the meaning and truth of what is already believed or proposed for belief, but not when it assumes doctrines to be by their nature necessarily uncertain [68].

Rather than deny the permanence of all doctrines, it is more productive to ask about changing understanding, resulting from changing contexts, and the consequent re-evaluation

of particular beliefs rather than to assert the impossibility or illegitimacy of meanings which endure. Praxis does indeed change our understanding of ideas we have been holding as truths, and sometimes, of course, what we had previously held as true we no longer hold. But it does not follow that what we have held we no longer hold merely when our understanding changes [69]. We may discover, for example, that what has been held to be part of the permanent meaning of a doctrine is now recognized as relative to an earlier context. Hence the continual need to sift authentic from unauthentic doctrines. In the words of Frederick Crowe, "we cannot, through any blind commitment to the past, shirk the work of research, interpretation, and history, in determining what our community has authentically held or now holds" [70]. Indeed, beliefs are sometimes found out to be untrue after being believed by an individual or a community for a certain period of time [71].

But Davis's argument does not show the force of his claim that because we sometimes recognize that a belief is false, we then should lose all confidence in the permanence of our beliefs. Take as an example Davis's own illustration of the analogy of the revolution caused by modern biblical scholarship: political theology is doing a similar thing, according to Davis, i.e., destroying the supposed permanence of doctrines. But in the example of biblical scholarship, we have a complex mixture of cognitional stances. There are instances of changed understanding as well as instances of rejected certitudes, but for some, perhaps most, it is not a simple rejection of all previous certitudes, or the assertion of a new (and incoherent) certitude that there can be no certitudes. Again, would it not be more appropriate to the actual state of affairs to point out precisely which doctrines are not true or permanent, and why not, rather than to claim a wholesale rejection of all doctrines as permanent? [72]

Doctrines and praxis

I have argued above that doctrines, expressed in theoretical propositions, can be understood to be consistent with a truly practical mediation of theological theory insofar as they are a second-order language which the human drive toward meaning and truth demands. Symbolic first-order language, which is closer to experience and laden with affectivity, spontaneously heads toward theoretical discourse, and is thus the beginning of a critical self-consciousness [73]. The result

is often a greater awareness of the meaning of Christian praxis, which for Davis is the prime carrier of Christian meaning [74].

But it does not follow from the recognition of an indispensable need for theoretical control of symbolic meaning that the role of symbolic communication is denied. Lonergan begins an essay entitled "Religious Experience" with the following observation:

> Traditionally man was defined with abstract generality as the zoon logikon, the animal rationale, the rational animal. More concretely today he is regarded as the symbolic animal, whose knowledge is mediated by symbols, whose actions are informed by symbols, whose existence in its most characteristic features is constituted by a self-understanding and by commitments specified by symbols. [75]

Symbols thus mediate meaning and value and motivate behavior. On this point, Lonergan and Davis are in agreement, even though Davis suspects that Lonergan has not taken the full role of symbol into account.

I would argue, however, that doctrines also motivate, a quality that Davis restricts to symbols. In other words, although the doctrines of the church are the product of the theoretic exigence, once they are in place, they do much more than merely express in an abstract or logical way what is judged to be the cognitive content of symbols. Doctrines also motivate behavior. In a helpful distinction between mysteries of fact and mysteries of value, Quentin Quesnell argues that theology

> involves perceiving how the mysteries of value flow from and towards conversion through them; and how the mysteries of fact are linked to conversion through them; how the mysteries of fact illustrate and exemplify the mysteries of value and motivate their acceptance and practice.[76]

The mysteries, which lie behind their doctrinal formulations, are not merely propositions about states of affairs, but often expressions of potential value of Christian praxis.

This is the case because "doctrines are not just doctrines," [77] i.e., they are not just propositions to be considered in an explicitly formal way. Doctrines have a normative function: they oppose the devaluation of Christian language by those who do not share the originating experience but nonetheless use the traditional language of the tradition. For those not converted religiously, morally, or intellectually

doctrines function as signs "that there is something lacking in themselves" [78]. Beliefs thus unite or divide communities by raising in an explicit way the question of the shared common meaning of a community. As Joseph Komonchak has put it, "the Church itself, in its full and proper sense, arises only when the interpreting word illumines the constitutive experience and thus becomes, with the latter, the new principle of a new and distinct social reality" [79]. Doctrines alone do not constitute a community; indeed, they are the consequence of a second-order process. But without them, a community does not last long.

Perhaps it would be well to dwell on this point, lest its significance for the interdependence of doctrines, community, and praxis be underestimated. David Tracy has called attention not only to "the crisis of cognitive claims" in the contemporary world [80] but also to the fact that

> in the Christian religion such cognitive claims have played a central constitutive role for the practice of the religion itself....any understanding of any experience -- moral or aesthetic, for example -- inevitably gives rise to the development of explicit cognitive doctrines for a given ethical, scientific, aesthetic, or religious tradition. [81]

Unlike Davis, Tracy's understanding of a critical fundamental theology pivots on the reinterpretation and defense of the cognitive content of doctrines. Such a defense, according to Tracy, requires precisely what Davis has considered an enemy of mythic or symbolic mediations of meaning: a metaphysical or transcendental analysis [82].

There is, then, a difficulty both religiously and theologically (the two being distinct but not separate) with the marginalization of doctrines. With Matthew Lamb, I would hold that the failure to live out the praxis implicit in the doctrines has encouraged some to think that doctrines are irrelevant at best, and impediments to authentic praxis at worst. But the problem is not belief in doctrines or their permanence; the problem is in living out the values implicit in authentic (i.e., true) doctrines.

I have taken issue with several aspects of Davis's interpretation of the role of doctrines in Lonergan's theological method. First, I have argued that doctrines can participate in a critical evaluation of tradition. Second, given the truth of Davis's claim that openness to experience and the future

are important values, an acceptance of doctrines does not necessarily inhibit the acceptance of such values. In other words, there is more value in believing than Davis admits. Third, it is not a matter of choosing between praxis and doctrine; doctrines can be personally and socially transformative. Indeed, there can be no sustained and coherent praxis or continuity of tradition and community without them. My concluding remarks will be a critical appreciation of the important contribution Davis makes to ecclesiology within a political theology.

Doctrines, praxis, and ecclesiology

Let me conclude this essay by making more specific my belief that, in spite of my basic disagreement with the place he gives to doctrines, there is much of value in Davis's proposals. Specifically I should reiterate that there is much to learn from the "political turn" exemplified in his recent work, especially as it bears on the questions of ecclesiology. For, although I think he exaggerates when he frequently claims that doctrines are imposed by an extrinsicist authoritarianism, he is certainly right in suggesting that ecclesiology has to come to terms with the insights of social theory. If the problem with the doctrines of Christianity is that their values are too infrequently lived out, and if one's solution to the problem involves a needed reversal of this unauthentic religious stance, then social analysis will move us toward a better understanding of the structures of the church which aid or inhibit authentic praxis.

In mythical Christianity, along with its subsequent "doctrinalization", there exists an implicit ecclesiology which views the community's structural elements as part of the cosmic order and thus unchangeable; its magisterial authority thus places a high value on received tradition [83]. Such a concept of the church inevitably leads to the elimination of all pluralism. "Myth of its nature is exclusive and coercive, because it is a social charter that articulates an objective order, independent of human volition....dissident elements must be removed from the body of society..." [84].

Davis's critical appropriation of Habermas's notion of communicative praxis offers an important corrective to the tendency to view all pluralism as destructive and never enriching. But it also resists excessively spiritualized understandings of the church which have the practical effect of immunizing its structures from criticism [85]. Davis calls

for an openness of discussion within the church as a means of discerning commonly held meaning [86]. Habermas's consensus theory of truth, achieved in unrestrained and universal discourse, requires certain structural conditions if such discourse is to take place. But unlike Habermas, Davis holds that the burden of this openness cannot rest merely on rational argument. Shared praxis, especially as this is communicated in tradition as the community's memory, is prior to discourse.

In Davis's model of pragmatic Christianity, there remains a strong need for community, but within this model the church is viewed as a voluntary association and thus grounded on the principle of freedom of exchange. Davis's pragmatic model for the church employs Habermas's historical work on the emergence of the bourgeois public. In bourgeois, liberal society the distinction arose between that which came under the authority of the state bureaucracy and the rest of the public sphere. The bourgeoisie wielded public political power "distinct from that of the State by means of publicity, that is, by a critique, control, and surveillance through public discourse of the authority of the State" [87]. The challenge this presents to the church, through a truly critical political theology, is to develop structures similar to those of the bourgeois public which foster an openness of discussion within the church for the purpose of discerning the meanings Christians hold in common [88].

If Habermas exhibits a remnant of rationalism, still the ideal of openness, as a condition for the full participation of all the faithful in the ongoing self-constitution of the church, seems a necessary one if authority in the church is not to warrant Davis's charge that it imposes an extrinsic set of beliefs. If the political turn is to be made, it is to be made across the board, and therefore within the church.

Authoritarianism, however, is not a necessary consequence of shared doctrines, and I would anticipate that social analysis would show this to be the case. Precisely because of the unavoidable "political turn", no doctrine can be rejected in an a priori fashion. In the words of Matthew Lamb,

> Much more work needs to be done. We have to know if, and how, church doctrines of the past brought Christian living critically to bear on the economic, social, and political conditions of their times. Unlike the historical

analyses under the egis of second enlightenment techniques, such studies would not simply reduce those doctrines to the plausibility structures of their historical context. Instead they would indicate if, and how, the doctrines expressed and promoted a praxis critical of such structures in so far as these hindered human intellectual, moral, or religious development. [89]

The critical control of these historical investigations ultimately rests on authentic subjectivity [90]. Indeed, authenticity is the criterion of any legitimate authority [91]. In this paper I have tried to suggest that if Davis's valuable contributions toward a political theology are to bear fruit in structural change, he will have to give more attention to the problems of continuity within traditions and societies, especially the societies that constitute churches. That means more attention to the complex problems of what constitutes authentic doctrinal and ecclesiastical authority.

NOTES

[1] [Cambridge U. Press, 1980], p. 12. Originally given as the Hulsean Lectures of 1978. Hereafter TPS.

[2] [San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1986]; hereafter WL.

[3] WL, pp. 2-3.

[4] See TPS, p. 12: Political theology is "an attempt to give systematic expression to the conviction that the identity and truth of the Christian faith can no longer be maintained by doctrinal assertion or theoretical interpretation, but only by that experience of that identity and truth as mediated in and through a social practice of liberation" [my emphasis].

[5] WL, p. 70.

[6] In What is Living, What is Dead in Christianity Today? Davis employs Hayden White's typology of the principle modes of historical consciousness in order to outline the structure of the religious imagination. Four prefigurative or underlying tropes -- metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche, and irony -- correspond to four types of Christianity: mythical, pragmatic, visionary, and mystical. To each type there corresponds a plot structure, a form of argumentation, and a political stance.

[7] WL, p. 79.

[8] In contrast, mythical Christianity is an all-encompassing story of reality which possesses an underlying literal meaning: "it is taken as the inherently appropriate, the proper, expression of the objective order of reality" [WL, p. 23]. Mythical Christianity's organicist and synthetic form of argumentation grows out of the myth's comprehensive account of the order of the world, society, and the cosmos. In contrast to pragmatic Christianity, the mythic model's conservative ideology, grounded theoretically rather than through praxis, finds the past rather than the present to be normative.

[9] Visionary Christianity serves to inspire apocalyptic hope, especially for the weak and powerless, but its view of the church as the sect of the elect withdrawn from the world, cannot be integrated into a concrete social situation. Nor is there a place for intelligence or critical reason, only revelation [WL, pp. 85-94]. Mystical Christianity maintains against

all forms of humanism the reality of transcendent love and its ineffable nature. But its focus on interiority, which must be preserved, must not be allowed to degenerate into a private notion of religion. Hence the importance of a critical public discourse [WL, pp. 95-105].

[10] WL, p. 84. For a brief but excellent defense of transcendence and the concomitant "reflective appropriation of our own subjectivity" in the study of religion, see Davis's article '"Wherein there is no ecstasy"', Studies in Religion/Sciences Religieuse 13/4 [1984]: 393-400.

[11] TPS, p. 26.

[12] TPS, p. 172. Habermas' influence on this position is clear; see ibid., p. 166, where Davis cites Habermas's comment on the new identity based on communicative praxis: "Such an identity no longer requires fixed contents. Those interpretations which make man's situation in today's world comprehensible are distinguished from traditional world images not so much in that they are more limited in scope, but in that their status is open to counter-arguments and revisions at any time." Davis does not accept Habermas's dismissal of religion, but does believe that "fixed contents" and "membership of a fixed, objective, authoritative collectivity" are no longer adequate or necessary for the future of Christian identity.

[13] TPS, pp. 29-30. [14] WL, pp. 56-57.

[15] WL, p. 60. [16] WL, pp. 60-62.

[17] Davis mentions Heidegger and Derrida but none of the theologians (such as Bernhard Welte or Joseph O'Leary) who have carried forward this critique of ontotheology within theology.

[18] WL, p. 67. [19] WL, p. 68. [20] WL, pp. 67-69.

[21] WL, p. 69. See also TPS, p. 67: "...Christian meanings are primarily located in actions. The ambiguity of human actions is somehow easier to accept than the ambiguity of concepts and propositions."

[22] WL, p. 69. See also p. 71: "What it [faith] gives is the reality of transcendent love, made manifest in Jesus Christ, and mediated by set [sic] of images and stories.... Christian faith is a transforming principle, not a body of objective knowledge." The superiority of the symbolic does not, as we have already seen, imply that it is possible to return to the mythic model of Christianity as a world-encompassing or cosmic order.

[23] "Since there is continuity, that is, identity-in-change, in Christian faith, there must indeed be some invariant factors shaping the changing actions and meanings into a recognizably identical pattern or direction. But every attempted delineation of the essence or permanent structure of Christian faith becomes dated, because it is itself only an instance of changing human action as shaped by the underlying, not directly accessible prototype" TPS, p. 67.

[24] TPS, p. 96. [25] TPS, p. 65. [26] WL, p. 84.

[27] See the work of Robert Doran, especially "Aesthetic Subjectivity and Generalized Empirical Method," The Thomist 43 [1979]: 257-278.

[28] TPS, p. 66.

[29] Davis believes that his own position is more conservative than Segundo, for example, on the question of content. See TPS, p. 58: "[Segundo] makes a sharper distinction between faith and its objective content than I am prepared to admit. For me the objective content of faith participates in its permanence."

[30] TPS, p. 65. [31] TPS, p. 68. [32] WL, pp. 9-11.

[33] WL, p. 11. [34] WL, p. 118.

[35] See note 4 above. In his critique of Metz, whom Davis accuses of failing to give a concrete description of the social and economic realities of modernity, Davis writes: "However much theologians talk about praxis, their theology remains dogmatic in so far as they continue to

spin their new theories out of prior, sacrosanct concepts and doctrines, without allowing a genuinely practical mediation of theological theory", TPS, p. 50.

[36] TPS, p. 130. [37] TPS, p. 130; see also pp. 172-73.

[38] For a brief but excellent phenomenology of this conglomerate, see F. E. Crowe, "Dogma versus the Self-Correcting Process of Learning," in P. McShane [ed.], Foundations of Theology [Notre Dame U. Press, 1972], pp. 30-31.

[39] Ibid., p. 30. [40] See note 10 above.

[41] TPS, pp. 174-181. The same theme is sounded in his interpretation of mystical Christianity in WL, p. 51-54, 95-105.

[42] TPS, Chapter 6 and passim.

[43] "Likewise, the essential features of a religious tradition, though they change, are continually governed in their changing by the absolute focus of its faith. For that reason, the Christian tradition does have an objective content that permanently excludes any view that denies the essential equality of human beings, despite changing formulations of its positive conception of humanness", TPS, p. 58.

[44] See note 11 above.

[45] TPS, pp. 172-73; see also Body as Spirit: The Nature of Religious Feeling [NY: Seabury, 1976], p. 103, which Davis cites in this context.

[46] See, for example, J. B. Metz, "An Eschatological View of the Church in the World" in his Theology of the World [NY: Herder & Herder, 1969], pp. 81-97, and "The Future in the Memory of Suffering: The Dialectics of Progress" in Faith in History and Society: Toward a Practical Fundamental Theology [NY: Seabury, 1980], pp. 100-118.

[47] See note 43 above. [48] WL, pp. 64ff. [49] WL, p. 66. [50] WL, p. 68.

[51] Method, pp. 81-83; see also p. 93 and Insight, pp. 535-536, where Lonergan recognizes the shift from common sense to theory to be an achievement made possible by the proper linguistic, conceptual, and critical conditions of a culture.

[52] Method, pp. 93-96. Contrast Davis's contention that doctrines and systematic theologies "are attempts to express what cannot be expressed in the fashion chosen" [WL, pp. 68-9]. But it is wrong to assume that theoretical formulas exhaust the content of symbols. Abstraction from the richness of symbol does not have to be viewed as an impoverishment if it is acknowledged that, however necessary the move to theory may be, it does not usurp the primary and originating symbol in religious experience. David Tracy would agree with Davis that an overestimation of doctrine tends to underestimate the central and originating importance of symbol, or to view doctrine as an adequate paraphrase of symbol. The opposite tendency, however, is in Tracy's words "the assumption that 'doctrine' is either an abstract, spent or impoverished genre (compared to the concreteness of symbolic and poetic expression), or the assumption that a community does not need any explicitness or clarity to express its shared judgments on matters of belief" [The Analogical Imagination: Christian Theology and the Culture of Pluralism (NY: Crossroad, 1981), pp. 293-94].

[53] Method, pp. 20-21, 83. [54] WL, p. 115.

[55] The Analogical Imagination, p. 268. [56] WL, p. 89; also, 93-94.

[57] WL, p. 113. Such a characterization is an accurate description of classical apologetics but a caricature of Lonergan's position on revelation [see Lonergan's distinction between dogmatic theology, which seeks "to determine which are the unique propositions that are true" and doctrinal theology, which recognizes that meaning must be determined in its context, and that religious apprehension is not theological apprehension (Method, p. 333). See also Davis's article "Lonergan's Appropriation of the Concept of Praxis," New Blackfriars 62 [1981]:114-126, where a Davis claims that the "value of believing" in a set of doctrines is "an over-evaluation

of the theoretical and, consequently, of the doctrinal. Logos dominates mythos; and he is never free from the compulsion to seek the literal in the symbolic, thus losing the contribution of the symbolic', p. 123 and passim. It is interesting to note that Davis would place Lonergan in what George Lindbeck, in his book The Nature of Doctrine [Phila.: Westminster, 1984] calls the "cognitive-propositional" approach to religion, but that Lindbeck sees Lonergan much more in the "experiential-expressive" approach. For a critique of this interpretation, see Dennis M. Doyle, "Lindbeck's Appropriation of Lonergan," Method 4 [1986]: 18-28.

[58] "[I]f one takes one's stand upon reason, there is no way in which one can affirm the set of propositions constituting the body of Christian doctrine -- or any other set of religious doctrines for that matter -- as verified, factual, unchanging certainties", WL, p. 109.

[59] "...note that truths that are not eternal are relative, not to a place and time, but to the context of a place and time; but such contexts are related to one another; history includes the study of such relations; in the light of history it becomes possible to transpose from one context to another; by such transpositions one reaches a truth that extends over places and times", Second Collection, pp. 207-208. See also the remarks of F. E. Crowe, "Doctrines and Historicity in the Context of Lonergan's Method," Theological Studies 38 [1977]: 115-124, and Philip Boo Riley, "History and Doctrine: The Foundational Character of Bernard Lonergan's 'Christian Philosophy'," Religious Studies and Theology 5 [1985]: 79-96.

[60] See Second Collection, p . 219. Lonergan distinguishes between immanently generated knowledge and knowledge which is the result of belief, and the knowledge of any individual is constituted by both of these sources: see Insight, pp. 702-706. For a clear exposition of this notion see Dennis M. Doyle, "The Distinction Between Faith and Beliefs and the Question of Religious Truth: The Contributions of Wilfred Cantwell Smith and Bernard Lonergan," [unpublished dissertation, Cath. Univ. of America, 1984], pp. 135-137: "Belief and Knowledge".

[61] Davis acknowledges Lonergan's argument concerning the value of believing, but concludes that, as with Lonergan's earlier study of Aquinas, his later study of love and conversion "brings him back to the familiar Catholic dogmas. In my end was my beginning," WL, p. 70. But this is not so much an argument against the value of believing as Lonergan has presented it as an expression of dissatisfaction with Lonergan's acceptance of these dogmas. For Lonergan's arguments concerning the factors that enter into an evaluation of the value of belief, such as the judgment that belief is a social good, that it has been accurately communicated, and that the source of the belief is reliable, see Method, pp. 41-47, Insight, pp. 703-718; a helpful summary is to be found in Doyle, "The Distinction...," pp. 138-41: "Belief, Understanding and Judgment".

[62] Method, p. 243; part of the difficulty with Davis's interpretation has to do with the fact that he restricts his detailed analysis to Insight: "My account of his worldview was based on Insight. In Method in Theology and subsequent articles the intellectualism of Insight is considerably modified ....what becomes foundational is conversion... I cannot but agree with the shift from knowledge to love as foundational," WL, pp. 69-70. But Davis goes on to claim that Lonergan is inconsistent in this shift because he leaves a dichotomy between outer (social, political) and inner (personal) experience, and he retains his notion of the value of believing. In that sense, Davis does not perceive a real change in Lonergan's position insofar as he has failed to integrate the social and political dimensions of praxis, and because he "remains an incurable dogmatist, in the sense of seeking and claiming unrevisable certainties," WL,, p. 70. See also "Lonergan's Appropriation of the Concept of Praxis," New Blackfriars 62 [1981]: 122-23. On the role of dogmas in Lonergan's development from Insight to Method, see Charles Hefling, "On Reading The Way to Nicea," in T. Fallon and P. Boo Riley, eds., Religion and Culture [Albany: State Univ. of New York Press, 1987], pp. 149-166. "Are dogmas grist for the historical theologian's mill, or foundations on which the mill itself is built? It is not, I think, too much to say that in Insight Lonergan wants to have it both ways." This changes with the arrival of functional specializations

in 1965. "Conversion, not proof, provided the specifically theological component..." [p. 161].

[63] On the value of belief in science and other human endeavors that contribute to human progress, see Method, pp. 41-47 and Second Collection, p. 219.

[64] Method, p. 45; see also p. 223 on the difference between Descartes and Newman regarding the value of belief as a starting-point for philosophy, Newman's text is in An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985], pp. 242-43. The same point is employed by F. E. Crowe, "Dogma versus the Self-Correcting Process of Learning," in P. McShane,, ed., Foundations of Theology [see note 38], pp. 22-40. See also David Burrell, "Religious Belief and Rationality," in C. F. Delaney, ed., Rationality and Religious Belief [Notre Dame: U. of Notre Dame Press, 1979], pp. 84-115 for a persuasive case against the Cartesian starting-point. Burrell argues that the role of the 'proofs' for the existence of God is one of predisposing one to belief, not as foundational to belief.

[65] Lonergan appeals to Gadamer's critique of the Enlightenment: "The task for him is not the elimination of all assumptions but the elimination of mistaken assumptions" ["Bernard Lonergan Responds," in Foundations of Theology [see note 38], p. 228. For an excellent explication of the role of belief in Lonergan's method, see Dennis Doyle, "The Distinction..., pp. 132-183.

[66] "Method: Trend and Variations," in Third Collection, ed., F. E. Crowe [NY: Paulist, 1985], p. 17.

[67] TPS, p. 67. But how does one know that there is such an underlying, presumably continuous and identical, prototype if it is not 'directly' accessible? Is it indirectly accessible, and if so, how? And is its content determinate?

[68] On the question of starting-points for theology, see the insightful comments of William M. Shea, "The Stance and Task of the Foundational Theologian," Heythrop Journal 17 [1976]: 273-292, especially pp. 288-291, and "The Subjectivity of the Theologian," The Thomist 45 [1981]: 194-218. See also Matthew L. Lamb, Solidarity with Victims: Toward a Theology of Social Transformation [NY: Crossroad, 1982], pp. 116-143 on the critical role of values in theology.

[69] See Lonergan's discussion of the permanence and historicity of dogmas, based on an interpretation of Vatican I's constitution De Filius in Method, pp. 320-326, and in Doctrinal Pluralism [Milwaukee: Marquette U. Press, 1971].

[70] "Doctrines and Historicity...," Theological Studies 38 [1977]:121.

[71] The classic description of the vagaries of certitude as a state of mind remains J. H. Newman, An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent, Part II: Assent and Inference [see note 64].

[72] Newman's ideal of an "imperial intellect" may perhaps be invoked here: "If he has one cardinal maxim in his philosophy, it is, that truth cannot contradict truth; if he has a second, it is, that truth often seems contrary to truth; and, if a third, it is the practical conclusion, that we must be patient with such appearances, and not be hasty to pronounce them to be really of a more formidable character." The Idea of a University, ed., with intro. and notes by Ian T. Ker [Oxford: Clarendon, 1976], p. 372.

[73] See Method, pp. 81-83; see also Joseph A. Komonchak, "Ecclesiology and Social Theory: A Methodological Essay," Thomist 45 [1981]: 279-281.

[74] WL, pp. 9-10.

[75] A Third Collection [see note 66], p. 115. See Margaret Mary Kelleher, "Liturgy: An Ecclesial Act of Meaning," Worship 59 [1985]: 482-496, for an application of Lonergan's notion of symbolic meaning to liturgical theology and its relation to ecclesiology.

[76] Quentin Quesnell, "Beliefs and Authenticity," in M. Lamb, ed., Creativity and Method [Milwaukee: Marquette U. Press, 1981], p. 182. See also Method, p. 311: "Church doctrines are the content of the church's witness to Christ; they express the set of meanings and values that inform individual and collective Christian living."

[77] Method, p. 319. [78] Method, p. 299.

[79] "Ecclesiology and Social Theory," p. 280. Lonergan refers to the sociologist Georg Simmel's notion of die Wendung zur Idee which every social movement must make if it is to survive [Method, p. 139]. Note that in Insight the attributes of God imply that the solution to the problem of evil will have a cognitive aspect and this aspect will be given an institutional form for making judgments and keeping the collaboration (of those working to translate it into other cultures) from straying [see Charles Hefling, "On Reading The Way to Nicea," p. 160. For an excellent and very readable discussion of the sociological function of doctrines see Hefling's Why Doctrines? [Cambridge: Cowley, 1984], pp. 37-70.

[80] Blessed Rage for Order [NY: Seabury, 1976], p. 5.

[81] Ibid., p. 146, my emphasis.

[82] WL, pp. 61-62, With Davis, Tracy has raised the question whether Lonergan's foundations are critical or dogmatic and has insisted that a contemporary fundamental theology must be fully critical in a way that, in Tracy's view, Lonergan's is not. See Tracy's article, "Lonergan's Foundational Theology: an Interpretation and a Critique," in P. McShane, ed., Foundations of Theology [see note 38], pp. 197-222.

[83] WL, p. 29. [84] WL, p. 30.

[85] TPS, Chs. 4 and 5 and passim. For a similar argument, but one which proceeds from an appropriation of Lonergan's method rather than Habermas, see Joseph A. Komonchak, "Lonergan and the Tasks of Ecclesiology," in Creativity and Method [see note 76],pp. 265-273.

[86] TPS, p. 74. [87] WL, pp. 99-102; see also TPS, pp. 39-43.

[88] TPS, p. 74.

[89] "A Response (II) to Bernard Lonergan," CTSA Proceedings, 77-78,p.27.

[90] On intellectual conversion, see Method, pp. 238-240; on differentiations of consciousness, pp. 302-312. See also Verbum [Notre Dame: U. of Notre Dame Press, 1967], p. 60; Insight, p. 550; Method, pp. 37, 357.

[91] See Lonergan's essay, "Dialectic of Authority," in Third Collection [see note 66], pp. 5-12.